208 Norra Carotina Troops, 1861-’65. hood have met its doom in the Chickahominy swamps. Had Southern practicalness been at all commensurate with South- ern generalship and Southern courage, it is hard to see how McClellan’s army could have escaped ruin, if not total de- struction. This unpracticalness manifested itself here in the failure to prepare accurate topographical maps of a region which the trend of events had, for months, pointed out as the most probable scene of conflict. The position of the Federal army was, on the whole, nat- urally very strong and made as much stronger as engineering skill could make it. But owing to the isolating effect of the many streams and swamps, difficult of passage, it gave the opportunity of the war to the qualities in which the Southern army excelled—prowess and military genius. In this in- stance these qualities were largely negatived by the fact that the Confederate leaders fought and manouvered over a region of whose exact topography they knew scarcely more than of the craters in the moon. The result of this ignorance of nat- ural obstacles, and of the roads that turn them, was that thousands of gallant men, the very flower of the Southern army, were needlessly and heedlessly sacrificed, and that a half victory cost double the price for what a whole victory could have been obtained. Lee’s plans were that Jackson, then in the Shenandoah Valley, by a rapid and secret march, should strike the right flank of this twenty-mile line, while he smote its right front. Then beginning at the end, 55,000 of his 80,000 men, were to be thrown impetuously against the Federal line, flanking it as far as practicable, and rolling it back upon itself, compass its destruction if possible. After Seven Pines the Twenty-third was assigned a posi- tion near the left wing of the army. Our tents were pitched on the banks of a small stream about 600 yards in the rear of the works. As an advance of the enemy was hourly expected, the orders were that upon the sound of a bugle at brigade headquarters, the regiment must be formed in five minutes with three days’ rations, canteens filled and forty rounds of ammunition per man, ready to march rapidly to its place in line. This rendered it necessary for the men to sleep with TwENTY-THIRD REGIMENT. 209 their cartridge belts on and haversacks and canteens by their sides. Mounted officers had to keep their horses saddled. No one was allowed to be absent from the command for a moment. Many such alarms were given by day and by night. Two weeks of this rigid discipline made the order to advance a genuine relief. The fighting began in earnest on Thursday, 26 June, a fine cloudless day. On the afternoon of that day A. P. Hill moved to the east and without waiting for Jackson’s appear- ance on the Federal flank, as had been agreed, assaulted in front the impregnable lines on Beaver Dam Creek, a small stream running north and south, and emptying into the Chickahominy. The result was that he was beaten off with the loss of over 3,000 men, a loss nearly ten times as great as he inflicted on the enemy. This is often called the battle of Mechanicsville from a very small village at the cross roads a mile west of the stream. [This premature assault and conse- quent disastrous and useless loss of life General A. P. Hill afterward repeated at Gettysburg and at Bristoe Sta- tion.— Eb. | The Twenty-third, which belonged to D. H. Hill’s divis- ion, was not actively engaged on the 26th. About 11 a. m. of that day, we left our position in line and marched to the left, striking the Mechanicsville road as we filed down the hill towards a little stream. To the left of our line of march could be seen a group of high Confederate officers, including President Davis, Generals Lee, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, Gar- land and others. Their earnest consultation and the distant firing made us feel that a momentous period in the struggle was now athand. We were marched up and took position op- posite the hills beyond the stream, and were for a while under a spirited cannonade. Adjutant Turner’s horse was killed, falling on him, but not inflicting injury enough to keep him out of the. battle of the next day. Several other casualties were also sustained by the regiment. We slept that night on our arms. Early the next morning while Captain I. J. Young was getting his company 1 line for the work before us, one of his men complained that he 14