

reported that the location in the Army Service Forces was not suitable. Although the Director WAC was a special adviser to the Chief of Staff, and was responsible for advice concerning Air, Ground, and Service Forces, she was currently obliged to submit all papers to or through the Army Service Forces. The G-3 planners noted: "This form of organization is not entirely satisfactory, as the scope of WAC matters is Army-wide and determination of all basic policies should properly be made at the War Department level."³

G-3 Division therefore recommended that the office be placed under G-1 Division of the General Staff, comparable in place to the Military Intelligence Division under G-2, or else, and preferably, be made an independent Special Staff division, like Civil Affairs Division. The Special Staff location, although it was never to be adopted, was always the one recommended by organizational experts. G-3 Division pointed out that the Director's responsibilities were not limited to G-1 matters and that the Special Staff location "will expedite direct consultation with appropriate divisions of the General Staff."⁴

Director Hobby concurred in either move, but General Somervell nonconcurred and presented a counterplan that would keep the Office of the Director under his jurisdiction. He proposed that it be attached to his own office, and not be placed under any subordinate office such as that of General Grunert or of General Dalton. He agreed also that the Director would be allowed to consult directly with Air and Ground Forces on matters that did not concern the Service Forces.⁵

General Somervell's plan prevailed; at the time of the conversion, General McNarney verbally advised Colonel Hobby

to try the plan for several months and see if it would work. As a matter of fact, it was to be exactly six months before all concerned were convinced that the plan would not work.

Handicaps on ASF Level

During the early weeks of 1944, General Marshall called to his office General White and other officers to express his dissatisfaction with the situation, particularly as it affected recruiting.

Among issues leading toward a move from the ASF level, the major one was that of supply. In the midst of debate over the Austin-Wadsworth bill, members of Congress began publicly to criticize the WAC uniform. Criticism from Army stations, particularly air bases, was equally severe. Very little honest defense against the criticisms was possible. In spite of the easing of the supply problem, which had presumably resulted from the collapse of expansion plans eight months before, the situation remained approximately where it had been at that time.

Severe shortages still existed on field stations; recruits in training centers still did not receive complete clothing issue, and still suffered high sick rates; and the appearance of the uniform had not been improved in any respect. Since the Army Service Forces had now been responsible for the WAC uniform for almost two years, it did not appear that either inexperience or rapid build-up could any longer be offered in explanation. However, eight separate proposals for improving the situation—made by the Army Air Forces, by

³ Memo, G-3 for DCofS, 17 Aug 43. WDGCT 322 WAC (8-17-43), in CofS 291:9.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See pencil notation, *Ibid.*