120 Nortu Carko.ina Troops, 1861-65.

utes to cover the ground between it and the enemy, was more
hotly engaged than were any of the troops that participated
in the first day’s fight, and more of the enemy were killed
and wounded in front of it than on any other part of the field.
I have taken part in many hotly contested fights, but this I
think, was the deadliest of them all, not excepting the third
day’s charge on Cemetery Ridge; and never av. I seen or
known of better conduct on the part of any troops, under any
circumstances, or at any time. The marked achievement of
Pettigrew’s Brigade on this occasion was accomplished only
at great sacrifice of life. It lost not one prisoner, but its loss
in killed and wounded was 1,000 to 1,100, including a num-
ber of its best officers. The T'wenty-sixth North ‘Carolin
Regiment lost 549 out of 800. The Eleventh Regiment some
250 out of 550. The five field officers present with these two
regiments were killed or wounded. The Inspector-General
of the brigade was killed, and its Ordnance Officer wounded.
In the many so-called histories of the battle of Gettysburg.
which I have seen, I have found no record of these facts. The
brilliant achievement of Pettigrew’s Brigade on this day, its
persistent courage, and its great sacrifice, have never thet
with merited acknowledgment.*

In the midst of the engagement General Heth was wounded
and General Pettigrew was placed in command of the divis-
ion. Colonel Burgwyn, of the Twenty-sixth, had been killed
and Colonel Leventhorpe, of the Eleventh, had been wonuted,
so the command of General Pettigrew’s Brigade fell to Col-
onel Marshall, of the Fifty-second, a very able young officer.

I vividly recall my impression after the’ attack. The bril-
liant success of Rodes and Early on our left, ours in driving
the enemy from our front into a position on Seminary Ridge

*In some accounts it is stated that we were fighting f
On the skirmish line there was firing for mie tilpan, a apni sanstod
on the enemy’s line was quick work. To confirm my impression of the
time taken, which I remember as about twenty minutes, I took occasion
at the Confederate reunion in Charleston to look up evidence, and I
found two privates who had taken part in the charge. They were not
together when I put the question as to the time occupied in the charge;

both : i 4 y mi
Lor fg tye promptly, one said twenty minutes and the other about

eRe ee eT

halite eee ae

Si her recto

a as

PETTIGREW’S BRIGADE AT GETTYSBURG. 121

from which he was quickly driven by Pender, left us with
troops enough to follow up our success, and I wondered
that we did not do so and take possession of Cemetery Ridge,
which I believed then, and believe now, we could have
done easily. The troops which had been engaged, although
they had suffered severe losses, were in high spirit and
ready to go on. In Ewell’s Corps, J ohnson’s Division had
come up fresh, and in Hill’s Corps, Pender’s Division had
been only slightly engaged, while Anderson was in bivouac a
short distance away. That we did not continue the fight
was the first opportunity frittered away. If Ewell’s and
Hill’s Divisions had pressed forward when the enemy re-
tired to Cemetery Ridge, the battle of Gettysburg would have
ended on the day it began. Ewell did not advance when Gen-
eral Lee wished him, Hill’s Corps was halted, and the enemy
availed of our delay to hasten up fresh troops and to
strengthen his position.*

The 2 July was also a day of lost opportunities for the
Confederates. An early attack on either flank of the enemy
could searcely have failed of success. His line, three miles
long, aptly described as resembling a fish hook, with Round
Top Mountain to the south the end of the shank, and Culp’s
Hill, to the north the end of the curve, was a very strong de-
fensive position if thoroughly fortified and manned with
troops; but either end taken by us would have rendered it un-
tenable, and would have enabled us to sweep down upon the
enemy and destroy him before he could escape. It was evi-
dent that Meade’s whole army could not all be up. The fact
is, that only the First, Eleventh and a part of the Third
Corps were present, the Second was distant thirteen miles,

* General R. H. Anderson, of South Carolina, told me after the war,
that hearing our guns early in the day, he was hastening with his brig-
ade to join us; was not more than two miles away, when he was met by
a messenger from General Lee with an order for him to halt and bivouac
his brigade. Surprised at this. he first obeyed the order, and then rode
on to Gettysburg to see General Lee and learn from him if this message
was correctly delivered General Lee replied that there was no mistake
made, and explained that his army was not all up, that he was in igno-
rance as to the force of the enemy. in front, that his (General Anderson’s)
alone of the troops present, had not been engaged, and that a reserve in

case of disaster, was necessary.