540 NortH Carorina Troops, 1861~’65.

business and did not like my spurs. Kirkland ordered me to
ride down to the beach to see if there were any signs of land-
ing troops from the transports. I did so, and saw the ships
extending as far as I could see down the beach, but no indica-
tion of landing. Returning, I reported this to the General,
but in a few minutes a soldier came running up, almost
breathless, and told us that the enemy had lowered his boats
on the side opposite the shore, pulled rapidly to the land and
captured Captain Koontz and his company, but few escaping.
We rode down through the woods and found a large force on
the beach and more coming, while the woods around us were
filled with shrieking shells. General Kirkland promptly
ordered his small command forward to the edge of the woods
which skirted the shore and deployed both regiments as skir-
mishers. By his direction I rode down the line and told the
men to keep up the fire upon the enemy and cheer as much as
they could, but if they were hard pressed to fall back from
pine to pine in the direction of Wilmington, and not let the
enemy cut us off.

General Butler’s forces, being thus very promptly checked,
began at once to throw up breastworks on the sand shore. As
they consisted of at least six times our numbers we could not
have prevented their adyance. But General Butler greatly
exaggerated our force, and I have always believed that his ex-
amination of Captain Koontz had something to do with his
false impression. As it was these two regiments held his
army at bay (or at occan perhaps I should say) the entire day,
which was Christmas, 1864. By pushing our line close to
his we escaped much injury from the ships’ guns, their shells
passing over our heads. We had the help of Southerland’s
battery of artillery ( Company I, Tenth North Carolina) and
Lipseomh’s South Carolina Cavalry. During the night the
troops began to come in from our division. But a reconnois-
sance the next morning showed that General Butler had taken
advantage of the darkness, re-embarked his army and aban-
doned his expedition.

The navy had bombarded Fort Fisher for two days, but
inflicted slight loss. Kirkland’s bold and spirited defense

must have convinced Butler that we had a large force, as .

 

 

THe Martin-KirnKLAND BRIGADE. 541

Koontz had told him that Longstreet was there with his three
divisions—Hoke, Field and Kershaw.

The fact is that we did not have 2,000 men of all arms to
oppose him, and no infantry except two regiments of
Kirkland’s Brigade. Why Butler was considered fit to be
a General I don’t know, unless his tyranny and oppression of
non-combatants qualified him for “crushing out the rebel-
lion.”

CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

Soon after this battle General Bragg, the Department Com-
mander, ordered Hoke’s Division to Wilmington—not expect-
ing a renewal of the attack on Fort Fisher. We marched,
with colors flying and bands playing, into the city and were
enthusiastically received by the people as their victorious de-
fenders. General Bragg reviewed the division and made
preparations for a new campaign—for the capture of New
Bern, N. C. This was kept a secret, but it came to my
knowledge. Our brigade had orders to prepare three days’
rations, and all got ready for a march—destination unknown.
But during the very night previous to this intended movement
we were suddenly ordered to move to the wharf and take boats
down the river to Sugar Loaf, Kirkland’s Brigade again in
the advance, as the enemy had reappeared in front of Fort
Fisher, the army this time being commanded by an able Fed-
eral soldier, General Terry. When we reached Sugar Loaf
we found that Terry had landed his forces without opposi-
tion, and we began skirmishing with them at once. But the
enemy had intrenched his line from the ocean across the nar-
row peninsula to the Cape Fear river, between Sugar T.oaf
and Fort Fisher. We threw up a line in his front, Sugar
Loaf being our base, but were enfiladed by the tire from the
enemy’s fleet.

Terry’s command consisted of two divisions. One of our
brigades (Hagood’s South Carolina) was detached to the
south side of the river to assist Fort Caswell. During the
action Colquitt’s was sent too late to reinforce the garrison of
Fort Fisher, leaving Hoke the two brigades of Kirkland and
Clingman, with some artillery and Lipscomb’s cavalry regi-