

## GETTING READY FOR SALT

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inform ourselves  
debate rationally  
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## S P E E C H - S A L T

### A. S A L T I

If we are going to understand the current debate concerning SALT II, we are first going to have to understand what went on with SALT I.

In 1968 President Johnson began preparations for SALT and these talks formally opened in 1969 under the Nixon administration. After three years of intense negotiations, the first phase of SALT, which is known today as SALT I, produced two agreements.

#### I. ABM\_\_Treaty

The first of these agreements was a treaty called the Anti-Ballistic Missile or ABM Treaty. Both the

United States and the Soviet Union recognized that if both sides continued to try to develop effective anti-ballistic missile defenses, that this would lead to a deadly and increasingly expensive effort by each side to try to design offensive systems to penetrate these ABM defenses. This would work opposite to the theory of deterrence, because it would encourage one or the other side to shoot first.

Recognizing this danger, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in the ABM Treaty to limit each side to two anti-ballistic missile sites. This

treaty remains in effect today. However, there has been one significant change in it. In 1974 a protocol signed by the two countries lowered the limit of ABM sites for each country to one each.

2. Five year interim agreement

When the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, the United States and the Soviets had not reached the point where they could agree on any long-term treaty limiting offensive, strategic weapons. They were, however, able to reach an interim agreement which froze for five years the numbers of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and sea launch ballistic

missiles (SLBM) launchers, which were then  
deployed or under construction. This allowed the  
Soviets more launchers than the United States.

The Soviets could have 2,350 launchers, and the  
United States could have 1,710 launchers. The  
Soviets, however, were prevented from continuing  
their annual increases of several hundred launchers,  
which they had been making for the previous ten  
years.

The freeze on the numbers of launchers did not  
prevent us from conducting our own programs, because  
we had no plans for increases during the period of

the interim agreement anyway. The Soviet lead in the numbers of launchers was offset by superior United States technology and our big lead in strategic bombers, which were not covered by the agreement.

Another advantage that the United States had at that time which offset any Soviet lead in numbers of launchers was our ability to provide multiple, independent re-entry vehicles for missiles. It had initially been proposed to limit numbers of warheads, and to limit these MIRV's (multiple independent re-entry vehicles), but through the action of Mr.

Kissinger, Senator Jackson and other current critics of SALT, MIRV's were not limited. This has come back to haunt us, because the Soviets proceeded to develop MIRV's, which are the most dangerous and destabilizing of the nuclear weapons' systems, because they have the combination of accuracy and yield that may enable them to strike hard targets, such as our hardened Minuteman silos and threaten the survivability of the Minuteman forces.

B. How SALT I has worked

At various times since the SALT I agreements, there have been allegations that the Soviets have not



lived up to the agreements. For example, one part of the interim agreement stated that the parties would not start construction of additional, fixed land-based ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972. At one time, the United States believed that additional silos of a different design were under construction at a number of launch sites. We raised this with the Soviet Union, and as discussions proceeded and as additional intelligence became available, we concluded that the silos were built to serve a launch control function, as stated by the Soviets, and did not violate the agreement.

Again, there was a provision in the interim agreement that the parties would not convert land-based launchers for light ICBM's, or for ICBM's of older types, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBM's. When the Soviets deployed the SS-19 missile, many people said that this was a violation of the interim agreement provision. It was not, in fact, a violation, but because of certain technical questions related to SALT II, we chose to raise the issue with the Soviets so that we might be in a better negotiating position when we went into SALT II.

Under the interim agreement in 1972, the USSR had to dismantle, or destroy certain launchers. By early 1976, it appeared that the Soviet Union would not be able to complete the dismantling of the required number of launchers on time. The United States raised this question with the Soviets, and the Soviets have substantially met all the requirements at this time.

In 1975 there were reports that the Soviets were conducting experiments, or actually attempting to blind our satellites, which are used for verification

of compliance with SALT. This was raised with the Soviets, and it was subsequently determined that our initial intelligence was wrong, and that what we thought was laser energy, or some type of energy beam being used to interfere with our satellites, were in fact large gas fires caused by breaks along natural gas pipelines in the Soviet Union.

Also, from time to time, it has been alleged that the Soviet Union has developed, tested and deployed a mobile anti-ballistic missile system, or a

mobile anti-ballistic missile radar in ~~contra~~vention of an article of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The United States has examined this very closely, and the USSR does not have a mobile ABM system or the components for such a system. They do have such systems which could be erected in a shorter time than those that they previously possessed, however, it would still take about six months to construct an ABM site which is certainly not even arguably a mobile system.

