ain na RU Ll SSS heat Daan Se ee = 3 . : Ly CLirird IT oy Z t i — ee sea i: a oo . aii en CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, NEW ORLEANS, SEVEN PINES, RICHMOND AND NORTH CAROLINA. BY GUSTAVUS W. SMITH, Late Major General Confederate States Army. SECOND EDITION. New YorK: ATLANTIC PUBLISHING AND ENGRAVING CO. 1884, Oe CopyrieHt, 1883, By GUSTAVUS W. SMITH. ee SS apn PREFAOE. Tux war policy of the Confederate States Administra- tion in the Autumn of 1861—as shown by the conference, early in October, between President Davis and the three senior officers of General J. E. Johnston’s Army —is the subject discussed in the first of the following Series of papers. Apart from the inherent importance of this matter, the questions brought up by the Ex- President, in regard to it, give additional interest to what is believed to have been a turning point in the struggle made by the Southern States for political independence. The second paper of the series refers to the circum- stances attendant upon the defence and the evacuation of New Orleans—the third relates to Confederate opera- tions at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks—and the fourth treats of the defences of Richmond and of North Carolina in the latter part of 1862 and early months of 1863. It is believed that, up to the present time, some of the sub- jects discussed in these papers are in many essential points not clearly understood. The author has en- deavored to furnish authentic data, and proof, in regard to principal facts in this connection—and hopes the fol- lowing pages may aid in the formation of correct views in regard to the events referred to and be useful in obviating, at least in part, false impressions which are certainly liable to be conveyed by some of the writings heretofore published. New York Crry, October, 1883, ov ae eT wee ete.; but, when it was prop army during a winter, ete.; 5 : to pea into Eastern Maryland, she eos sod i i ion, difficulties aros session, for a partial campaign, eee ion 1 luggard, so that the prop lion in the path of the s sre ecuted. In like man was. postponed and never ex int er ana epeniiik in the Valley of See earl ig Council, General 1. J. c by an officer not of this sare it i i that the President s i Tn one place it is written : Spat uk no reénforcements could be sper wee : ked for.’ In another plac rmy of the character as ads to say he could not take any troops from the points named and, ‘ without arms from ab reénforce that army.’ He answer that the proposition ment as additional arms would Those arms he expected to receive, of the sea, and of the enemy, whic vented the ‘ positive assurance ceived at all.’ It was, as stated, with a bitter disappointment that T found, notw1 diligent efforts to re the battle of Manass road, could not re, again, it is clear from the had been for such reénforce- enable him to give. barring the dangers h obstacles alone pre- that they would be re- th deep regret and thstanding our énforce this army, before and after as, that its strength had but little 4 £ 4 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 25 increased, and that the arms of absentees and discharged men were represented by only twenty-five hundred on hand. I cannot suppose that General Johnston could have noticed the statement that his request for confer- ence had set forth the object of it to be to discuss the question of reénforcement. He would have known that in Richmond, where all the returns were to be found, any consideration of reénforcement, by the withdrawal of troops, from existing garrisons, could best be decided. Very little experience or a fair amount of modesty with- out any experience would serve to prevent one from an- nouncing his conclusion that troops could be withdrawn from a place or places without knowing how many were there, and what was the necessity for their presence. I was at the Conference by request; the confidence felt in those officers is shown by the fact that I met them alone, and did not require any minutes to be made of the meeting. About four months afterward a paper was prepared to make a record of the conversation; the fact was concealed from me, whereas, both for accuracy and frankness, it should have been submitted to me, even if there had been nothing due to our official relations. Twenty years after the event, I learned of this secret re- port, by one party, without notice having been given to the other, of a conversation said to have lasted two hours, I have noticed the improbabilities and inconsist- encies of the paper, and without remark, I submit to honorable men the concealment from me in which it was prepared, whereby they may judge of the chances for such co-intelligence as needs must exist between the Ex- ecutive and the Commanders of armies to insure attain- able success. The position at Fairfax Court House though it would answer very well as a point from which to advance was quite unfavorable for defence; and when 26 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. T so remarked, the opinion seemed to be that to which the Generals had previously arrived. It, therefore, only remained to consider what change of position should be made in the event of the enemy threatening soon to ad- vance. But in the mean time I hoped that something could be done by detachments from the army to effect objects less difficult than an advance against his main force, and particularly indicated the lower part of Mary- land, where a small force was said to be ravaging the country and oppressing our friends. This, I thought, might be feasible by the establishment of a battery near to Acquia Creek, where the channel of the Potomac was said to be so narrow that our guns could prevent the use of the river by the enemy’s boats, and, by employing a steamboat lying there, troops enough could be sent over some night to defeat that force, and return before any large body could be concentrated against them. The effect of the battery and of the expedition, it was hoped, would be important in relieving our friends and securing recruits from those who wished to join us. Previously General Johnston’s attention had been called to possi- bilities in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and that these and other like things were not done, was surely due to other causes than ‘the policy of the administration’ as will appear by the letters hereto annexed : « ¢RrcuMmonp, Vireria, August, 1 1861. “¢ General J. EK, JOHNSTON: «é . , General Lee has gone to Western Virginia, and I hope may be able to strike a decisive blow in that quar- ter, or, failing in that will be able to organize and post our troops so as to check the enemy, after which he will re- turn to this place. The movement of Banks will require your attention. It may be a ruse, but if a real move- CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 27 ment when your army has the requisite strength and mobility, you will probably find an opportunity, by a rapid movement through the passes, to strike him in rear or flank, and thus add another to your many claims to your country’s gratitude. . . . We must be prompt to avail ourselves of the weakness resulting from the ex- change of the new and less reliable forces of the enemy for those heretofore in service, as well as of the moral effect produced by their late defeat. . . . “ a ammunition on hand was so inferior in quality as 0 give more than half range. . . . The ammunition did not average more than twenty r Rina ounds per gun. . , res had been taken f i he sien ck iki, n for obstructing any of the : either by felling timber, driving pi feet ae shuts except that the materials had bee ‘- Pt n part, for making a raft to be placed in the ban ppi River at the forts, and the work on it had commenced. A line of intrenchments around the Pram er ee * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 11. 66 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. city itself had been planned, and was commenced some weeks before my arrival by Major (now General) M. L. Smith; but it was entirely unfinished: not a gun was mounted, a magazine built, ora platform laid. . . . There was a vast amount of Engineer and ordnance work to be done, and both of these important branches were im- posed upon Major Smith, who found it impossible to do justice tothem both. . . * The general plan adopted was to have two lines of works, an exterior line passing through the forts and earthworks which guarded the various water approaches, and an interior line, embracing New Orleans and Algiers, which was intended principally to repel an attack by land. . . {Several new regiments were in process of organization and preparation at Camp Moore, seventy-eight miles north of the city, but were only partially armed and equipped. There were in all five new regiments which were yet unfit to take the field.” CHAPTER II. Condition of the defences in November, 1861—delayed by want of competent officers—heavy guns could not be obtained—pre- parations for defence pressed forward—organized, armed, and equipped, a brigade of 5000 men—ordered to seize, arm, man, and equip, fourteen, named, river steamboats—one million dollars appropriated by the Confederate Congress. In continuing his testimony General Lovell says:t “ Tcommenced at once, with all the available means at my disposal, to supply deficiencies. . . In making these preparations, however, I was materially delayed by the ee * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 14. Tp: 12. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 67 want of a sufficient number of competent officers of ex- perience and detailed knowledge. This deficiency was made known to the War Department, and relief asked on several occasions, but without success. Having com- pleted my inspection in the early part of November, I telegraphed on the 5th to Colonel Gorgas, Chief of Ord- nance, at Richmond,-for mortars and columbiads. He replied the next day that ‘ He had no mortars or colum- biads to spare at present.’ I then telegraphed General Bragg at Pensacola to send me, if possible, some ten- meh guns and mortars. He answered ‘Not a gun to Spare.’ Knowing that there was no other point to look to for guns, I then turned my attention to making ar- rangements, in New Orleans, for casting eight and ten- inch colambiads, and ten-inch sea-coast mortars. I pro- cured all the large chains and anchors that could be had from Pensacola, Savannah, and other places for the pur- pose of constructing rafts and booms to place in the various water approaches, giving particular attention to that in the Mississippi River. . . . And soon commenced the manufacture of powder, which was submitted to the eprouvette test before it was received. Having arrange- ments made with the foundries in New Orleans for cast- ing shot and shell, I proceeded, with the permission of the Secretary of the Treasury, to convert one half of the large new Marine Hospital into an arsenal. A cartridge manufactory was established, in which a number of hands were employed, and which not only supplied my Department, but enabled me to send more than a million rounds to the army in Tennessee. . . . Earthwork forts, mounting from two to six guns each, were com- menced on the Grand Caillou, on Bayou Lafourche, on Bayou Barrataria, at the Manshac passes, and at Proe- torsville; and two forts on Berwick’s Bay were almost NE tale ome eee see Me tee ere aaa aes 68 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. entirely reconstructed. On the Mississippi River works were put up above the city; and on the southern and western shores of Lake Pontchartrain. . . . Twenty inde- pendent companies of infantry, raised by my predeces- sor, were organised by me into regiments, placed as gar- risons in the various works of the exterior line, and tho- roughly drilled in the heavy artillery service. The in- fantry at Camp Moore was brought to the city, placed in camp, and when General Ruggles (after four weeks of severe illness) reported for duty, he was charged with the organization of a brigade out of these troops. ... Previous to taking command at New Orleans, I had verb- ally stated, both to the President and Secretary of War that, in my opinion, batteries on shore could be passed by ships of war under steam with the loss of but few vessels, and had repeated this opinion to the latter in my letter of November 19th, 1861.” Condition of the Defences of New Orleans in Decem- ber, 1861.—In his testimony before the Court of Inquiry General Lovell says: * “I reported, quite in detail, to the War Department, my progress in the duties of my com- mand on the 5th of December, 1861. During the suc- _ ceeding four weeks I was directed, from Richmond, to send out of the Department twenty-two heavy guns to Tennessee and Charleston, South Carolina; and to pro- vide one gun each for the fourteen vessels of the river defence fleet, intended for service on the upper river. Talso turned over to the navy ten forty-two-pounders for arming the steamers Bienville and Carondelet, for service in Lake Pontchartrain and Mississippi Sound; besides which, I supplied them with powder and the —_———_— rr Crr'Mhvh CC * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 15. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 69 men to serve their guns, as they had neither guns, powder, nor crews to make the ships available.” On the 25th of December General Lovell wrote to the Secretary of War:* “In conversation with the President before leaving Richmond, I understood him to say that I could call for such troops as the case might require, taking care not to create more expense for maintaining men than was absolutely necessary. As the enemy is congregating at Ship Island I shall orga- nize the forces here as rapidly as possible.” On the 29th he wrote: + “The enemy has now at Ship Island twenty- two vessels, large and small, and is landing troops in large numbers. . . . They cannot take New Orleans by a land attack with any force they can bring to bear. - . . Tam almost entirely deficient in the way of officers. General Ruggles and Colonel Duncan are the only two serving with troops who can render me aid. No other department is so deficient, and certainly none is more important.” Condition of the Defences of New Orleans in Janu- ary, 1862.—On the 7th of this month General Lovell wrote to the Secretary of War:{ “You will recollect our conversation the evening before I left Richmond, in which you took a different view from myself. I felt satisfied that if the protection of the navigable streams running up into the country was removed from my con- trol, it would in all probability not be properly arranged in connection with the land defences, while the general commanding the Department would be considered by the people at large as responsible for inroads into the territory of his command. This is just what has hap- pened.” ce eal * Official Correspondence, p. 26, tp. 28. tp. 29. Pee SE ey HENNY SERN Se es SN ee eR TT 70 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. On the 8th he wrote: * “Some’six weeks since, at the urgent call of an officer in Kentucky, and believing that I would be safe from attack until January, T sent two regiments to Columbus, with the distinct understanding on my part, and so expressed both to Generals Johnston and Polk, that when the enemy appeared here they should be returned. General Polk now, in answer to my call, telegraphs me that he has asked you to send me other troops, and you have consented. T hope that this is not so. The troops I sent him are natives of this part of the country and cannot be replaced by others.” In his testimony before the Court of Inquiry, General Lovell says: + “I received orders about the 15th Janu- ary, 1862, from the Secretary of War, to seize fourteen steamers, then at New Orleans, which were to be strengthened, protected with cotton bales, armed, manned and equipped under my general supervision, by Captains Montgomery, Townsend, and others named by them. For this purpose one million of dollars was placed to my credit. . . ” On the 19th the Secretary of War, referring to the telegraphic order directing the seizure of these vessels, wrote to General Lovell : f “These instructions were sent you in consequence of the passage by Congress of two laws, Nos. 344 and 350, herewith forwarded, providing one million of dollars for application to floating defences for the Western rivers, to be expended at the discretion of the President... . The Department relies confidently on your co-operation in rendering effective this plan, which may perhaps not only be of vast importance for the péculiar service now hoped for on the upper Mississippi, but may prove very formidable aids to your future operations in the lower ep eer * Official Correspondence, p. 81. + p. 15. ¢ p. 33. