A presentation d
Made at the
Avia. Supply Officer
Corp while attached
to COMFAIRWESTPAC
in Atsugi Japan.
30 % of my time of 3 years
there, I was in various
places in Vietnam.

Bryan Colbert

PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 22nd
AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICERS' CONFERENCE
23-25 October 1967

U.S. NAVY Aviation Supply Office Philadelphia Pa. 19111

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AERONAUTICAL SUPPLY SUPPORT IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

CDR B. R. Colbert, SC, USN
FLTAIRWESTPAC

Aeronautical Supply Support in the Western Pacific is vast and varied and to the uninformed may seem rather complex. This complexity is lessened, however, with an understanding of Western Pacific Aviation Units, their locations, the degree of support requirements, and the support channels. That is the purpose of this presentation, to give a brief insight into WESTPAC aviation supply operations and, to be more specific, to point out some of the peculiarities of support requirements and channels.



COMFAIRWESTPAC

Let us begin by looking at the area we are referring to. This chart shows the geographical area of responsibility of COMFAIRWESTPAC. Within this area is all of Southeast Asia. For comparison as to the vast area involved it should be noted that Australia is 80 percent the size of the United States. I believe it is necessary that we look at how the aviation support structure in WESTPAC has changed during the last few years or how it was prior to Tonkin Gulf.



Following the end of World War II and until the 1965 build-up in Southeast Asia, the majority of the 7TH Fleet Operations were conducted in waters adjacent to Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and Taiwan. Normally, only three CVAs and one CVS were deployed in these waters at any one time. The 1ST MAW (Marine Air Wing) was in Iwakuni and/or in Okinawa. Many squadrons were deployed to WESTPAC prior to Tonkin Gulf; however, very few detachments were then established. These were the aviation units requiring support prior to 1965. Now let us look at the changes in support requirements which occurred during 1965.

SUPPORT CHANGES IN 1965

- FMAW MOVED TO RVN
- MAJORITY OF 7TH FLT OPS MOVED SOUTH
- SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFERRED TO NSD SUBIC

In March 1965, the 1ST MAW started its move to operating areas and by July all FMAW units were in-country. Aviation support requirements during this period skyrocketed. Early in 1965 Seventh Fleet Units also began migrating South. With the establishment of the carrier strike forces on YANKEE and DIXIE stations and as Navy combat strike commitments increased so did the requirements for our Navy Units although supply support continued to be provided directly from NSD Yokosuka. It was during this initial build-up that two additional CVAs were added to Seventh Fleet.

In August 1965, steps were taken to shorten the support pipeline. Preparations were made to shift primary aviation support for the 1ST MAW to NSD Subic. In this regard, a concerted "Material Push Program" was established, designed to outfit NSD Subic for the increased support responsibilities. In January 1966 the primary support responsibilities for 1ST MAW were officially transferred to NSD Subic. NSD Yokosuka continued to be a prime for some material and was reassigned responsibility as a back-up depot for Southeast Asia. At the same time, Subic was directed to refer all unfilled 1ST MAW requisitions to Yokosuka for possible issue action prior to passing the requirement to CONUS.



With the shift of aeronautical units to the South, and the concurrent build-up of squadrons and squadron detachments, our total number of aircraft supported in WESTPAC increased from under 500 to over 1,300. Detachments of VH-1 were positioned at NAS Cubi Point and Danang RVN, VRC-50 and VAP-61 deployed detachments to NAS Cubi Point and a VW-1 detachment periodically operates out of Naval Station Sangley. During this same period, MAG-15 was deployed to MCAS Iwakuni as an element of the 9TH MAB.



