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# STATE OF THE NAVY

## I. INTRODUCTION

In talking with you about the state of our Navy, I must tell you that it is in a very critical position. The current Navy structure of 12 carrier battle groups is the absolute minimum in capability needed to give us our offensive punch and to enable us to handle our required missions, both in peace and in wartime. This is probably the absolute minimum in numbers of combat units below which we cannot safely go without forfeiting our narrow margin of maritime superiority.

Maritime superiority is the yardstick against which we must measure the adequacy of our naval forces. This recognizes the hard fact of our geographic position as an island nation. As an island nation, maritime superiority is absolutely essential if we are to preserve our independence, our freedom of action, our influence and our economic well-being. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward, in testifying before our Armed Services Committee recently, said, "So long as we possess a clear margin of maritime superiority, the incentive to challenge our capability is greatly diminished. But let that margin become

tenuous, as it is today, and not only do we invite challenge, but in a more subtle way, we undermine the faith which our friends and allies have in our ability to meet our commitments. And we risk setting in motion profound political realignments that would be wholly inconsistent with our most basic national interests."

Admiral Hayward went on to say that he believed it essential for the Navy, not only to possess the ability to prevail over any maritime challenger, but to be perceived by the rest of the world as having that capability.

It is quite clear that the United States Navy is outnumbered by the navy of the Soviet Union, and is likely to remain in that inferior numerical position in the near future. The only way that we have been able to compensate for this numerical inferiority is by our sea-based tactical air superiority, our technological superiority and the fact that we can sustain our forces at sea. While the numbers of ships in our Navy will go up in the near term, as previously funded ships come into the inventory, the trend that we see, because of the shipbuilding level in this year's and last year's budgets, shows an inevitable decline in total ship

numbers beginning in about the mid-1980's, when the investment that we have made in past years slows down. There is plenty of blame to go around as to why the Navy is not building more ships. Probably the chief problem is that the Navy has not been able to articulate a coherent and rational shipbuilding program over the last few years. The Navy is in disarray because of disagreements within the Navy and the fact that there are actually several navies within the one Navy competing for attention. Because of these competing interests and the inability of the Navy leadership to get these elements together, the

Navy has not been able to define its mission clearly enough so that it can project a force structure required for that mission and thus has not been able to present to the Administration and to the Congress a defensible hardware-buying program.

## II. FY 79 SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION

In the Senate Armed Services Committee, and thus in the Senate, we recently completed work on the fiscal year 1979 supplemental authorization for the Department of Defense. This supplemental authorization was made necessary by the Administration veto of the

the first authorization bill last year, because we included a nuclear carrier in the bill. It would have been difficult and complicated enough to handle this 1979 supplemental authorization for items the Pentagon said were urgently needed, but then the Iranian crisis complicated the problem even more.

A. Iranian Destroyers

Iran had ordered four destroyers of a type currently being purchased by our Navy. When the government changed in Iran, Iran cancelled the order for these four destroyers. It then became possible



for the United States to buy these four destroyers, which are in various stages of completion, at prices significantly below what we would have to pay if we contracted for them now. This is because they were initially contracted for at prices which do not reflect the inflation of the last few years. It then became necessary to consider in our debate on the supplemental authorization whether we should buy these destroyers and, if so, whether they should be bought in the fiscal year 1979 supplemental authorization or in the 1980 budget. I did not believe that we needed to buy all four in the fiscal year 1979 authorization. But

the final action of the Committee was that we buy them all in 1979 rather than two in 1979 and two in 1980.

The Senate as a whole finally approved that position.

The House, however, has not acted on this supplemental.

B. Missiles

There were also several other items of military hardware that had been ordered by the Iranians and which they have now cancelled. Among these were three types of missiles of interest to the Navy: the Harpoon, the Standard Missile and the Phoenix; and we put in the supplemental authorization money for

some of these missiles which are currently being built for the Iranians. With regard to some of them however, they have been so compromised by the insecure situation that exists in Iran, and some others are obsolete, so that we were not willing to buy all of them.

