THE REAL LOSERS IN MIDDLE EAST PALESTINIAN ARABSPalestine ProblemOf all the problems bequeathed to the world by Europeanimperialism, Palestine is among the most intractable.It is a peculiarly emotional issue, not only for thoseimmediately involved. In the West the burden of guilt leftby HitlerTs crimes against the Jews has created a barrierwhich the injustices suffered by the Palestinian Arabs can-not penetrate. In many Arab countries hatred of the Jewsis whipped up to divert the internal struggle against re-actionary regimes into external channels. Western economicinterests in the area, and the tendency of both East andWest to exploit the situation for ideological or strategicadvantage, further complicate the problem. To makematters worse, in both Israel and the Arab countries thereis almost, total ignorance of the other's history, people andaspirations.Emotions, however, whether rightly or wrongly based,cannot solve complex political problems. They are muchmore likely to lead to disaster. At the centre of the emo-tional miasma surrounding Palestine lie two hard facts "the displaced Arab population who still live in refugeecamps round Israel's borders; and a new nation of Israel,with a complete class structure of its own, who by incessantpropaganda and, to a certain extent, real achievement, arebeginning to carve a place in the world. Neither can beforgotten, ignored, or annihilated. A political solution mustsooner or later be found, that is both realistic and just.The alternative is " eventually " war, which will at bestonly defer, not solve, the political problems.A realistic solution can only be based on a thoroughhistorical, economic, political and social analysis of thePALESTINIAN COMMANDOSIn the first half of the 20th Century the population ofPalestine was about 700,000, the overwhelming majoritybeing Arabs. There were various minority communities,including some 70,000 Jews. Economically and politicallythese Jews were an integral part of the indigenouspopulation, differing only in religion. They had nothingto do with colonization or Zionism.The first step in the modern Jewish colonization of Pales-tine was taken in 1870 when Baron Edmund de Rothschildof France acquired some land near Jaffa and established anagricultural school (Mikveh Israel " o Catherer of Israel �).This was followed by the building of some twenty villages,inhabited by some 5,000 Jews, mostly from Russia. Up to1900 the Baron invested about £2m. in Palestine. TheRothschilds were (and still are) among the worldTs leadingfinanciers, with the French and British branches of thefamily holding influential positions in the economy of thesetwo countries. Baron Edmund combined his Jewish senti-ments with his support for French interests in colonizingPalestine following the Algerian model. He wished toamalgamate the emigration of east European Jews withthe colonial interests of French imperialism. He did notentertain the idea of an independent Jewish state inPalestine (he was no Zionist) but used his financial powerin the Ottoman treasury in order to prepare a new sphereof influence for French interests, employing Jewish immi-grants as settlers. His Palestine activities were thirty yearsold when Zionism was born.Zionism FoundedPolitical Zionism was founded in 1897 at a congress neldin Basle, Switzerland. If differed significantly from theRothschild colonization in that it declared its intention ofsolving the Jewish problem by creating a national Jewishstate. However, the Viennese journalist T. Herzl, thefounder and first leader of the Zionist movement, didnot consider Palestine as the indispensable location forsuch a state. On the contrary, he advocated Uganda as themost suitable place for Jewish colonization. But the majorityof the Zionists reiected the Uganda scheme and insisted orfulfilling the Jewish religious sentiment towards Palestine.British. Imperialismnpese Fpmergeseomi which ruled Palestine from 1918 toused the familiar ~tactics of o divide and rule �, exploit-ing to the utmost the possibilities which rivalling national-istic movements offered. For the masses it employed nation-ist and religious incitement and provocation, which provedto be effective. It employed Jewish policemen against Arabpopulation and vice versa. For the leaders it employeddiplomacy, o white papers �, round-table donferences, givingcontradictory promises to buvin sides and acting as meaia-tors�. It succeeded in diverting what threatened to becomean anti-imperialist struggle into the channels of national-istic strife.The first important statement of British policy on Pales-tine wass et out in a private letter from Arthur JamesBalfour, Foreign Minister in Lloyd GeorgeTs Cabinet, toLord Rothschild. This become known as oThe BalfourDeclaration �T.Tt reads as follows:Foreign Office,2nd November, 1917.Dear Lord Rothschild,I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf ofHis Majesty's Government the following declaration of sym-pathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been