It is sometimes reported that the Soviets have

developed a mobile ICBM. The development and testing of a mobile ICBM was not prohibited by the interim agreement, but we have always told the Soviets that we would consider deployment of such a system to be inconsistent with the objectives of the agreement. It really does not appear that the Soviets have deployed an ICBM in a mobile mode. The SS-20, which is a mobile missile, has been deployed by the Soviets to replace older medium and intermediate range missiles. This missile could reach the Aleutian Islands in western Alaska from its present and likely deployment areas in the Soviet Union. However it cannot reach the continental United States from any of its likely deployment sites in the Soviet Union. It is

possible that the Soviets could extend the range capabilities of the SS-20 by reducing the total weight of its payload or adding another propulsion stage, but there is no evidence that they have done so. We are quite confident that we could detect the necessary inter-continental range testing of such a missile if they did attempt to modify it.

I am sure you have also heard reports about the Soviets denying us test information on their re-entry vehicles by encoding or encrypting their missile test telemetry. If they were doing this, that

activity would be inconsistent with those provisions of the interim agreement that provide for verification of compliance with the agreement provisions. This matter has been specifically covered in SALT II.

I am sure you've all read in the press about anti-satellite systems being developed by the Soviets. However, development of such a system is not prohibited by the earlier SALT agreements. The actual use of such an anti-satellite system against our United States national technical means of verification is prohibited, but the Soviets has not done so.



There have been various other allegations in the press that the Soviets have not complied with the provisions of the five year interim agreement on offensive strategic nuclear weapons that was entered into in SALT I. Each of these supposed violations have been examined by the United States and our experts are satisfied that there have been no substantial violations of the agreements.

C. SALT II Prelude

After SALT I, the next phase of the talks leading to SALT II began in late 1972. The talks continued for

two years, with hard negotiating but without any significant break-through or agreement. At a 1974 summit meeting in Vladivostok between President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, the Soviets finally accepted the principle of equal overall ceilings. The agreed overall limit for each side was 2,400 ICBM's, SLBM's, heavy bombers and air to surface ballistic missiles. Of these 2,400 delivered vehicles, only 1,320 could be MIRV systems, an important step forward because of the capability of MIRV's to multiply the number of targets a single missile can strike. Within these limits, each side would be free to

choose whatever mix of forces it preferred. And, finally, at Vladivostok the Soviets dropped their insistence on including in this aggregate limit American forward-based missiles ~~or~~ nuclear-capable aircraft that could strike the Soviet Union from NATO countries or from aircraft carriers.

As the negotiators tried to put the Vladivostok understanding into a treaty, there were two issues that arose which had not been settled in the Vladivostok understanding and which began to loom as large problems. These were the Soviet bomber, known to us as the Backfire, and cruise missiles.

Although the Backfire is currently deployed for a theater and naval strike role, it could, under certain circumstances, be used in a long-range mission against the continental United States. Cruise missiles, which are actually small, pilotless jet airplanes, are potentially capable of great range and accuracy. They are relatively cheap to produce, they can be launched from land, surface vessels, submarines or aircraft in flight, and can fly low to elude radar detection and to better penetrate air defenses.

Disagreement on whether or how these weapons should be limited played a large part in delaying SALT II agreement.

When President Carter took office in January, 1977, he decided to try to go beyond the Vladivostok proposals and ceilings of Ford and Kissinger and make a more comprehensive and harder line proposal. He wanted to seek greater reductions and stricter limits on new systems and technological changes than had been agreed to by the previous Republican administration.

As an alternative, President Carter instructed his negotiators to propose a treaty that would simply codify the Vladivostok ceilings and to defer the more difficult issues for later negotiations. When the

United States presented these positions in March of 1977, the Soviets rejected these harder lines while stressing that they wanted to reach an agreement essentially on the Vladivostok lines.

D. SALT II Agreement

I. Terms

Later in 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a new framework for SALT II that permitted an agreement going somewhat beyond Vladivostok, with interim limits on the systems that posed the most difficult problems. This SALT II framework has three parts. First, there is a basic

agreement which is to last through 1985, embodying the Vladivostok accords, but with significant cuts below the Vladivostok ceilings. Second, there is a short-term protocol which deals with contentious issues which are not yet ready for long-term resolution. And third, a joint statement of principles for SALT III, which will include commitments to further reductions, broader technological constraints on new weapons and other goals.