C. F-14's in Iran

A significant problem exists as to the F-14's which were purchased by Iran and are currently there in that country. These are the most sophisticated fighters owned by our Navy. We are very much afraid that the sophisticated and sensitive systems on these

aircraft have been compromised by the insecure situation in Iran. However, there is another side to the coin. There have been overtures made by Iran to sell these F-14's back to the United States. If we could retrieve these at an acceptable figure, it might be advantageous to us.

### III. FY80 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

We have currently been holding hearings on the fiscal year 1980 defense authorization as presented by the President. I believe that we are going to make several changes in it in regard to Navy items.

A. Torpedoes

One of these is the Mark 48 torpedo. We have discovered that the Mark 48 torpedo, which is the primary anti-submarine and anti-ship torpedo used by our attack submarines is in short supply and the production line will be closing down in late 1979. The Navy has a 65% shortage in its needed torpedo allotment for tests and training. We are taking action in the Armed Services Committee to increase the procurement of these torpedoes and to keep the line open into the future so that we can have the necessary torpedoes.

B. Cruise Missiles

I discovered through my study and investigations that the cruise missile program was not being properly managed. The number of air-launch cruise missiles which is to be purchased is considerably greater than the number of sea-launch cruise missiles projected for purchase in the program. However, the number of tests being conducted are opposite to those numbers. In other words, for a smaller number of sea-launch cruise missiles, there are a greater number of tests being conducted. There appears to be no justification

for the inverse proportion of testing and funding for the cruise missile program. Therefore, I have insisted that language be put in our authorization report to try and straighten out that program, and also require the Navy, which manages the program, to report back to us on just exactly how they are conducting the sea-launch cruise missile launches and what their measure of success is.

C. Trident Missiles

With regard to our strategic nuclear ballistic submarine program, of course we are going to continue

funding for the research, development and procurement of the current program for Trident 1 missiles and submarines and for the research and development of the Trident 2 missile.

D. F-18

One controversial hardware program within the Navy which has not yet been finally determined is the F-18 program and exactly how many of these airplanes are going to be authorized and built. The Navy is moving into production of the F-18 aircraft and there is strong sentiment within our Committee to add onto



the number of F-18 aircraft requested by the Navy so that the Navy can be assisted in their aircraft modernization plans.

E. AV-8B

With regard to the Marine Corps there is one program that is of particular concern to them. As you know, the AV-8A Harrier is the vertical take off and landing aircraft that the Marines have been flying in their light attack missions. This aircraft is particularly advantageous for the Marines because it can operate from forward areas and requires no airfield.

This aircraft was developed by the British and has turned out to be an excellent aircraft. There were some initial difficulties which arose because of maintenance and supplies provisioning and the assignment of pilots who were less qualified than they should have been and several crashes resulted. However, once these problems were corrected, the problem of the crashes has been corrected. The AV-8B is the advanced version of the Harrier and is a significant improvement of the Harrier. The power plant remains essentially the same but the lift characteristics have been changed and the weight has been reduced so that it is a much more efficient

and productive aircraft as far as range and armament capability. We believe that the AV-8B research and development program should be continued and accelerated, and we wrote a letter urging the Armed Services Committee and the Senate to take that action. Let me read to you from that letter:

"We are writing to express our support for the restoration of \$180 million to the FY 1980 Authorization Request for the Navy RDT&E appropriation to continue development of the AV-8B V/STOL Advanced Harrier for the U.S. Marine Corps. Although the original request

was \$203 million, delays resulting from Defense Department withholding of the FY 1979 funding have reduced the amount which can be absorbed in FY 1980 to \$180 million.

"The Commandant of the Marine Corps has stated that this is his number one priority program in the FY 1980 budget. Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy have stated their support for the AV-8B in testimony before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate."

"The decision by the Secretary of Defense to deny funds to continue this program during FY 1980 is in direct contradiction to the actions and direction of the Congress, and specifically the Senate Armed Services Committee."

"... We consider the AV-8B to be a vitally important weapon system the development of which should be continued. We ask your assistance in restoring \$180 million for the AV-8B to the FY 1980 budget."

## F. Ships

With regard to Navy surface ships, the shipbuilding program being proposed by the Navy this fiscal year is a very modest one and certainly one that we not only should be able to support, but if we can find the funds within the budget, may be able to increase.

