44 Norra Carotina Troops, 1861-65. The 32 on the left of this was mounted on a ship carriage, on an elevated platform and was very slightly protected by the parapet. This gun was in charge of Lieutenant Mur- daugh, and a force from the naval steamer Hillis. Stewart Johnson had charge of the howitzer in the angle. Lieutenant Grimes the 32 left of the traverse. These three guns were the only ones fired during the en- gagement. The Hertford Light Infantry had charge of a 32-pounder on the face of the fort looking towards Hatteras woods, and Fort Clark. During the night part of the traverse had been taken down, so as to bring this gun to bear on the rear of Fort Clark. Captain Sharp commanded here in person. DISPOSITIONS. It was determined that only those on duty should remain in the fort. The detachments to man the guns were to re- main near them, and the reliefs were to stay in the bomb- proof until called for. All the men not on duty were ordered outside of the par- apet facing the sound for their protection. I was ordered not to fire a gun until the enemy should come within full range of our guns. Just to the right of my guns was a traverse, already spoken of as the one where my men slept during the night. Just be- hind this I posted my men, so as to be in readiness to man and fire their guns when called upon. Here I remained some time before and in the early part of the bombardment. Here not a man was wounded. : Before the action commenced I was standing on the para- pet near the pancoup facing the inlet and ocean, with Com- modore Barron, Colonel Bradford and others, when bang, bang, went some rifles at Fort Clark, and at the same time the balls went whistling over our heads. The Germans there seeing us on the walls, took us as‘a target for their pieces. We got out of the way, of course. They continued to fire at the fort for some time without doing any harm. When guns were assigned to me, the first thought that oc- curred to me was that owing to the position the enemy’s ships Tue Fart or Harreras. 45 had taken, there was no protection for my men, as they would be subjected to a raking fire from them. Looking from my guns seaward, I could see the broadside of the Minnesota between the rear of the two traverses at that angle of the fort. It was obvious that they would be un- protected at their guns. I immediately took Commodore Barron, Colonel Martin, and Major Andrews to the parapet and pointed out to them this defect. Orders were immediately issued to Mr. Allen, the engineer, to take down a traverse in the rear of the fort and extend one in the angle named (at right angles to the face fronting the inlet) so as to protect the guns manned by my men. It was only half completed when the firing com- menced, so the guns were unprotected. In the engagement both were disabled by shells from the Minnesota. The large vessels had steamed off some distance from the shore at night, and the smaller ones took shelter in a bight under the cape near the shore. ‘At early dawn their heavy outlines could be descried off the bar to seaward, in all their formidable array. As the morning wore away about 7 o’clock, a signal was fired from the flag-ship Minnesota, and soon the fleet were in motion for the shore. They moved in, took their positions with appar- ent deliberation and came to anchor. The bombarding fleet egnsisted of the following vessels: F lag-ship Minnesota, 74 guns; Susquehannah, 74 guns; Cumberland, 74 guns; Wa- bash, 74 guns; Harriet Lane, 7 guns. The Cumberland came into action after the rest had begun to fire. The Harriet Lane joined them but did not confine herself to one position. The action lasted three hours and twenty minutes. Such a bombardment is not on record in the annals of war. Not less than three thousand shells were fired by the enemy during the three hours. As many as twenty-eight in one minute were known to fall within and about the fort. It was like a hailstorm, and how so many escaped is known only to Providence, who sheltered and preserved us. On this subject see the official reports of Commodore Barron,