

such as whether women should enter the combat zone, until it was known what the combat zone of the next war might include. Before the time arrived to make these specific decisions, the women who were to help make them must be trained not merely in drill but in an understanding of Army thinking, a process that could not be achieved overnight. And the men who were to make the decisions must also be trained in understanding the problems of militarization of women. If the women who were to lead the new corps were ignorant, said Hughes, *"this ignorance, coupled with man's intolerance, may be fatal."*<sup>40</sup>

The Hughes plan contemplated that only women overseas or in danger zones would be militarized. The only advantage to the Army in militarizing other women would be that of being able to order them to perform certain unpopular duties such as laundry work, and the plan noted the fallacy of supposing that women of a higher type would enlist after they knew that only menial work was in store for them.

The need for military status in danger zones was strongly indicated by current arguments then before Congress concerning women who had worked in France and who were seeking compensation for the loss of their health. The War Department had already decided that such women were not entitled to veterans' gratuities, ruling in one case:

Female telephone operators have no military status whatever . . . those serving with the American Expeditionary Forces [were] not even under civil service regulations. . . . It is not believed that Congress intended that a gratuity should be paid to any person not actually a member of the military establishment.<sup>41</sup>

Nevertheless, the sentiment in Congress favored those women whose disabilities

were directly due to war service, and financial relief to prevent their destitution was voted in certain cases. At this time Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts developed an interest in the problem which was to lead ultimately to her sponsorship, fifteen years later, of the WAAC bill.<sup>42</sup>

Major Hughes also stated that it was uneconomical and confusing to have separate organizations of men and women, and that qualified women could be integrated into the men's army, with a similar uniform and privileges. He argued against camouflaging rank by odd titles such as Deputy Controller, which spared the male ego but confused the employing agencies. "Why not take the whole step and do the thing right?" he wrote.

Major Hughes' prophetic efforts were embalmed with indorsements, laid out for observation for a period, and then buried so deep in the files that they were recovered only after the WAAC was six months old and War Department planners had already made most of the mistakes he predicted.<sup>43</sup> His study was sent to the Chief of

<sup>40</sup> Author's italics.

<sup>41</sup> Memo, Dir WPD for CofS, 18 Mar 19. WD Rec. OCofS, War College Div, 10730-26, National Archives.

<sup>42</sup> (1) House Com on Veterans Legislation, 69th Cong, 1st sess, *Hearings*, 6 Aug 26. (2) Interv with Mrs. Rogers, 14 Dec 45. (This form of citation is used throughout for interviews conducted by the author.)

<sup>43</sup> The study was recovered then only when Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, Director, WAAC, on temporary duty in England, was introduced to Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, who demanded to know what G-1 had done with his masterpiece. Returning to Washington, she unearthed it but found no evidence that it had been known to the G-1 planners. Interv with Lt Col Helen Hamilton Woods, Deputy Dir WAC, 22 Oct 45.

Throughout the volume, the rank held by the officer at the time of the interview or of the discussion in the text is given. Since this is not a completely chronological account, an officer who appears in an early