Attention is now directed to South Vietnam and the First Marine Air Wing. The 1ST MAW is composed of five Marine Air Groups and Marine Wing Support Group 17. MAG-11 is presently positioned at Danang, MAG-16 at Marble Mountain, MAG-12 and MAG-13 at Chu Lai, and MAG-36 which is in process of moving from Chu Lai to Phu Bai. The 1ST MAW has some 450 aircraft in-country, which include the A-6A, EA-6A, F-4B, RF-4B, A-4E, F-8, EF-10B, H-34, CH-46, UH-1E, TF-9J, US-2B, and the C-117D. The CH-53 and TA-4J have recently been added with the TF-9J being phased out. The number of aircraft in the wing is equal to six CVA deck-loads and supply support requirements are as great and, obviously, equally important. MAG-16 and MAG-36 stock approximately 30,000 line items, and MAG-11, which supports a variety of aircraft has in excess of 60,000 line items. The facilities in our MAGs are vastly improved. Eight months ago supply personnel were tramping through two feet of mud to make an issue. 23,000 line items of MAG-13 at Chu Lai were stowed under a makeshift tent with extension cords rigged for lighting. When it rains the sand is mud and when it is dry the fine sand is everywhere. But they were there; they had an inventory and stock cards; they made issues, prepared requisitions and took on stores 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Supply support for the Marines is a presentation in itself. Needless to say they are doing a tremendous job in spite of the elements and the Viet Cong.

Continuing on in Southeast Asia with the Navy, a detachment of VQ-1 is permanently based in Danang and a VW-1 detachment in Chu Lai. We have a VP squadron at Cam Ranh Bay and at Tan Son Nhut, Saigon, a helicopter attack squadron in Vung Tau. In Thailand, a P-3 detachment is positioned at U-Tapao and we will soon have another P-2 squadron in Nakom Phanom. Some of the aircraft types being operated by these in-country Navy Units are the EA-3B, EC-121M, EC-121K, P-2, P-3 and the UH-1B, which is supported aeronautically by the Army though operated by Navy crews. Our Naval Air Facility at Cam Ranh Bay is growing steadily and hopefully the Hanger and associate IMA (Intermediate Maintenance Activity) facilities will be available within three months. I might add that COMFAIRWESTPAC performed all of the facility planning for Cam Ranh Bay. The galley, warehouses, and other buildings will also be completed soon. A Supply Department has been established and a temporary ready supply store is being activated which will be supported and controlled by Naval Station Sangley Point. Upon arrival of our aircraft in both U-Tapao and Cam Ranh Bay, the only facilities available were a concrete parking ramp with squadron or station personnel performing all preliminary and temporary construction. Yet the aircraft operated and they were supported. At this point, I would like to discuss in more detail our in-country squadron detachments and their support channels which are so essential for mission accomplishment. Each air station in WESTPAC is assigned as a primary support point for specific squadrons. This entails not only supply support but ground support equipment with associated repair, and any other support the detachment may require.



This slide typifies support channels for these units. NAS Atsugi supports VQ-1 detachment Danang. VQ-1, as are most all squadron detachments, is supported primarily by pack-up kits and avionic vans with a minimum of GSE (General Support Equipment)/SSE (Special Support Equipment). Replenishment is made primarily by squadron aircraft or by COMFAIRWESTPAC augment aircraft, which I will touch on later. NAS Agana, operating the aviation department of NSD Guam, supports VAP-61 at Bangkok and, at times, a detachment in Australia. Agana also renders limited support to VW-1 in Chu Lai. NAF Naha supports a P-3 detachment at U-Tapao, Thailand. Naval Station Sangley directly supports NAF Cam Ranh Bay and various squadron detachments such as the VP squadron, CEFLIENLION, which is an Army squadron supported by the Navy, Project TRIM, Project MUDDY HILL, VO-67, and a VP detachment at Tan Son Nhut. The missions of the various detachments and projects are varied but for the most part all operate patrol type aircraft. As may be seen on the chart, Naval Station Sangley provides most of the direct support to Navy squadrons in-country, and I might add, does so with a minimum of supply personnel. In addition to providing supply support, many other squadron requirements must be fulfilled such as messing and berthing facilities, ramp space, power sources, stowage spaces, to name but a few. Our air stations must determine the most expeditious method of pack-up kit replenishment, provide bit and piece requirements for ground support equipment repair and for the avionic vans. I would like to point out that some of our "30-day" pack-up kits have been in continuous use for as long as two years. Our air stations must be motivated and responsive to provide these "extra" demands. As previously mentioned, most of the supply support for our squadrons in Vietnam is provided by the supporting air station; however, it must be understood that each in-country squadron, and therefore each supporting home air station has some peculiar supply problems. In order to assist our stations in providing support, arrangements have been made with NSA Danang for certain support requirements for VQ-1 detachment Danang and VW-1 detachment in Chu Lai. Interservice supply support agreements are utilized in Cam Ranh Bay for non-aeronautical support received from the Army and Air Force. In addition, NSA Saigon provides support. Our squadron detachment in U-Tapao obtains limited support from the Air Force; and, the CINCPACFLTREPTHAI Supply Officer in Bangkok is sometimes called upon to procure requirements which may be available locally. I have merely touched the surface of the varied arrangements that must be made away from the normal air station support. I might add that this base and housekeeping type support is arranged by COMFAIRWESTPAC and we spend a considerable amount of time travelling and negotiating for this support. Speaking of travelling distances, I will show briefly an inherent problem in supporting all of our units in Southeast Asia.



