

MILITARY HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS

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DURING THIS CONGRESS, WHICH RUNS THROUGH 1978, AND THE NEXT CONGRESS, THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE IS GOING TO BE PRESENTED WITH THE TASK OF DECIDING THE FATE OF SEVERAL "HARDWARE" ITEMS THE ARMY FEELS ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

THE MOST OBVIOUS OF THESE, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE PUBLICITY IT HAS RECEIVED, IS THE XMV TANK SYSTEM. THIS IS TO PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT TO THE ARMY'S OFFENSIVE GROUND COMBAT POWER THROUGH IMPROVED FIRE CONTROL AND BALLISTIC PROTECTION, HIGHER SPEEDS, FASTER ACCELERATION AND SHOOT ON THE MOVE CAPABILITIES. IF IT GOES INTO PRODUCTION, IT WILL REPLACE SOME OF THE M60 SERIES TANKS AND \$400 MILLION IS NEEDED IN FY 79 IF THAT PRODUCTION DECISION IS MADE. THE ARMY ULTIMATELY WANTS 3,312 OF THESE TANKS AND THE COST OF EACH ONE AT THAT QUANTITY WOULD BE \$1.2 MILLION.

ANOTHER KEY ARMY PROGRAM IS THE ADVANCED ATTACK HELICOPTER (AAH) WHICH IS DESIGNED TO KILL THE SOVIET VERSION OF OUR XMI TANK. IT PROVIDES A HIGHLY MOBILE ANTITANK CAPABILITY ABLE TO OPERATE DAY OR NIGHT IN ADVERSE WEAPON^{THAT} AND CAN DEFEAT ANY KNOWN ARMOR WITH ITS MISSILES, CANNONS AND ROCKETS. IF THIS HELICOPTER GOES INTO PRODUCTION, THE UNIT COST IS LIKELY TO BE VERY HIGH - IN THE \$5 MILLION PER COPY RANGE.

FOR THIS REASON, THERE IS SOME CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN FITTING ONE OF THE OTHER KEY ITEMS ON THE ARMY'S NEED LIST TO DO TWO JOBS. THIS IS THE UTILITY TACTICAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UTTAS) WHICH IS CURRENTLY DESIGNED TO TRANSPORT INFANTRY UNITS INTO COMBAT, RESUPPLY THESE UNITS, PROVIDE MEDICAL

EVACUATION AND REPOSITIONING OF RESERVES. THE UNIT COST OF THIS HELICOPTER IS TO BE ABOUT HALF THAT OF THE AAH AND THERE MAY BE A WAY TO HAVE TWO VERSIONS; ONE A TRANSPORT, THE OTHER AN ATTACK HELICOPTER. THESE WOULD THEN REPLACE BOTH THE HUEY AND THE COBRA NOW IN THE INVENTORY.

THE ARMY FEELS IT NEEDS A CONSIDERABLE JUMP IN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND IS PROMOTING THREE NEW SYSTEMS FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES.

THE FIRST IS THE ADVANCED FORWARD AREA AIR DEFENSE GUN, A FOLLOW-ON TO THE 20 MM VULCAN GUN SYSTEM. THIS NEW GUN WILL ACCOMPANY ARMORED AND MECHANIZED MANEUVER FORCES AND PROVIDE RESPONSIVE AIR DEFENSE AGAINST HELICOPTERS ARMED WITH ANTI-TANK MISSILES AND AGAINST LOW LEVEL, HIGH SPEED AIRCRAFT.

THE SECOND IS THE ROLAND WHICH IS DESIGNED FOR AIR DEFENSE FOR AIR BASES AND REAR AREA TARGET COMPLEXES. THIS SYSTEM WAS PARTIALLY FOREIGN DEVELOPED AND HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE COST GROWTH IN DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION, CAUSING CONSIDERABLE CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY.

THE NEXT IS THE PATRIOT, AN ADVANCED SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM, TO REPLACE THE ARMY'S PRESENT HIGH AND MEDIUM ALTITUDE SYSTEMS (NIKE HERCULES AND HAWK) AND WILL PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE AT FIELD ARMY LEVEL IN THE 1980'S AND BEYOND. THE PATRIOT IS A SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM USING PHASED ARRAY RADAR AND CONTROLLED BY DIGITAL COMPUTER.

THE LAST OF THE ARMY'S SIGNIFICANT SYSTEM DESIRES IS THE INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE (IFV) WHICH IS DESIGNED TO GIVE THE INFANTRY THE CAPABILITY FOR MOUNTED COMBAT AND OPERATE AS A COMPANION VEHICLE TO THE TANK. THIS WILL BE A

TRACKED, HIGHLY ARMOED, AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE DESIGNED TO CARRY A SQUAD OF INFANTRY.

