SOUT VIETNAM1SshIM.2e~be�othere in August 195). In May 1956, inwhat the Pentagon account says is an"example of the U.S. ignoring the Ge-neva Accords" 350 additional militarymen were sent to Saigon under the pre-text of helping the Vietnamese recoverand redistribute equipment abandonedby the French. (p. 23* In July 1955, under the provisionsof the Geneva Accords, the two zones ofVie tnam were to begin consultations onthe elections scheduled for the nextyear. But Diem refused to talk with theCommunists. And in July 1955, he re-fused to hold elections for reunifi-cation. (p. 21)% Eisenhower's Secretary of State,John Foster Dulles, recognized Ho'spopularity by observing that it was~undoubtedly true that elections mighteventually mean unification of Vietnamounder Ho Chi Minh." (p. 22)* In 1952 the National SecurityCouncil explained the reasons behind[NIXON EVADES OFFETO RELEASE POWTSOn July first,the Nixon admini-stration was offered the chance toshow that it's really sincere about "winding down the war and to proveit's concern over the American pri-soners of war. The Provisional Rev-olutionary Government of South Viet-nan's ranrasantotivee atthe ParksPeace Talks presented to the Americannegotiating team a new seven pointprogram for ending the war that Thurs-day.This program throws the POW issueinto Nixons lap by agreeing to a re-lease of American prisoners parallelto an American troop withdrawal witha target date set for the end of 1971.If Nixon is really concerned aboutthe POWs, and if his true aim isreally total withdrawal, it is nowtime for him to act in line with allof the publicity he has been blowingup around these two issues. The PRGplan clearly links the two questionsof prisonwes and total withdrawal,~and it answers criticisms of earlierproposals that setting a date forU.S. withdrawel would only mean dis-cussions on the release of POWs,-andnot an actual releaseThe plan states that:"If the U.S. government sets aterminal date for the withdrawalfrom South Vietnam in 1971 of thetotality of the U.S. forces andthose of other foriegn countriesin the U.S. camp, the parties willat the same time agree on ..-The release of the totality of themilitary men of all partiesand of the civilians capturedin the war, including Americanpilots captured in North Vietnam,so that they may all rapidly returnto their homes. These two opereations will begin on the samedate and will end on the samedate".A cease fire is called for in theplan as soon as both sides reachagreement on the withdrawal, whichagain gives the ball to Nixon byleaving the end of hostilities up tohis setting of a date. The Nixon ad-ministration is faced with the embar.assing situation of havin to, "put itsmoney where its' mouth is". The U.S.government has so far responded * _U.S. support for French colonialismAmong other things it said: "SoutheastAsia, especially Malaya and Indonesia,is the principal world source ofnatural rubber and tin, and a producerof petroleum and other strategicallyimportant commodities. The rice exportsof Burma and Thailand and are critical-ly important to Malaya, Ceylon, andHong Kong and are of cons}derable sig-nificance to Japan and India, all in-portant parts of free Asia.Later in the same document it saidthe U.S. should oencourage thecountries of Southeast Asia to restoreand expand their commerce with eachother and with the rest of the freeworld, and stimulate the flow of theraw material resources of the area tothe free world." This economic inte-rest is set among others, but even thefrank colonialism of Britain andFrance were not merely economicempires. The difference betweenHIS CHOICEto the PRG plan with a series of stalltactics that seem designed to coverup the new proposal by avoiding a res-ponse until the American public haslost contact with it and it can berelegated to page 5 in the news.papers,The switching of key U.S. personnelon the Paris negotiating team and thepropagandizing of Nixon's proposedtrip to China are the two most flag-arant examples of the governmentalstall.The China trip, though a historymaking venture, is being dispropor-tionally acclaimed ad a new avenue ofpeace in Southeast Asia in order totake some of the heat off the neces- "sity for an immediate response tothe Paris prosal. Once American eyesare gawking at China, Paris seemsless urgent.COALITION GOVERNMENTThe Provisional RevolutionaryGovernment of South Vietnam wantsthe U.S. government to, "reallyrespect the South Vietnam people'sright to self-determination", and willenter into talks with a South Viet-namese administration, "favoring peace,independence, neutratility, and democracy", formed by, "various means"by, "the political, social and reli-cont. On aepage 7France's motives andour motives havenot been that different. (p. 27-29)% The Lansdale report praisedvarious members of the press, includingreporters for the NY Times, for beingowarm friends of SMM." SMM was thegroup that had been involved insabotage in Hanoie This cozy relation-ship is one reason the American publicnever had a very good picture of whatoe pening in Vietnam in the fiftiespe 62% Though many Americans thinkforeign aid is just a giveaway, it isusually part and parcel of militarysupport. In Vietnam the study reportsthe American aid effort was focusedalmost entirely on security. Eight ofevery ten dollars went to security, andmuch of what was intended for agricul-ture, education or itransportationactually went to security directedprograms. (p. 22)* One of the Pentagon Paper analystsconcluded: oSouth Vietnam was essenti-ally the creation of the United StatesStates." He argued: "Without U.S. sup-port Diem almost certainly could nothave consolidated his hold on theSouth during 1955 and 1956. Without thethreat of U.S. intervention, South Vi-etnam could not have refused to evendiscuss the elections called for in1956 under the Geneva settlement with-out being immediately overrun by theVietminh armies. Without U.S. aid inthe years following, the Diem regimecertainly and an independent SouthVietnam almost as certainly would nothave occurred." (p. 25)% The study says the U.S. Govern-ment's official view that the war wasimposed on South Vietnam by aggressionfrom Hanoi is "not wholly compelling."Successive administrations in Wash-ington, from President John F. Ken-nedy to Presdient Richard M. Nixon haveused this interpretationof the originsof the war to justify American involve-mentl But American intelligence esti-mates during the 1950's show, the Pen-tagon account says, that the war beganlargely as a rebellion in the Southagainst the oppressive and corrupt re-gime of Ngo Dinh Diem." (p. 67)* American officials in Saigon,including those in the embassy, the CIAand the military command were fully a-ware of President Diem's shortcomings.They regularly reported to Washingtonthat he was oauthoritarian, inflexibleand remote," that he entrusted power .only to his own family and that he hadalienated all elements of the popula-tion by his oppressive policies. (p.69)* From 1954 to 1958 North Vietnamconcentrated on ;its internal develop-ment; apparently hoping to achieve re-unification either through the elec-tions provided for in the Geneva set»tlement or the natural collapse of theweak Diem regime. The Communists leftbehind a skeletal apparatus in theSouth when they regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954 after the war with theFrench ended but the cadre memberswere ordered to engage only in "poli-tical struggle." (p. 69-78)% In the years before 1959 the Diemregime was nearly successful in wipingout the agents, who felt constrainedby their orders not to fight back.Their fear and anger at being caughtin this predicament, however, apparent-ly led them to begin the insurgencyagainst Mr. Diem, despite their orderssometime during 1956-57. (p. 69-78)%+ President Kennedy made his firstfresh commitments to Vietnam secretlyiuse the Special Forces troops hein 1961 violated the 685 man limity the Geneva Accords of 195k.\ 2) cont. on pg. 8