566 Norra Carona Troops, 1861-’65.

dashed along, running into Cooke’s command and carrying it
straight along to the enemy’s works, which were taken with
little loss to the two brigades.

With a beam in his bright, blue eyes, General MacRae ex-
plained to me after the battle the cause of his action. As
Colonel of the Fifteenth North Carolina, he had served under
Cooke, and knowing him thoroughly, had divined the reason
why he had postponed his advance. The obstruction in front
of Lane’s Brigade would render its advance slow. There
being nothing to retard Cooke’s, it would outstrip Lane’s and
the enemy’s fire be concentrated on the former. Therefore
Cooke to save his command from this, was for giving Lane a
good start. The thought flashed through General MacRae’s
mind that this had gone far enough, and acting upon this im-
pulse, he relieved Lane’s Brigade, which was suffering fear-
fully, and hastened a brilliant victory for us. The fruits of
this victory, and General Lee’s complimentary letter to Gov-
ernor Vance are given elsewhere in thesé volumes.

Again, at Burgess’ Mill on 27 October, the brigade, de-
tached and under the command of General Mahone, distin-
guished itself by alone driving the enemy from his field guns,
in which feat it ran twice the gauntlet of fire from two
columns of the enemy’s infantry, through which it had to
pass, and one of which it could have destroyed had the sup-
port asked for been given. This engagement entailed heavy
loss on the brigade, but its fiery attack had the result of caus-
ing the enemy to retire under cover of night.

As we were on the extreme right of the army. we were
often in isolated positions of great peril; but there was no
shrinking from danger, and the brigade was engaged in more
fights than it is possible to recall. Whenever Grant extended
his left, we were of the attacking party to try and drive him
back.

I recall an incident which may interest. The brigade on
one occasion, worn and weary from one of its engagements,
was early in the morning going into bivouac on the extreme
right, where it was told to entrench itself. General MacRae
ordered me to lay out the works and make the details to con-
struct them. This I did to the best of my ability, and when

Tue Perrigkew-KirKLAND-MACRAE BRIGADE. 567

the work was fairly under way, the General came to see what
was being done. To my chagrin he condemned and changed
my lines, whereupon I retired. Returning later, my pride
was eased by finding him angry with himself for having
changed my lines, which he generously acknowledged to be
right; and this would have been so had the enemy approached
from the direction he should have done. This apparent mis-
take on the part of the General necessitated additional works,
which, after several days, were scarcely completed when we
were called off to try to drive out the enemy from a redoubt
in course of construction on another part of the line. With-
drawn from this attempt, we were just going into bivouac
again when we were double-quicked to meet the enemy, who
was, as usual, extending his left, Then occurred the unique
incident of two opposing forces running to reach the same
point, the point being in this instance the very works we had
recently built. The brigade reached them first and just in
time to drive back the enemy, who had approached through
an extended open field instead of through a wood in front,
which would have concealed his movement. Thus did it
providentially happen that had the lines been correctly laid
out the works could not have been held by us for five minutes.
As it was the attack was repelled and the extension of Grant’s
left delayed for many days.

The last battle of the brigade in which I was engaged was
that of Hatcher’s Run, on 5 February, 1865. The brigade
had been in so many fights, and had done so much hard work,
that it was ordered by the division and corps commanders
that it be relieved to the extent of “doing no more fighting on
the front lines for a year.” In future its place in battle was
to be in the supporting column. Although the end was too
near for this, and we so understood it, true to this command,
the brigade was placed in rear of the left of our attacking
column to support it.

The effect of the first volley from the enemy was to cause
a stampede in the command in our front, and as soon as it
had broken through our lines, we closed up and the brigade
advanced to the front line. There we remained ready to
join in the attack which was ordered, but the troops on our