590 Nortx Carorina Troops, 1861-65.

vision of Blucher’s corps was to Wellington at Waterloo.

They saved the day. The North Carolina troops, other than

Baker’s Cavalry Regiment, and the brigades of Walker,
Branch, Ransom and Pender, which have been located above,
were all stationed in the left center, reaching from the town
of Sharpsburg, which was the center of our line up towards
the Dunkard Church. A part of this left center was singu-
larly thrown forward, in advance of our general line, till
driven back by overwhelming numbers. It was the North
Carolina brigade of Anderson, thus advanced beyond the
main line, that held the now historic “Bloody Lane’’ till
thrice their number of Federals lay dead in their front in
musket range. It was thrust out in the flank of the advane-

ing enemy like a “solid lance head of iron tempered in the
fire of battle.”

To the military student the battle of Sharpsburg will al-
ways appear one of the boldest—not to say one of the rashest
—battles of modern time, judging it from the Southern
standpoint. Nothing but success redeemed General Lee from
liability to the severest military criticism. But he safely
relied upon the tried valor of his troops and the wholesome
awe with which our then recent successes around Richmond
and at Second Manassas had inspired the enemy. He also
knew the slow movement and cautious character of the oppos-
ing General—so slow that a board of war condemned him for
having moved in this campaign at the rate of only six miles
a day. An accident, the loss of a dispatch sent by General
Lee to one of his Major-Generals and dropped in his encamp-
ment, disclosed to McClellan General Lee’s plan of campaign
and that in face of a foe largely his superior he had divided
his army and had left nearly one-half of it on the southern
bank of the Potomac to capture Harper’s Ferry while the
other wing remained in Maryland. Had McClellan fallen
with vigor and promptness with his whole army upon the
20,000 or 22,000 men under Lee, north of the Potomac, the
loss of that army with its commanders would have been a
fatal blow to the Confederacy. But fortunately, McClellan
neither did this nor relieved Harper’s Ferry, which surren-
dered with 12,000 prisoners on the 15th releasing the besieg-

Nortu Carorina at SHARPSBURG. 591

ing force, of which Walker’s Division rejoined Lee on the
night before the battle and McLaw’s and A. P. Hill’s Divis-
ions came up during the progress of the battle as above stated.
It is true that after finding the “lost dispatch” revealing
Lee’s plan, McClellan sent an overwhelming force again D.
H. Hill’s Division, holding the pass in the South Mountain
on the 14th which that gallant general held as long:as possi-
ble, delaying the Federal advance till Harper’s Ferry might
surrender and its besiegers might join our army north of
the Potomac. But the “Rebellion Record” gives us the situ-
ation on both sides better than either commander could have
then known it. From that it appears that McClellan had
not only 101,000 men present for dyty, but that 73,000 more
were then around Washington forty miles away by rail.
That in the presence of 174,000 men, General Lee could
divide his effective force of less than 40,000 by the Potomac
river, and several miles of interval, should capture 12,000
men at Harper’s Ferry, and should then re-unite his army
during the battle north of the river and hold the field was
splendid justification of Lee’s superb confidence in his troops.
It showed a boldness the success of which future ages may
admire, but which will not justify an attempt to imitate. At
no other time did the Confederacy so narrowly escape a catas-
trophe. The greatest compliment perhaps ever paid to Con-
federate valor will be found in the reports of this battle made
by the Federal Colonels and Generals, and by McClellan him-
self, as preserved in the “Rebellion Record.” They recite
the heavy losses sustained from our fire, and the courage
shown by their men in attacking our positions or repulsing
our assaults. They all concur in ascribing to us superior
numbers. Even McClellan, in a dispatch during the battle,
attributes to Lee 95,000 men and telegraphs Lincoln that he
is “in the midst of the bloodiest and most memorable battle
of the war and probably of all history.” Yet it is beyond
question that Lee had only about 35,000 men after his rein-
forcements had joined him and was outnumbered nearly
three to one. General McClellan places his own forces at
87,000, while the morning report of his army for that day
ealls for 101,000 effective. Though thus outnumbered, Lee