As you can see, it is approximately 2,000 miles from Yokosuka and Atsugi to South Vietnam and approximately 800 miles from the Subic/Sangley area. Obviously you cannot truck it or send it by rail. Everything must move by air, and everything does, from a small bit and piece, an engine, a ground support equipment item to a technical representative that is required on the spot to solve a technical problem. You may wonder why NAS Cubi Point has not been discussed as yet. Certainly the support rendered by NAS Cubi is of equal importance; however, their support is somewhat different in nature. Established at NAS Cubi are the Bomb Rack Repair Facility, the MK Four Gun Pod Repair Facility, CSD (Constant Speed Drive) repair, the SHOEHORN program, Crash/Battle damage repair program and others. A large IMA is located at NAS Cubi which turns out a tremendous number of repaired components. Due to the need for specialized supply support in some areas, we have established certain repair capabilities in WESTPAC. These include CER (Complete Engine Repair), AMSE (Aeronautical Maintenance Support Equipment) rehabilitation, STRAAD (Special Technique Repair and Analysis of Aircraft Damage), COSA (Combat Operational Support Aircraft), SHOEHORN, Calibration Laboratories, specialized repair for such items as MERs (Multiple Ejection Racks) and TERs (Triple Ejection racks), gun pods, CSDs, etc. All of these specialized repair programs are vital to Southeast Asia. However, of equal importance is the ability to move retrograde and the associated RFI product to the ultimate user. This is one significant factor in the need for Navy organic airlift. In addition, the FAWPRA (Fleet Air WESTPAC Repair Activity) provides an invaluable rework and repair capability and I will touch on that in a moment. Although each of these programs is significant and requires varying degrees of peculiar supply support, time does not allow a detailed description of their tasks and missions. However, I will briefly discuss a few. NAS Atsugi and NAS Cubi Point are both actively engaged in CER on the J-79, J-52, and T-58 aircraft engines. NAS Agana performs CER on all J-57 generations and NAF Naha has most models of the T-56. An AMSE rehabilitation and repair program has been established at NAS Atsugi, primarily to fulfill AMSE requirements of the 1ST MAW. NAS Atsugi also supports COSA for component repair and corrosion control. NAS Cubi Point supports the various repair programs previously mentioned as well as the STRAAD program. A team operates in WESTPAC to extend repair to the CBD (Crash and Battle Damage) site wherever and whenever possible. Custodians report aircraft damage and request the assistance of the STRAAD team. The team is composed of structural engineers from the various aircraft companies: Douglas/Ling-Temco-Vought/North American/McDonald/etc., and approximately 60 NARF hydraulic, structural and electrical specialists. A Navy Commander, Lieutenant, and various enlisted ratings also make-up this team. This program is of prime importance in aircraft availability. The material requirements generated by these teams are other than the normal in view of the type of repairs effected. Actually material requirements are generated that would not be realized outside of the NARF, FAWPRA, PAR (Progressive Aircraft Rework) or CBD sites. The STRAAD normally makes all repairs when 500 or less hours are required for repair.

