246 NortuH Caroitina Troops, 1861-65.

I could venture to move), reached me on the evening of 30
January. Some ten or twelve days anterior thereto, however,
the following order was received from General Wise to the

same effect:
Norrotr, Va., 15 January, 1862.

Ineutenant-Colonel W. J. Green, Commanding, Etc. :
Srr:—You will as early as practicable, move your whole
force from Wilmington, N. C., to Norfolk, Va., and there re-
port to General Huger for transportation to Roanoke Island.
Bring with your men all the outfit which you can procure at
Wilmington, and make requisition at Norfolk for deficien-
cies. Prompt movement is necessary, as the enemy are near

in large force.
Henry A. WIsz,

Brigadier-General.

I waited at once on General Anderson and asked for per-
mission to start the next day. This he peremptorily refused,
threatening arrest if the attempt was made. “You are un-
der my command,” he said, “by order of General Cooper, and
no less authority is going to take you away from here.”

He, however, consented that Major Erwin might to to
Richmond and lay the matter before the Secretary of War
for final arbitrament. The Major carried request from me
to obey General Wise’s order, and protest against it from
General Anderson.

After the interval stated, and after General Wise had writ-
ten the Secretary of War under date of 26 January, ‘“‘Please
order the forces of my Legion under Colonel Green, at Wil-
mington, N. C., * * * to be forwarded to me,” the de-
sired permission (order) arrived.

Within the shortest possible time that transportation could
be obtained, about thirty-six hours after receipt of order, we
went on our way to destination. On reaching Norfolk, was
again detained two or three days, needlessly, awaiting water
transportation, starting on 5 February.

ROANOKE ISLAND.

The sequel is sufficiently set forth in my report of oper-
ations of the next three days ensuing, of date of 18 February,

Seconp BarTrTaLion. 247

herewith reproduced from Ojficial Records, Vol. 9, Series 1,
to which should be added that this command was the only
one under arms outside of the water batteries at the time of
the surrender.

Am thus explicit in details concerning this first great dis-
aster to the Confederate cause in order to refute the unjust
insinuations of General Wise that I was needlessly dilatory
in starting from Wilmington in obedience to his orders. In
plain words that those issued direct from the War Office were
not subordinate to his. The absurdity of the assumption is
not deserving of comment. If any were needed, it is sup-
plied in the report of the Congressional Investigating Corn-
mittee. General Wise’s absence from the island, and pres-
ence on the mainland during the entire fighting, should have
made him more cautious in his reflections, not only in this
case, but as to almost every other regimental commander there
present. It grieves to say as much of one who had presump-
tively done a favor. A brilliant talker, a fiery orator, a
pungent writer, and withal a patriot, all this he was, but like
some other political generals, a very indifferent soldier.

Querulous with superiors, captious to equals, insolent to
subordinates, and opinionated in the superlative degree,
he was totally unfitted for command at a most important point
and at a most critical juncture. Had this not been said in
effect before the Investigating Committee relative to the fall
of Roanoke Island, and in refutal of the baseless aspersion
above referred to, it probably would not here appear. No
less is due to my gallant command as well as to myself in the
proposed embodiment of historic regimental sketches of the
various commands of our State. Immediately after ex-
change the Second Battalion was upon my application trans-
ferred to the brigade of that superb soldier, Junius Daniel,
which after his death at Spottsylvania, was commanded by
his worthy successor, General Bryan Grimes.

Recurring to report alluded to, let it be premised that the
Second Battalion was most needlessly included in the list of
prisoners that day. After the fall back of the troops engaged
and the resolve to surrender, an official order to re-embark and
strike for the mainland would have saved every man in it.