

large messes and as hospital orderly would require two women for one man, thus canceling the earlier savings.

Such estimates gave no clue to the actual cost of the wartime WAC, which had never operated under "normal" conditions. The Corps as a whole had been the victim of the expensive experiments inherent in any new organization. It had accumulated stocks of unusable misfit clothing; it had spent money on early ill-planned recruiting schemes, with ill-chosen slogans and personnel, and aimed at unrealistic goals; it had opened and promptly closed large training centers for recruits who never appeared. It had also required incalculable man-hours of the time of experienced Army staff officers, from the Chief of Staff downward to every headquarters and station commander, which could not be reckoned in dollars and cents. Whether or not the expense of such an experimental stage was recompensed by even the most superlative efficiency in its members was a question difficult to answer. However, if later wars required total mobilization, and if the organizational lessons of World War II were not forgotten, the experiment had obviously been a useful and necessary one.

Recommendations for the Future

Although no WAC or Army authorities left detailed studies as to the means by which successive mobilizations could avoid the major causes of expense or difficulty in World War II, their general recommendations could to some extent be pieced together from speeches, separate staff studies, historical accounts, and lists of incomplete projects.

General Paul, the postwar head of G-1 Division, was the only man on the General

Staff level to leave a formal recommendation. He stated that five problems "must be solved in order to effect a sound and complete utilization of women." Two of these had, he believed, been solved by Regular Army legislation: the "lack of prior planning" before an emergency occurred, and the "lack of an organized nucleus within the military establishment on which to build." Two others concerned what was generally now recognized by administrators of women: that women's jobs were more important to them than any other factor in their environment. General Paul therefore stated that the Army must not again be guilty either of "failure to evaluate civilian training and experience" or of "reluctance to utilize women in Army jobs formerly held by men." Finally, he noted the effect of unfavorable Army attitude on all echelons, resulting from "failure to orient key male personnel as to proper utilization of women in the Army." In spite of these past problems, General Paul was confident that they need not be repeated. In any case, he concluded:

Experience of World War II proved that women play a vital role in the military effectiveness of any nation. And American women, through their services in the Women's Army Corps, showed that, contrary to dogmatic opinion, the previously untapped potentiality of womanpower could be directed into the channel of personnel power with positive results. The record shows that their contribution erased any doubt as to the ability, adaptability, and stability of American women in time of national crisis.

As to continuation of this wartime performance in the peacetime Army or any future wartime Corps, only one immediate question occurred to General Paul, which he called, "the question that pops up in anyone's mind—Would you be able to get