

ported the unanimous opinion of their commands: that authority must be decentralized to them to determine their own continuation training needs. ASF's report to this effect was prepared by Colonel Goodwin and forwarded by General Dalton of Military Personnel Division, who stated, "Because enlisted women are working longer hours and harder than at any time since the Corps was established, it is felt that consideration should be given to reducing the number of training hours required."¹³⁰ AAF's objections were even more strenuous, since that command had now abandoned any continuation training program for its men, and saw no reason for special requirements for women in a time of great manpower shortage.¹³¹

All such requests for modification were consistently refused by Military Training Division, with the statement that continuation training could not safely be decentralized to the station commander, since the resulting programs would not be uniform and thus would not produce an identical Army-wide state of training. In rejecting the recommendations, Military Training Division pointed out that the opinion of personnel officers could not be considered formal complaints until approved by directors of training in subordinate commands and submitted to headquarters through channels.¹³²

General Dalton replied:

Admittedly not all the Staff Directors are training specialists, but . . . post commanders, section chiefs, and hospital commanders complain to them of the difficulties in carrying out the present training program.¹³³

He suggested that Brig. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau verify their comments by inviting the formal opinions of the service commands and technical services. This, the Director of Training, ASF, refused to do.¹³⁴

In any case, the comments were inapplicable to the Army Air Forces. Colonel Bandel had opposed an earlier break with the ASF because she preferred to use the powerful lever of AAF opposition to force Army-wide reforms, rather than to rescue Air Wacs alone. After the failure of Colonel Goodwin's efforts in March, Colonel Bandel made a final attempt to prevent a division by requesting a conference of Air, Ground, and Service Forces officers with a representative of the War Department's G-3 Division. At this conference the AAF's argument was supported by the AGF and by the ASF WAC Officer "in view of pressing work demands on assigned personnel."

Military Training Division again refused to consider this recommendation on the grounds that:

This opinion was based on administrative and morale problems evolving from the field approach to the training requirement. It did not represent an evaluation of the ability of the training program to accomplish its stated purpose.

Therefore, Military Training Division still refused to modify the program in any command.¹³⁵

At this, the Air Forces recommended that continuation training of AAF Wacs be made a responsibility solely of the AAF, in line with the system for men's training.

¹³⁰ Memo, ASF WAC Off for Dir Mil Tng ASF through Dir Pers ASF, 23 Feb 45. SPAP 353 WAC (5-17-43).

¹³¹ AAF Ltr 50-18, 18 Jan 45.

¹³² Memo, MTD ASF for Dir Pers ASF, 2 Mar 45. SPAP 353 WAC (5-17-43).

¹³³ *Ibid.* 1st Ind, Gen Dalton to MTD ASF, 13 Mar 45.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* 2d Ind, MTD to Dir Pers ASF, 22 Mar 45. See also Speech by Maj Smith, pp. 10-11. Min cited n. 120.

¹³⁵ Above based on ASF Hist of WAC Tng, p. 339, except for Colonel Bandel's opinions, obtained by interview.