Prior to describing the WESTPAC requisitioning channels, I would like to outline one additional program in WESTPAC which is so very vital to aviation supply support and that is the FAWPRA. What is it and what does it do? FAWPRA is a depot level repair activity which provides maintenance and repair/rework beyond the capability of squadrons, ships or air stations. Control of FAWPRA

is a function of COMFAIRWESTPAC. The mission, very simply, is to assist in fleet readiness of Navy and Marine aircraft in WESTPAC. This is accomplished by the following:

a. Progressive Aircraft Rework/Overhaul

b. Crash and Battle Damage

c. Component Rework

d. Customer Service

e. Special Programs

FAWPRA PLANTS

JAPAN AIRCRAFT MFG CO,ATSUGI

JAPAN AIRCRAFT MFG CO,SUGITA

KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT CO,GIFU

TOKYO AIRCRAFT INSTRUMENT CO,TOKYO

SHIN MEIWA INDUSTRIES,ITAMI

ISHIKAWAJIMA-HARIMA HEAVY INDUSTRIES,TOKYO

MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES,NAGOYA

FUJI HEAVY INDUSTRIES,UTSUNOMIYA



There are eight primary Japanese FAWPRA contractors with some ten different locations, with each having certain limitations and some interchangeability of the type work that can be performed.

FAWPRA Kawasaki Aircraft Company

CH46	PAR / *CBD
CH46	Dynamic Components

* CH46 CBD Being Phased to JAC-Sugita

FAWPRA Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

Overhaul/Repair/Rework of three UH-34 Dynamic Components

FAWPRA Fuji Heavy Industries

Overhaul/Repair/Rework of thirty-four UH-1E Dynamic Components

FAWPRA Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries

Overhaul/Repair/Rework of T58 Compressor Rotors

FAWPRA Tokyo Aircraft Instrument Company

Overhaul/Repair/Rework of 99 various aircraft instruments and components

FAWPRA Japan Aircraft Company (Atsugi Plant)

F8	PAR/CBD
A4	PAR/CBD
F4	PAR/CBD
A3	CBD
C1	CBD

Overhaul/Repair/Rework of about 300 various Stock Numbered repairable components applicable to various aircraft types.

FAWPRA Japan Aircraft Company (Sugita Plant)

C117	CBD
A4	CBD
F8	CBD
A3	CBD
F4	CBD
CH46	*CBD

* CH46 CBD Being phased in from KAC.

Overhaul/Repair/Rework on Tail Hooks for eight various types of aircraft.

FAWPRA Shin Meiwa Industry Company

UH34	OVHL/CBD	QH50	CBD
HU16	OVHL/CBD	E1	CBD
C45	OVHL/CBD	C2	CBD/PAR
S2	PAR/CBD	TF9	CBD/PAR
C1	PAR/CBD	C47	OVHL/CBD
UH1	PAR/CBD	C117	OVHL/CBD

Overhaul/Repair/Rework of about 109 various Stock Numbered repairable components applicable to various aircraft types.

PROGRESSIVE AIRCRAFT REWORK/OVERHAUL: FAWPRA provides, for the most part, all major rework (PAR/Overhaul) for aircraft permanently deployed in WESTPAC, namely Marine fighter and attack aircraft, Marine helicopters, and Navy and Marine training and utility types. In the very near future the C-2A aircraft will also undergo PAR.