sub-mitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet: o His MajestyTsGovernment view with favour the establishment in Pales-tine of a National home for the Jewish people and will usetheir best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of thisobject, it being clearly understood that nothing shall bedone which may prejudice the civil and religious rights ofexisting non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rightsand political status enjoyed by the Jews in any othercountry�. I should be grateful if you would bring thisdeclaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.Yours sincerely,Arthur James Balfour.We will not analyse here in detail the wording of thisdocument (which with extraordinary impudence refers tothe Palestine Arabs who outnumbered the Jalestine Jewsby about eight to one, as o existing non-Jewish communi-tiesT) but comment briefly on its main motives. TheBritish Governemnt was engaged at that timé in the waragainst Germany, whose ally in the Middle East wasTurkey. The Balfour Declaration was meant to rally theJews all over the world (including those in Germany,America, Austria and Palestine) to its side. Moreover, beingwell aware of the aspirations of Arab Nationalism, it wascalculated to supply Zionist hopes with a political founda-tion to use as a counterweight to Arab Nationalism.. Similarpromises of national independence were givea to theArabs through Capt. Lawrence and Ronald Storrs.Even before these promises were handed out to theonatives �, the whole area was divided between British andFrench imperialism in the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916)which dissected the Ottoman Empire two years before itsdownfall. In 1922 the British government implemented theBalfour letter by an official white paper and in order topacify the enraged Arabs for the Sykes-Picot and Balfourobetrayal�, granted oindependence� to TransJordan in1923 and appointed Abdallah as ruler.The calculated ambiguities and o contradictions� in theBritish Foreign policy increased the unrest and hostilitiesbetween Jews and Arabs, and involved considerable blood-shed. In the late 30Ts this factor turned from an asset intoa liability. The religious, feudal and bourgeois elements inArab Nationalism welcomed the rise of fascism in Germanyand Italy, as fellow enemies of British Imperialism. Con-tacts between these camps worried the British. The oil-fields, pipelines and Suez Canal seemed in danger. Zionistdemands for more independence and increased immigrationquotas for European Jews fleeing from persecution wereother issues which had to be handled, too. But the ForeignOffice, confident that the Nazis would never consider theZionists as potential allies, produced another white paperin 1939, aimed at currying favour with the Arabs. It stated:oHis Majesty's Government now declare unequivocablythat it is not part of their policy that Palestine shouldbecome a Jewish state... . It should be a state in which thetwo peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authorityin government in such a way that the essential interests ofeach are secured... .TThis, briefly, was the situation on the eve of WorldWar IFrom WWII toPresentDuring the Second World War, new economic and poli-cal factors revolutionised the Palestine situation.The decisive period in the development of the Palestineproblem started with the rise of fascism in Europe. TThe Nazi crimes against the Jews : gave Zionists anentirely new status in the international arena. Previously,it had been a minority trend amongst the worldTs 18,000,000Jews, with the majority either indifferent or hostile. Afterthe extermination of 6,000,000 European Jews by Nazism,many more were attracted by the idea of an independentJewish state. Zionism, which had always accepted anti-semitism, became a major political tendency even amongJews who had no intention of personally emigrating toPalestine. The World Powers began to regard Zionism asthe representative of the whole Jewish people.The war left large numbers of Jewish refugees in Europe,many of whom, encouraged by the Zionists, wanted to emi-grate to Palestine. The Palestine Arabs had no wish tobecome a minority in their own country, pressed the Britishgovernment to stop Jewish emigration. The Zionists there-upon began to organise clandestine emigration on a largescale. The British tried to prevent this not only because ofArab pressure but also because they. were worried by therising tendencies towards independence among the Pales-tine Jews. World opinion, especially in Europe and theU.S, wag still reeling with the shock of discovering theenormity of the Nazi war-crimes and inevitably sympathizedwith the refugees.:The resulting political atmosphere washostile both to the British government and to Arab nation-alism. This atmosphere persists today and is one of themajor assets of Zionism.The emergence of the U.S. as a major world power afterWorld War II and the decline of British imperialism broughtabout a