116 Norra CaroLina Troops, 1861-’65.

Cavalry, supported no doubt by a home guard, to fight, the cost
of the stores when gotten would have been dear, still General
Pettigrew was willing to make the attack had not his orders
forbidden it. Buford’s Cavalry followed us at some dis-
tance, and Lieutenant Walter H. Robertson and I, of Petti-
grew’s staff, remained in the rear to watch it. This we easily
did, for the country is rolling, and from behind the ridges we
could see without being seen and we had a perfect view of the
movements of the approaching column. Whenever it would
come within three or four hundred yards of us we would
make our appearance, mounted, when the column would halt
until we retired. This was repeated several times. It was
purely an affair of observation on both sides and the cavalry
made no effort to molest us.

My object in mentioning so minutely what might seem
unimportant and purely personal will appear when I narrate
what happened the next day, and will help to show how the
great battle of Gettysburg was stumbled into. Blindness in
part seemed to have come over our commanders, who, slow to
believe in the presence of an organized army of the enemy,
thought there must be a mistake in the report taken back by
General Pettigrew, but General Heth asked for and ob
tained permission to take his division to Gettysburg on the
following day, for the purpose of reconnoitering, and of
making the levy which had been the object of the expedition
on the day before. Neither General Heth nor General Hill
believed in the presence of the enemy in force, and they ex-
pressed their doubts so positively to General Pettigrew that
I was called up to tell General Hill what I had seen while re-
connoitering the movements of the force which had followed
us from Gettysburg. As a staff officer with General Pender,
I had served under General Hill in the seven days fights
around Richmond and at Cedar Run, and because I was well
known to General Hill, General Pettigrew supposed that my
report might have some weight with him. Yet, when in an-
swer to his inquiry as to the character of the column I had
watched I said their movements were undoubtedly those of
well-trained troops and not those of a home guard, he replied
that he still could not believe that any portion of the Army of

PETTIGREW’S BRIGADE AT GETTYSBURG. 137

the Potomac was up; and in emphatic words, expressed the
hope that it was, as this was the place he wanted it to be.
This spirit of unbelief had taken such hold, that I doubt if
any of the commanders of brigades, except General Petti-
grew, believed that we were marching to battle, a weakness
on their part which rendered them unprepared for what was
about to happen. General Archer with his Tennessee Bri-
gade, was to lead, and General Pettigrew described to him
minutely the topography of the country between Cashtown
and Gettysburg, and suggested that he look out for a road that
ran at right angles to the one we were on, and which might be
used by the enemy to break into his line of march. And, as
he had carefully observed the configuration of the ground
in the vicinity of the town, told General Archer of a
ridge some distance out of Gettysburg on which he would
probably find the enemy, as this position was favorable for
defense. He found him there. General Archer listened,
but believed not, marched on unprepared, and was taken by
surprise, his command routed, a part captured and he himself
taken prisoner. Davis’ Mississippi Brigade, close on to
Archer’s, felt the impact, and a portion of it, carried away
by the break in front, made the mistake of seeking shelter in
an adjacent railroad cut, and about four hundred of them
were captured there. For want of faith in what had been
told, and a consequent lack of caution, the two leading bri-
gades of Heth’s Division marched into the jaws of the enemy,
met with disaster, and, contrary to General Lee’s wish,
brought on an engagement with the Army of the Potomac be-
fore we were ready, and precipitated one of the greatest bat-
tles of modern times.

Buford, informed by-his scouts of the approach of Heth,
posted his command, dismounted and acting as infantry, on
McPherson’s Ridge to the west of Gettysburg, and notified
Reynolds, who, according to the testimony before the commit-
tee on the conduct of the war, had just received orders to
withdraw to Middleburg and Manchester, but who, Swinton
says, “was with Wadsworth’s Division moving on to Gettys-
burg according to prescribed orders.” Be this as it may,
Reynolds was up immediately; and Wadsworth’s Division