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 71 part of the valley. . . . To a commander of your intel- ligence and capacity it is deemed sufficient thus gen- erally to sketch the outline of a scheme of defence, without attempting to lay down any minute rules or de- tails for carrying out what is necessarily a novel experi- ‘Ment, yet one from which much is hoped by the Government.” CHAPTER II. Five thousand men sent from New Orleans to Columbus, Ky. by direction of President Davis—General Lovell expresses regret at being thus deprived of all his available force—Presi- dent Davis calls for more troops to be sent to Corinth—Gen- eral Lovell protests against sending the ironclad Louisiana up the river—Refusal of the Government to change the order— Important letter from General Lovell to the Secretary of War. On the 8th of February the Secretary of War wrote to General Lovell: * “The President desires that, as soon as possible on receipt of this letter, you dispatch five thousand men to Columbus. . . . New Orleans is to be defended from above by defeating the enemy at Columbus.” On the 12th General Lovell wrote to the Secretary of War: + “I regret the necessity for sending away my only force at this particular juncture... . I borrowed from the navy two launches of one gun each. - . . The Secretary of the Navy requires that they be returned. . . . I should like to have authority to use any funds that may be in my hands to construct two more. ...I can get no assistance from the navy as they have no funds.” * Official Correspondence, p. 49. + p. 5h iS 72 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, On the 23d the Secretary of War wrote to General ' Lovell: * “The order for the defence of the Mississippi coast was issued against my judgment, but the urgency of the members from that State on the President was so great that it was not politic to refuse at the time to able was their demand, and we must dismiss all idea of scattering our force in defence of unimportant points, and concentrate them at vital lines.” On the 27th General Lovell wrote to the Secretary of War:+ “People are beginning to complain that J have stripped the Department so completely. ...I am a good deal delayed by the want of competent officers to assist me in the. laborious details of this Department. We want an ordnance officer here badly. Many things are necessarily kept back by having Major Smith per- form the duties of engineer and of ordnance officer, either one of which would tax a competent man to the utmost. It is neither justice to him nor the service to make him responsible for such an immense and varied amount of detailed work.” Condition of the Defences of New Orleans in March, 1862. On the 5th General Lovell wrote the Secretary of War:t{ “ This Department is being completely drained of everything. . . . We have filled requisitions for arms, men, and munitions until ew Orleans is about defence- less. . . . Mobile and Pensacola, even Galveston, are defended by 10-inch columbiads, while this city has nothing above an 8-inch, and but few of them. The fortified line about the city is complete, but I have taken ten of the guns for the navy and sixteen for the vessels that we are fitting up for the river expedition. * Official Correspondence, p. 54. tp. 56. tp. 59. gratify their wish. Events have shown how unreason- - CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. v6} My reliance to defend these lines will be upon the militia with double-barrelled shot-guns and thirty-two- pound carronades. If now you take the powder from me, we shall be in no condition to resist. The only thing to provide is a sufficiency of powder to enable us to resist a prolonged attack by ships and mortar-boats upon two points, Forts Pike and Macomb, and Forts Jackson and St. Philip. If the first are passed we still have a land defence to make; if the last, a fleet can proceed at once to the city. . . . I cannot organize the militia left here without the assistance of a general officer of experience and detailed knowledge. . . . Iam hunting all over the Confederacy to procure saltpetre to rework the powder lately arrived from Cuba. They are sending it from Memphis to Augusta. . . . Permit me again to urge upon you the necessity of sending here an officer of ordnance. . . . I am somewhat fearful that a little too much latitude has been given to the steam- boat captains and pilots in charge of the river expedi- tion. . . . The Calhoun runs up the river below the forts, and we have nothing to keep her back... .I / hope the Secretary of the Navy will keep at least one vessel here to prevent the enemy from making recon- naissances under our very guns.” On the 7th General Lovell telegraphed to the Secretary of War:* “In case of evacuation of points now occupied (Pensacola), please order 10-inch guns and mortars here.” The raft gives way.—tIn his testimony before the Court of Inquiry, General Lovell says:+ “In the latter part of February, the great raft in the Mississippi River at the forts began to show signs of giving way. The CEP, NN Yd OR OR A NER Oe Bese TS EROS RL BERN Ey PA: * Official Correspondence, p. 61. + Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 17. 74 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. drift had accumulated greatly, and the river was higher than ever known before. I employed steamboats and skiffs to remove the drift, but it gained on us so rapidly that the attempt was given up. The raft gave way at various points, and by the end of the first week in March, the main chains snapped and it ceased to be any langer an obstruction. ... As soon as the raft had given way, I applied for and got one hundred thousand dollars from the City Council of New Orleans, by whom the money for the previous raft had been furnished, and sent Colonel Higgins, an able and efficient officer, for- merly of the United States Navy, down to éndeavor to repair the raft. I gave him full authority to take or hire steamers, employ men, and do anything that might be necessary to accomplish his purpose. It was found impossible to restore the raft; but a new obstruction was made of parts of the old raft, and with schooners an- chored and fastened together by chains. This obstruc- tion was, however, far inferior to the other, and was by no means satisfactory; but heavy chains for anchoring a more formidable obstruction could not be obtained by the most strenuous endeavors.” On the 8th General Lovell wrote to General Beaure- gard:* “The current and drift have finally got the up- per hand of my raft between St. Philip and Jackson, This, taken in connection with the facts that Commodore Hollins has taken up the river every vessel that mounts a gun, and that General Polk declined to ship me the chains and anchors at Columbus, which would have saved my raft, compels a new disposition as to the four- teen vessels of Montgomery’s expedition.” On the 9th General Lovell wrote to the Secretary of a a * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 143. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 75 War:* “You will thus perceive that this Department has been completely stripped of every organized body of troops. . . . Persons are found here who assert that Tam sending away all troops so that the city may fall an easy prey to the enemy. . . . All requisitions for am- munition have been filled until I have none left, except what is in the hands of troops. Neither have I funds placed at my disposal to create supplies in place of those sent off. . . . If the enemy intends an attack here, he will make it soon, and I trust no further calls will be made until we are. placed in a defensible condition.” On the 10th he wrote: “. . . I should have sent the whole number (fourteen river steamboats) up as soon as they were ready, had not the heavy drift and current broken up, in a great measure, the river obstructions at Fort Jackson. . . . The enemy’s fleet is collecting and begin- ning to enter the mouths of the river with boldness, and have an open passage to New Orleans if the forts below are passed. The fleet threatening us below is much more formidable than that above, and I object strongly to sending every armed vessel away from New Orleans at this time. This city has been already too much weakened by detachments of all kinds.” On the 11th he telegraphed to the Secretary of War:+ “ Quarter- master, Commissary, river defence, Engineer, and medi- cal funds exhausted; can’t move rapidly without money.” On the 12th the Secretary of War wrote to General Lovell: { “I have your letter of the 27th ult., together With its enclosures. I have also received several com- munications in relation to the command of the river steamer defences, and both the President and myself have felt much embarrassed by them. The expedition aig eae oa a ae a * Official Correspondence, p. 62. tp. 63. = fp. 68, winwtiail 76 ' CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, was planned and gotten up by Captains Montgomery and Townsend, recommended by the whole Missouri delegation, and General Polk, and the objections made to them now appear to us of the most vague and incon- elusive character. . . . The expedition ought to go as promptly as possible, subject to the orders of General Beauregard, as regards the service required of it... . As soon as I can get one moment, I will answer the rest of your letter, but, I conclude by saying that your whole conduct of your Department justifies the confidence re- posed in you, and that I have not yet found a single act of yours which I disapprove in the smallest degree. . . P.S. The expedition is: in no event to be put under control of officers of the navy.” On the 22d of March, Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of War, wrote to General Lovell:* “Before turning over the affairs of the War Department to my successor, I am anxious to give you full replies to your letters of the 6th, 9th, and 10th insts., as well as those points remain- ing unanswered in your letter of the 27th ult.... Nothing is more gratifying than the zeal and activity you have so intelligently applied to remedying the de- ficiency under which we labor in the conduct of this war. Exercise your discretion in concentrating all our resources for the public defence, and feel assured of ex- ecutive support and approval. No more calls will be made on you for any supplies. . . . Your assistance to the army in Tennessee has been most timely and valu- able, and exceeded what I had hoped. . . . In view of the great extent to which you have been-weakened, by sending aid up the river, you are right in retaining some of the steamboat fleet below.” * Official Correspondence, p. 65. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. U7 On thie 22d General Lovell wrote to the Secretary of War:* “Within the past few days they (the enemy) have had thirteen ships near the mouth of the river and have succeeded in towing inside several large (war) steamers, which in my opinion only await the arrival of the mortar fleet to attempt to come up the river to New Orleans. .. . In guns of large calibre we are greatly deficient, as I have mentioned before. It was to be hoped that on the evacuation of Pensacola some ten- inch columbiads would be sent here, but I have only succeeded in getting one, and that by sending a perse- vering officer after it... . We are called upon here from all quarters to furnish everything—powder, food, equipments, and ordnance stores of all kinds; and it is impossible to make any estimate which will suit the re- quirements of the bureaus in Richmond. . . . We know not what urgent requisition may come upon us by tele- graph at a moment’s notice. Bragg telegraphed to-day for five hundred thousand pounds of hard bread; yet the estimate of my Commissary, approved by me, has been returned from Richmond for details of what we would require. Such red tape will kill us.” On the same day he sent telegram: “Please order General Jones, at Mobile, to send me some ten-inch columbiads and sea-coast mortars promptly. . . . Seven vessels of enemy inside of mouth of river, All our naval ships at Memphis. I will have to retain six of Montgomery’s fleet for service below.” “ Note:+ On the 24th of March, 1862, Hon. G. W. Randolph entered on the duties of the office of Secretary of War.” On the 29th General Lovell telegraphed to the Secre- * Official Correspondence, p. 67. +p. 67. Sica 78 ; CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, tary of War:* “T cannot get heavy guns from Mobile. The enemy is in large force at the mouth of the river. Please order commanding officer at Mobile to send im- mediately.” The new Secretary of War, General Ran- dolph, replied, the same day: “What guns do you mean? Guns in batteries, or guns on their way to you?” On the 31st General Lovell answered: “A part of the ten-inch columbiads and sea-coast mortars which were at Pensacola. New Orleans has only one of the former and none of the latter.” Condition of the Defences of New Orleans in April, 1862.—On the 3d of April General Lovell telegraphed to the Secretary of War: “The seizure of Governor Moore’s guns by the War Department leaves me in a precarious condition. We sent off all of our men, rely- ing upon these guns to arm others. Please order them here.” On the 10th he telegraphed: “Can you possibly order here four or five thousand small arms? I have sent all my troops to Corinth, but have several unarmed war regiments.”+ On the same day President Davis telegraphed to the Governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama: { “General Beau- regard must have reénforcements to meet the vast ac- . cumulation of the enemy before him. The necessity is imminent: the case of vital importance, Send forward to Corinth all the armed men you can furnish.” On the 11th Governor Moore replied: “Can troops be armed if Isend them? I have no arms here except those General Lovell thinks we should keep, those just received from Pensacola.” On the same day the President answered: “No arms to furnish. You will not fail to appreciate the necessity which caused the application to you. If * Official Correspondence, p. 69. tp. 71. tp. 113. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 79 you could spare armed troops for a few weeks, they might be returned to you.” On the same day General Lovell telegraphed to the Secretary of War:* “With forty vessels in the lower river, please protest in my name against sending the Louisiana up the river.” To this the Secretary replied: “The Louisiana was ordered up the river to meet three iron-clad boats which have succeeded in passing Island Number Ten, and her presence there is deemed very im- portant to the defence of New Orleans.” On the same day the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to Captain Hollins: “Every effort that nautical skill, invention, and courage can put forth must be made to oppose the enemy’s descent of the river, and at every hazard.” On the 12th General Lovell wrote to the Secretary of War:+ “I have the honor to report that we shall in a few days have about five thousand men in this part of the State, enlisted for the war, for whom I have no arms. All the troops for the interior lines about the city that I had organized were sent to Corinth, and the defence of those lines left in the hands of a few badly organized volunteers, very poorly armed. The forces. of the enemy at Ship Island and Isle Briton cannot be less than ten or twelve thousand men, and I deem it my duty to lay before you the entirely defenceless condition of the city against any attack by land. . . . The condi- tion of our defences, so far as regards artillery, has been represented to the Department; yet, upon the evacua- tion of Pensacola, the greater portion of the heavy guns were sent to Mobile and other points, and that, too, at a time when the whole mortar fleet of the enemy and * Official Correspondence, p. 72. + Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 152. 80 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. twelve (war) steamers were in the river below the forts. . . . Dissatisfaction exists among the people here, who, having sent arms, and everything they had, to Vir- ginia and Tennessee, now find the enemy at their doors, both by land and water, while they can obtain neither heavy guns nor small arms, which they learn by the papers are being sent to places which certainly are not consid- ered so important as the city of New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi. . . . It is scarcely probable that the gunboats of the enemy would come down the river much in advance of their army. Meanwhile we might clear the mouth of the river and then send the whole fleet above and drive them back to Cairo... . I would also earnestly urge the confirmation of Colonel Smith as a brigadier-general. I have but one officer of that rank in the Department, which compels me to do a great deal of work that should devolve upon subordinate officers.” CHAPTER IV. Forts bombarded on 16th—guns from forts could not reach the enemy—On the 17th the Governor of Louisiana protests against sending the Louisiana up the river—President Davis replies, ‘‘The wooden vessels are below; the iron gunboats - are above. The forts should destroy the former if they at- tempt to ascend”—enemy’s ships passed the forts on the 24th—oflicial reports of Generals Lovell, Duncan, and M. L. Smith. On the 15th General Lovell telegraphed the Sécretary of War:* “The énemy is preparing for a formidable attack on the forts below. He shelled them a little for . ——_—_— _ = * Official Correspondence, /p. 73. 