102 NortH Caroxuina Troops, 1861-’65.

Pettigrew’s (under Marshall), Davis’ and Brockenbrough’s
Brigades in the order named from right to left; and the sec-
ond or supporting line composed of Armistead’s, Scales’ and
Lane’s Brigades. In the front line were thirteen Virginia
Regiments and one battalion in Kemper’s, Garnett’s and
Brockenborough’s Brigades; five North Carolina Regiments,
four of them in Pettigrew’s Brigade (under Marshall), and
one of them in Davis’ Brigade; three Mississippi Regiments
in Davis’ Brigade; three Tennessee and one Alabama Regi-
ment and Battalion in Archer’s Brigade, making twenty-five
regiments and two battalions in this line. In the second line
were five Virginia Regiments in Armistead’s Brigade and ten
North Carolina regiments in Scales’ and Lane’s Brigades,
making fifteen regiments in this line.

The ridge on which the Confederates formed their lines for
the assault is called Seminary Ridge and is 1,400 yards west-
ward from Cemetery Ridge, which was occupied by the Union
army. These ridges are parallel with each other, the last
named being somewhat the higher of the two, and between
them are cultivated fields with many fences running hither
and thither about them. The Emmitsburg Road also passes
obliquely in front of the Union line, enclosed on both sides by
post and rail fences which are almost immovable and consti-
tute a formidable obstacle to the orderly advance of a charg:
ing line of battle.

Codori’s house and barn just east of that road also dis-
turbed the compactness and continuity of Kemper’s line as he
advanced.

The Union position on Cemetery Ridge was exceedingly
strong and formidable. From the elevated plateau, called
Cemetery Hill, where the National Cemetery is, the ridge
extends southward towards Round Top, a distance of more
than two miles, and overlooks and dominates every foot of
the ground over which the Confederates charged. Along
its crest from Cemetery Hill to Round Top was a line of
Union batteries which General Hunt, Chief of Artillery,
shrewdly divining what the great cannonade meant, had kept
in reserve until the crucial moment and hurried into position
when he saw the Confederate infantry begin its advance.

LonastrReEet’s ASSAULT AT GETTYSBURG. 103

All along the front where the assault was made there was
also a double line of Union infantry ready to resist the as-
sault, and the front line of that infantry was posted benind a
stone fence which served as an almost impregnable barrier
against assailants. Strong details of skirmishers were out
along the fences of the Emmitsburg road and also along the
fence running westerly from that road past the Confederate
left flank. Another point in relation to the Union defences
should be stated, which is, that the stone fence above men-
tioned as a strong defense for the Union forces does not run
in an unbroken straight line north and south, but after run-
ning from its southern terminus due north for several hun-
dred yards, it turns due east at what is called “The Angle,”

and runs 80 yards in that direction, and then turns again and

runs due north for several hundred yards to the Bryan barn.
Tts length from north to. south almost exactly equaled the
length of the Confederate front line when it reached there.
The important influence of its angular course upon the issue
of the Confederate assault will be shown later on.

The cannonade preceding the advance of the Confederate
infantry opened about 1 o’clock, p. m., and continued nearly
two hours. It was one of the greatest cannonades of modern
times, but it nevertheless.failed to accomplish the results ex-
pected. Artillery will do to batter down fortifications, shell
towns, sink ships and eut in pieces with grape and canister ad-
vancing lines of infantry; but every old soldier knows that
ordinarily it is much less to be dreaded than the “blue whist-
lers” from the musketry. So it was at Gettysburg. A num-
ber of Union gun carriages were ruined, caissons blown up,
and now and then a soldier hugging the ground was struck
and torn to pieces; but there was no important weakening of
the Union infantry lines, and the manner in which General
Hunt saved his artillery for the crisis he foresaw has already
been mentioned.

As soon as the eannonade ceased the Confederate infantry
moved forward to the assault. Only the three brigades of
Pickett were fresh troops. All the other brigades had par-
ticipated in the fighting of the previous days, and suffered
heavy losses. Both their division commanders, Heth and