

ORGANIZATIONS SERVED BY THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE CENTER

Garner, North Carolina

October 23, 1977

1. 171st Support Group, Commanded by Colonel James H. Wheless
2. 3286th USAR School, Commanded by Colonel Thomas M. Moore
The school includes the following courses:
Command and General Staff Classes
Officer Advanced Course
Senior Warrant Officer Course
Military Occupational Specialty Courses
Non-commissioned Officer Academy
(This school has the largest student body of any USAR school in the 120th Army Reserve Command.)
3. 319th Public Affairs Detachment, Commanded by Major John Straiton

Note: You will be introduced by Brigadier General Ben Rushing, Deputy Commander, 120th U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

Other military dignitaries present will be:
General Brandenburg, representative of the 1st Army at Fort Meade and General McKinney of the North Carolina Army National Guard.

The program begins at 3:00 p.m. Your talk is at 3:30 for 20 minutes. The program is to end at 4:30.

Intro: Status and Changing Role of Reserve

1. National defense capabilities must be purchased with scarce tax money.
 - a. 65% of that money for defense goes to personnel costs.
 - b. To make the AVF concept work this cannot be allowed to increase.
 1. Results in inadequate hardware.
 2. Taxpayers will opt for inadequate defense.
 - c. Only way to provide adequate force is to make total force concept work.
2. Reserves are most cost effective.
 - a. Low cost to train and maintain.
 - b. Low cost of benefits and retirement.
 - c. Highly motivated.
 - d. Capable.
3. Reserve problems.
 - a. Neglect found by RAND study.
 - b. Strength problems.
 - c. Actual versus authorized not a true measure.
 - d. Quality of AD leadership.
 - e. Quality of training.
 - f. Quality of accessions.
 - g. Readiness and mobilization capabilities.
4. Solutions.
 - a. Reserve recruiting improvement.
 - b. Intensify the interest in active duty leadership support of the reserve.
 - c. Critically examine the force structure to best use the reserve.
 - d. Provide reserves with dynamic and realistic training and missions to motivate.
 - e. Unhappy option of return to a form of national service.
 1. Short active duty and long reserve.
 2. Long active duty.
 3. Non-military national service, longer than 1 or 2.

One of the things that I am proudest of in my life is that I have been a citizen soldier. That means that I was privileged to be an American citizen, who remained a citizen of North Carolina and who was honored to serve in our reserve forces, I was called to active duty and mobilized as a member of our reserve forces, returned to North Carolina and served until my retirement from the reserve. Both by experience and from conviction I know that the reserves in our military are among the most highly motivated, best trained, and dedicated personnel in our armed forces.

As a reservist, as a North Carolinian and as your Senator I know of and am proud of the job that is done by the 171st support group under Colonel Wheless; by the 3286th USAR school under Colonel Moore and by the 319th Public Affairs detachment under Major Straiton.

I think it particularly appropriate that this fine reserve

center which we dedicate today should be named for another Moore, General James Moore, one of the most distinguished of our North Carolina ancestors. Like the rest of us reservists, General Moore was not one of the regular military establishment but rather a young gentleman of one of the families of the province which became North Carolina. He had that dedication to his countrymen and his neighbors that is evident in the best of our reserves; that dedication which was decisive in the struggle to form this country and will remain decisive in our efforts to keep it free.

In dedicating this center for the service of the reserves and the community, I want to share with you my views of the reserve, its status, and its needs in the years to come.

ADDRESS BY ROBERT MORGAN

STATUS

The reserve forces of the United States are vital elements of the nation's total military and total force concept. All seven of the main components of our reserve forces; the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve have a great responsibility for quick mobilization and deployment in the whole spectrum of wartime scenarios. As an example, the Army Reserve is comprised of about 3,350 units, most of which are combat support and combat service units. Over half the Army's support capabilities are in the Army Reserve. The Army Guard has about 3,280 units, more than two thirds being combat units. Army Guard units represent about 46 percent of the Army's combat units and 8 of the Army's 24 combat divisions are in the Guard. The Army

Reserve and Army Guard units are organized with missions, people, and equipment and are the prime sources of trained and ready units to augment the active Army in an emergency. These units are manned by citizen soldiers whose true roots are in their communities, but who stand ready for the call to combat anywhere in the world.

CHANGING ROLE

The Reserves have performed well and heroically throughout the history of our country. Our military has always been built on the concept of the citizen soldier, whose training and loyalty enable him to respond to the nation's needs, and has been built on the absence of a large standing force. In the past the theory was that the active Army could bear the brunt of the initial assault and hold the ground until the reserve components could be mobilized, trained, and equipped. This is no longer the case. Today we have a Total Force, a combination of the active and reserve components which have been

welded into one fighting force, with the greatest reliance in our history being placed upon the reserves to be ready for mobilization almost instantly. For example, in the Army 53 percent of the combat assets are in the reserve components. Sixty-seven percent of combat service support assets are now in the reserve components, and 80 percent of the forces needed in the United States Army Reserve structure are combat service and combat service support units. In the future when the Army is committed, the reserves must be able to join it immediately.