SEVERAL OF THESE PROGRAM ITEMS LEAD INTO A SERIOUS CONCERN OF THE COMMITTEE - NATO RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY. NATO IS SERIOUSLY HAMPERED IN ITS DEFENSE POSTURE BY NATIONAL ARMAMENTS INVENTORIES LARGELY INCOMPATIBLE ONE TO ANOTHER. THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED FOR A NATO DEFENSE PROGRAM TO INSURE COORDINATED EFFORTS TO ALLEVIATE THESE PROBLEMS. ONE WAY CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION IS THE POSSIBILITY FOR CO-PRODUCTION OF THE PATRIOT MISSILE BETWEEN A U.S. AND EUROPEAN COMPANY. ANOTHER IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE ADVANCED FORWARD AREA IN DEFENSE GUN COULD BE BOUGHT FOR THE ALLIANCE, POSSIBLY FROM AMONG SUCH COMPETITORS AS A CURRENT GERMAN CANDIDATE. THE ROLAND MISSILE ITSELF IS A STEP IN THAT DIRECTION, HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT IN ITS ANCESTRY.

FOR ALL THIS TALK ABOUT FASCINATING NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND ARMAMENTS, THE REAL PROBLEMS LIE IN THE AREA OF PEOPLE, WHOSE COST HAS GROWN SO GREAT AS TO IMPERIL THE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS AND FORCE CUTBACKS IN NUMBERS OF OUR FIGHTING FORCE.

MANY OF THE PEOPLE PROBLEMS ARE UNIVERSAL TO THE SERVICES, BUT SOME OF THEM LOOM LARGER FOR THE ARMY.

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL SKEPTICISM ON THE COMMITTEE OVER THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE. ~~THIS PROGRAM WAS STARTED TO ELIMINATE CONSCRIPTION BY MAKING THE SERVICE MORE ATTRACTIVE THROUGH RAISING PAY AND IMPROVING THE CONDITIONS OF SERVICE. AT~~

GREAT EXPENSE AND EFFORT AND SOME DEGRADATION OF QUALITY; THE IDEA HAS BEEN MADE TO WORK. AS THE POOL OF 18 YEARS OLD MANPOWER CONTINUES TO DECREASE AND THE COMPETITION BETWEEN THE SERVICES AND INDUSTRY FOR THOSE YOUNG PEOPLE GROWS, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO RECRUIT AND THE COST THREATENS TO OVERWHELM THE REQUIREMENTS FOR HARDWARE. THE PROBLEM EVEN RAISES THE SPECTOR OF IMPROPRIETIES IN THE RECRUITING EFFORTS AS COMPETITION GROWS. THE COMMITTEE IS SURE TO HAVE LENGTHY DELIBERATIONS ON THE WISDOM OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE.

ALONG THIS SAME LINE, IT IS SURE TO TAKE AN INTEREST IN THE ACTUAL OR PROPOSED REDUCTION IN SUPPORT FOR NON-APPROPRIATED FUND ACTIVITIES, WHICH SUPPORT IS NECESSARY COST OF ATTRACTING THAT "ALL-VOLUNTEER" FORCE.

HAND IN HAND WITH THE PERSONNEL COSTS AND RECRUITING PROBLEMS OF THE ACTIVE FORCE ARE THE EVEN MORE VEXING ONES OF THE RESERVE PROGRAM. ^{HERE WAS A PROBLEM} WHEN THE SERVICES TOOK IN LARGE QUANTITIES OF PEOPLE AND DISCHARGED THEM TO SERVE THE BALANCE OF THEIR COMMITMENT IN THE RESERVES, THIS SOURCE OF MEMBERS FOR THE RESERVE HAS DRIED UP WITH THE END OF THE DRAFT AND NO SUCCESSFUL WAY TO RECRUIT TO FILL RESERVE RANKS HAS BEEN DISCOVERED. IF THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT, A MIX OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE FORCES TO THE BEST ADVANTAGE FOR THE LEAST MONEY, IS TO CONTINUE MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO CUT PERSONNEL COSTS IN GENERAL WHILE ENTICING HIGH QUALITY PEOPLE TO ENTER THE SERVICE. THERE HAS BEEN PROPOSED THE RESERVE REVITALIZATION ACT WHICH WAS TO CREATE A SPECIAL CATEGORY

OF INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR) WHOSE MEMBERS WOULD HAVE A LONG INITIAL ENLISTMENT BUT WITH NO EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY AFTER 12 WEEKS OF TRAINING. VARIOUS TAX, PAY AND INSURANCE INCENTIVES WERE THOUGHT NECESSARY TO ATTRACT THE MEMBERS. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE SERVICES AS TO THE WISDOM OF THE PLAN AND IT HAS NOT YET THIS YEAR COME FORTH FROM THE ADMINISTRATION.

THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SERVICES ON THE DEFENSE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT. DOPMA IS THE CULMINATION OF A NUMBER OF EFFORTS BY THE DOD AND CONGRESS OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS TO UPDATE THE LAWS PERTAINING TO COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. ADDITIONALLY, IT SPECIFICALLY COMPLIES WITH A 1972 CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE FOR LEGISLATION FOR NEW PERMANENT GRADE LIMITATIONS THAT WILL PROVIDE SIMILAR CAREER OPPORTUNITY FOR THE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF EACH MILITARY SERVICE AND ELIMINATE THE RECURRING NEED SINCE 1959 FOR TEMPORARY GRADE RELIEF LEGISLATION FOR THE AIR FORCE

DOPMA IS NOT A RADICAL CHANGE FROM THE TEMPORARY SYSTEMS IN ACTUAL USE TODAY AND IT WILL NOT HAVE A DRAMATIC EFFECT ON THE EXISTING OFFICER FORCE STRUCTURES. IT BASICALLY ATTEMPTS TO CLEAN UP SOME INEFFICIENCIES, CURE CERTAIN INEQUITIES IN OFFICER TREATMENT, PROVIDE NEW TOOLS TO CONTROL THE FORCE DURING EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION AND ESTABLISH MORE UNIFORM PERMANENT PROMOTION, SEPARATION AND RETIREMENT LAWS FOR EACH SERVICE. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT MAKING A RADICAL DEFACTO CHANGE, THERE ARE OLD LAWS WHICH NEED CHANGE AND A BRIEF LOOK AT HISTORY WILL EXPLAIN WHY.

THE OFFICER PERSONNEL ACT OF 1947 (OPA) IS THE FOUNDATION FOR TODAY'S OFFICER PERSONNEL SYSTEM; HOWEVER, IT WAS DESIGNED FOR SMALL, ALL-REGULAR FORCES THAT WERE EXPECTED FOLLOWING WWII. THE ACT DOES HAVE TEMPORARY PROVISIONS BUT THESE WERE EXPECTED TO PHASE-OUT OVER A TEN-YEAR PERIOD AS WORLD WAR II RESERVE AND TEMPORARY OFFICERS LEFT AND THE FORCE BECAME ALL-REGULAR. NONE THE LESS, THE TEMPORARY PROMOTION SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT FOR THIRTY YEARS BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO KEEP LARGE NUMBERS OF RESERVES ON ACTIVE DUTY TO MEET MUCH LARGER FORCE REQUIREMENTS. AS EVENTS PROVED, OPA HAD INEFFECTIVE LIMITS FOR TEMPORARY PROMOTIONS SO IN 1954 CONGRESS PASSED THE OFFICER GRADE LIMITATION ACT (OGLA) TO SUPPLEMENT OPA AND ESTABLISH GRADE LIMITS TO COVER BOTH REGULAR AND RESERVE OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY.

JEHNA THE BILL PASSED IN THE HOUSE LAST YEAR AND WILL AGAIN THIS YEAR. OUR COMMITTEE, HOWEVER, HAS SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE BILL. WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE GRADE AUTHORIZATIONS IN THE BILL ARE ADEQUATELY JUSTIFIED BY MISSION REQUIREMENTS; WE THINK THE "UP OR OUT" PROVISIONS NEED MODIFICATION, PERHAPS TO PERMIT SELECTIVE CONTINUATION OF MAJORS TO 24 YEARS SERVICE AND CAPTAINS TO 20 YEARS; AND WE THINK ANOTHER LOCK MUST BE TAKEN AT THE RESERVE INTEGRATION AND FORCE-OUT PROCEDURES, PERHAPS WITH A VIEW TO INTEGRATION INTO THE REGULAR FORCE AFTER 5 YEARS OF DEMONSTRATED PERFORMANCE AND NOT SEPARATING RESERVE OFFICERS FOR FAILURE TO BE INTEGRATED. I FORESEE EXTENSIVE HEARINGS AND REVISIONS IN THE BILL IF IT IS TO WIN SENATE APPROVAL.

AS A COROLLARY TO ALL THE PEOPLE PROBLEMS, THERE ARE THE CONSIDERATIONS OF BENEFITS. ANY CHANGE OR PERCEIVED CHANGE IN THIS AREA HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE, RECRUITING, RETENTION, RESERVE PROGRAMS, UNIONIZATION THREATS, ETC. FOR EXAMPLE, AN ISSUE WHICH WILL ARISE AGAIN IS AN ATTEMPT TO PUT A CONGRESSIONAL CEILING ON MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO MORALE AND WELFARE ACTIVITIES. WE KNOW THAT THESE ACTIVITIES ARE A NECESSARY PART OF MILITARY LIFE, ESPECIALLY IN REMOTE AREAS. HOWEVER, THE COST IN MANPOWER IS AN AREA WHICH IS SUBJECT TO QUESTION IN THESE TIMES OF ESCALATING PEOPLE COSTS AND PRESSURES TO CUT BACK.