The treaty includes the following major provisions:

(1) an initial overall aggregate level of 2,400

strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, to be reduced to 2,250 during the term of the treaty; (2) a 1,320 sublimit on MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers and aircraft equipped with long-range missiles; (3) a sublimit of 1,200 MIRVed ballistic missile launchers and, (4) a sublimit of 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers.

The protocol, which is for a shorter term and is not a treaty, includes the following provisions:

(1) a ban on deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and on the flight testing of ICBM's from such launchers,



(2) a ban on testing and development of air-to-surface ballistic missiles and (3) a ban on the deployment of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

2. Problems

I'm sure you have all heard of many problems that have come up with regard to the SALT II treaty.

a. Backfire Bomber

One of these, of course, is the Backfire bomber. As I said before, the Backfire can reach a significant number of targets in the United States on a one-way, high altitude, unrefueled mission. The Soviets have

not currently deployed the Backfire for use on this role. However, we have to assume that they will do so if it serves their interests. We do, however, have to recognize that we have a very large number of aircraft in forward bases in the European theater which are capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. The Soviets have no such capability with regard to the Continental United States. We, of course, have refused to include these aircraft located

in Europe in the SALT agreements because we insist that they are theater systems. The Soviets have agreed to limit production of the Backfire and not give it refueling capability to make it truly intercontinental.

b. Cruise Missile Range

Another problem which is prominently raised is with regard to the cruise missile and its range. The United States has been very careful to preserve those cruise missile options which are most important to

our defense needs. The new agreement permits us to go ahead with the deployment of the air-launched long-range cruise missiles we have now decided to deploy on heavy bombers. The principle limitations on cruise missiles are contained in the shorter-term protocol rather than in the treaty. Even during the period of the protocol, we will be permitted to flight test all types of cruise missiles and to deploy ground and sea launched cruise missiles capable of ranges up to 375 miles. We will be able to go ahead with development and testing programs for all types of cruise missiles without changing our present schedules

at all. After the protocol expires, of course, there will be no limitations on ground and sea launch cruise missiles unless we mutually agree upon those limits in subsequent negotiations. These cruise missile limitations will be an agenda item for SALT III.

c. Mobile ICBM Development

The question has also been raised as to whether SALT II will stop the United States from developing mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles and the answer is no. The protocol will prohibit both sides from deploying mobile ICBM launchers and flight testing ICBM's from mobile launchers. Research and

development programs short of flight testing will not be affected.

At the present time the United States has decided to develop and deploy a new mobile missile, called the MX. It will be bigger and more powerful than the Minuteman we currently have and will be more accurate. Many deployment modes were studied and the one chosen is a "racetrack" mobile system. It will be located on federal lands in Nevada or some state in that area of the United States. The SALT II agreement allows

deployment of mobile ICBM systems of any of the types we are considering, and we could deploy these mobile ICBM launchers any time after the expiration of the protocol period. We have to realize that the protocol period will end well before any of our mobile ICBM systems would be ready for deployment. Of course, any mobile ICBM basing system would have to be consistent with the verification provisions of a SALT agreement. We will not deploy a mobile ICBM system that would not permit adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed and we will insist that any Soviet system meet the same verification standards.

d. Minuteman Vulnerability

A great deal of interest has been shown in the question of the potential vulnerability in the 1980's of our Minuteman missiles to Soviet attack. With or without SALT, our Minuteman missiles may become increasingly vulnerable to attack by Soviet ICBM's. If so, this is the result of Soviet advances in missile accuracy, coupled with the deployment of large numbers of ICBM carried nuclear warheads. As I have pointed out before, much of this is because of our insistence in not limiting the numbers of warheads and MIRV's in the last SALT agreement.



