

probably be employed without any comparable loss rate by application of the principles of WAC employment used elsewhere. These included, particularly, advance planning, a definition of the place of WAC advisers, command of women by female company officers, specialist attention to tracing the supplies of the relatively small group of women, and consideration of women's psychological need for treatment as responsible adults. In her final report to General George Marshall, Colonel Boyce summarized the WAC impression:

Women in the Army should be required and permitted to serve wherever the Army serves when their services are needed. However, in . . . New Guinea, Biak, and the Philippines, it is apparent that essential safeguards to the effective utilization of WAC personnel were not applied.²⁰⁹

A clue to an explanation of this lack of

safeguards could be found in world-wide WAC experience, which indicated that the fault lay in the time factor as much as in any human element. In both other major theaters, a considerable shakedown period was required after WAC arrival in order to set up a satisfactory administrative system and specialist attention to supply and other needs. The Fifth Army experiment had not been attempted until eleven months after the first Wacs' arrival; the Normandy move, until twelve months after arrival. In the Pacific, the world-wide norm of a WAC administrative system had also been worked out at the end of a year. It was the theater's misfortune that, because of the lateness of its requisitions for Wacs, the achievement of this system had coincided with the end, and not with the beginning, of a risky experiment.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*