CRASH AND BATTLE DAMAGE: FAWPRA provides CBD repair for all type aircraft in WESTPAC. As I mentioned previously, STRAAD performs a certain portion of this function at the site or at NAS Cubi Point. The following aircraft are PAR'd or CBD repaired in FAWPRA:

CH-46	C-117
UH-34	HU-16
UH-1E	C-45
F-8	S-2
A-4	QH-50
F-4	C-2
A-3	TF-9
C-1	C-47

The volume of these first two functions will be depicted in a later chart.

COMPONENT REWORK: The COMFAIRWESTPAC RED STRIPE List cites items appearing in the CAMEL (Critical Aeronautical Material/Equipment List) for which NSD Yokosuka is listed as the DOP (Designated Overhaul Point). Also in this list are other components critical in WESTPAC. The list is promulgated to all activities in WESTPAC generating repairable aeronautical components and directs immediate premium air shipment to NSD Yokosuka for every failed unit appearing in that list. Some 500 components appear in the RED STRIPE List which includes such items as helicopter dynamic components and the T-58 compressor rotor. The volume of items reworked, as you will see in a later chart, has been life blood to aeronautical support in WESTPAC.

CUSTOMER SERVICE: In addition to the RED STRIPE List, COMFAIRWESTPAC publishes a complete "Capability List" of all items for which a capability exists in FAWPRA but for which stock position has not dictated rework of all F/J generations in WESTPAC. This capability is established for concurrent rework of aircraft undergoing PAR. If normal supply response does not produce an urgently required component, "Customer Service" is an alternate source.

SPECIAL PROGRAMS: This program includes any aeronautical support function such as manufacture of parts, i.e., A-4E nose landing gear shear bolts, shrike shear bolts; incorporation changes and modernization of fleet aircraft; arrestment, removal and treatment of corrosion which is beyond fleet and Marine capabilities; and routine intercept manufacture action on all part numbered NORS requisitions based upon being an information addressee on all such requisitions. As you can see, this is a sizeable organization and, if concentrated, would probably compare with the NARF at NAS Quonset Point. With this in mind and in view of the FAWPRA support of Southeast Asia, you can readily understand the FAWPRA being one of the prime concerns for adequate and available aeronautical support.

What has FAWPRA done? The following figures will readily reflect the increase

in production since the 1965/present time frames as presented in earlier slides.

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FAWPRA AIRCRAFT REWORK



FAWPRA STATISTICS

	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68 (PROJECT)
WORK FORCE	1,493	2,328	3,052	3,175
CONTRACT AMT ($,000)	4,635	8,482	11,022	12,198
NSA EXP. ($,000)	766	1,512	1,493	1,883
APA EXP. ($,000)	N/A	30,759	34,200	36,000
COMPONENTS RWK	5,063	10,461	19,535	20,000

All repairables are handled as pool items. The present inventory of individual items is approximately ten million and being reduced to a goal of six million.

CHINA

SEOUL

KOREA

YELLOW SEA

KYOTO

JAPAN

NSD YOKOSUKA

CVA

PACIFIC OCEAN

SHANG-HAI

RYUKYU ISLANDS

CHINA SEA

United States Administration

BONIN IS.

TAIWAN

HANOI

HONG KONG

GULF OF TONKIN

LAOS

CVA

CVA

CVA

CVA

CVA

THAILAND

1st MARINE AIR WING

NSD SUBIC

PHILIPPINE SEA

MARIANA ISLANDS

BANGKOK

CAMBODIA

GUAM(US)