The potential Soviet advantage, then, is not the result of SALT. The SALT agreement does nothing which would prevent us from working to make our Minuteman force less vulnerable to Soviet attack. As I have just described to you, the SALT II agreement specifically permits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers after the expiration of the protocol period and permits their development during that period. We must also recognize that the land-based ICBMs that we have are only one part of our nuclear arsenal. Of course, even if we were to assume that the Minuteman missiles would be vulnerable to a Soviet attack, we still have

enough nuclear capability in our submarine-launched ballistic missiles and our heavy bombers to destroy the Soviet Union.

e. SALT and NATO

The SALT treaty and its protocol have contributed to European concerns about their safety and about the steadfastness of the American commitment to European security and world peace. These European fears about the deterioration of the American strategic nuclear capability are exacerbated by certain things that happened in the current SALT treaty. Not all of the unfavorable

situations that exist can be blamed on the SALT treaty, but a number of them can.

In the current SALT treaty and its negotiations, we have made clear that we will tolerate the Soviet Backfire bomber so long as it is not deployed in an anti-U.S. mode; that is, so long as it is deployed against areas bordering the Warsaw Pact. Our European allies view this as an American expression of insularity and lack of concern for their security.

This is a specific instance where the U.S. has gone beyond merely neglecting threats to its allies and

has actually diverted the threats in that direction.

Equally unsatisfactory from the European point of view is the treatment of the cruise missile in the SALT II protocol. On this issue, Europe is caught two ways. Restriction on the deployment on the air-launch cruise missile classifies it as a system subject to non-circumvention understandings. A moratorium on deployment of other forms of cruise missiles capable of more than short tactical ranges, threatens to deprive NATO of a very attractive option for a medium-to-intermediate range system for interdiction or retaliation within the European theater.

The protocol is appended to the main treaty and is to last until the end of 1981. The main treaty goes on to 1985.

The protocol prohibits the testing of mobile missiles before 1982, and sets a limit on the range of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles until then. Many critics say that the Russians will try to squeeze America into continuing the protocol after 1981, which would stop the Americans from providing their European allies with the right sort of cruise-missile technology to balance the growing power of Soviet

missiles aimed at Western Europe.

As I am sure you already know, the strategy for NATO calls for a forward defense against conventional attack. I am sure you also understand that if that forward defense begins to weaken, the strategy calls for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, if that is the only way to contain the attack. Since there is such an imbalance in conventional forces favoring the Warsaw Pact, our allies have no illusions about the need for early resort to tactical nuclear weapons to defend Europe. With that in mind, you can see their interest

and concern at the language of the SALT II protocol.

In past years, NATO had a clearly superior position or, at least, a balance in theater nuclear forces. The Soviets, however, have conducted an intensive program of modernization and replacement in their theater nuclear forces. They are now in a position of approximately a three-to-one advantage, and the deployment of the SS20 intermediate-range ballistic missile and the Backfire bomber is particularly threatening to the alliance.

The allies necessarily are very concerned that

the protocol and other documents to the treaty do not limit the Backfire with regard to its use in Europe, and place restrictions on the range and deployability of cruise missiles, which might be deployed by the U.S. and its allies in Europe. Our NATO partners are seriously concerned about this development and about the effect of the SALT II protocol on our relations and our commitment to European and world security.

At the recent NATO conference in Brussels, which was organized by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Secretary



of State Henry Kissinger caused a great controversy and furor within American political, military and diplomatic circles, and particularly within the European community, when he said that the American nuclear umbrella, as represented by our arsenal of strategic weaponry, no longer provides any kind of protection for Western Europe against Soviet aggression. It certainly does not provide any protections against such aggression carried out by Soviet conventional military forces. Now that the Soviet Union has achieved parity in strategic weapons, the only function of our strategic arsenal is to deter a Soviet first strike against the U.S. itself. He said that no

American president is going respond to Soviet troop movements against Western Europe by launching these intercontinental missiles and bombers, when he knows that to do so is to invite retaliation which will reduce the U.S. to rubble.

This nuclear umbrella was a credible shield to Europe, so long as the US. had a clear and unquestionable superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. However, that is not now the case. NATO began to recognize this some time ago, and began to add tactical nuclear weapons to its arsenals. ~~Since~~ The Europeans and even the U.S. now

recognize that the Soviets' superiority in conventional troops and armaments mean that they will surely break through NATO's defenses, and that tactical nuclear response is the only thing that can slow up the Soviets if they happen to attack Europe. Since this is the case, the protocol to the SALT treaty and the understandings on the Backfire bomber, which clearly tell the Europeans that we are willing to make agreements on weapons systems to our advantage and their disadvantage, are of enormous concern to them.

f. Verification

Verification has been a very critical factor in the SALT negotiations and will be a very critical factor in the debate in the Senate on the SALT II treaty.

