jn an SO a a a i gl ne

80 Norta Carorina Troops, 1861-65.

should have captured Lee. The latter had committed a grave
military fault by dividing his army by a river and many
miles of interval in the presence of an enemy greatly his su-
perior in numbers. Besides, he ought not to have fought
north of the Potomac. Lee was saved from the consequences
of his boldness by the opposite quality of over-caution in Me-
Clellan; the latter erroneously estimated Lee’s force at
95,000, when it was a little more than one-fourth of that
number at the time the battle opened. Then, when the Fed-
erals fought it was done in detail. At daybreak Hooker’s
Corps went in; he was wounded, and his corps badly cut up
and scattered. Then Mansfield with’ the Twelfth Corps,
eame on; he was killed and his corps was driven out. Then
Sumner’s Corps was launched at us and came on in good
style; it broke our line, and was only driven back by fresh
troops—Walker’s Division taken from the right, as above
stated, and by McLaws’ Division, just arrived from Harper’s
Ferry. Summner’s Corps was driven back but fought well, as
is shown by the fact that its loss, which was over 5,000,
was more than double that of any other corps. When
they went back Franklin’s Corps came up, but had small op-
portunity, as is shown by its loss of less than 500 in the
whole battle. By 11 o’clock the battle on the left wing was
practically over, except by artillery; on the other wing at 1
p- m., Burnside’s Corps crossed the Antietam over the bridge,
but his corps did not move forward till 3 p. m., at which in-
stant A. P. Hill’s Division, arriving from paroling prison-
ers at Harper’s Ferry, met and overthrew it. The other
eorps (Fitz John Porter’s) was in reserve and did not fire a
gun, except some detachments sent to other commands during
the battle. With six corps the weight of McClellan’s fight-
ing at any moment was that of one corps only. Had he, with
Napoleonic vigor, dropped his four corps—full 60,000 men—
simultaneously on our thin left wing of 15,000 men like a
massive trip hammer, it must have shattered it. Had he
moved his other two corps of 30,000 at the same moment in
rear of our right, the fight would have been over by 9 a. m.,
and Appomattox would have been antedated two years and a
half. The star of the Confederacy would have set in night,

SHARPSBURG (oR ANTIETAM). 81

and Sharpsburg might have taken its place in the history
of our race by the side of Hastings and Flodden. The loss
of that army, with Lee, Jackson and the other Generals there,
would have been fatal. We know what happened when the
same glorious army, even with smaller numbers, disappeared
at Appomattox. From this fate the leadership of our Gen-
erals and the superb valor of our soldiers could not have saved
us, had not McClellan singularly overrated our numbers.
But he should have known that if Lee and Jackson had really
had 95,000 men they would not have waited for him to at-
tack; they would have taken possession of his army.

Thirty-nine years after the event it is hard to realize the
misapprehension which then existed in the minds of others
as well as General McClellan as to the size of Lee’s army.
As an example, read the following from the 28 (Serial No.)
Official Records Union and Confed. Armies, 268, from the
war Governor of Pennsylvania, Andrew G. Curtin:

“Harrispure, Pa., 11 September, 1862.
“His Excellency the President:

* * “You should order a strong guard placed upon

the railway line from Washington to Harrisburg to-night,

and send here not less than 80,000 disciplined forces, and

order from New York and States east all available forces to

concentrate here at once. To this we will add all the militia

forces possible, and I think that in a few days we can mus-

ter 50,000 men. It is our only hope to save the North and

crush the rebel army. * * * The enemy will bring .
against us not less than 120,000, with large amount of ar-

tillery. The time for decided action by the National Gov-

ernment has arrived. What may we expect?

“A. G. Currin.”

To this President Lincoln very sensibly replied, at p. 2¥76,
same volume:

“* * Jf I should start half of our forces to Harrisburg,
the enemy will turn upon and beat the remaining half and
then reach Harrisburg before the part going there, and beat it
too when it comes. The best possible security for Pennsplva-

6