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"AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY"

IT IS ALWAYS A PLEASURE TO SPEAK TO A GROUP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATION'S SECURITY. TONIGHT I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF MY THOUGHTS ABOUT AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY.

I HAVE A FIRM COMMITMENT. IT IS SIMPLE AND DIRECT. I FEEL THAT OUR COUNTRY HAS TO MAINTAIN A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. I BELIEVE THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY MOST NORTH CAROLINIANS.

OUR STATE IS CERTAINLY MAKING A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE THROUGH OUR BASES AT FORT BRAGG, SEYMOUR JOHNSON, CHERRY POINT, AND CAMP LEJEUNE.

WHEN I SAY THAT WE NEED TO REMAIN STRONG IN THE DEFENSE AREA, I DO NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD NOT CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZE OUR DEFENSE BUDGETS. OUR NATION HAS MANY IMPORTANT NEEDS ON THE DOMESTIC SIDE AND AN UNNECESSARY DRAIN OR WASTE OF OUR RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE WOULD SLOW OUR PROGRESS IN OTHER CRUCIAL PROGRAMS FOR THE AMERICAN

PEOPLE. SO, MY GOAL IN THE SENATE WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN A STRONG SECURITY POSTURE WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE EXPENDITURE OF RESOURCES.

AS FAR AS I CAN TELL, DEFENSE SPENDING IS LEVELING OFF WHEN YOU CONSIDER IT IN TERMS OF BUYING POWER. THINGS ARE GOING UP IN EVERY SECTOR OF OUR ECONOMY AND DEFENSE IS NOT SPARED THE PRICE OF INFLATION. PETROLEUM PRICE INCREASES ALONE WILL ADD \$1.7 BILLION TO THE 1975 BUDGET--ABOVE THE 1973 COSTS FOR THE SAME PETROLEUM (UP 125 PERCENT).

ACCORDING TO TESTIMONY IN CONGRESS THIS LAST MONTH (MARCH 4TH BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE), THE DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST OF \$85.8 BILLION FOR 1975 REPRESENTS THE LOWEST LEVEL OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES SINCE 1951, IN TERMS OF PURCHASING POWER. THE TESTIMONY ALSO SHOWED A REDUCTION OF ABOUT 1.5 MILLION PEOPLE IN OUR ARMED FORCES SINCE 1968 (3.5 MIL VS 2.1 MIL).

I ALSO NOTED THAT NATIONAL DEFENSE SPENDING PER CAPITA IN THIS COUNTRY WILL DECLINE FROM \$325 IN 1968 TO \$202 IN 1973 IN BUYING POWER, WHILE OTHER PUBLIC SPENDING IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE FROM \$693 TO \$900 PER CAPITA DURING THE SAME PERIOD.

THIS IS A TREND THAT WE ARE ALL GLAD TO SEE AS LONG AS WE MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SECURITY AT THE SAME TIME. I HOPE THAT WORLD CONDITIONS AND THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT WILL FURTHER LESSEN THE NEED TO SPEND LARGE AMOUNTS ON ARMS. I WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE IN FAVOR OF MAKING CUTS THAT WOULD DANGEROUSLY WEAKEN OUR CAPABILITY TO DEFEND OUR OWN COUNTRY OR BRING ON A SITUATION WHEREIN THE UNITED STATES COULD BE INTIMIDATED AND COERCED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE INDIFFERENCE OR HOSTILITY THAT MANY AMERICANS EXPRESS TOWARD THE MILITARY. THESE ATTITUDES ARE SO WIDESPREAD THAT THEY MAY HAVE A PROFOUNDLY ADVERSE EFFECT UPON NATIONAL DEFENSE.

IN A DEMOCRACY, NATIONAL DEFENSE SUFFERS WHEN THERE IS LACK OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT. IT MAY BE FATALLY UNDERMINED WHEN A SIGNIFICANT SEGMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION IS NOT MERELY INDIFFERENT, BUT HOSTILE.

THE WAY TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IS TO PUT THE "DEFENSE HOUSE" IN ORDER.

A GOOD BEGINNING WOULD BE A GENERAL POLICY THAT THE MILITARY SERVICES CONFINE THEMSELVES STRICTLY TO THOSE FUNCTIONS THAT HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE NICE-TO-HAVE FUNCTIONS HAVE GOT TO GO IN FAVOR OF FIGHTING CAPABILITIES. AS AN EXAMPLE, I SEE NO REASON WHY AIR FORCE DOCTORS SHOULD BE CONDUCTING SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS ON BEAGLES. THE DOCTORS SHOULD GO BACK TO BEING MILITARY DOCTORS, DIRECTLY SUPPORTING THE MEN IN THE COMBAT UNITS.