gradual shift of Zionist orientation from Britaintowards the U.S. A strong Zionists lobby was built up inWashington and at the same time the pro-American ele-ments in world Zionism gained supremacy over the pro-British faction.oIr this new situation the ZionistT demanded political in-dependence in Palestine. The right-wing demanded im-, \ \s: KERST SITE. sath = --_~ iAmman * Jardanian/ army tanksFighting betweenarmy and commandos-yORDAN2» 40 mi.)TIME Map by J. Donovanmediate independence for the whole of Palestine underJewish minority rule; the centrists favoured the partitionof Palestine between Arabs and Jews; the left-wing Zion-ists (among them parts of the present-day o Napam� party)wanted to postpone independence until the Jews becamea majority through increased immigration.In essence there were three parties directly involved inthe Palestine problem. British imperialism; the Jewishminority (about 0.6m.); and the Arab majority (about 1m.).Each of these had its own demands, in conflict with theother two. But " mainly owing to the deformation of Arabsociety by the process of Jewish colonization " the Pales-tine Arabs did not in fact constitute a major independentpolitical force in the period 1945-1947. The struggle waswaged mainly between the Zionists and Britain.Bri problem to theIn 1947 Britain referred the PalestineU.N. expecting disagreement in the U.N. to lead to arenewal of the mandate. This would lend a new lease of lifeto the precarious British authority in the area. In Novem-ber, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolutionrecommending the partition of Palestine into two inde-pendent, but economically linked, states. This solution wasa victory for Zionism and was strongly opposed by theArabs (who, of course, demanded an undivided indepen-dent Arab Palestine), and by British imperialism whichstruggled to retain its influence and power.Both the U.S. and the U.S S.R. supported the resolution;the U.S. because they considered it a convenient way ofgaining a foothold in the Middle East and replacing Britishimperialism; the U.S.S.R. because it considered it the mostpractical way to drive British imperialism out of one of itsstrongholds. The U.S.S.R. probably under-estimated thestrong links between Zionism and American imperialism.As for the Foreign Office, it was worried not only becausethe creation of a Zionist state meant loss of influence tothe U.S. but also because the establishing of an independentArab state in Palestine could have repercussions in theArab world.After the U.N. partition resolution, the British tried toprovoke the Palestine Arabs'~against the Jewish population,to prove that a British presence was necessary to keep lawand order. This attempt failed. Next, the British organisedin Syria an irregular volunteer army (headed by Fawzi elKaukji) which entered Palestine and attacked Jewish settle-ments. When this attempt failed too, the British finallydecided to employ the regular armies of TransJordan,Syria, Egypt and Iraq in order to wage open war againstthe Zionist state, which (according to the U.N. resolution),was to come into existence on 15th May, 1948. The politicaland itary plans for this invasion were grawn up by~C. Clayton (one of the main tish colonialagents in thtMiddle East) in a meeting of the Arab chiefsof staffs held eatty in 1948 at Bludan, Syria.The 1948 war became a military conflict between theZionists and the Arab armies. These armies were not, how-ever, playing an independent role for achieving Arab inde-pendence in Palestine, but rather serving British interests,through the puppet regimes of Farouk, Abdallah and NuriSa'id. The war was used by these regimes to divert theinternal anti-imperialist struggle (especially in Egypt andIraq) into an imperialist-sponsored Holy War. The conductof the war exposed the utter corruption of these regimesand hastened their downfall.The fate of Palestine was decided not on the battle-field, but also in secret talks between the Zionist leadersand Abdallah. These talks started immediately after theadoption of the partition resolution by the U.N. and wenton until 1950. In these talks the two ofriendly enemies ",although ostensibly at war with each other, agreed todivide between them the territory which the U.N. resolu-tion had allotted to the Palestinian Arabs, as well as Jeru-salem which, according to the resolution, was to become aseparate unit under the U.N. administration. The armisticeagreement coincided, more or less, with the results of thepolitical negotiations between the Zionist leaders andAbdallah.A new set-up was thus established in Palestine: 20,000sq. km. (instead of the 14,000 sq. .m. allotted to it in theU.N. resolution) became Israel; anc the remaining territory(except the Gaza strip) was annexed by Abdallah, who re-named his kingdom o Jordan� (instead of Trans-Jordan).This new set-up expressed the new lance of influenceamong the Western Powers. The area of the Zionist statewas lost to British imperialism and came under U~S. influ-ence; while