No one believes that we should rely on trust or on Soviet good faith. We should trust the Soviets to do exactly what will serve their best national interests.

We cannot agree to any SALT treaty which will require

on<sup>2</sup>-sight or on the ground verification. We must only agree to a SALT treaty, the provisions of which can be verified by our national technical means, such as satellite photography. These means are very effective.

One of the things that the administration could do to increase understanding of and support for a SALT treaty would be to make clear to the American people exactly what the general capabilities of our national technical systems are. Currently, those capabilities are so highly classified that only those with high security clearances and a demonstrated need-to-know within the government are aware of them. I am urging the

administration to take serious and immediate steps to declassify the essential elements of these systems so that they can be explained to the American people.

E. The ~~1974~~ SALT Debate

The questions we must ask ourselves are these:

(1) what will be the costs and benefits to the security of this country in the limitations, (2) what dangers are posed by the Soviet and American weapons programs, many of which are not limited by SALT II, (3) if we do not have a SALT II treaty, what are we going to do with regard to our strategic nuclear program and (4) how do the agreements affect the aims of each country in a

contest for world influence.

### Soviet Troops in Cuba

The deployment of Soviet troops in Cuba is a very serious matter. Obviously the existence of a mere 3,000 troops in Cuba, no matter what kind of troops they are, poses no direct threat to the security of the U.S. Obviously they are not going to attack the U.S. or do any direct damage to us.

However, they have implications quite beyond their size or character. They can be used for various

purposes. One is that they free Cuban troops for assault on Latin American nations. Another is that they may be assigned to protect Russian installations in Cuba, whose existence we may not be aware of. Another is that they may train Cuban troops to intervene around the world to spread Soviet influence and free the Cuban troops for that purpose.

Another, and potentially very great danger, is their very presence. If we discovered that the Cubans were doing something clearly against the interests of the U.S., clearly aggressive in nature toward nations



in the Western Hemisphere, could we intervene in Cuba if we felt it necessary for our vital interests? If we did so, with the presence of the Soviet troops, we would be in the position of directly threatening Soviet strength and presenting a direct confrontation to the Soviet Union.

This raises enormous implications for our national security.

Thus, it is absolutely essential that the issue of the Soviet troops in Cuba be resolved satisfactorily before we continue with any change of our relations with the Soviet Union. The President and the Secretary of

State recognize, as do the rest of us, the danger of this situation. They are doing everything within their powers to negotiate the resolution of the problem. These discussions are, of necessity, extremely sensitive and delicate. It is not appropriate to demagogue or to issue ultimatums at this time. It is particularly inappropriate to put the Russians in a position where they have to back down and lose face, because they are not willing to do that in very many instances. I regard this matter as so serious, however, I would not consider voting on ratification on the SALT II treaty until this matter is resolved.

## Defense Spending

The consideration of the SALT II treaty in the Senate has shifted from a debate on the treaty itself to defense and the needs for defense.

The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, has testified, as have other officials, that we are deficient in what we have been doing with regard to defense as opposed to the Russians in the last few years, and the real question is how much we are going to do to redress that balance.

Soviet defense programs have shown a steady increase from 1968 through 1978. The Soviets have sustained steady real increases in military outlays for 10 to 15 years while the U.S. has maintained a steady pace in decreasing real military expenditures. The Soviets have continued to climb and we have continued to descend.

In the most important category of military investment, the Soviets have spent over \$100 billion more than we have. This is the area encompassing new weapons systems, major spares and military

construction. In doing this, the Soviets have introduced four new ICBM's, the Backfire bomber, the SS20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, missile submarines, and sea-launched ballistic missiles, new tanks, new armored combat fighting vehicles, modernization of their tactical air forces, new air defense systems and whole new classes of ships.

If we look at the disparity in investment in defense between the Soviet Union and the U.S. over the last six years, and if the U.S. Department of Defense had at its disposal those funds, it could have bought

all 244 B-1 bombers, all MX missiles and 5,000 shelters to hide them in, the 13 Trident submarines programed to date, as well as all the Trident 1 missiles, all 7,000 XM-1 tanks that they want, 500 advance attack helicopters, 7,000 new infantry fighting vehicles and new tactical airlift planes. It could have bought 400 F-14's and 800 F-18's to modernize the naval airforce, and could have modernized the U.S. Airforce tactical air by adding 400 F-15's, 1250 F-16's and 400 A-10's.

