72 NortH CaroLina Troops, 1861-65.

The Federal army was composed of six Corps: First
(Hooker’s), Second (Sumner’s), Fifth (Porter’s), Sixth
(Franklin’s), Ninth (Burnside’s), Twelfth (Mansfield’s),
besides Pleasanton’s Cavalry Division.

On the Southern side were two Corps: Longstreet’s and
Jackson’s, with Stuart’s Cavalry. The morning reports for
that day of the Federal army show 101,000 “effective ;” but
General McClellan, in his report of the battle, places his
number of men in line at 87,000. General Lee, in his re-
port simply puts his force at “less than 40,000.” General
Longstreet estimates them at 37,000, and General D. H. Hill
at 31,000. The best estimate of numbers actually in line
would be 87,000 Federals and 25,000 Confederates. Of the
latter, only 27,000 were in hand when the battle opened.
The arrival of the divisions of MecLaws and A. P. Hill from
Harper’s Ferry during the battle, raised Lee’s total to 35,000.
Over a fourth of these were from North Carolina, which had
thirty-two regiments and three batteries there.

The battle was fought in a bend of the Potomac river, the
town of Sharpsburg, Md., being the center of the Southern
line of battle, whose right flank rested on the Antietam creek,
just above where it flows into the Potomac, and the left flank
on the Potomac higher up. General Lee had braved all
rules of strategy by dividing his army im the presence of an
enemy treble his numbers. He had sent Jackson, with
nearly half the army, to the south side of the Potomac to in-
vest Harper’s Ferry, while with the other part of the army
he himself advanced on Hagerstown. General McClellan,
who slowly and with caution was. following Lee’s movements,
found at Frederick, Md., a dispatch from Lee to General D.
H. Hill, which had been dropped in the latter’s encampment.
This disclosed to him Lee’s entire plan of campaign and the

division of his army. With more than his ustial promptness, .

McClellan threw himself (on 14 September), upon Turner’s
(Boonsboro) and Crampton’s Gaps. These were stubbornly
held. till next day, when Lee fell back to Sharpsburg. For-
‘ tunately for Lee, Harper’s Ferry surrendered with 12,000
prisoners early on the morning of the 15th, releasing the be-
sieging force. Of these, Walker’s Division, with Jackson

SHARPSBURG (OR ANTIETAM). 73

himself, rejoined Lee north of the Potomac, at Sharpsburg,
on the afternoon of the 16th. McLaws and A. P. Hill joined
him there during the battle on the 17th—McLaws at 9 a. m.,
and A. P. Hill at 3 p. m.—and each just in time to prevent

BN WN Lwi //lamsport

SHARPSBURG AND VICINITY.

the destruction of the army. With 87,000 men in line, as
against Lee’s 35,000, General McClellan should have cap-
tured the Confederate army, for fighting with the river at its
back any disaster could not have been retrieved. Besides,
till 9 a. M., Lee had only 27,000 men, and this number was
not finally raised to 35,000 till the arrival of A. P. Hill after
3 p.m. ‘There were no breastworks and neither time nor op-
portunity to make any. General McClellan was an excellent
General, but his over-eaution saved Lee’s army. He greatly
overestimated the numbers opposed to him. He telegraphed
to President Lincoln during the battle that Lee had 95,000
men. Had he known that in truth Lee had only 27,000 men
when the battle opened, the history of the war and General
McClellan’s fortunes would have been essentially different.