

We knew we needed the power to get the thing out of there and I guess it was reflex.

[But under normal conditions you would never do that?]

Oh no.

[Were you taught to do that or were you just doing it instinctively?]

We did it instinctively.

[In other words, no one ever said that in case of a situation like this to do it this particular way. You just did it because you knew this is what had to be done in that particular situation.]

At least that is what we thought anyway, whether it was right or wrong.

[There were no questions asked later or anything about it?]

No, not that I can remember. Now of course if we had knocked the front out of the boiler, it probably would have been a hell of a lot different.

I was on her til May of '44 and I caught one of the transports back, one of the president lines, President Grant I think. I came back and put the Bonhomme Richard in commission.

[Well do you remember anything, I assume that when you were under air attack you were below deck most of the time there, you recall any feelings, anything about the air attack?]

Nothing other than we had a boiler maker name Stubblefield. His general quarters station was up on the super structure as a smoke watch. In other words if one of them started smoking, he would call down and tell us if the smoke was white or black and we would adjust accordingly. He was up there during air attacks and of course through the phone he would give a play by play description of it. I remember one time, I think it was in the Gilberts but I'm not positive, but he was up there and we were under air attack and I asked him, "hey Stubby, what is coming in?" And he said, "there are about three of them coming in." And I said, "well get out there and tell us what kind of planes they are." And