In other words, if our Department of Defense had had available to it the money that the Soviet Union has had over and above what our Defense Department

has had, we would be clearly superior in national defense capabilities and would not be in our current position.

Recently, in the Senate we voted to increase budget ceilings so that we would have a real increase in defense spending of 3% this year and 5% in the two succeeding years, assuming a certain rate of inflation. We view this as the absolute minimum that we can do if we are going to make those hard decisions necessary to modernize and improve our strategic and conventional forces to meet the obvious threat of the Russian offensive build-up.

We cannot meet our military requirements with our current military capability. Unless we have these real increases in defense spending over the long term, the situation is only going to get worse.

In the area of strategic nuclear forces, we are losing essential equivalence and we will not be able to hold onto this edge unless we increase our effort in this strategic area. In theater nuclear systems, as I have said, we have already lost our advantage and we desperately need to modernize our theater nuclear systems. In the general purpose forces, our Army's



disadvantage is growing by the day.

### Politics and SALT

The entire SALT treaty debate process has become intensely politicized. Various people are using the SALT debate as a springboard to launch their presidential aspirations.

Various Senators are using things that happened during the SALT debate, such as the Soviet troops in Cuba, as a way to excuse themselves and curry favor with their conservative constituencies when they feel

themselves too liberal in their past performances. Just this week, former president Gerald Ford has made the clearest move so far in thrusting himself forward as a candidate for the presidency in 1980, by coming out with an elaborate apology for the decline in our defense posture during his term of office and with an attack on the SALT treaty, the basic tenets of which were negotiated during his presidency.

CONCLUSION

The debate on the SALT II treaty that we are having in the Senate is one of the most significant discussions in the history of this country. I would like to point out to you, however, that the debate on the technical aspects of American versus Soviet capability is a debate that will be characterized by more heat than light. At any point around the circumference of this argument, I can find 50 experts with impeccable qualifications who are absolutely sincere, who will swear that their position is correct. At any other point

around the circumference of this argument, I can find you an equal number of equally-qualified experts who are equally sincere, who will swear that their position is correct.

If we are each going to play our part in this critical national debate, which may involve our very survival, we must inform ourselves as thoroughly as we can on the potential of a SALT agreement or the lack of a SALT agreement. We must debate the question rationally without resorting to jingoism and

emotionalism, and above all, we must decide the question on the basis of what is in our real national interest.

The principal of arms control is enormously important and must be the desire of any rational person. The catch is how to agree on arms control with such precision and safeguards that each side can back off from the precipice at the same rate. If the rate is unequal and either side comes to believe itself either weaker or stronger than the other, the danger arises of aggression out of

insecurity or intimidation out of opportunity.

The basic questions we should grapple with in the SALT II debate are not black and white and do not lend themselves to simplistic, breast-beating rhetoric.

Should ratification of SALT II be linked to Soviet behavior at home and abroad? The real way to phrase this question is: Will the SALT II agreement be to our best national interest? If it is we should ratify it, if not we should reject it. The ideal of arms control need not blind us to Soviet dealings

around the world. We will continue to condemn their bad behavior and attempt to counter it. SALT II does not deal with this behavior nor with our own actions within our country or with third nations.

Can we trust the Russians? The real question is: Can we verify whether or not the Russians are complying with the provisions of SALT II that are essential to safe arms control? If we have to rely on trust that the Russians will comply with any vital element of a SALT agreement, we should not enter into the agreement. Not every minute detail

must be verified at all times. Our intelligence services should be able to tell us when a critical element of such a treaty is being violated, and do it in such a timely way that we can react to it.

If we are not satisfied they can do this, we should not ratify such a treaty.

Does a SALT II agreement freeze the U.S. into a position of unequal strategic disadvantage? Expressed in less "loaded" and more exact terms: Will strategic stability and the risk of nuclear war be increased or decreased by SALT II? We must determine whether SALT II will permit either side to develop



a capability not only greater in quantity but significantly different in character. We must decide if the agreement would permit this decisive margin of superiority to be gained without our being able to counter it.

We must not address only the question of what can SALT II do for us. We must also ask ourselves a much harder question: What will happen if we reject the treaty? We have seen the frightening growth of the Soviet arsenal even within the terms of SALT I. Can we expect them to change that pattern if we reject