5 81 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. past two days—no harm done. Twenty-seven hiss ** by sight from forts.” On the same day he wrote: river pilots (Montgomery and Townsend) who are at the head of the fleet are men of limited ideas, no system, and no administrative capacity whatever. ..- Unless some competent person of education, system, and brains is put over each division of this fleet it will, in re judgment, prove an utter failure. .. - 7” a forty vessels just below Fort Jackson. . . . 1 thin y will locate their mortar-ships, shell the forts for agra days or weeks, and then try to dash by “—_ their steamers,” On the 16th he telegraphed: * “My com- missary, Major Lanier, is out of funds. pede bonds. Heavy demands made on him. He can get 0 + ” answer from Commissary General.” On the 17th the Governor of Louisiana telegraphed President Davis:+ “ Forts bombarded an hour and a legraphs ‘None of half yesterday. General Dunean te our pooh will reach them.’ Commodore Whittle has orders from Secretary of Navy to send the Louisiana to Tennessee. Duncan and Higgins both telegraph she-is absolutely a necessity at the Forts for the reign! of New Orleans, and that it is suicidal to send her else- where, With the enemy’s plan of attack our safety may depend upon her timely arrival there. I wre beg her destination may be changed, and protest —_ her being sent up the river. Excitement papa. ” people great on the subject.” The President rep ¥ . the same day:{ “The wooden vessels are below; iron gunboats are above. The forts should destroy the former if they attempt to ascend. The Louisiana may be indispensable to check the descent of the iron boats. ee oe ete oe eaten 5. * Official Correspondence, p. 74. + p. 114. ¢ p. 11 . 82 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. The purpose is to defend the city and valley; the only question is as to the best mode of effecting the object. Military men must decide; and to-day their discretion- ary power has been enlarged.” On the 22d General Lovell telegraphed the Secretary of War:* “TI require funds for river defence fleet immediately, or cannot keep it up.” And on the 23d to ‘Adjutant-General.of the army: “Bombardment con- tinues with unabated vigor; now five days and nights. We still hold out, with four casualties; but Fort Jack- son much cut up. Want more powder if it can be had.” On the 24th the Governor of Louisiana telegraphed to President Davis: + “Enemy’s ships passed the. forts this morning, after several days’ bombardment.” | On the same day the President replied: “Your despatch in relation to enemy’s ships this day received. I am in hopes that, while the forts divide the fleet, the Louisi- ana will not lose the opportunity. In painful anxiety wait further intelligence.” Evacuation of New Orleans.—On the 26th General Lovell wrote, from Camp Moore, to the Adjutant-Gen- eral of the army:{ “The bombardment of Fort J. ackson, which commenced on Friday, the 19th inst., was con- tinued day night until about three o’clock A.M. on the 24th, when the whole of the enemy’s fleet came up abreast the forts, and while a portion of them engaged our batteries and vessels, the remainder passed under the fire, our men being greatly worn and exhausted with an incessant fight of six days. General Duncan and Colonel Higgins were in command of the troops. I * Official Correspondence, p. 75. + pr tik ¢ Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 147, 83 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. and was about to had just arrived in a river steamer, 9: When'tiit i + commence disembark as the engagement \ op enemy’s fleet passed I was satisfied that New Orle could not be held for more than twenty-four ERE he therefore started at once for the city im order be e move as many of the troops and as large a eget id bes stores as possible. I was well aware that pnd a rare of thirty-two-pouriders at the lower lines ( ee ; miles below the city), manned, by inexperience ee : could not detain for any length of time the heavy sl _ of war of the enemy, armed with nine and — me guns, I will state that when the current and he t _ carried away the obstructions of the river, a convinced that a portion at least of their eo hd . pass whenever the attempt was made, and ha = HA given orders to prepare for removal a large quanti y a the Government stores, directing cars and eyo’ - be held in readiness for that purpose. On my sep : New Orleans I gave orders to the few —_— hs the was organizing there to be ready to sank an ee . larger portion of the Government property Pp wre ‘the boats and cars and started North. In this year . a very inconsiderable portion of our stores were “ behind. The guns om the lines about the city co “ not be removed for want of transportation. Moreove . as soon as it became known that the enemy had ree the forts, laborers refused to work, and the peor: jority of persons declined to take any more ' vane vad ate notes for property bought. On the morning He 25th thirteen of the enemy’s ships engaged our —— s five miles below the city, and after two hours’ firing, during which time they drove the men from one —- and disabled the other, they passed up and anchore abreast the city. General M. L. Smith had a few com- is tia tinal sa 84 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. panies of his brigade at these works. At eleven a.m. our last batteries were passed. I immediately ordered the troops and stores to be sent off rapidly by rail towards Jackson, Mississippi. At three p.w., Captain Bailey and another officer of the Federal navy came ashore and demanded the surrender of the city, and that the United States flag be put upon the principal public buildings. I declined peremptorily to surrender, saying to Captain Bailey that while they were too strong for us on water, I felt abundantly able to beat them on land, but that as I did not feel willing to bring on the bombardment of a city filled with the wives and children of absent soldiers, I should evacuate with my command, and turn the city over to the Mayor; that if they were willing to consent to this proposition I would quietly withdraw; if not, they might commence the bombardment at once. He said he would report to his commander. At his request I sent two of my staff with them to their boat to protect them from the peo- ple. I then continued the removal of troops and stores, and left the city at three p.m, on the last train of cars. Ihave been unable to receive any report from General Duncan or General Smith, so am unable to give any details further than above stated, but will commu- nicate with the Department as soon as possible. I shall probably fall back to Jackson to prevent the enemy from going up to Vicksburg and coming in rear of Beauregard. P.S. I will add, as a postscript to my letter, that, as far as I could see, the river-defence boats, six in number, made a very poor show—want of disci- pline, system, and training. I had a few regiments apart from the miscellaneous and self-armed militia of the city, and think I shall endeavor to collect such men as I can from the various forts in the Department, and GONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 85 fall back to Jackson to prevent the enemy, now in pos- session of the river, from getting in rear of Beauregard, by way of the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad. . I write this in great haste, and without any facilities or con- veniences.” On the 30th, General J. K. Duncan, commander of the sea-coast defences of the Department of Louisiana, who was in person in Fort Jackson, made an elaborate report of the contest at the forts, from which the follow- ing quotations are taken:* “ April 15th.—The enemy brought up his whole fleet, extending the same from the head of the Passes to the point of woods below the forts. Orders were repeatedly given to Captain Stephenson, of the river-defence fleet, to cause the fire- barges to be sent down nightly upon the enemy; but every attempt seemed to be a perfect abortion, the barges being cut adrift too soon, so that they drifted against the banks directly under the forts, firing our wharves and lighting us up, but obscuring the position of the enemy. ... April 16th.—Two mortar boats were brought out into the stream. These boats opened fire upon Fort Jackson at five p.m., which was con- tinued for an hour and a half... .. April 18th.—At nine o’clock A.m., the enemy opened upon Fort Jackson, with his entire mortar fleet of twenty-one vessels and with rifled guns from his gunboats. . . . Our fire dis- abled one gunboat and one mortar boat, causing those in the stream to retire behind the cover of the woods. Generally our shots fell short. . . . I endeavored to get the naval forces to carry down fire-barges against the enemy, so as to disperse it, but they were all let go above the raft, and with such a lack of judgment that * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 168. 86 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. they only lodged under the forts and did not reach the enemy. None of the boats acted as a guard boat below the raft at night, so that, in consequence, the enemy sent up two launches to examine the character of the raft obstructing the river... . April 19th.—The mor- tar fleet again opened at half-past six o’clock a.m., and the fire was kept up throughout the day. Gunboats constantly came above the point during the day to en- gage the forts, but were as constantly driven back by our fire. . . . Bombardment continued very regularly and accurately all night. Failures again made in send- ing down fire-barges.... April 20th.— Bombard- ment constant throughout the day. . . . No fire-barges sent down to light up the river or distract the atten- tion of the enemy at night. In consequence, between eleven and twelve o’clock p.m., under cover of the heaviest shelling during the bombardment thus far, one of the enemy’s gunboats came up in the darkness and attempted to cut the chains of the raft and drag off the schooners. A heavy fire was opened upon her, which caused her to retire, but not until she had parti- ally accomplished her purpose. The raft after this could not be regarded as an obstruction. ... April 21st.—Firing continued all day and all night without interruption. . . . Fort Jackson, by this time, was in need of extensive repairs almost everywhere, and it was with extreme pleasure that we learned of the arrival during the night of the iron-clad steamer Louis- jana, under cover of whose heavy guns we expected to make the necessary repairs... . April 22d.—On the morning of this date I learned that the motive power of the Louisiana was not likely to be completed within any reasonable time, and that, in consequence, it was not within the range of probabilities that she could Bas a eh ne aie ape a ee Ee s nas CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 87 be regarded as an aggressive steamer, or that she could be brought into the pending action in that character. As an iron-clad, invulnerable floating battery, with six- teen guns of the heaviest calibre, however, she was then as complete asshe would ever be. Fort Jackson had already undergone, and was still subjected to, a terrible fire of thirteen-inch mortar shells, which it was neces- sary to relieve at once, to prevent the disabling of all the best guns at that fort. . . . I considered that the Louisiana could only be regarded as a battery, and that her best possible position would be below the raft, close in on the Fort St. Philip shore, where her fire could dis- lodge the mortar boats from behind the’ point of woods, and give sufficient respite to Fort Jackson to repair én ex- tenso. . . . Accordingly, I earnestly and strongly urged these views upon Captain Mitchell, in a letter’ of this date, but without avail. . . . He is sustained by all the naval officers present having the command of vessels. April 23d—The bombardment continued. . . . Captain Mitchell’s aid came on shore about nine o’clock p.M., to inform me that the Louisiana would be ready for service by the next evening—the evening of the 24th. I informed him that time was everything to us, and that to-morrow would in all probability be too late. Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins warmly seconded my opin- ion, and warned Lieutenant Shryock (Captain Mitchell’s aid) that the final battle was imminent within a few hours.. In regard to lighting the river, Lieutenant Shryock stated that fire-barges would be regularly sent down during the night, every two hours... . To my surprise, not one single fire-barge was sent down the river, notwithstanding, at any hour of this night. It was impossible for us to send them down, as everything afloat here had been turned over to Captain Mitchell, ' stitial att alt 8 88 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. ... The bombardment continued all night, and grew furious towards morning. ... April 24th.—At half- past three o’clock A.m., the larger vessels of the enemy were observed to be in motion. . . . A rapid rush was made by the enemy in columns of twos in echelon, so as not to interfere with each other’s broadsides. ‘The mor- tar fire was furiously increased upon Fort Jackson, and, in dashing by, each of the vessels delivered broadside after broadside, of shot, shell, grape, canister, and spheri- cal case, to drive the men from our guns. Both the officers and the men stood up manfully under this galling and fearful hail, and the batteries of both forts were promptly opened at their longest range, with shot, shell, hot shot, and a little grape, and most gallantly and rapidly fought, until the enemy succeeded in getting above and beyond our range. The absence of light on the river, together with the smoke of the guns, made the obscurity so dense that scarely a vessel was visible. ... The heroic courage displayed by the officers and men at both forts was deserving of a better’ success, especially after the fortitude which they constantly ex- hibited through the long tedium of a protracted bom- bardment, unsurpassed for its terrible accuracy, con- stancy, and fury. Thirteen of the enemy’s vessels, out of twenty-three, succeeded in getting by. . . . “ April 25th.—About twelve o’clock M. one of the: enemy’s gunboats from, below made her appearance ander a flag of truce, bearing a written demand for the surrender of the forts, signed by Commander David D. Porter, U. 8. N., commanding mortar flotilla. The forts refused to surrender. . April 27th.