82 NortH CaroLina Troops, 1861-’65.

nia is putting the strongest force possible into the enemy’s
rear.
“September, 12, 1862. A. Linco.”

The same day (12 September), Governor Curtin tele-
graphs the President that he has reliable information as to
the rebel movements and intentions, which he details, and
says: “Their force in Maryland is about 190,000 men.
They have in Virginia about 250,000 more, all of whom are
being concentrated to menace Washington and keep the
Union armies employed there while their forces in Maryland
devastate and destroy Pennsylvania.”

In fact, as we now know from the Official Records, Lee, by
reason of his losses at Second Manassas and from sickness and
straggling, had only about 40,000 men in Maryland, and
there were probably 10,000 more in Virginia, exclusive of
the stragglers from his army, around Richmond, a total
of 50,000 effective, while opposed to them was McClellan im-
mediately in front with an army of 101,000 “effective,”
12,000 more Federals (afterwards captured) were at Har-
per’s Ferry, 73,000 “effective, fit for duty” were in the
intrenchments round Washington, 10,000 under General
Wool at Baltimore—total, by morning reports, of 195,000
effective, besides the Federal and State troops under arms in
Pennsylvania.

Such are the illusions and confusion which disturb even
the clearest minds under such circumstances.

Singularly enough, too, General McClellan gave as his
reason for not putting in Fitz John Porter’s Corps and fight-
ing on the 18th, that it was the only force that stood intact
between the Capital and possible disaster. Yet on that day
73,000 other soldiers were behind the ramparts around
Washington. The publication of the Official Records has
thrown a flood of light on the history of those times.

Rarziex, N. C., V4
17 September, 1901

BATH OF WHAE-AALL.

13 DECEMBER, 1862.

By COLONEL S. D. POOL, Tenru Reeimentr (1 Art.) N. C. T.

The winter campaign of 1862 was initiated early by the
Federal commander.

In the months of October and November feints were made
along the Confederate lines from North Carolina to the
Blackwater. These movements were instituted to divert
forces from the Army of Northern Virginia to the apparent
points of attack previous to the decisive assault on General
Lee’s position at Fredericksburg, and which, they expected,
would work the overthrow of the Confederacy. Shortly be-
fore that attack should take place, a subordinate, though real,
attack was to be made on Goldsboro, North Carolina, by the
advance of General Foster from New Bern, which, while
weakening General Lee by the division of his forces, would
also, if successful, interrupt his communications, and further
the general plan. Great activity was shown in Suffolk,
where General Peck had command. Large~reinforcements
were sent to that garrison in November. The Blackwater
was the Confederate line; and the twenty miles between the
river and Suffolk, covered with low brushwood, and of level
surface, intersected by innumerable roads, constituted a neu-
tral ground traversed by the foraging parties of both armies,
and became the theatre of frequent skirmishes of cavalry.
Colonel Leventhorpe, of the Eleventh North Carolina Regi-
ment, in command of two North Carolina infantry regiments,
Ferrebee’s Cavalry (Fifty-ninth North Carolina) and a Pe
tersburg Battery (Captain Graham’s), had charge of this line
from September to the end of November. Towards the end
of November an attack in force was made upon Franklin—
the Confederate headquarters—and a flank attack at a fort on
the Blackwater, on the left of, and seven miles from, Frank-
jin. Marshall’s Regiment (Fifty-second North Carolina)