122 NortH CAaRrotina Troops, 1861-65.

the Fifth 23 miles, and the Sixth (16,000 strong) 34 miles.
Here was an opportunity to crush the enemy in detail; and
General Lee having nearly the whole of his army with him,
was ready and anxious to avail of it. Meade’s refused right
on Culp’s Hill, if driven in, would have placed Lee’s left
partly in rear of it; this therefore seemed to be the most vul-
nerable point, and General Lee at first wished Ewell and Hill
to commence the attack, to be followed up by Longstreet, on
Hill’s right ; but Ewell’s and Hill’s troops had been hotly en-
gaged, and the enemy’s position in their front would be very
formidable if fortified during the night, which it was, so
Longstreet was instructed to open the attack on the enemy’s
left, as soon as possible in the morning, (he was expected to
do so at sunrise), while Ewell should make a demonstration
on his right, so as to prevent reinforcements being sent to re-
lieve the point of the main attack in front of Longstreet.
Had this simple plan been carried out, one cannot doubt that
the enemy’s left positions would have fallen into our hands;
and with little Round Top, which Meade said rightly was
the key to his whole position, in our possession, three of the
corps of the Army of the Potomac would have been crushed
before they could have received assistance, we would have oc-
cupied Cemetery Ridge, and the battle of Gettysburg ended
early on the second day. But Longstreet’s heart was not in
the attack ; his troops were near the battle field at day break,
ready and waiting, while he “went to General Lee’s headquar-
ters at daylight and renewed his (my) views against making
an attack.” (lLongstreet’s words). ‘Every moment lost by
us was gain to the enemy, whose distant corps were hurrying
to Gettysburg. Yet General Lee, not desiring to force Long-
street against his will, again reconnoitered the right of the
enemy’s position to see if it might not be better to make his
main attack there; but he found that during the night Culp’s
Hill had been turned into a fort. He therefore at 11 o’clock
ordered Longstreet to attack, which order was not obeyed, on
the plea of waiting for Law’s Brigade, which was on picket.
= attack, therefore, instead of being at sunrise, or at 11
o’clock, was postponed to late in the afternoon, some nine
hours later than it should have been. By this time Meade

> AN ESOT NET TERROR eT noe bai

PETTIGREW’s BRIGADE AT GETTYSBURG. 123

had strengthened his left, new troops had arrived and what
would, without doubt have been an easy and brilliant success
in the morning, was a cruel failure in the afternoon.

Heth’s Division was not engaged on the 2d.

The third day found the Army of Northern Virginia weak-
ened by the hard fighting of the first day, and by the dis-
jointed efforts of the second, but there was still left in its
“incomparable Southern infantry” the spirit and strength to
achieve success if a proper concert of action could be obtained.
General Lee, therefore, decided to renew the attack, this time
on the enemy’s left center, his flanks being now too strongly
fortified and guarded. The attack was again unfortunately
intrusted to Longstreet, who, if he had little heart for the sec-
ond day’s fight, made no concealment of the fact, that he had
none at all for the third day’s; and to this cause, without seek-
ing any other, may be traced its failure. The weight of ev-
idence goes to prove that it was General Lee’s intention that
Longstreet should make the attack with his entire corps, to be
supported by half of Hill’s Corps, all of it if necessary, and
should this force succeed in penetrating the enemy’s line, all
the troops on the right -to be pushed forward. Meanwhile
Ewell on our left, acting in concert, was to assail the enemy’s
right so as to prevent him from reinforcing his center, and to
assist in crushing his right wing. The artillery was to pre-
pare the way, and before the smoke of the guns should have
cleared away the attacking column was to be started. All
this required concert and prompt, spirited action. But this
is what happened. “General Longstreet’s dispositions were
not completed as expected,” (General R. E. Lee’s report)
and therefore Ewell could not be notified, his attack, which
was to have been simultaneous with that of Longstreet’s, was
made and repulsed. Thus the object of the diversion on the
enemy’s right was defeated. At 11 o’clock Colonel A. P.
Alexander, in charge of the artillery, with nearly 150 guns
ranged along Seminary Ridge, reported that he was ready ;
but not until 1 p. m. was the order given by Longstreet to
commence firing. At the appointed signal our artillery
opened on the enemy with its 150 guns, and kept it up for
nearly two hours. Meanwhile the assaulting column had