ANOTHER GROUP OF MILITARY MEN WHO SHOULD RETURN TO PERFORMING TASKS MORE AKIN TO THEIR TRAINING AND RANK ARE THE GENERALS NOW SERVING AS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE. ALL OF THESE MEN ARE HIGH RANKING, USUALLY LT. GENERAL OR MAJOR GENERAL AND MOST ARE EXPERIENCED IN COMBAT AS WELL AS HAVING SERVED AS COMMANDERS OF UNITS. THEY WOULD BE BETTER UTILIZED SOMEWHERE IN THEIR SERVICES AND NOT IN THE CIVILIAN HIERARCHY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S

OFFICE. NOT ONLY CAN THEY DO MORE IN THEIR SERVICES, BUT THEIR PRESENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CERTAINLY IS IN VIOLATION OF THE SPIRIT OF STRICT CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY.

THE SAME CAN BE SAID FOR GREAT NUMBERS OF LOWER RANKING OFFICERS WHO ARE SPRINKLED THROUGHOUT OSD. WHEN YOU CONSIDER THAT MR. BREHM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, TOLD REPORTERS THAT A MAJOR REVIEW OF ALL HEAD-QUARTERS, INCLUDING THE PENTAGON, COULD ELIMINATE UP TO 60,000 JOBS, THE REASON FOR CONCERN ABOUT WASTE IS EVIDENT.

ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM CONFRONTING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS THE THREAT THAT THE HIGH COST OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS WILL "PRICE THE SERVICES OUT OF BUSINESS".

THIS THREAT AND PAST EXPERIENCE WITH RUNAWAY COST OVERRUNS HAS PROMPTED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO DIRECT CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO SOLVE THIS MONUMENTAL PROBLEM.

FIRST AND MOST OBVIOUS IS A NEW, STRICT, SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN WEAPONS THAT ARE NEEDED AND THOSE THAT ARE "NICE TO HAVE".

ALSO THE DoD INTENDS TO STRUCTURE THE FORCE USING THE "HI-LOW" MIX CONCEPT. FOR A PARTICULAR MISSION, THE FORCE WOULD CONSIST OF A SMALL NUMBER OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE, SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS CAPABLE OF COPING WITH THE MAXIMUM ENEMY THREAT AND A LARGER NUMBER OF LESS SOPHISTICATED AND LESS EXPENSIVE WEAPONS FOR COUNTERING LESSER ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

OTHER REFORMS ARE TAKING PLACE IN DEFENSE CONTRACTING. WITH THE DESIGN-TO-A-COST CONCEPT, THE SERVICES AND THEIR PROJECT MANAGERS WILL HAVE TO WEIGH COSTS--ALONG WITH PERFORMANCE AND SCHEDULE-- IN THE EVOLUTION OF A WEAPON.

ANOTHER CONCERN IS THE VOLUNTEER FORCE. THE ARMY IS HAVING THE MOST PROBLEMS. IT HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS RECRUITING QUOTA NEARLY EVERY MONTH SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE VOLUNTEER PROGRAM. FIGURES RELEASED APRIL 16 BY THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHOW A SHORTFALL OF 22,000 MEN FOR ALL SERVICES WITH 17,000 OF THIS BEING IN THE ARMY. NOBODY IN WASHINGTON, HOWEVER, IS THINKING OF RETURNING TO THE DRAFT.

ASIDE FROM RECRUITING SHORTFALLS, OTHER UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE VOLUNTEER ARMY CENTER ON FEARS THAT IT IS TOO POOR, TOO YOUNG, TOO UNEDUCATED AND TOO ISOLATED FROM THE MIDDLE CLASSES OF AMERICAN SOCIETY.

WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE TREND THE VOLUNTEER FORCE IS TAKING? PERHAPS ONE WAY TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM IS TO HAVE BETTER CONTACT BETWEEN THE REGULAR AND RESERVE FORCES.

AT THIS POINT LET ME INTERJECT ANOTHER ONE OF MY COMMITMENTS: MY SUPPORT FOR BOTH THE RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMS IS UNEQUIVOCAL.

A VARIETY OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE GUARD AND RESERVES CAN BE FOUND, A FEW EXAMPLES:

THE RESERVES ARE A LOBBY WHICH COSTS TOO MUCH--JUST A PART OF THE POLITICAL PORK BARREL

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RESERVES CAN DO ANYTHING THE ACTIVE FORCE CAN DO--AND BETTER.

RESERVES CAN HELP WITH PEACETIME MISSIONS.

RESERVES LOSE THEIR EXPANSION VALUE WHEN USED IN PEACETIME MISSIONS.

EVERY CENT SPENT ON RESERVES DEPRIVES THE ACTIVE FORCE OF NEEDED DOLLARS.