the area annexed by Abdallah represented theremnants of British influence. This new division of spheresof influence received formal confirmation in the Tri-partite(U.S., Britain and France) Declaration of May, 1950.This state of affairs, established as a consequence of the1948 war, persists today and is referred to as the o statusquo� in the Middle East. It is an inherently unstable situa-tion because the war was not terminated by a politicTsolution of the Palestine problem but only by a temporTArmistice Agreement. Since Israel is interested in prese.ing the o status quo �, it has become more and more depen-dent on the Western Powers who guarantee its continuance.The same applies, of course, to the Jordanian regime, whichbecause of its military weakness also depends indirectly onIsrael. In spite of their seemingly hostile relations, thesetwo regimes share a common interest " to preserve theo status quo�. Thus, the sum total of the relations betweenImperialism, the Zionists, and the various Arab parties. which was known up to 1948 as o The Palestine Problem �was transformed in 1948 into the o Israeli-Arab conflict �,the latter being a direct continuation (albeit in a new form)of the former.The LosersThe losers and victims of the 1948 war were the PalestineArabs, who hardly participated in the war. Their right toSelf-determination, which previously nobody " not even theZionist leaders " had denied, was violated. Most of thembecame homesless refugees. The fate of those who remainedin the area held by Israel was hardly better. They had livedever since under military rule and are subject to constantand severe repression. The land remaining in Arab handsis still gradually but systematically expropriated, often byadministrative subterfuge, to make way for Zionist develop-ment. The Arabs are second-class citizens in their owncountry.Arab Opposition toI - e emperialismIn the early 50Ts the anti-imperialist struggle intensifiedthroughout the Arab world. In the Arab East this intenai-fication was, in part, a result of the Palestine war. Britain,already too weak to defend its old positio:. ad to acceptthe fact that the U.S. was becoming dominant in this partof the woarld as in others, The global policy of the US.to surround the U.S.S.R. by a chain of bases and militarypacts was welded in the Middle East with the traditionalBritish colonial policy into a single anti-Soviet and imperi-alist policy. Throughout the 50Ts these two Powers triedto create a military alliance of Middle-Eastern countries,to serve as a link in the chain of anti-Soviet alliancesstretching from Scandinavia to Korea and to strengthenWestern domination in the Middle East.This policy encountered great difficulties, because theArab miase¥ wéte aware of its imperialist character andopposed it violently. Qn the government level, the consis-tent refusal of Egypt and Syria to participate in such pactsundermined the whole of Western policy in the region. TheIsraeli government on the other hand, was always willingto participate actively in any such scheme, not only becauseof the traditional links between Zionism and Imperialism,but also (and more specifically) because IsraelTs adherenceto the ostatus quo� made it a natural ally of imperialism"an ally who identified his own national interests"indeedhis very existence " with the Imperialist presence in theMiddle East. xThe Israeli position was fully understood and utilized bythe West. Whenever the governments of Egypt, Syria orJordan attacked the Anglo-American schemes, Israel wasused as a threat against them. These threats often material-ised in the form of armed raids by Israeli forces. Jordan,particularly, was raided during the period when the elNabulsi government there conducted anti-Western policies.Usually, after such a raid, the Arab government concernedwould turn to the West and ask for arms. The reply wasalways: oJoin the Baghdad Pact, and you will get arms�This Western policy was finally defeated when, after thebig Israeli raid on Gaza on 28th April, 1955, Nasserrefused to submit to Western pressure and turned toCzechoslovakia for arms. This broke the arms monopolyof Imperialism in the area, and considerably: weakened itspolitical influence. From this time onwards, the SovietUnion emerged as a protagonist in the Middle East scene.This development, followed by the nationalisation of theSuez Canal, drove Britain and France to desperation. Em-ploying an Israeli invasion of Egypt as a pre-arranged pre-text, they launched a direct military attack on Egypt inorder to regain possession of the Canal and to overthrowthe neutralist and anti-imperialist governments in theMiddle East. The fate of this aggression is well known.For Israel the failure of the Suez invasion meant that shewas unable to force tie Arab world to accept the o statusquo�. From that time the Palestine problem entered aperiod of stalemate.The Zionist leaders of Israel are generally satisfied withthe present stalemate. It is true that originally Zionismaimed to