i a i a

224 Nort Carorina Troops, 1861-65.

and the ships took position accordingly. When attacked in
December, I had had for my 44 heavy guns and three mortars
not over 3,600 shot and shell; and for the most effective gun
in the work, the 150-pounder Armstrong, there were but 13
shells, and we had no other ammunition that could be used in
it. The frigates Minnesota and Wabash each had an arma-
ment superior to ours, and these two vessels alone fired more
shot and shell at the works in the last attack than we had, all
told or on hand, in both engagements. During the time be-
tween the two expeditions we had begged for more ammuni-
tion, but none came except a few useless bolts designed for the
Armstrong gun. In the former fight we had fired 1,272 shot
and shell; leaving about 2,328, exclusive of grape and shrap-
nel, to resist a passage of the ships and an assault by land. I
was obliged to husband my ammunition even more than in
the previous battle, and therefore gave the same orders that
each gun should be fired only once every half hour until disa-
bled or destroyed, except when special orders were given to
concentrate on a particular vessel, or in case an attempt were
made to cross the bar and run in, when every available gun
should be used with all possible effectiveness. It was this
slow firing from the fort, at times not over forty-four guns
in thirty minutes, compared to the naval fire of from one to
two guns a second, that gave the navy the erroneous idea that
they had silenced the fort. But no attempt was made to run
by the fort, which was a great surprise to us. Occasionally
a wooden vessel, more daring than her consorts, would come
close in, when the guns of several batteries would be concen-
trated upon ber and she would be quickly withdrawn more or
less injured.

All day and night on 13 and 14 January the navy con-
tinued its ceaseless torment; it was impossible to repair dam-
ages at night on the land face. The Tronsides and monitors
bowled their eleven and fifteen inch shells along the parapet,
seattering shrapnel in the darkness. We could scarcely
gather up and bury our dead without fresh’ casualties. At
least two hundred had been killed and wounded in the two
days since the fight began. Only three or four of my land
guns were of any service. The Federal army had been ap-

Tue DeErence or Fort FisHer. 225

proaching on the river side during the day; but they were
more or less covered by the formation of the land, and we
could only surmise their number. I had seen them pass
Craig’s Landing near my cottage and occupy the redoubt about
half a mile from the fort. We had fired some shot and shell
at their approaching columns, but it was at a fearful cost of
limb and life that a land gun was discharged ; for to fire from
that face was to draw upon the gunners the fury of the fleet.
Early in the afternoon, to my astonishment, I saw a Confed-
erate flat-bottomed steam transport, loaded with stores, ap-
proaching Craig’s Landing, which was now in the enemy’s
lines. I had a gun fired toward her to warn her off, but on
she came, unconscious of her danger, and she fell an easy cap-
tive in the enemy’s hands. Shortly after, the Confederate
steamer Chickamauga, which had been annoying the enemy
from the river, fired into and sank the stupid craft. This in-
cident gave me the first intimation that we were deserted.
From the conformation of the Cape Fear river, General
Bragg could have passed safely froma Sugar Loaf toward
Smithville, and with a glass could have seen everything on
the beach and in the fort, and in pérson or through an aide,
with the steamers at his command, could have detected every
movement of the enemy; but now, thirty-six hours after the
fight had commenced, several hours after Craig’s Landing
had been in the possession of the enemy, he sent into the en-
emy’s lines a steamer full of sorely needed stores, which at
night could have gone to Battery Buchanan in safety. We had
both telegraphic and signal communication between Fort
Fisher and Sugar Loaf, Bragg’s headquarters, and I got Gen-
eral Whiting to telegraph him to attack the enemy under cover
of night when the fleet could not co-operate, and we would do
the same from the fort, and that thus we could capture a por-
tion or the whole of the force, or at least demoralize it. No
reply was received. Still I thought General Bragg could
not fail to respond; so, after the dead were buried, ten com-
panies were put in readiness for a sortie, and I carried Cap-
tain Patterson’s company out in front of the work beyond the
palisade line and the range of the enemy’s fire, and threw
them out as skirmishers with orders to discover the position

15