THE RESERVES ARE A STOREHOUSE FOR EQUIPMENT WHICH IS EXCESS AFTER THE MOST RECENT NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

RESERVES SHOULD BE CALLED ONLY FOR GRAVE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES.

THE RESERVES ARE GREAT BUT THE GOVERNOR DOESN'T NEED ANY FIGHTER PLANES.

WE SHOULD KEEP THE GUARD UP BECAUSE THE ACTIVE FORCES TEND TO HOLD THE RESERVES DOWN.

WITH UNLIMITED RESOURCES, WE WOULD NEED NO RESERVES.

A LARGE REGULAR ESTABLISHMENT IS ITSELF A SECURITY THREAT.

AS ACTIVE FORCES ARE REDUCED --

RESERVES SHOULD BE EQUALLY REDUCED.

RESERVES SHOULD BE INCREASED.

AND, LASTLY, OF COURSE, THE USUAL "LET'S MERGE THE GUARD AND RESERVE."

DESPITE OR BECAUSE OF THIS MIX OF CONFLICTING ATTITUDES OR PREJUDICES--THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THE RESERVE FORCES HAVE BECOME MORE CLEARLY DEFINED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. AND THE ABILITY OF THE RESERVES TO RESPOND HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED.

MOREOVER, MORE PEOPLE APPRECIATE NOW THAN EVER BEFORE THE INHERENT ECONOMY OF LOWER MANPOWER COST IN THE RESERVE FORCES AND THEY REALIZE THAT AIRLIFT PLANS AND CAPABILITY MAKE EARLY, SPEEDY DEPLOYMENT OF THIS LOWER COST FORCE FEASIBLE.

THESE FACTS HAVE LED LOGICALLY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT RESERVE FORCES CAN BE A MAJOR NATIONAL SECURITY BARGAIN AS WE APPROACH 1976 JUST AS TRULY AS WAS THE CASE IN 1776.

AND, FINALLY, THESE FACTS -- COUPLED WITH TERMINATION OF THE DRAFT --HAVE FORCED ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE FORCES AS THE INITIAL AND PRIMARY AUGMENTATION FOR REGULAR FORCES. EVEN THE MOST TRADITION BOUND HAVE BEGUN TO REALIZE THAT THE SURVIVAL OF OUR NATION'S MILITARY FORCES AND OUR NATION ITSELF IS DEPENDENT ON HOW WELL WE EQUIP, MAN, TRAIN AND DELIVER IN THEATRE A COMBINED FORCE OF REGULAR, GUARD AND RESERVE AMERICANS.

UNDER THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT, THE RESERVE FORCES CONSTITUTE 30 PERCENT OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS 30 PERCENT MUST BE KEPT STRONG, NOT ALLOWED TO WITHER WITH INACTION. RATHER, AS I SAID PREVIOUSLY, IT SHOULD BECOME CLOSELY RELATED, CO-MINGLED WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ACTIVE FORCE. A GREAT BONUS, RESULTING FROM THIS CLOSE COOPERATION, IS THIS: IT INSURES A LINK BETWEEN THE REGULARS AND CIVILIAN SOCIETY, REDUCING THE CHANCE THE REGULARS WILL BECOME TOO ISOLATED.

A GOOD EXAMPLE OF HOW CLOSE THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE RESERVES AND THE REGULARS SHOULD BE IS FOUND IN THE AIR FORCE. IN THE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCES, AIR FORCE RESERVISTS ROUTINELY FLY C-5 AND C-141 AIRCRAFT PERFORMING REGULAR AIR FORCE TASKS. DURING THE MIDEAST CRISIS THIS PROGRAM PROVED ITS WORTH, DEMONSTRATING THE IMMEDIATE SURGE CAPABILITY WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED BY THE ASSOCIATED RESERVE UNITS, WITHOUT MOBILIZATION.

THIS EXAMPLE OF CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN RESERVES AND REGULAR FORCES MUST BECOME ENDEMIC TO THE ENTIRE FORCE. WHY? BECAUSE RESERVE AND GUARD UNITS ARE NEEDED TO PERFORM MILITARY OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO OUR SURVIVAL AS A NATION IF WAR COMES. RECOGNIZING THIS, ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO PROVIDE THE GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS WITH MODERN EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN MODERN COMBAT FOR A LONG TIME.

GIVEN MY OWN RESERVE EXPERIENCE, YOU MAY BE SURE THAT I WILL WORK IN WASHINGTON TO INSURE THAT NO INEQUITIES -- QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE-- EXISTS FOR GUARD, OR RESERVE SOLDIERS, SAILORS, OR AIRMEN SENT INTO COMBAT.