—So far, throughout the entire bombardment and final action, the spirit of the troops was cheerful, confident, and courageous. They were mostly foreign enlistments, . CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 89 without any great interests at stake in the ultimate suc- cess of the revolution. . . . The garrison at Fort Jack- son (about midnight) revolted en masse, seized upon the guard and posterns, reversed the field-pieces command- ing the gates, and commenced to spike the guns ; while many of the men were leaving the fort, in the mean time, under arms. All this occurred as suddenly as it was unexpected. The men were mostly drawn up under arms, and positively refused to fight any longer; be- sides endeavoring by force to bring over the St. Mary’s cannoneers, and such other few men as remained true to their cause and country. . . . There seemed to be but one course open to us, viz., to await the approach of daylight, communicate then with the gunboats of the ‘mortar flotilla below under a flag of truce, and negotiate for a surrender under the terms offered us by Com- modore Porter on the 25th inst. . . . The terms of the capitulation are attached hereto: in addition to which Commander Porter verbally agreed not to haul down the Confederate flag or hoist the Federal until the officers should get away from the forts.” The casualties at Fort Jackson were, nine killed and thirty-five wounded : at Fort St. Philip, two killed and four wounded. The interior line of defence at New Orleans was in- tended to protect the city from a land attack. This line was under the immediate command of General M. L. Smith. In his official report General Smith says: “The short resistance made by the few guns mounted in the two batteries (on the river below the city) of the in- terior line was made through a sense of duty, but with- out any expectation of success, the enemy numbering as many vessels, less one, as we had guns. . .. The enemy’s vessels had approached within about the fourth eRe eee ere eee Ste Mit si A 90 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 5 of a mile, before we opened on them, the first gun being from Pinckney’s battery (nine guns on the right bank of the river), and immediately followed by several from the battery (five guns) on the opposite side, and as promptly replied to from the enemy’s vessels. The en- gagement lasted until every round of ammunition on hand was fired, both officers and men displaying a coolness and intrepidity that was gratifying, especially as re- gards the men, who then for the first time in their lives discharged a heavy gun. The firing on our side was spirited, perhaps a little uncertain; on the enemy’s, heavy, and rather well-directed. During the engage- ment, their vessels gradually lessened the distance until near enough to open with grape and canister. The ammunition being expended, and every sense of duty’ satisfied, permission was given to Colonel Pinckney to withdraw his command along the line of field-works, affording shelter, which was done deliberately, officers and men retiring together. The casualties were (on the right bank, where General Smith was in person during the engagement) one killed and one wounded. The battery on the Chalmette side (opposite) seemed well served, and no doubt was so, judging from the character of the officers present. The enemy steaming up between us and the city prevented the retreat of the troops to that point. They were accordingly directed to gain the Opelousas Railroad and reach Camp Moore via Lafourche, or such route as might be found best.” CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 91 “ CHAPTER V. ' General Lovell applies for a Court of Inquiry—conduct approved by Generals R. E. Lee, J. E. Johnston, and Beauregard. Complaint made by the Governor of Louisiana—General Lovell’s reply—application for Court of Inquiry renewed— General Van Dorn ordered to supersede General Lovell—the latter serves under the former in the campaign against Corinth. —relieved from duty in the field—renews his application for a Court of Inquiry—official correspondence called for by Con- gress—Court of Inquiry ordered. Tux outcry and howl of indignation against the Commanding General after the fall of New Orleans was terrific. He had repeatedly warned the Government at Richmond that the people were saying that he (General Lovell) was stripping New Orleans of its defences in order that it might become an easy prey to the enemy; this, too, when men, arms, ships, supplies, and munitions of war were being sent away in compliance with posi- tive orders from Richmond; against the judgment, and in spite of the appeals of the Commanding General. On the 2d of May General Lovell made application, through the Adjutant-General of the Army, for a Court of Inquiry. The following is his letter of that date: * “I have the honor to request that the Department will appoint a board of competent officers to examine into and report upon the circumstances preceding and attendant on the evacuation of the city of New Orleans, as well as the passage of the Forts (Jackson and St. Philip) by the fleet of the enemy, which brought about egg I i a on gh eee * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 31. 92 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, that evacuation. This is necessary as an act of justice to myself and officers, as well as to vindicate the truth of history.” In the mean while, apparently regardless of the wild clamor of denunciation and injustice with which he was assailed by the public, General Lovell rapidly pressed forward preparations for the defence of Vicksburg. He knew that the authorities at Richmond had access to all the facts, and believed that they would in due time have them promulgated—at least to such extent as would relieve him of the unjust odium cast upon his reputation and conduct connected with the defence and the fall of New Orleans. On the 8th of May, General R. E. Lee, then at Rich- mond, in general charge of army operations, wrote to General Lovell: * “Your letter of the 26th ult., to the Adjutant-General, containing a report of the circum- stances attending the fall of New Orleans, is received. The loss -of the city is a very severe blow to us, and one that we cannot fail to feel most sensibly; but it is believed that, with the means of defence at your dis- posal, you have done all in your power. Your plan of collecting all the troops you can, and taking a position which will enable you to defend the rear of General Beauregard, and protect his communications, is fully approved, and I regard it as a matter of great moment.” Again, on the 24th of May, General Lee wrote to Gen- eral Lovell: + “Ihave had the honor to receive your letter of the 11th inst. My reply to your former com- munication will have made known to you the opinion I entertain of your course in evacuating New Orleans. That opinion is confirmed by the additional particulars * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 150. t p. 151. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 93 contained in your letter just received. After the enemy succeeded in passing the Forts, it seems there was nothing left for you to do but to withdraw the. troops. I think you may confidently rely upon the judgment of intelligent and reflecting men for the justification of your course, as soon as the facts as they actually existed, shall be known.” The hue and cry against General Lovell was such as to induce Generals J. E. Johnston and Beauregard to write tohim expressing views similar to those contained in the letters of General Lee above quoted. By the last week in May, twenty-three heavy guns, ranging in calibre from thirty-two-pounders to ten-inch columbiads, were mounted at Vicksburg, and protected by entrenchments. and an infantry force of three thou- ‘Sand men. On the 21st of May the Governor of Louis- iana wrote to President Davis: * “The Fort at Grand Caillou had been evacuated on the 27th of April by order of General Lovell—the guns spiked, and the powder thrown into the bayou. Eleven days after, the enemy made their first appearance there. This is the manner in which all our Forts (of course I do not in- clude Jackson and St. Philip) were evacuated. There was not a Yankee near one of them until more than a week after the powder was all destroyed and the in- terior of the fort burned. Ample time was had to have Saved the guns as well as powder, ete. If, for these acts, some of the officers are not cashiered or shot, we need not expect either a brave ora disciplined army. The Navy emulated this conduct of the Army—the fleet in Pontchartrain being run up the bayous and Scuttled or burnt. It is absolutely necessary that some wrninnin ninco ins * Official Correspondence, p. 116. 94 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. steps should be taken to stop the incursions of the enemy in the lower part of the State.” The letter from which the above extract is quoted was endorsed by the Presi- dent: * “Secretary of War for special attention. Call on General Lovell for report as to Fort at Grand Cail- lou. = FSD.” On the 10th of June the Secretary of War wrote to General Lovell: + “ Your attention is respectfully called to the annexed copy of a letter, received from a person in Louisiana, in regard to the evacuation of the Forts at. Grand Caillou, and you are requested to report to this Department the facts of the case.” That enclosure was a paragraph from the foregoing letter of Governor Moore. General Lovell was not informed that the allegations contained in the above extract were made by the Governor to the President; neither did he know that the President had directed the Secretary to call for a report as to Fort at Grand Caillou. On the 19th of June, General Lovell wrote to the Secretary of War:{ “In reply to your letter of the 10th inst., requesting the reasons for evacuating Fort Quitman, on the Bayou Grand Caillou, I have to state + that it was a little earthwork, with two smooth-bore thirty-two-pounders, established by me to prevent in- gress for marauding purposes by the enemy in small vessels, through the Caillou, and other inlets, into the southern parishes of Louisiana. The fall of New Or- leans laid open the route to those parishes, and as the troops, stationed in the Fort, were supplied from the city, and were at any moment liable to be taken in rear and captured by way of the Opelousas Railroad, which was in the enemy’s hands, I ordered the guns to be * Official Correspondence, p. 117, +p.11% tp. 118. marae sa see es! . ; a CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 95 spiked and the garrison (a small company of twelve- months’ volunteers) to bring away their small arms, the ammunition, and the stores, and to rejoin me at Camp Moore. The enemy did not go down, it is true, for Some days; but they could have gone at any hour and any day and taken the men, with their arms, which I was anxious to preserve. The order I gave was not obeyed. Instead of joining me at Camp Moore, the men mutinied and disbanded, and both officers and men re- turned to New Orleans. It would be well, as your Correspondent suggests, to punish the officers; but, as they are now in New Orleans, such a step is impracti- cable. A glance at the map, which I sent to the De- partment some months ago, will show that after the City fell, the little works on the coast must be aban- doned. . . . I trust that the Department will not give ear to the many false and absurd rumors that are set afloat by persons who think there should be an army Stationed on every plantation for its protection, I am satisfied that our present condition is to be attributed, ina great measure, to the fact that we have followed this plan too much already, dispersing, instead of con- centrating our troops, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the enemy.” Upon this letter the following endorsements were made, viz.: by the Secretary of War, “Respectfully Submitted to the President for his information ;” by the President, “Read—it might be well to furnish the ‘Complainant with a copy of this reply. The abandon- ment of the Fort was a necessary consequence of the Si of New Orleans and the subsequent events. hether it was possible to save the armament for use elsewhere, was a question which the Commanding-Gen- eral, of course, duly considered. As he established the a ens Cae 96 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. post under the discretionary power conferred on him, the application of his remark about the error of dis- persion is not perceived. J. D.” About this time General Lovell was informed by Senator Gwinn that Mr. Davis had said to him—in the presence of several others—that General Lovell had not kept the Government at Richmond informed of the dan- ger to New Orleans—and that, had he done so, he (Mr. Davis) would have taken prompt measures for prevent- ing the catastrophe. After being assured that Senator Gwinn was not mistaken in regard to what Mr. Davis had formally and publicly said on this subject, General Lov- ell showed the official correspondence to Senator Gwinn. The latter was amazed, by this direct proof, that Mr. Davis had perverted the facts. On the 20th of June, 1862, General Lovell wrote to President Davis:* “T learned yesterday from a mutual acquaintance that you had remarked to him that you thought I ‘had not less than thirty thousand men in New Orleans at the time of its evacuation.’ If this be correct, the War Department could not certainly have communicated to you the information contained in my letters... . [have been content to bide the storm of popu- lar clamor rather than make public, at this time, the weakness and straitened means of the Government; but, feeling confident of my ability to vindicate myself, I requested the Department, on the 2d of May, to order an investigation relative to the fall of New Orleans in order that I might stand in the right light before the country and to prevent my usefulness from being im- paired by a want of popular confidence. This request has never elicited a reply. I learn, however, indirectly * Taken from General Lovell’s letter-book, p. 101. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 97 that a general officer (Van Dorn) has been directed to supersede me in my command—abruptly and without notice to me—thus indicating a want of confidence on the part of the administration. . . . General Beauregard offers me the command of a fine corps in his army, a far better position for a soldier than one where he is in- cessantly striving to accomplish important objects with ridiculously disproportionate means.” On the 10th of December, 1862, General Lovell wrote from Jackson, Miss., to the Adjutant-General, in Rich- mond:* “ Arriving in Grenada in charge of the rear- guard of our army ona long and tedious retreat, I found myself relieved from the command of my corps, because Thad not been assigned to duty here by the War De- partment. This is a very mortifying result to me, Gen- eral, after the severe: labors of the last three months. Under the orders of General Van Dorn I had organized, clothed, equipped, and proyided as fine a corps as any in the army, consisting of 13,000 present at Abbeville and 1,500 at Port Hudson. They had been with me in battle and on the march, and I have no hesitation in say- ing that officers and men had become attached to me, and placed entire confidence in me as acommander, I beg leave to say, with deference, that I do not see the difference between my assignment to duty here, and that of General Van Dorn. I was in command of the De- partment and was superseded by him, and he in turn by General Pemberton, and both have remained here on duty, under the same conditions. When in Richmond I requested the President to relieve me from duty in this Department, and he replied that ‘he did not see why I could not serve under General Van Dorn, I asked Gen- Diesen ee EE tee PRR TTY le * General Lovell’s letter-book, p. 184, cial ila ai Minin slisidt dai diaiinas cassia alingaitsse sei ty a a i I i 98 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, eral Bragg then in command of this section of the coun- try for assignment under him, and he telegraphed me, that probably General Van Dorn could give me a position. The Court of Inquiry having been postponed until fur- ther orders, he gave me a command, and I can refer to his written reports to show that I have done my duty. With regard to my conduct at Corinth, on the retreat thence to Holly Springs, and from there to Grenada, I am willing to be judged by the officers and soldiers of my command. Their opinion, as universally expressed, is one of entire satisfaction and confidence; and much regret was manifested by them at my removal. I hope that the President will see fit to place me again on active _ duty, as I dislike greatly to remain idle while there is so much to be done.” On the 8th of December, 1862, General Van Dorn wrote to General Lovell: “I regretted to learn to-day that you had been relieved of your command. . . . The order comes from the War Department. . .-. I don’t know what it means. . . . Let it be your proud consola- tion that you have fought gallantly, skilfully at Corinth— persistently and bravely on the long retreat as rear-guard from that unfortunate field to Holly Springs—and subse- quently from Holly Springs to Grenada. . . . I am truly sorry to lose you from the Army.” On the 27th of January, 1863, General Lovell, in Richmond, wrote to President Davis: “I have the honor to request. that the consideration of my case be not permitted to escape your mind. It is now two months since I was relieved from duty in Missis- sippi to await the action of a Court of Inquiry, and it would be a source of great satisfaction to me to have this matter (so long held in suspense) finally settled. If deemed incompatible with the public interest to con- ee CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 99 vene a Court, I respectfully ask that I may be placed on duty.” The delay in ordering this investigation had induced General Lovell to apply to one of his friends in Con- gress to have the official correspondence between him- self and the Government called for. This was done by resolution of the House of Representatives passed on the 8th of February, 1863. On the 18th of the same month the Court of Inquiry was ordered.