SAIGON

SOUTH CHINA SEA

PHILIPPINES

CAROLINE ISLANDS

MALAY PENINSULA

United Staes Admininistration

To this point, I have presented a brief description of the aeronautical units in WESTPAC that require supply support and some of the peculiarities of providing that support. I will now discuss some of the more well known support channels and their utilization. The 1ST MAW was initially outfitted and reoutfitted by pull action with revised AVCALs. Carriers, after return from a deployment, are likewise reoutfitted based on usage, deckload, and revised AVCALs. Back-up stock for both are provided by the two major WESTPAC depots, NSD Yokosuka and NSD Subic Bay. This chart depicts the normal requisitioning channel for the 1ST MAW and our carriers. It is based on geographical location of the requisitioner. All 1ST MAW Units and carriers in Southeast Asia submit requisitions directly to NSD Subic Bay, as does NAS Cubi Point. NS Sangley Point requisitions NSA/DSA from Subic and aeronautical P-2 spares from NSD Yokosuka, P-3 requirements from CONUS. The sequential referral system provides for maximum utilization of WESTPAC assets to satisfy NORS requirements by referring the requirements between the two depots in WESTPAC with local screens of NAS Cubi Point and/or NAS Atsugi. This sequential referral applies to all NORS requirements and, recently, two other vital projects have been added to this same referral method. These are Project Code ZX5 and ZX2, both in Issue Group 1; ZX5 being CER work stoppage requirements of NAS Cubi Point and NAS Atsugi; ZX2 covers CBD requirements generated by NAS Cubi Point and the FAWPRA. Both of these projects are vital to our effort and contribute directly towards getting our aircraft in the air. By these processes we are able to utilize all of our WESTPAC assets to the greatest advantage. The two depots are averaging approximately 50-55 percent gross effectiveness in "R" cognizance and between the two we are satisfying about 50-65 percent of the NORS in WESTPAC. However, the depots are not satisfied with this effectiveness, nor are we at COMFAIRWESTPAC, and are continually striving to improve.

That brings us to the present. I have briefly outlined our aeronautical units in WESTPAC, support requirements, and support channels. Support in some areas in WESTPAC has improved; however, as I am sure you are all aware, some areas require still further improvement. Of major importance are, of course, aircraft. A number of aircraft are being lost and replacements are not always timely. As an example, one 12 plane F-8 squadron recently was operating for a period of time with only five aircraft. This was due to a shortage of F-8E aircraft and emphasized the need for rapid turnaround in the FAWPRA and COSA pool. It is the operator, then, who comes up short and must meet his commitments and make do with what assets he has. This is the reason for our existence and why it is so important to keep what aircraft we have in a ready status at all times. We do not keep a lot of statistics in COMFAIRWESTPAC. We do monitor the total NORS of each activity with the NORS digest in order to note developing trends both up and down. The following are a few comparisons to show how some of our units have performed.

AVERAGE NORS FOR LAST TWO CRUISES OF CVA'S

USS ENTERPRISE

PREVIOUS	LAST
506 Avg	321 Avg

36.6% DROP

USS TICONDEROGA

PREVIOUS	LAST
255 Avg	127 Avg

50.2% DROP

USS CONSTELLATION

PREVIOUS	LAST
343 Avg	180 Avg

47.5% DROP

MARINE AIR GROUPS AVERAGE NORS OVER GIVEN PERIODS

MAG-11

MAR-AUG 1966		SEP-FEB 1966-67		MAR-AUG 1967
421 Avg	24.7% DROP	317 Avg	2.2% DROP	310 Avg

26.4% DROP

MAG-13

MAR-AUG 1966		SEP-FEB 1966-67		MAR-AUG 1967
178 Avg	62.4% INCREASE	289 Avg	36% DROP	185 Avg

3.9% INCREASE

MAG-16

MAR-AUG 1966		SEP-FEB 1966-67		MAR-AUG 1967
190 Avg	30.5% INCREASE	248 Avg	23% INCREASE	305 Avg

60.5% INCREASE

The support of the carriers and the 1ST MAW in Southease Asia is given equal emphasis at all levels of support. Every effort is made by all concerned to aid each Marine Unit or carrier that is having NORS problems. Although the number of NORS is not a definite factor showing a trend, it does give an

indication of units requiring additional assistance. MAG-16 is having CH-53 problems. And speaking of problems there are continually problems in-country. One problem is that some people invariably rotate just as they become well-trained, another is the environment. Also support which is split to more than one location. This is true also with MAG-16. Also a few well placed mortars are problems now and then. But still the aircraft are flying and missions are accomplished. As an example, aircraft operational readiness of 1ST MAW for the A-6 for August was 27 percent, yet over 100 percent of programmed flight hours were flown. The same was true for the F-4 and A-4.