get hold of all of Palestine, and that for mostZionists this included the whole of the territory west ofthe River Jordan. An extremist minority had, and still has,aspirations to the eastern bank, but the defeat of the Suezaggression brought home to the Zionist leadérship thelesson that even direct military partnership with imperi-alist powers cannot, in the world of today, achieve afurther expansion of Israel. At present they consider expan-sionism unrealistic.But they do consider as realistic a policy aimed at con:solidating and perpetpating the ostatus quo�. This is theprinciple object of Israeli foreign policy. In carrying outthis policy, they rely on three factors.First, that Israel] is the most stable and reliable ally ofimperialism in the area. In return, imperialism " whichhas an interest in preserving such an ally " grants themprotection. Their hope is that the West will always be ableto grant them this protection and wiil never let them down.Jewish PressureSecond, .Zfonism has a powerful ally in Western publicopinion. The 5,000,000 American Jews constitute a strongpressure group exerting considerable influence not only onU.S. official policy but also on American public opinion.Even-that section of Western public opinion which opposesimperialism, is reluctant to criticise Israel. This is a resultof the deep feeling o f guilt in the West after the massacreof 6,000,000 Jews by the Nazis. Even socialists in the Westoften mistakenly identify anti-Zionism with anti-semitism.Zionist propaganda has another great advantage: it aimsat consolidating an existing situation and_ thereforepreaches peace. Arab policy wishes to change the situation,and cannot simply preach peace, but has the difficult taskof explaining the injustice of the ~~ status quo�. Thus theZionists appear as peace seekers, the Arabs as aggressors.Third, the Zionists rely on military force. Knowing thateventually the balance of conventional forces will beagainst them, they have recently started to develop nuclearweapons. They hope that possession of such weapons willmake it impossible for the Arabs to upset the o status quo�.Alternatively, should the Great Powers force them to giveup possession of nucuear weapons, the Zionists hope to getin exchange for this an East-West guarantee to maintainthe ostatus quo�.In the long run, the Zionist policies cannot succeed. Evenif they do manage to maintain the ostatus quoT for arelatively long period, Israel will remain a small beseigedfortress, economically unviable and dependent on outsideeconomic aid for its very existence (about $400m. per yearflow into the country since 1950, to balance a constantdeficit in the balance of payments). Its own natural re-sources are meagre, and its markets extremely limited.It cannot compete with the advanced economies of theEuropean countries, and Arab markets are closed to it. Itis only the world-wide fund-raising activities of Zionistorganisations such as the Jewish Agency, and the repara-tions paid by the Germans which keep the standard ofliving in Israel at an artificially high level. If Israel's care-fully cultivated image in the West"'~of a democratic,refugee sheltering, peace-loving country were seriouslydented, the economic consequences could be very serious.The inevitable decline of imperialist influence coupled withthe progressive unification of the Arab world, will makeIsraelTs position even more precarious.The Arab feudal regimes, like Zionism, had always beennatural allies of Western imperialism. Both waged astruggle against rising bourgeois nationalism, therefore,these regimes considered Zionism as the lesser of the twoevils. Today, as in the past, they share common politicalinterests with Zionism as both depend for their existenceon Imperialist influence in the area. 5The feudal regimes cannot uphold such a policy publiclyin the Arab world where the masses are anti-imperialist andclamour for political independence. To cover up theircooperation with imperialism they put out virulent anti-Zionist and antiJewish propaganda. A classic exampleoccurred during King Feisal's visit to Washington in June,1966. While conferring with President Johnson on con-taining Nasser and his policies, and thereby running therisk of revealing his pro-imperialist policies to the Arab~vorld, a press question him the opportunity to declare that~all the Jews in the world support Israel, and thereforeare enemies of the ArabsT. The mayor of New York city,which has more Jews than Israel itself, promptly cancelledan official dinner with him. Feisal could only congratulateConsenthimself on this chance to coin the Arab world.Publicly, the feudal rensolidate his tarnished imagegimes advocate the annihilco-operate with it. eevene if Hussein is overthrown. The rebeliimmediately o pacified � on the grounds tharmy can defend them from the aggrethough Hussein's throne has rocked vionce, it has stood all attacks up to nowvention of Israel, which woul 'Hussein as a violation of the ~10US Masses areat only Hussein'sSsive