* CHAPTER VI. Court met in April, 1863—the word ‘‘accused”. not to be used to designate General Lovell—instructions from the War Depart- menf April 21st—instructions from the War Department June 15th—report of facts—opinion of the Court. Tur Court consisted of three members—Major-General T. C. Hindman, Brigadier-General T. F. Drayton, and Brigadier-General W. M. Gardner. Major L. W. Page, Assistant Adjutant-General, was appointed J udge Ad- vocate and Recorder of the Court. It was ordered to assemble at Jackson, Miss., on the 10th of March, | 1863, or as soon thereafter as practicable, “to examine into the facts and circumstances attending the capture of the city of New Orleans by the enemy in April, 1862, and the defence of the city and the evacuation of the same by our troops under the command of Major-General Mansfield Lovell. . . . And report the facts resulting from the investigation, together with their opinion thereon, ee ene aa Rs OPO AME ROTO Te AN AL se * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 5, ESSN ere ee OY Oe Oe 4 100 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. for the information of the President.” The Court was ordered “by direction of the President, on the applica- tion of Major-General Mansfield Lovell.” The Court met in April, 1863, and preliminary to the investigation it was ordered by the Court that the word “accused” should not be used to designate Major-Gen- eral Mansfield Lovell in their proceedings; “ there being no accusation or imputation against him before the Court.” When the Court had been some time in session the Judge Advocate asked that a witness be directed to exclude from his reply any opinion touching the effi- ciency or inefficiency of the officers of the Confederate States Navy. After an elaborate argument by the Judge Advocate, the Court stated that: “ It is the duty of the Court to obey the order under which it acts.” The examination of witnesses continued without excluding opinions touching the efficiency of naval officers; but, the question raised by the Judge Advocate was referred by the Court to the War Department. On the 27th of April the following telegram, dated Richmond, Vay April 21st, 1863, was received from the Adjutant and Inspector General of the Army “The Court is required by the order to examine into the facts and circumstances attending the capture of New Orleans, the-defence of ‘that city, and the evacuation of the same. The inquiry is broad and not restrictive, and will embrace every fact and every officer, whether of Army or Navy, connected with the object of the inquiry. It is fully competent for the Court, and it is expected of it, to report all the facts of the whole subject, of the capture, defence, and evacuation of New Orleans, which included the defences on the river, below the city, and to report their Opinion thereon.” Under these instructions the Court continued its in- CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 101 vestigations until the 15th of June, when the Judge Ad- vocate read to the Court the following letter, of that date, from the Adjutant-General of the Army, addressed to the President of the Court:* “I have the honor to refer to you the enclosed copy of a letter of the Secre- tary of the Navy, with the President’s endorsement thereon, on the subject of the examination of N avy ope- rations by the Court over which you preside. Recurring to my answer of 21st of April last to the telegram of the Judge Advocate on this subject, I find that my language Was not as precise as could be wished, and in order that there may be no misunderstanding, I desire now to state my views. The Court of Inquiry, being an Army Court, is, of course, without authority to express any opinion upon the conduct of any officers of the N. avy Department. But where the General, whose conduct is under investi- gation, alleges that the fall of the city was attributable to the misconduct or failure of any person not under his control, it is perfectly proper to examine as witnesses all that are cognizant of the facts, even if they be officers of the Navy. The inquiry is to be directed solely to the purpose of ascertaining whether the defence of the Gen- eral is true: if it be so, the Court will pronounce, of course, that the failure to defend the city arose from causes not within his control; but, will not express any opinion as to the conduct of the officers of another De- partment of the service. If, onthe contrary, the defence of the General is rebutted by the evidence, the Court will give its opinion that his defence is not sustained. In this way the truth may be reached without the Court touching at all on the province of a Naval Court. It is plain that no opinion of the conduct of an ofticer con- * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 116. 102 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. nected with the Navy can be expressed by the Court because, if the Court desires to examine into the conduct of any other officer than General Lovell, the Court would be compelled to cite the officer before it; and it has no power to do so with a navy officer, whose conduct can only be inquired into by a naval court.” The following is the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, above referred to. It is dated June 8th, 1863, and is addressed to President Davis:* “I learn to-day, from an authentic source, that the Court of Inquiry con- voked by the War Department, at the request of General Lovell, and now in session in Richmond, for the ostens- ible purpose of investigating his conduct as connected with the defence and fall of New Orleans, is engaged in taking testimony, formally, as to the official conduct of the Navy Department and that of all its officers, civil and military, in any way connected with its operations in New Orleans and on the Mississippi River; embracing within the field of its enquiry the manner in which this Department transmitted its funds from Richmond, how it met its expenditures, its correspondence with its sub- ordinates, the construction and equipment of vessels, ete. A Court of Inquiry is a tribunal whose results necessarily shape public opinion, and obvious justice demands that if this Court could properly enter upon such investigas tion at all, the parties whose conduct is to be inquired of and whose fame may be disparaged by its results, should have notice of its purpose, and opportunity for explana- tion and defence. I will not dwell upon the evils which may follow a precedent thus established of subjecting the conduct of one department of the Government and its officers to the formal inquiry of the officers of a dif- SOL ER See Sie Aa Seen ee eG ae ea eR eT * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 117. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 103 ferent department and this, too, without notice; but I cannot refrain from saying that, in my judgment, the proceeding is illegal, and is fraught with mischief to both branches of the military service. The naval officer in command afloat at New Orleans has been subjected to a Court of Inquiry formed of his peers, and the entire Operations of the Department connected with the defence of New Orleans have been investigated by a Committee of Congress, and the testimony in both cases is of record. T respectfully submit these facts to your attention as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.’ The above letter was endorsed:* “ Respectfully re- ferred to Adjutant and Inspector-General, that proper: notice may be given to the Court. Jefferson Davis: June 9th, 1863.” This order from President Davis changed the whole. character of the investigation, and restricted it, in the words of the Judge Advocate of the Court,+ to “The case of Major-General M. Lovell, on trial in Rich- mond.” But evidence damaging to the Secretary of the Navy had already become of record in the proceedings —and remained there. On the 9th of July, 1863,t the Court having ma- turely considered the evidence adduced, submitted the following report of facts and opinion thereon: “ Report of Facts, §—Department No. 1 is intersected by numerous streams which, in high-water, afford ten or twelve different approaches to New Orleans, and render its defence difficult without a strong naval force. When General Lovell assumed command of the Department on the 18th of October, 1861, but little had been done in constructing the land defences of New Orleans.” a TRIN * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 118. + p. 187. t p. 180, § p. 181, i104 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. A general summary of facts as already shown by the testimony then follows; and it is stated * that, “ owing to the high stage of water, the river being higher than it had been before for twenty-five years, the efforts to employ sharpshooters outside the forts proved ineffec- tual. In the forts the water rose to a height of from twelve to eighteen inches, causing great discomfort to the garrisons, and requiring the men in Fort Jackson to work day and night to prevent the magazines being flooded. . . . The country between the forts and New Orleans is of a character most unfavorable for the con- struction of batteries, the banks of the river, in its highest stages, being below the surface of the water, and only protected from inundation by levees which might be easily destroyed by an enemy. . . . There were no suit- able guns in Department No. 1 for such batteries, and no infantry forces adequate to their protection against a land attack. . . . It is shown that but little or no provi- sion was made for an evacuation before the passage of the forts. After that event the work of removing sup- plies was prosecuted with energy, and a vast amount of property belonging to the Confederate and State Goy- ernments, as well as that of private individuals, was saved. . . . In their movement from the city there was no greater confusion manifested than is usual among such bodies of men. The last troops in Department No. 1 had been sent to reinforce General A. S. John- ston after the fall of Fort Donelson. General Lovell had also sent many supplies from his Department to the army of that general. Between General Lovell and the naval officers on duty in Department No. 1 there existed good feeling and a desire to co-operate for the public * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 182. ‘CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 105 defence. General Lovell often supplied the navy with guns and ammunition. During the bombardment it was designed by Generals Lovell and Duncan that the Louisiana should be placed in a position from which they thought she could enfilade and drive off the mortar fleet of the enemy, but this request was not complied with—Captain J. K. Mitchell, commanding the defences afloat, alleging, in reply, that the Louisiana was without Motive-power, that in the position indicated her guns could not be given sufficient elevation to reach the enemy, while she would be in fair range of his mortar fleet, and that her top deck was flat and vulnerable. These statements are proven to be true. He also added as his opinion, sustained ‘by a council of navy officers, that the desired movement would result in the destruc- tion of the vessel by the enemy. . . . The proof shows that General Lovell’s demeanor was cool and self-pos- sessed during the evacuation.” “OPINION OF THE COURT.* “1. As against a land attack by any force the enemy could probably bring, the interior line of fortifications, as adopted and completed by Major-General Lovell, was a sutlicient defence of the city of New Orleans, but his ability to hold that line against such an attack was greatly impaired by the withdrawal from him, by Superior authority, of nearly all his effective troops. “2. The exterior line, as adopted and improved by means at his command allowed. ‘ . . ns “3. Until the iron-clad gunboats Louisiana and Mis- Same NEI 5: * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 188. } E 4 Pe nen RMN Se ae” ee wes ner ee Sa re eee aes 106 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, sissippi should be ready for service, it was indispensably necessary to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi River between Forts Jackson and St. Philip. The raft completed under General Lovell’s direction was ad- equate for the purpose while in position, but it was swept away, and left the river unimpeded, either by reason of some error in its construction or neglect in pre- venting the accumulation of drift, or because of insup- erable mechanical difficulties, as to which this Court feels unprepared to give an opinion. General Lovell communicated to the Government no opinion as to the insecurity of the raft, nor any apprehension that it might be swept away, nor did he immediately make known that fact when it occurred. In this it is con- sidered that he was remiss in his duty. “4, When the raft was swept away, General Lovell, with great energy, immediately endeavored to replace it, and partially succeeded; but, without fault on his part, this last obstruction was broken by the careless- ness of vessels of the river-defence fleet colliding with it and by fire rafts drifting against it, and by the failure of the guard-boats to protect it against night expedi- tions of the enemy. “5. The non-completion of the iron-clad gunboats Louisiana and Mississippi made it impossible for the navy to co-operate efficiently with General Lovell. “6. The so-called river-defence fleet was wholly use- less as a means of resistance to the enemy, for which General Lovell was in no wise responsible. “7, Under the existing circumstances, the passage of the forts by the enemy’s fleet could not have been pre- vented by General Lovell with any means under his con- trol, and the forts being passed, the fall of New Orleans was inevitable and its evacuation a military necessity, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 107 “8, When the first raft was broken, and the danger of New Orleans thus became imminent, all necessary preparation should have been made for removing the public property and private property available for mil- itary uses, and when the second obstruction was swept away the removal of such property should have been commenced immediately. The failure to take these timely steps caused the losses of property that occurred; but there was comparatively little property lost for which General Lovell was responsible. “9. The failure of General Lovell to give proper orders to Brigadier-General M. L. Smith for the retire- ment of his command from Chalmette is not sufficiently explained, and is therefore regarded a serious error. “10. The proposition of General Lovell to return to New Orleans with his command was not demanded by his duty as a soldier, involving, as it did, the useless sacrifice of himself and his troops, though it explains itself upon the ground of sympathy for the population and a natural sensitiveness to their reproaches, “11. General Lovell displayed great energy and an untiring industry in performing his duties. His conduct was marked by all the coolness and self-possession due to the circumstances and his position, and he evinced a high capacity for command, and the clearest foresight in many of his measures for the defence of New Ortennd. “The Court respectfully reports that its delayed by the failure of its President to receive his orders in due time, and that its session was protracted by the taking of testimony, under the order of the War Department, as to the conduct of naval officers on duty im Department No. 1. This order was rescinded, thus rendering irrelevant and useless much of the labor of the Court. The testimony referred to, although appearing assembly was STE CTCE ee ee Te i A rat tal ia AS a NT 108 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, of record, was not considered by the Court in determin- ing its findings and opinion. There being no further business before them the Court adjourned sine die.” _ On the 13th of July, 1863,* the record of proceed- ings and accompanying documents were transmitted to General 8. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va. CHAPTER VIL. Comments upon the opinion of the Court—General Lovell asks the War Department to inform him of the action of the Court —Congress calls for a copy of the proceedings — General Lovell applies to be assigned to duty—proceedings of the Court of Inquiry transmitted. Tue opinion of the Court must be accepted as a full vindication of General Lovell in all essential points. It is now proposed to make some reference to those points in the opinion of the Court which are somewhat adverse to him. 1. The Raft.