DEFENSE COSTS

The national defense capabilities for America must be purchased with increasingly scarce tax money. We have come to the point where approximately 65 percent of the money spent for defense goes for personnel costs. Some of these increased costs, though by no means

all, were caused by the All Volunteer Force concept. This concept has resulted in the elimination of the selective service draft, and the reliance on volunteers to maintain the strengths of the military components. Prior to the all volunteer force, young males facing conscription had the choice of a two year active duty tour and several years of reserve requirement, or a six year assignment with a reserve component, of which several months were devoted to full time active duty. During this period the reserve components were able to maintain their strengths at about total authorized levels, even while being selective with the applicants. The large number of reservists entering the program in the late 1960's and early 70's meant that large number of discharges would occur in the mid to late 1970's.

If the all volunteer force concept is to work we must slow the rise of personnel costs. If we do not, the inevitable results will

be inadequate hardware and military equipment, because too much of the money will be used for personnel costs, and the final result is that the taxpayers will opt for inadequate defense, a result we cannot allow to happen.

RESERVES MAKE TOTAL FORCE WORK

It seems clear that the only way in which we can provide an adequate force is to make the Total Force concept work. This means that we must find ways to maintain a vital reserve force, since the reserves are the most cost effective element of the military personnel structure. A viable reserve force can be maintained at a relatively low cost for training as opposed to the standing forces and the reserves are low cost in benefits and retirements. The reserves have been and can consistently be made to have high motivation and capabilities.

RESERVE PROBLEMS

The reserves are not without problems. A Rand Corporation study just completed for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, concludes that the selected reserves under the all volunteer force concept appear to be as good as their draft-dependent predecessors. But the report goes on to say that there are problems in the reserves which transcend any questions of draft versus the All Volunteer Force. These problems result, instead, from the more than 25 years of neglect under which the reserves have struggled. For most of the postwar period the reserves were an afterthought, frequently provided with only outdated or obsolete equipment. This situation has begun to change significantly, and deliberate attempts are being made to upgrade the materiel readiness of the reserves, including some significant improvements in their weaponry and support

systems. Improvement in personnel management has perhaps been even slower, although efforts were made in the mid-50's to improve the efficiencies of the reserves. There has been virtually no change since then, a period of more than 20 years. Thus, I believe a major review of the reserves seems to be clearly in order.

As I mentioned before, the reserve has serious strength problems. For example, the current strength in the Army reserve continues to decline at an alarming rate. There are various causes for this. It seems quite clear to me that during the Viet Nam conflict there were young men who chose the reserves as they believed the choice would cause less disruption in their personal lives. By fiscal year 1974, because of the wind-down of the Viet Nam conflict and the elimination of the draft, the Army Reserve components found it more difficult to attract enlistees. The draft-motivated volun-

teers who had provided nearly three fourths of the Army Reserve enlistees during the Viet Nam conflict had disappeared, and the number of new enlistees who had not had previous military experience declined significantly. The net result was an inability of the Army Reserve and to a lesser degree the Army National Guard to maintain personnel strength levels as they had in the Viet Nam conflict era.

Likewise, with U.S. involvement in the Viet Nam conflict, anti-military sentiment grew in the country. This, when coupled with the elimination of the draft, had a detrimental impact on the ability of reserve components to recruit personnel.

The figures for reserve personnel are always given as actual as opposed to authorized strengths. I believe these figures are deceptive, and the situation is probably actually worse than is portrayed by the commonly quoted statistics. I have a strong

suspicion that the authorized strengths decrease not as a result of a careful examination of the needs for personnel, but as a result of an attempt to adjust the authorizations closer to what is actually achievable in the accessions.

There is some suggestion that there has been a problem in the quality of the accessions into both the reserve and the active duty forces. I also feel there has been some degradation in the quality of the active duty leadership being provided for the reserve forces, and a degradation in the training, readiness, and mobilization capabilities of the reserve forces as a result of the neglect of the last 25 years.

SOLUTIONS

I am convinced that the All Volunteer Force concept and the Total Force concept are inseparable and one cannot work without the other; that serious efforts must be made to review probable threats,

logistics structures, reserve organization, and reserve motivation

if this vital component of the Total Force is to be maintained.

Clearly we should intensify the interest in the active duty leader-

ship for support of the reserve elements. This active duty leader-

ship should critically examine the force structure for the best use

of the reserve. They must provide the reserves with dynamic and

realistic training and missions, because a knowledge that you are

part of a ready and competent military organization is the best

possible motivator for both enlistment and retention. There must be

increased attention to reserve recruiting, and an education process

undertaken to make the public and the active force aware that this

highly motivated, well-trained, dynamic reserve force which can be

produced is not a second cousin or something to be put up with for

political purposes, but is a viable, essential component of the

Total Force.

A failure to take these actions can result only in the unhappy option of a return to a form of national service, with such alternatives as a long period of active duty; short period of active duty and long reserve service; or non-military national service of a longer duration than either of the first two choices. As the Rand Corporation study concluded, the All Volunteer Force can be made to fail but it can also be made to work, and it can be made to work much better than the draft system. Whether or not the potential of the All Volunteer Force is realized will depend in large part upon whether the Total Force concept works; and the Total Force concept can work if the Department of Defense and the people are aware of the necessity to make the hard decisions and promote the reforms necessary to recruit, train, and motivate the dynamic, essential reserve component of that Total Force.