One of the most controversial items of course is another carrier. As I said before, last year we put a nuclear carrier into the authorization and the President vetoed the authorization bill because of that. He did, however, promise to put a carrier in this year's budget. He has done so. However, it is not

a nuclear carrier and its development and production costs may be so large that we would be better off in buying a nuclear carrier. This is going to be a very controversial issue, both in the Committee and on the floor of both the House and the Senate, and I can't predict now exactly what will come out.

#### IV. RESERVE

##### A. Ship Deactivation

With specific regard to the reserve forces, I know that you are aware that there is an early deactivation of 20 Naval Reserve ships. Admiral Hayward

told us that part of the reason for that early deactivation is the inability to man those ships with the necessary active-duty personnel. The Navy is simply not able to recruit and retain adequate active-duty personnel to maintain their own capabilities and the capabilities of our necessary Naval Reserve ships.

We are trying to provide the legislation, and we hope the Navy can provide the management, to recruit and retain the necessary people.

B. Selected Reserve

In the selected reserve forces, the Navy plans



significant decreases in several support activities. In research and development, base operating support, central logistics and central support, the Navy plans to decrease selected reservists by over 14,000, but to increase active-duty military by 2,200. We don't believe that these are areas where the active-duty personnel should be used and we believe that the selected reserve could be better utilized and we intend to take action to require the Navy to conform to that judgment.

C. Reserve Strength Stability

As you know, for the last two years there has

been an attempt to cut down the strength of the Naval Reserve. Both of those years I have been the sponsor of the amendment on the floor of the Senate which has been successful in keeping up the strength level of the Naval Reserve. This year the Navy again recommends a decrease in the strength of the Naval Reserve by 38,100 people. This year I took another tack and instead of doing it on the floor, we have gone to the Committee itself and have signed a strong letter supporting a stable Naval Reserve strength of 87,000. Let me read to you a portion of that letter:

"We are deeply concerned by the Administration's attempts to make drastic reductions in the Naval Reserve in the Fiscal Year 1980 budget proposal. After carefully reviewing this recommendation, we believe that this authorization would tend to erode further our national security posture by severely reducing our naval wartime responsiveness. In view of the importance of protecting our Naval Reserve readiness at a time when maintaining personnel levels is becoming a grave problem, we ask your support to restore the Naval Reserve force level to 87,000.

"As you know, the Department of Defense has produced four studies during the past six years recommending Naval Reserve strength in excess of 90,000 reservists. Admiral Hayward, the new Chief of Naval Operations, has clearly stated his reliance upon the Naval Reserve by emphasizing that the reserve is vital to our services' overall strength and readiness. Last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized an 87,000 strength level and expressed concern that requested reductions in the Naval Reserve could lead to losses of important capabilities and critical types of units. In approving

a stabilized strength level last year, the Committee reemphasized its view that new or augmented missions should be developed whereby the Naval Reserve could be more closely affiliated with the active fleet.

"Specifically, we believe that the reduction of personnel from 87,000 to 48,000, the deletion of the Naval Reserve Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Squadrons, the Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons, Air Composite Squadrons, the retirement of 20 destroyers without replacement, the closing of 101 Naval Reserve centers and eight Readiness Commands is inconsistent with the

posture of military preparedness that is essential to this vital segment of our reserve establishment. This reorganization of the Naval Reserve is, without question, ill-advised and ill-timed, and we hope that you will help put to rest this annual restructuring that has tended to inhibit the development of a total force policy for our Navy.

"Mr. Chairman, we urge that the Senate Armed Services Committee take the necessary actions to maintain the strength of the Naval Reserve during Fiscal Year 1980 despite DOD efforts to the contrary.

We ask your leadership to ensure that the Naval Reserve is strengthened rather than crippled as the Administration has proposed. We feel that the maintenance of a strong Naval Reserve is in the best interests of our Navy and our Nation."

V. CONCLUSION

I assure you that I am dedicated to the maintenance of United States maritime superiority. I regard it as absolutely fundamental for the survival of this country as a free, independent and economically viable society. I am not content with what the Navy

and the Administration have done in the past to assure the strength of our Navy, and as you can see, I have been taking every opportunity I can to ensure that our Navy, both active and reserve components, have the people and the equipment that we need to retain at least our narrow margin of superiority at sea.