—It appears in General Lovell’s testimony that: “In the latter part of February the great raft in the Mississippi River began to show signs of giving way. . . By the end of the first week in March the main chains snapped and it ceased to be any longer an ob- struction. . . . As soon as the raft had given way, I applied for and got one hundred thousand dollars from the City Council of New Orleans, by whom the money for the previous raft had been furnished, and sent Colonel Higgins, an able and efficient officer, formerly of * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 185. RE le a Ae ea ae ee, eal CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 109 the United States Navy, down to repair it.” Colonel Higgins testified: “At the time spoken of (the early part of March, 1862) I was informed by General Lovell that the raft had broken from its fastenings on the Fort Jackson side of the river, and left about one third of the river open. He instructed me to go down with a num- ber of barges and fill up the gap. . . . Each vessel had two anchors down, and sixty fathoms of chain to each anchor, and three one-inch chains were stretched across all of them, connecting them with the raft sections re- maining in position, forming a barrier which, I am con- fident, none of the enemy’s ships could have forced under fire from the forts.” Whilst these efforts were being made at the raft, General Lovell, in a letter dated March 10th, 1862, in- formed the Secretary of War that: * “The heavy drift and current had broken up, in a great measure, the river obstructions at Fort Jackson.” The Judge Advo- cate asked General Lovell the following: + “ Question— In your testimony you speak of many deficiencies in Department No. 1 which are not mentioned in your official correspondence with the War Department; why were you silent as to these points? Answer—I did not particularize all the deficiencies in my letters to the War Department, because, before I assumed command, and, while in Richmond, I learned from conversations with — the Secretary of War and heads of bureaus, in substance, that, as the Department and its various bureaus had been but lately set on foot, there was in almost all the kinds of material required for war purposes many deficiencies, not only in the materials, but in the mechanical means SE re eke Ee SLD NA SENN MN IY PR CP ag SCO. * Official Correspondence, p. 68. t Proceedings of Court, p. 127. si 110 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, and appliances for creating them; and I was informed that my predecessor had made pefsistent appeals for things which, as yet, the Department had no means of furnishing, which was a source of some annoyance; and I stated that I should make the most of the means at my disposal, without bothering the Department about deficiencies in which I knew they could not help me.” As to opinion in regard to the insecurity of the raft— at time of high-water—the only question in the minds of those who had any knowledge of the Mississippi River was the possibility of securing the obstruction. All such persons—and amongst these were the President and Secretary of War, whose homes had long been on that river—knew the insecurity of the raft at a time of unprecedented freshet, without a special report from General Lovell, or any one else, informing them that there was cause for apprehension that it might be swept away. The damage to the first obstruction had been repaired more than a month before the action com- menced at the forts. The Court says: “ Without fault on his (General Lovell’s) part, this last obstruction was broken by the carelessness of the river-defence flect col- liding with it, and by fire rafts drifting against it, and by the failure of the guard-boats to protect it against. night expeditions of the enemy.” 2. The loss of public property.—In General Lovell’s testimony, he states: “Believing that the iron-clads would probably be completed before the enemy would make his final attack, I did not feel so insecure as to justify me in removing the public stores, which removal I knew could not be kept secret and would create a great panic among our own people, and also convey to the enemy the impression that we despaired of holding our position. . . . I did, however, make arrangements,, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 111 as already stated, to remove the property under my control, in case of disaster at the lower forts.” That these arrangements were adequate is sufficiently at- tested by the statement of the Court that: “There was comparatively but little property lost for which General Lovell was responsible.” 3. The alleged failure of General Lovell to give proper orders for the retirement of General M. L. Smith’s command from Chalmette.—The latter states, in his official report,* that he was in person at the bat- tery opposite Chalmette during the action, and that the ammunition being expended, permission was given to Colonel Pinckney to withdraw his command... They were accordingly directed to gain the Opelousas Railroad and reach Camp Moore via Lafourche, or such route as might be found best. In his testimony, General Smith says: “Orders would not probably have reached me‘ after the enemy’s fleet passed Chalmette.” He was the commander of the interior line, and it was just as proper -for him to give orders to the troops in the battery at Chalmette as to those on the opposite side of the river. But, the troops at Chalmette having exhausted their ammunition, very wisely withdrew themselves from the lines; and this being done in plain sight of General Lovell there was no occasion for him to send an order to General M. L, Smith to retire this command. General Smith and his troops joined the main body soon after at Camp Moore. 4. “ The proposition of General Lovell to return to New Orleans with his command was not demanded by his duty as a soldier.”—The testimony in reference to this matter shows clearly that certain parties in New Nee nee Oe edi is rained: ER ES ONE OS EVES TEL * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 205. 112 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, Orleans, after the evacuation, proposed to organize a force to board the vessels of the enemy, then lying in the stream abreast of the city, and carry them in a hand- to-hand fight. In this enterprise they desired regular military countenance and authority. When General Lovell was appealed to he strongly advised these parties against the project—but finally told them that, if they could get a thousand men in the city to attempt it, and the civil authorities and people desired to bring this risk on their city, he would consent to return with his command and share their fate. They wisely concluded to abandon the idea. The Court says that General Lovell’s course in this matter “ explains itself upon the ground of sympathy for the population and a natural sensitiveness to their reproaches,” But, even if it were admitted that all the adverse comment on General Lovell’s conduct, expressed in the opinion given by the Court, is well founded, it will be seen that these points are of comparatively little mo- ment; and that, in all matters of importance, he stands fully vindicated in the opinion of the Court; the con- clusion of which is, that “General Lovell displayed great energy and an untiring industry in performing his duties. His conduct was marked by all the coolness and self-possession due to the circumstances and his position, and he evinced a high capacity for command, and the clearest foresight in many of his measures for the defence of New Orleans.” On the 5th of May, 1864, General Lovell, from Colum- bia, S. C., wrote to the Seeretary of War: * “T have the honor to submit for your consideration the following facts and to request your decision and action thereon, * General Lovell’s letter-book, p. 188, ] b| CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 113 On the 18th October, 1861, I assumed command of De- partment No. 1, by virtue of orders from the War De- partment. On the 22d June, 1862, two months after the evacuation of New Orleans, and after I had fortified, armed, and garrisoned Vicksburg, and the attack on that place had commenced, I was superseded by General Van Dorn without subsequent orders, thus leaving me on duty under him. On the 2d of May previous I had ap- plied for a Court of Inquiry in reference to the evacua- tion of New Orleans, which application remained un- answered. After my supercession I repaired to Rich- mond, with General Van Dorn’s permission, and urged the convening of the Court of Inquiry. In an interview with the President, on the 18th of July, he alluded to the inconvenience of assembling a court of general officers at that time, and I then requested him to make the necessary examinations and to decide the matter himself. This he declined to do, saying that, ‘It was a very important matter which he did not wish to take the responsibility of deciding,’ but added that he would order the Court; which was in fact done soon after. I returned to Jackson, Miss., where orders from the War Department shortly reached me, postponing the meeting of the court, and soon afterwards General Van Dorn, my immediate senior, assigned me to the command of a division, with which I assisted in the attack on Corinth on the 3d and 4th of October, The report of that officer will explain the part I took in that attack and as commander of the rear guard on the retreat to Holly Springs. He there assigned me an additional division, thus making a corps, which (after General Van Dorn was superseded by Lieutenant-General Pemberton) I com- manded as a rear guard on the retreat to Grenada, On the 5th of December, with this command, I engaged the 114 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, advancing enemy at Coffeeville, defeating him with loss and checking his farther advance. Immediately after- wards I was relieved from my command by orders from the War Department; the dispatch (dated 7th December, 1862) stating that I ‘was considered off duty until the investigation by a Court of Inquiry in my case was com- pleted and final action had thereon.’ 'The Court met in the following April, and their finding and opinion was sub- mitted to the Department in J uly, but was not acted on until the following November. In the mean time an ap- plication for my services by General J oseph E, Johnston was declined for the reason that these proceedings had not been published. After the publication of the opinion of that Court exonerating me from blame for the loss of New Orleans, I was entitled not only by the custom of military service but as an act of justice, to be restored to the command from which I had been relieved. Nearly six months, however, have elapsed since that time; but, notwithstanding my personal application for duty, and the request of the distinguished commander of one of our armies to have my services with him in the field, I still remain without a command, although during that time twelve assignments of major-generals have been made, four of them by promotion. By this declension to re- store me to duty I am virtually tried, condemned, and punished by a suspension from command, after a Court - of Inquiry, composed of three general officers; detailed by the Department, has pronounced an opinion under which, according to military usage, I should at once have been placed again in position. The effect of this course of action is to impair my reputation in the eyes of the country at large, ‘and under the circumstances there is no redress other than an appeal to the usages of military service and the sense of justice of the adminis- CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 115 tration. This appeal I now make, and ask your action thereon at the earliest moment that your official con- venience will allow.” ‘ On the 8th of June, 1864, President Davis sent the following message to the House of Representatives: “In response to a resolution of the House of Representa- tives of January 15, 1864, I herewith transmit for your information a communication from the Secretary of War, covering a copy of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry relative to the capture of New Orleans.” * On the 24th of December, 1864, General Lovell, at Columbia, S. C., wrote to the Governor of that State: “The occupation of Savannah. by the enemy in large force renders the invasion of this State quite probable. Under these circumstances, as I am unemployed in my official position, I beg leave to say that, if, in this emergency, I can render any service, or render you any assistance in military matters, I will do so most cheer- fully. My sole desire is to contribute to the utmost of my ability to the success of the common cause.” + a * Proceedings of Court of Inquiry, p. 3. + General Lovell’s Letter Book, p. 142, 116 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. CHAPTER VIII. Ex-President Davis reviews. the events connected with the fall of New Orleans—difficult to reach ‘a satisfactory conclusion— attests the zeal and capacity of the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Davis says: “New Orleans was the most’ im- portant commercial port in the Confederacy. . . . Its defence attracted the early attention of the Confederate Government.”* “In March, 1861, the Navy Depart- ment sent from Montgomery officers to New Orleans, with instructions to purchase steamers and fit them for war purposes. Officers were also sent to the North to purchase vessels suited to such uses, and in the ensuing May an Agent was dispatched to Canada and another to Europe for like objects ; and in April, 1861, contracts were made with foundries at Richmond and New Or- leans, to make guns for the defence of New Orleans. On the 8th of May, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy communicated at some length to the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Confederate Congress his views in favor of iron-clad vessels, arguing as well for their efficiency as the economy in building them, believing that one such vessel could successfully engage a fleet of the wooden vessels which constituted the enemy’s Navy. His further view was that we could not hope to build wooden fleets equal to those with which the enemy were supplied. The Committee, if it should be deemed ex- Oe *“The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II., p. 210. — CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 117 pedient to construct an iron-clad ship, was urged to prompt action by the forcible declaration, ‘not a mo- ment should be lost.’”* “So promptly had the iron- clad boats been put under contract that the arrange- ments had all been made in anticipation of the ap- propriation, and the contract was signed ‘on the very day the law was passed.’” + “New Orleans had never been a ship-building port, and when the Messrs. Tift, the Agents to build the iron-clad Steamer Mississippi, arrived there, they had to prepare a ship-yard, procure lumber from a distance, have the foundries and rolling- mills adapted to such iron-work as could be done in the city, and contract elsewhere for the balance. They were ingenious, well informed in matters of ship-build- ing, and were held in high esteem in Georgia and Florida, where they had long resided. They submitted a proposition to the Secretary of the Navy to build a vessel on a new model. The proposition was accepted after full examination of the plan proposed, the novelty of which made it necessary that they should have full control of the work of construction.” t “The Secre- tary of the Navy knew both of the Tifts, but had no personal relations or family connection with either, as was recklessly alleged. He, in accepting their propo- sition, connected with it the detail of officers of the Navy to supervise expenditures and aid in procuring materials. Assisted by the Chief Engineer and Con- structor of the Navy, minute instructions were given as to the manner in which the work was to be conducted. As early as the 19th of September, he sent twenty ship eer rurrmeere ner e ER CTO * “The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II. p. 227, t p. 228. tp. 225, a Nicci a a i ae a Bs it iit lai ac i ii li ht tt Neat 118 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. carpenters from Richmond to New Orleans to aid in the construction of the Mississippi. On the 7th of October, authority was given to have guns of the heaviest calibre made in New Orleans for the ship. Frequent telegrams were sent in November, December, and January, show- ing great earnestness about the work on the ship.” * “On December 12th, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy submitted an estimate for an appropriation to meet’ the expenses incurred ‘for ordnance and ordnance stores for the defence of the Mississippi River.’” + “In February and March, 1862, notice was given of the forwarding from Richmond of Capstan and Main Shaft, which could not be made in New Orleans. On March 22d, the Secretary, by telegraph, directed the Constructors to ‘strain every nerve to finish the ship,’ and added, ‘work day and night.’ April 5th, he again wrote: ‘Spare neither men nor money to complete her at the earliest moment. Cannot you hire night gangs for triple wages?’ April 10th, the Secretary again says: ‘Enemy’s boats have passed Island 10. Work night and day with all the force you can command to get the Mississippi ready. Spare neither men nor money.’ April 11th he asks, ‘When will you launch and when will she be ready for action?’ These inquiries indicate the prevalent opinion, at that time, that the danger to New Orleans was from the iron-clad fleet above and not the vessels at the mouth of the river; but the anxiety of the Secretary of the Navy and the efforts made by him were of a character applicable to either or both the sources of danger. Thus we find as early as the 24th of February, 1862, that he instructed Com- 2 *“«The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” by Jefferson Davis, Vol, II. p. 226, + p. 229, 119 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. “ have mander Mitchell to make all proper exertions * : i guns and carriages ready for both the iron-clad vessels, the Mississippi and the Louisiana. Reports having ssel was reached him that the work on the latter a March i i he 15th not pushed with sufficient energy, on t Ka he authorized Commander Mitchell to consult wi General Lovell; and, if the contractors — os everything practicable to complete her at . e Cae moment, that he should take her out of their “in and, with the aid of General Lovell, go on to "aide r her himself. On the 5th of April, 1862, — pe Mallory instructed Commander Sinclair, who ha < assigned to the command of the Mississipp!, bys er by night and day the completion of the ship. Raw powerful vessels were under construction, the Lo as iana and the Mississippi, but neither of sg — finished.” + “The defences afloat except ec 1b ded iana, consisted of tugs and river steamers, whic eek been converted to war purposes by yee bows with iron so as to make them rams, and oe on them such armament as boats of that class wou bear: and these were again divided into such as bay subject to control as naval vessels, and others whi be compliance with the wish of the Governor of a and many influential citizens were fitted out to . — extent by State and private resources, with t z we dition that they should be commanded by sa ef - boat captains, and should not be under the contro : the naval commander. This, of course, — na unity requisite in battle.” { “The means hy — mainly relied on were the two heavy arme = A Jackson and St. Philip, with the obstruction me ahcaenanihais hese g iP ROO ERAESI EE * “The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” by Jefferson Davis, Vol. IL. p. 226. + p. 211. 4p, 200. 120 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS,’ between them: this was a raft trees, forty feet long, and averaging four or five feet at the larger end. They were placed longitudinally in the river, about three feet apart, and held together by gunwales on top and strung upon two two-and-a-half- inch chain cables fastened to their lower sides. This raft was anchored in the river abreast the forts,” * “The prevailing belief that vessels of war, in a straight, smooth channel, could pass batteries, led to tion of a raft between the two forts whic posed, would detain the ships under fire of enough for the guns to sink them, them to retire. The power of the rive the driftwood it bore upon it, brok was constructed, which, when the dri upon it, met a like fate. Whether obstructions differently arranged, such as booms secured to the shores with ap- paratus by which they could be Swung across the chan- nel when needful, or logs such as were used, except that being unconnected together, but each separately secured by chain and anchor, they might severally yield to the pressure of the driftwood, sinking, so as to allow it to pass over them, and when relieved of the weight rise again—or whether other expedients could have been made permanent and efficient, is a problem which need not be discussed, as the time for its application has passed from us.”+ “A number of fire rafts had been also provided, which were to serve the double purpose of lighting up the river in the event of the hostile fleet attempting to pass the forts under cover of the night, and of setting fire to any vessel with which they might become entangled.” { “ Commander George Minor, the construc- h, it was sup- the forts long or at least compel r when in flood, and e the raft; another * « V ese are the pe ! fe made it convenient to select for censure those most ing General was responsible for t Orleans. A Court—the majority were special friends of Mr. Davis, s fully exonerated General Lovell. : and his administration, President mit that officer to be again assig now attempts to withdraw him toward that general—as far as defending Mr. Mississippi, fro he defence of New elected by himself— But, to screen himself Davis refused to per- ned to any duty: and self—and his conduct possible from view, by ae and the constructors of the m the attacks he says were made again the st them by the conflicting testimony of those Pd concerned in the defence and the fall of This, too, most nearly | : New Orleans. whilst professing to write in the name of justice and truth—for the purpose of elucidating ob- security and correcting error—lamenting that he cannot mention for praise “each and all who wore the gray.” conflicting testimony,” Mr. Davis says, . es a alin lem pein Soins bes ope eee PART I. NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS. CHAPTER I. Preliminary movements: Report that McDowell was advancing on the 27th-—-General Johnston orders preparations to attack the Federal right on the north bank of the Chickahominy—McDow- ell’s forces turn back—General Johnston reverts to his first intention to attack the Federal left on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy—letter from General Johnston to General Whiting. Preliminary.—In withdrawing from the Peninsula, formed by the James and York rivers, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, moved upon two lines from Williamsburg to Richmond. The divisions of D. H. Hill and Longstreet on the Charles City Road—both under General Longstreet—crossed the Chickahominy River at Long Bridge. G. W.Smith’s division, the two di- visions which formed Magruder’s command, the main body of the cavalry, and the reserve artillery—all under ‘General G. W. Smith—followed the Old Stage road through New Kent Court-house, and crossed the Chicka- ominy at Bottom’s Bridge. The Federal Army of the Potomac, commanded by General George B. McClellan, advanced by the road upon which the forces under Gen- eral G. W. Smith retired. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 145 The following note from General Longstreet is illus. trative of the time: ‘* HEADQUARTERS, SECOND CoRPs, “Pato ALTO, May 8th, 1862. “ My dear General: “Yours of this morning is received. If your road can beat this for mud I don’t want to see it. I will stop near Forge Bridge to-night—headquarters three wall tents. My men have their bellies full, also their cartridge boxes; so I don’t fear McClellan or any one in Yankeedom. If you see the General say to him that we are as happy as larks over here till we get 126 wagons (the total number) upto the hub at onetime. Anything less we can endure with composure. Write often. “ With respect, “J. Lonestrert, Maj.-Gen’l Comdg. “General G. W. Smith, Comdg. First Corps.” After General Johnston’s army crossed the Chickaho- miny Magruder’s troops were placed in position to guard the passage of the bridges and fords of that river from the Mechanicsville Bridge* to New Bridge, and extended from the latter point along the New Bridge road across the Nine Miles road to the Richmond and York River Railroad. G. W. Smith’s division was on the Williams- burg or Old Stage road two or three miles from the city, with one brigade in observation near Bottom’s Bridge. The two divisions under General Longstreet took position south of the Williamsburg road three or four miles from Richmond. On the 23d of May Brigadier-General Hatton reported from a point on the Williamsburg Road nine and a half eel RE MOE AP PCE leis fee SIP E * See Map of the vicinity of Richmond. 146 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. miles east of Richmond that the enemy had moved out from their position this side of Bottom’s Bridge, and was in his immediate front with infantry, artillery, and cav- alry. The next day he wrote as follows: “ Junorion* oF 7 AND 9 Mixes Roaps, “7 p., May 24th, 1862. “General Smith: ‘I will retire my command to-night to a point, on the 7 miles road,t one and a half miles from this. The enemy are in considerable force in my. immediate front. In my skirmish to-day I lost but three men. “R. Harron, Brig.-Genl.” The same night General Stuart reported to General Smith that the Meadow Bridges were in the hands of the enemy—that General Semmes had, during the day, repulsed a party attempting to cross at New Bridge— and that, later, the enemy’s pickets crossed above and slipped through the swamps and occupied this side of that bridge. At the same time General Cobb reported to General Smith, through General McLaws, that a cross- ing was being established by the enemy about half a mile below Mechanicsville Bridge. On the 27th General McLaws reported the enemy’s skirmishers pressing ours in front of Semmes’s and Grif- fith’s brigades, just east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road. About 1 o’clock, p.m., on the 27th General Smith re- ceived the following note from General Johnston: “We must get ready to fight. Anderson reports (Junction, 11 a.m.) that his videttes have informed him es i * This junction is called “Seven Pines.” + Williamsburg old Stage road, z Set. eee id Beate Oe CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 147 that McDowell is advancing ‘in force’—his pickets at Guinea’s. The Army reported six miles this side of Fredericksburg. His main force at Half Sink—three regiments under Hamilton at the junction. We must get ready for this.” Up to this time General Johnston’s intention had been to strike an effective blow upon the enemy, approaching by the Williamsburg road, as soon as they came near enough, in force, to enable him to engage the larger part of his army in the direction of Seven Pines without ex- posing Richmond too much to an attack coming from the north bank of the Chickahominy. He knew that a large portion of two corps of McClellan’s army were in the vicinity of Bottom’s Bridge and at a point near Seven Pines—and considered them still toq far off—but was expecting them to come nearer—and had held his army ready to strike in that direction at the shortest notice. On the receipt of General Johnston’s note stating that McDowell was moving to form a junction with McClel- lan, General Smith proceeded at once to the headquarters - of the Army, and it was there soon arranged that he should go in person to the left—that A. P. Hill, whose division was then near Ashland, should be ordered up— that Smith’s Division, under Whiting, should move to the vicinity of Meadow Bridges, and that General Smith should be relieved of the duty of commanding General Magruder, who would report direct to General Johnston. But, D. R. Jones’ division, which was on the left, should . be, for the time, placed under General Smith’s orders. In the new arrangement the divisions of A. P. Hill, D. R. Jones, and Smith’s division, under General Whiting, would constitute the left wing of the Army. General Smith was directed by General Johnston to make every preparation to attack the right of the enemy 148 CONIEDERATE WAR PAPERS. on the north bank of the Chickahominy, with these three divisions, as soon as practicable. A little before sunset, on the 28th, he returned to General Johnston’s headquarters and informed him that A. P. Hill’s divi- sion would be in the immediate presence of the enemy at Mechanicsville before midnight; and would assault that position at the dawn of day. This would clear the way for Smith’s division, under Whiting, and D. R. Jones’ division, to cross the river at Meadow Bridges and the Mechanicsville Bridge. After carrying the works at Mechanicsville, A. P. Hill was ordered to press on to Beaver Dam Creek, to which point he would be quickly followed by the other two divisions, and the three would make a combined assault on the enemy’s line along the eastern crest of that creek. This position had been closely examined by the Chief Engineer of the Army, and by General Smith’s chief of staff, whilst General Johnston’s Army was awaiting the enemy between the Pamunky and Chickahominy rivers. They had report- ed it to be very strong—in natural features of the ground—especially against an attack coming from the direction of Mechanicsville; and that. it could not be turned from that side, without making a wide detour which would consume a good deal of time. General Smith distinctly advised that the direct attack should be made, as there was no time to lose if we expected to beat the enemy before McDowell’s forces formed a junction with those of McClellan. Every confidence was felt that A. P. Hill would take the works at Mechanicsville with certainty and without delay—and it was believed that the three divisions could carry the lines at Beaver Dam Creek; but, it would be bloody work. More than justi- fied, however, because of the necessity for accomplishing decisive results before the arrival of McDowell. ao sy = lo SS CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 149 When General Johnston informed the officers present that McDowell’s forces had returned to Fredericksburg, and it was believed they were moving further north, General Smith advised that the attack, he had just pre- viously urged, should not be made; at least, until it was known that McDowell was moving to join McClellan— and stated that, until this fact was known there was no oceasion to cross the Chickahominy, all of the bridges and fords of which stream-were held by the enemy, in order to attack three corps on the north side—having a strong position like that of Beaver Dam Creek—when two corps were on our side of the river, almost within reach, where there were no such strong natural features of the ground against us. _ General Longstreet thought the attack ought to be made as contemplated before it was known that McDowell had gone back to Fredericksburg. General Johnston decided that this was inexpedient: and he directed Gen- eral Smith to order A. P. Hill to withdraw from his position—in contact with the enemy at Mechanicsville— before daylight, and take position on the extreme left of the army on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy. General Longstreet then urged that an attack be made, next morning, against the enemy on our side of the river, in the direction of Seven Pines. General Johnston said that so soon as it should become certainly known that McDowell was not coming, he would revert to his for- mer intention, to strike an effective blow on the enemy approaching by the Williamsburg road, when a respec- table force, worth crushing, came within easy and safe reach—and stated that the disposition of our forces, made whilst it was supposed McDowell was on the way to join McClellan, was too strong on the extreme left to warrant an attack toward Seven Pines next morning— - — A ES at Si Ret Li SN PUES CIA eh te) ye 150 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. - and that Huger’s division was expected to arrive very soon. For these reasons it was not deemed expedient to adopt Longstreet’s suggestion that an attack be made in . the direction of Seven Pines on the morning of May 29th. : Before midnight General Smith sent several different messengers to A. P. Hill directing him to withdraw be- fore daylight: only one of whom reached him. Appre- hending that none of the messengers would succeed in finding their way through the intricate swamps of that locality in time to countermand the order for Hill’s at- tack—General Smith informed General Johnston that, in case the change of order did not reach General Hill —and the latter should become involved with superior forces on the north bank of the river—he (General Smith) would feel bound to take the other two divisions over the river to Hill’s assistance; and asked thatin this case General Johnston would hold the rest of the army in readiness for whatever action might be necessary. General Johnston acquiesced in this, and at midnight General Smith proceeded to the vicinity of the Meadovz Bridges. In the morning there was a dense fog. Before it lifted, about eight o’clock a.m., General Smith learned that A. P. Hill’s division had been withdrawn, without its presence having been suspected by the ene- my, and Hill was moving quietly to take the position assigned him on the Richmond side of the river. Gen- eral Smith then proceeded to the extreme left to confer with General Hill and General J. E. B. Stuart. Whilst with General Hill, General Smith received the following letter transmitted to him by General Whiting, to whom it was addressed by General Johnston: eee CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 151 “‘ Heapquarters, Harrison’s, May 29, 1862. “ My Dear General: Ihave just received the note you wrote in regard to your camp. I will give precise orders not to let it be interfered with. I received a message from Huger to the effect that his troops had not arrived at 6.30 this morning—no cars having been sent for them. The Quartermaster who had charge of the matter reported to me at sunset that the trains were ready and would be off at 9 0’clock. Lee ordered John G. Walker’s brigade to Petersburg and Holmes ordered it back. For any purpose but that contemplated yesterday the present disposition of our troops is not good, too strong on the extreme left. If nothing is heard of McDowell we must bring you back to a more central place. D. H. Hill re- ported an hour ago that one of his advanced brigadiers had sent forward two hundred skirmishers who very soon met a brigade of the enemy with cavalry and artillery. Who knows but that in the course of the morning Longstreet’s scheme may accomplish itself. If we get into a fight here you'll have to hurry to help us. I think it will be best for A. P. Hill’s troops to watch the bridges and for yours to be well in this direction ready to act anywhere. Tell G. W. “Yours truly, J. E. Jounsron. “ Brigadier-General