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176 Nort Carotina Troops, 1861-65.

and nights without rest, sleep or rations. When we reached
the ferry that night there was perhaps not more than one-
fourth of our men in line. The writer had charge of the
remnants of four companies, but after a rest of about two
hours nearly every man and officer was in his place. About
midnight some citizens of that section came into our camp
and reported that General Potter had communicated with
New Bern and that a number of transports had reached the
Ferry with heavy reinforcements, and that we were in very
great danger of being captured. Acting upon the supposi-
tion that this report was true, we left our campfires brightly
burning, and retiring in midnight darkness, marched the bal-
ance of the night, in the direction of Kinston, thus adding
this to our previous record of forty-eight miles, all within
twenty-four hours. We afterward learned that we had been
deceived by “Buffaloes,” and that the transports from New
Bern did not reach Street’s Ferry until late in the afternoon
of the next day. Thus ended the “Potter Raid,” one of the
most infamous affairs that stain the record of our Civil War,
and one which, I believe, has made every true soldier, who
was foreed to take part in it, blush with shame.

On 9 August the regiment was ordered to Wilmington, and
first went into camp at Virginia Creek and afterward at vari-
ous places along the sound from there to Fort Fisher. On
reaching camp on Topsail Sound, commissary supplies were
brought down from Wilmington late at night, and rations
were issued to the entire regiment early the next morning.
All cooked and ate breakfast about the same time, and the en-
tire regiment, men and officers, were poisoned by eating flour
which had been poisoned and sent through the blockade. No
deaths resulted directly, but the serious effects were felt for
a long time and much sickness resulted. This was the sec-
ond occurrence of the kind at Wilmington. We remained in
and around Wilmington until the spring of 1864, engaged in
constructing fortifications, doing picket duty along the coast,
and provost duty in the city. Nothing except an occasional
shelling from some of the enemy’s guns and watching our
steamers successfully, and with a regularity almost equal to

FIrtietH REGIMENT. 177

an up-to-date railroad schedule, run the so-called blockades,
served to break the monotony of our every-day life.

On 28 April, 1864, we received orders to proceed to Tar-
boro. On 30 April, started on the march to Plymouth. The
town had, after two days of desperate fighting by the Con-
federate infantry, led by the gallant Hoke, assisted by Cap-
tain Cooke, with the iron-clad boat ‘“‘Albemarle,” surrendered
to the commander of the Confederate forces on 20 April.

A part of the Fiftieth Regiment was stationed at Plymouth
as a garrison for that place and the other part was sent to the
town of Washington in charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Van
Hook for similar duty. The chief oecupation of the regi-
ment from this time to the latter part of October following,
was raiding the eastern counties lying along the coast from
New Bern to the Virginia line for the purpose of collecting
and bringing out provisions from these productive counties
for the use of our army in Virginia. This work was done
by small detachments usually in charge of a Captain or a
Lieutenant, but in many instances in charge only of a non-
commissioned officer. The enemy being constantly on the
lookout for these raiding parties, frequent encounters re-
sulted. Recounting the many thrilling adventures covering
this period, a whole volume might be written as a well-earned
tribute to the private soldier, as many of the daring deeds
were accomplished by them without the aid or direction of an
officer. Many prisoners and much valuable property were
brought in by these small detachments, and a remarkable fact
is that they rarely ever lost a man. On one occasion a small
party were scouting in the vicinity of Coinjock, where there
was a “lock” on the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal, and
noticing the manner of passing boats through this “lock,”
concluded that it afforded a splendid opportunity to capture
one. On returning to camp they reported to their officers the
result of their observations and conclusions, and asked per-
mission to make the attempt to carry them into effect. The
officers seeming unwilling to assume the responsibility, they
then asked for the assurance that they did not object to their
assuming all the responsibility and undertaking the job.

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