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218 Norra Carotina Troops, 1861-’65.

From the 6th to the 10th of September, we remained in
camp near Frederick, Maryland. Here rest, full rations and
delightful weather recuperated us fast. It was while in
camp at this place that the famous “Lost Order” was dropped
by some one at the headquarters of our division commander,
General D. H. Hill. General Hill subsequently established
the fact that he never saw this duplicate order. The sol-
dier who lost it was never guilty of a more culpable act,
nor one fraught with more moment. This order, which was
picked up on the 13th by a Federal soldier, wrapped around
some Confederate cigars, and at once transmitted to McClel-
lan, revealed not only the dangerous secret that Lee’s army
was divided, but told in minute detail the present position
and future movements of infantry, artillery, cavalry and
trains. In the hands of an able and active foe—one alive to
the tremendous advantage thus given him and quick and res-
olute in availing himself of it—this paper must in all proba-
bility, have been the death warrant of the Southern Confed-
eracy. For by a strange fatality it revealed the faults of
Southern strategy at its faultiest moment, and told where
and when to meet and overcome the Confederate commands
when their strength was at the lowest ebb.

Fortunately McClellan had few of the qualities of a Jack-
son, a Forest or even a Hood. He acted upon the informa-
tion thus obtained, but not with the promptitude and energy
that Fate demands when at long intervals she places such op-
portunity in mortal hands. McClellan’s report of the find
to Lincoln was not only characteristic, but a fine tribute to the
valor of his weakened, scattered and now betrayed antago-
nists. “TI have all the plans of the rebels,” he wires, “and
will catch them in their own trap, if my men are equal to the
emergency.” Lee’s strokes had been so hard and his strat-
egy, based upon the prowess of his army, so bold, that Me-
Clellan informed Halleck that he had “120,000 men to fight.”

McClellan thus apprized of the situation, moved forward
on the morning of 13 September, to take advantage of it.

One column under Franklin was thrown forward south-
westerly towards Crampton Gap of South Mountain. Its
objective was to crush Jackson’s force, then hammering the

TweENtTy-THIRD REGIMENT. 219

Federal. garrison at Harper’s Ferry. The bulk of the Fed-
eral army was moved westerly against us through Turner’s
and Fox’s Gap, its object being Hagerstown, which the “Lost
Order’ had disclosed as Lee’s point of rendezvous.

We had withdrawn from Frederick 10 September, moving
slowly through Turner’s Gap of South Mountain to-
wards Boonsboro, on the direct road to Hagerstown. Our
division was the rear guard of the army and was encumbered
with all the wagon and artillery trains.

THE BATTLE OF BOONSBORO, OR SOUTH MOUNTAIN,

By the afternoon 13 September, we had marched to
the west of Boonsboro, and gone into camp near Funks-
town. From here we were hurried back east to South Moun-
tain; meeting General Stuart coming down as we marched
up. That night we spent on the western slope of the ridge; a
chilly bivouae without blankets or any manner of covering
from the keen mountain air.

Early in the morning of Sunday, 14 September, General
D. H. Hill came in person and posted Colquitt’s brigade in
Turner’s Gap and our brigade (Garland’s) in Fox’s Gap, a
mile to the south of Turner’s. These two Gaps, which are
virtually one, are traversed by many roads. If McClellan’s
advance was to be checked till Jackson could take Harper’s
Ferry and join Lee, all these roads must be held by this hand-
ful of men against McClellan to the last extremity. This
necessitated the scattering of the regiments of the brigade
and resulted almost in the destruction of some of them, but
the pass was held and the precious time necessary for Lee
to concentrate, gained.

Garland’s brigade of five regiments numbered less than
1,000 men. Our regiment had been severely cut to pieces
at Seven Pines and Malvern Hill, and not yet having been re-
eruited by conscripts to the same extent as some of the others,
was much smaller in proportion than the brigade. Our posi-
tion was in the centre of the brigade and along the crest of
the ridge behind an old stone fence, so common in that region.