Let us summarize some of the actions taken to improve aeronautical supply support in WESTPAC/Southeast Asia.

a. Maximum utilization of positioned assets through the sequential referral system and redistribution by COMFAIRWESTPAC.

b. Arrival briefs for all in-chopping carriers with maximum crossdecking of critical assets.

c. Continuous visits by COMFAIRWESTPAC and COMNAVAIRPAC representatives to carriers and MAGs on regular and on an "as required" basis.

d. Screen of carriers and MAGs work stoppage reports through WESTPAC sources.

e. In-country Marine/COMFAIRWESTPAC support review briefs.

f. Establishment of a COMFAIRWESTPAC Red Stripe List for maximum utilization of WESTPAC repair/rework facilities to shorten turn-around-time on critical components.

g. AMO San Diego WESTPAC special rerun of all Status Code BB/BV/BD WESTPAC NORS through NSD Yokosuka, NSD Subic and NAS Atsugi on a weekly basis. This is an AUTODIN transmission by FSN for report of stock availability.

h. Maximum solicitation of assist requests from the operators to expose problem areas for concentrated corrective action.

i. COMFAIRWESTPAC has been assigned two C-118 aircraft that have been utilized continuously in an attempt to meet requirements to move HI-PRI material "today". These aircraft, although used to the maximum, have not been able to meet all requirements. Four C-130's are justified and would certainly enhance the support posture.

j. Specialized repair programs to shorten the turn-around-time of critical items.

Obviously, to support the vast Navy and Marine aeronautical operations and programs in Southeast Asia, require a tremendous amount of effort. Supply support must continue to improve to keep pace with ever increasing requirements. Constant surveillance and review is necessary to stay up with or get ahead of the

deficiencies.

What problems still exist? I will not attempt to cover them all. Some of the problems we have in WESTPAC are not peculiar to WESTPAC but are system problems. Some of these you are probably familiar with; support for MER/TER breech cap assemblies, APN-141/APN-153/A4E constant speed drives/C-130 generators/CH-46 AFT transmissions/C-2A support/CH-53 support. There are others, but these are a few of the material problems. Others include such things as response to follow-up action, status. Lack of replies to numerous queries when 100 percent supply status was originally requested. I will not belabor this because I realize some of the shortcomings exist in WESTPAC also. It appears that with all the special programs and associated project codes such as Tiger Tom, 777, 711, ANORS, CER and battle damage that the common BK1, AN1, etc., work stoppage is neglected. We are not getting proper response to bit and piece requirements for work stoppage items on our carriers, MAGs, FAWPRA, etc. A considerable workload is generated in the makeup of the bi-monthly work stoppage report to ASO. It is essential that special attention be given to work stoppages especially in the FAWPRA. As stated earlier, the FAWPRA has been our life blood in WESTPAC and we are not getting the necessary response to effect timely repair/rework.

What can be done to help aeronautical supply support in Southeast Asia? Again, I could not possibly cover everything that could be done and if I did, many of these actions would be common knowledge with active and maximum effort already being exerted. I would like, though, to just mention a couple pet peeves that I am sure could readily be corrected.

a. Rejections or no record on requisitions/follow-up, on Issue Group/and/or NORS requirements, to activities in a combat environment. These priority messages containing MILSTRIP Priority 02 requirements should be considered as a requisition with immediate reinstatement action.

b. Recognizing the system problems, as mentioned before, be alert and emphasize to everyone that a message from a WESTPAC Unit must be handled with recognition of the project code, priority and median status code. Status should not have to be pried out with follow-up after follow-up. Normally when COMFAIRWESTPAC follows up it is due to poor or lack of supply response. We follow-up only on Southeast Asia requirements. Give us a timely answer. We are in a war out there and every effort possible must be exerted to give the maximum assistance at our disposal.