

legislation, thereupon requiring additional WAAC legislation.

Still worse, the camouflaged grades were not strictly comparable to Army grades in either rank or pay and were to cause great confusion in finance and personnel offices when the attempt was made to replace men on Army Tables of Organization. Instead of lieutenants and captains, the WAAC had third, second, and first officers. A first officer was comparable to a captain in duties and insignia but drew the pay of a first lieutenant; a second officer drew pay somewhere between a first and second lieutenant's; and a third officer was comparable to a second lieutenant, with pay of \$1,500.

Enlisted grades were still more confusing, with three grades of auxiliaries comparable to the Army's two grades of privates and three grades of leaders in place of the Army's five grades of noncommissioned officers. In addition there was to be a director, who was authorized the salary of \$3,000, comparable to a major's, and a few assistant directors, who were to receive a captain's pay of \$2,400.

This bill after its introduction immediately sank from sight; it was not to become law for a full year. It was referred routinely to the Bureau of the Budget, which did not reply for four months. Meanwhile, G-1 Division had reversed its previous stand and ventured the hope that the Chief of Staff would withdraw his support or at least not commit himself until the Bureau of the Budget was heard from.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff, almost alone in the War Department, made it clear in the fall of 1941 that he had come to look on the bill with more than official approval. Mrs. Rogers noted that "Gen-

eral Marshall now became very enthusiastic about the bill."⁶⁵ Col. John H. Hilldring, soon to assume office as G-1, stated later:

By the summer of 1941, General Marshall was intensely interested in the WAAC business. He foresaw a cycle of shortages; that of the moment was the supply shortage, in which the scarcity of supplies hindered mobilization, but he now became convinced that the bottleneck of the future would be that of manpower. He also considered the fact that war had become a complicated business which needed many civilian techniques, and that many of these were almost completely in the control of women. General Marshall asked me why we should try to train men in a specialty such as typing or telephone work which in civilian life has been taken over completely by women; this, he felt, was uneconomical and a waste of time which we didn't have. For example, the Army's telephone service had always had a reputation for being bad in spite of our superior equipment, and women operators could and did end all that.

The Chief of Staff was also influenced by the fact that the ladies wanted in; he literally has a passionate regard for democratic ideals.⁶⁶

General Marshall at this time told several of his staff members that, while he did not see any immediate need for large numbers of women in the Army, he would like to have authorization for a women's corps on his books so that, if the need for quick action should arise, the point of debate would be past.⁶⁷ This agreed with what he later wrote to Congress:

⁶⁴ Memo, Budget and Leg Plng Br for G-1, 18 Jun 41, sub: Rpt on HR 4906. AG 291.9 WAAC sec 1 pt 1 (6-2-41).

⁶⁵ Interv cited n. 42(2).

⁶⁶ Interv with Gen Hilldring, 17 Jan 46.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*; also, statement was made to Mrs. Hobby and repeated by her later to a Congressional committee. House Com on Mil Affairs, 77th Cong, 2d sess. *Hearings on HR 6293*, 20-21 Jan 42, p. 33.