Israelis. A]-Olently more thanthanks to the inter.d regard the overthrow of~status quo " " a new regimerecognise the Abdallah-BenTri-partite Declaration ofThus, whereas on the surfacto be the most extreme eneconcerned as {srael to consoliist influence and presence infeudalism are, as aiways,e the feudal regimes appearmies of Zionism, they are asdate and perpetuate imperial-the area. Zionism, and Arabofriendly enemies �.not CoercionThe bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties throughout theArab world approach the Palestine problem through theUnited Nations resolutions. This policy was first formulatedby Nasser at the Bandung Conference (1955) and it wasunanimously adopted. This policy meanf essentially twothings: (1) Israel should repatriate the Arab refugees(according to a 1949 U.N. resolution); (2) Israel shouldgive up the territory annexed by it as a result of thesecret pact with Abdallah. This policy would reduce thearea of Israel but would not affect its Zionist characterIn fact, this conciliatory programme (which representsa vonsiderable concession to Zionism) would rot providea stable solution of the Palestine problem. It would prob.ably be as dangerous as the ostatus quo�. A smallerZionist state would still be dependent on Western imperia!-ism, and as such would continue to threaten Arab progresstowards unity and socialism. This programme was raisedagain by Bourgiba in order to embarrass Nasser. whodropped this formula after Suez, realising that althoughthe slogan of adhering to the U.N. resolutions had anattractive propaganda value, it did not provide for a stablesolution. Moreover, since Nasser's approach to the problemof Arab unity is a basically bourgeois one, relegating classcontradictions within Arab society to second place, he wasled to seek an understanding with the reactionary regimein Jordan. But this regime is as much opposed to theU.N, partition resolution as the Ziunists are, because Jordantoo annexed. part of Palestine territory. Nasser is now notso keen to raise the U.N. formula.Today, the Nasserites and BaTathists do not have anypolitical solution. Instead, they talk in military terms andargue endlessly with each other whether to go to war withIsrael (oliberate Palestine") in the near future (SyrianBa'ath) or to postpone the war until a considerable pro-gress is made towards Arab unity (Nasser). This militaryapproach evades the main question. War can, at the verymost, serve as a means to political solution; it can neverreplace one. Even if a war against Israel were to be won,the question of the political future of Palestine wouldremain unsolved. A military Arab victory would, at most,destroy the Zionist regime, but 2,000,000 Jews wouldremain, and probably constitute a problem similar to theKurdish problem, unless a political solution is implemented.As is well known, the Nasserites and the BaTathists do nothave a political solution even to the Kurdish problemIt is clear that the existence of an Israeli state (whateverthe size of its territory) isolated from the Arab world iscontrary to the interests of the Arab masses. It is alsocontrary to the interests of the Israeli masses. Such a statecannot exist without outside support and will alwaysnecessarily be dependent on imperialism. The inherentinstability of such a situation will always be a threat overthe heads of the Israelis. A stable solution must thereforeprovide for a non-Zionist form of self-determination forIsrael within the framework of an Arab Socialist UnionThe Palestine problem is, in fact, closely linked with theclass struggle in the Arab world and with the problem ofunification. This is the reason why those forces in the Arabworld which are unable to solve the problem of Arab unityare also unable to solve the Palestine problem. "Another aspect of the Palestine problem is the self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs. Should they exer-ise this right and establish a state of their own? Naturally,th the Zionists and Hussein are hysterically opposed toany such suggestion. But progressive elements are also un-decided on this issue, believing that the creation of a newsmall Arab state would have a harmful effect on the processof unification. :Here, too, any solution must be compatible with theinterests of unification and socialism throughout theMiddle East. If a political form of self-determination of thePalestine Arabs be established (because it is theirs aright) it must come about in a way that will conform ierthe interests of the masses throughout the Middle East.unification based on the denial of the right to self-determination is morally, and politically, wrong, and erpractised in the past has introduced suspicion, mistrust =instability, into the union. If these are to be pag Atfrom the Union cf the Middle Eastern states, the = oeimental national rights of the constituent members ave oifulfiled, They shpulg be given. up By conser TAL POMPTaken from the Israeli SociaiisOrganization's Pamphlet-- ThePalestine Problem.