Wurrtrne.” On the same day at 4.30 p.m. General J. E. B. Stuart, commander of the cavalry, reported to General G. W. Smith — “Before I could get to Ashland the enemy with infantry and cavalry returned and now hold it, doubtless with the view of removing the stores there. No advance here. Some sharp shooting on Telegraph Road.” * 152 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. General Johnston’s letter of the 29th, to General © Whiting, required new arrangements of the troops to be made. On the 30th A. P. Hill was brought nearer to the Meadow Bridges, and Whiting (commanding G. W. Smith’s division) was directed to take ground nearer Richmond in position to move towards Seven Pines, if General Johnston determined to strike in that direction, or on Mechanicsville in case it should be found that McDowell, after all, was really coming to join Mc- Clellan. “ It will thus be seen that the movement of McDowell, reported to General Johnston in the afternoon of the 27th, had resulted in removing General Smith from the Williamsburg Road, where his division had been watching the advance of the enemy on that side, and placing him in command of the left wing of the Army; whilst General Longstreet became the Senior Officer of all the troops on the right, CHAPTER I. Me-President Davis's account of preliminary operations around Richmond—Tells General Lee why and how he was dissatisfied —General Johnston’s reported proposed plan—President rides out to see the action commence—account of that ride—Author’s comments. Mr. Davis says:* “Our army having retreated from the Peninsula and withdrawn from the north ‘side of the Chickahominy to the immediate vicinity of Richmond, * Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. II. p. 119. * Ne em tithas Eee A CCAM kl adg Ni AARRNE E o N ee ee Ce er CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 1538 T rode out occasionally to the lines and visited the head- quarters of the commanding General. There were ne Visible preparations for defence, and my brief conversa- tions with the General afforded no satisfactory infor- tation as to his plans and purposes. We had, under the supervision of General Lee, perfected as far as we could the detached works before the city, but these were rather designed to protect it against a sudden at- tack than to resist approaches by a great army. They were, also, so near to the city that it might have been effectually bombarded by guns exterior to them. Anx- lous for the defence of the ancient capital of Virginia, now the capital of the Confederate States, and remem- bering a remark of General Johnston, that the Spaniards were the only people who now undertook to hold forti- fied towns, I had written to him that he knew the de- fence of Richmond must be made at a distance-from it. Seeing no preparation to keep the enemy at a distance, and kept in ignorance of any plan for such purpose, I sent for General R. E. Lee, then at Richmond, in gen- eral charge of army operations, and told him why and how I was dissatisfied with the condition of affairs. He asked me what I thought it was proper to do. Re- curring to a conversation held about the time we had together visited General: Johnston, I answered that McClellan should be attacked on the other side of the Chickahominy before he matured his preparations fora siege of Richmond. To this he promptly assented, as I anticipated he would, for I knew it had been his own opinion. He then said: ‘General Johnston should of course advise you of what he expects or proposes to do. Let me go and see him, and defer this discussion until I return.’ When General Lee came back, he told me that General Johnston proposed, on the next Thursday, to 154 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. move against the enemy as follows. General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flank and rear of the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill’s guns opened, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and by the con- junction of the two it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville Bridge and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped by both of us. On the morning of the day proposed I hastily dispatched my office busi- ness, and rode out toward the Meadow Bridge to see the action commence. On the road I found Smith’s | division halted, and the men dispersed in the woods. Looking for some one from whom I could get informa- tion, I finally saw General Hood, and asked him the meaning of what I saw. He told me he did not know , anything more than that they had-been halted. Iasked him where General Smith was; he said he believed he had gone to afarm house in the rear, adding that he thought he was ill. Riding on to the bluff which overlooks the Meadow Bridge, I asked Colonel Anderson, posted there in observation, whether he had seen anything of the enemy in his front. He said that he had seen only two mounted men across the bridge, and a small party of infantry on the other side of the river, some distance below, both of whom, he said, he could show me if I would go with him into the garden back of the house. There, by the use of a powerful glass, were distinctly visible two cavalry videttes at the farther end of the bridge, and a squad of infantry lower down the river, who had covered themselves with a screen of green boughs. The Colonel informed me’ that he had not heard Hill’s guns; it was, therefore, supposed he had not advanced. .I then rode down the bank of the river, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 155 oe by a cavalcade of sight-seers, who, I suppose, inde een attracted by the expectation of a battle. The : squad of infantry, about fifteen in number, as we PF aioe fled over the ridge, and were lost to sight. a to the Mechanicsville Bridge I found General owell Cobb, commanding the support of a battery of artillery, He pointed out to me on the opposite side of the river the only enemy he had seen, and which was evidently a light battery. Riding on to the main road which led to the Mechaniesville Bridge, I found General Longstreet, walking to and fro in an impatient, it might be said fretful, manner. Before speaking to him, he said his division had been under arms all day waiting for orders to advance, and that the day was now so far spent that he did not know what was tlie matter.- I afterward learned from General Smith that he haa’ re- ceived information from a citizen that the Beaver-dam Creek presented an impassable barrier, and that he had thus fortunately been saved from a disaster. Thus ended the offensive defensive programme from which Lee expected much, and of which I was hopeful.” Comments.—General Smith has no recollection of ever having spoken to President Davis in reference to the position of the Federals at Beaverdam Creek; he certainly never said anything to any one which oonla justify Mr. Davis in making the statement, just quoted in regard to that subject. General Smith’s intoruiathels on that matter was derived from his Chief of Staff and from the Chief Engineer of the Army, both of whom had closely examined the ground in question. In speaking of Beaverdam Creek in another connection Mr. Davis Says, On page 134, volume ii., “ Rise and Fall of the Con- federate States Government:” “This position was natu- rally strong, the banks of the Creek in front being high 156 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. and almost perpendicular, and the approach to it was over open fields commanded by the fire of artillery and infantry under cover on the opposite side.” It should be borne in mind that the front of the Federal main line on the north bank of the Chicka- hominy was nearly parallel to that stream, its right being thrown back along the eastern crest of Beaverdam Creek, almost at right angles to the main line. At Mechanicsville, about a mile west of Beaverdam Creek, the Federals had an intrenched outpost, with videttes at the Meadow Bridges. When it was believed that McDowell was moving to form a junction with McClel- lan, General G. W. Smith advised that A. P. Hill’s division should carry the Federal outpost at Mechanics- ville at daylight on the 29th and push on against the right of their main line. In the attack upon the enemy’s position at Beaverdam Creek, A. P. Hill’s division was to be closely supported by D. R. Jones’s division and G. W. Smith’s division, under Whiting. It was believed that these three divisions could carry the right of the Federal line by direct assault. But Mr. Davis says: “General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flank and rear of the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill’s guns opened, was to cross the Chicka- hominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and by the conjunction of the two it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville Bridge and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped.” It has already been stated that the right of the Federal main line, in position along the eastern crest of Beaverdam Creek, could not be turned without making a long detour to the north. Mr. Davis does not explain how A. P. Hill and G. W. Smith were to attack the CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 157 enemy in rear and flank and double him up; whilst Longstreet would cross on the Mechanicsville Bridge— a mile west of the right of the enemy’s main line—and attack him in front. But, he says that from this al- leged plan the best results were hoped by both General Lee and himself. It should be remembered that the order to attack on the morning of the 29th was countermanded by General Johnston on the night of the 28th; and that whilst President Davis was riding out on the 29th “to see the action commence,” General Johnston had written to General Whiting, then commanding Smith’s division saying: “For any purpose but that contemplated Featers day the present disposition of our troops is not good— too strong on the extreme left. If nothing is heard of McDowell we must bring you back to a more central place. . . . If we get into a fight here you'll have to hurry to help us. I think it will be best for A. P. Hill’s troops to watch the bridges—and for yours to be well in this direction, ready to act anywhere. Tell G. W.” The letter from which the foregoing quotation is made was received by General Whiting and by him transmitted to General Smith—on the extreme left of the army—whilst President Davis having “hastily dis- patched his office business,” was riding out toward the Meadow Bridge “to see the action commence;” was catechising General Hood; looking through a noweatul glass at two of the enemy’s videttes; riding down the bank of the river, followed by a cavaleade of sight- seers; frightening a little squad of infantry, about fif- teen in number; conversing with General Cobb about the only enemy he had seen; and finding General Long- street, who told him “the day was now so far spent that he did not know what was the matter.” Such is the ac- ee 158 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. count Mr. Davis now gives of “the offensive defensive programme,” from which he says he was hopeful and Lee expected much. Without further allusion to General Johnston’s con- templated attack upon the right of the Federal army in the direction of Mechanicsville on the 29th, attention will now be called to the battle of the 31st of May. CHAPTER III. Description of the battle-ground of Seven Pines—Position and number of Confederates—of Federals—General Johnston’s plan and intentions—documentary proof. Tue point known as Seven Pines is merely the junc- tion of two roads. It is on the Williamsburg, or old stage road, seven miles east of Richmond. From the north-east suburb of Richmond another road, lying be- tween the Williamsburg road and the Chickahominy, leads to Seven Pines. This is called the Nine Miles road, and the distance from Richmond to Seven Pines by this road is nine miles; it crosses the Richmond and York River Railroad, at Fair Oaks station, a little less than one mile from Seven Pines. At a point on the Nine Miles road, about six and a half miles from Rich- mond, a road turns off north and leads across the Chickahominy at New Bridge. The Charles City road branches off from the Williamsburg road at a point some four miles west of Seven Pines; lateral roads lead from it into the Williamsburg road. The country about Seven Pines is mostly flat, farm land, quite heavily wooded and swampy. In rainy weather it is very boggy and difficult of passage, even in the beaten tracks. Be- CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 159 sides the main roads already mentioned, the country is intersected by farm and wood roads. Position and Number of the Confederate Forces,—At night, on the 30th of May, the right wing of General Johnston’s army was east of the city. This wing, 30,000 strong, was commanded by General Longstreet. It was composed of three divisions—Longstreet’s 14,000, six brigades, on and near the Nine Miles road, three brigades in the vicinity of Richmond, and the other three brigades three and a half miles from the city. D. H. Hill’s, 11,000, on the Williamsburg road, about two and a half miles from Richmond, and Huger’s, 5000 strong, near Hill. The centre of the army, commanded by General Magruder, consisted, at this time, of McLaws’s division, 11,000 strong—it was guarding the Chicka- hominy from the Mechanicsville road to New Bridge, and thence along the New Bridge road across the Nine Miles road. The left wing of the army, 19,500 strong, commanded by General G. W. Smith, was composed, at this time, of three divisions—D,. R. Jones’s, 5,000, on the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff, guarding the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges roads—A. P. Hill’s, 4000 strong, guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy on the extreme left—and Smith’s division, under General Whiting, 10,500 strong, on the Meadow Bridges road, a little in rear of the troops that held the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff at that point. There were 1300 cavalry under General J. E. B. Stuart, and 900 reserve artillery under Colonel Pendleton. The total strength of the Confederate army was a little more than 62,000.* Position and Number of the Federal Forces.—The BUSS or ee eed ea eT A eR CN SH cs * These figures, in round numbers, are from Colonel Taylor’s ‘Four Years with General Lee.” 160 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, following summary is taken from an account of the “Battle of Fair Oaks,” given by General George W. Mindil. At night, on the 30th of May, there were two corps of General McClellan’s army on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, and three corps on the north bank of that stream. The latter extended from near the Railroad Bridge to Mechanicsville. Of the two corps on the Richmond side, “The Fourth,” 12,000 effectives, was commanded by General Keyes—it was composed of two divisions—Casey’s, 5000, had its left on the Williamsburg road half a mile west of Seven ' Pines, its right near the Richmond and York River Railroad, two or three hundred yards in advance of. Fair Oaks station; Couch’s division, 7000, was in line along the Nine Miles road, its left at Seven Pines, its right a little beyond the railroad near Fair Oaks station, with an intrenched picket across the Nine Miles road, about one mile in advance of Fair Oaks. The front of each of these divisions was protected by lines of rifle- pits, strengthened by abattis. On the left of Casey’s line there was a small, unfinished, pentangular redoubt. The flanks of both divisions were “in the air.” About one third of a mile in front of Keyes’s main force there was a line of pickets from the White Oak Swamp to the Chickahominy. The third corps, 13,000, commanded by General Heintzelman, was composed of two divisions—Kear- ney’s, 6500, at Bottom’s Bridge, was ordered at 4 p.m. on the 30th to prepare to march early next morning to the support of Keyes’s corps, and Hooker’s division, 6500, at the White Oak Bridge, was instructed to get ready, and—after leaving a sufficient guard of artillery and infantry at the bridge crossings, to follow Kearney at the earliest practicable moment, The two corps, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 161 25,000 effectives, were under the command of General Heintzelman. Besides tétes-de-pont at these two bridges, and the rifle-pits and abattis protecting the front of the two divisions near Seven Pines, a strong line had been con- structed at right angles to, and south of, the Williams- burg road, about a mile and a half east of Seven Pines. This was called the “third line of defence”—it was un- occupied on the 30th of May. The third corps num- bered 17,088 “total present” in camp on the 25th of May, but the effective force did not exceed 13,000 muskets. The fourth corps numbered, at the same time, 15,678 present in camp, or about 12,000 “ effec- tives” for line of battle. General Johnston’s information on the 30th of May when he gave orders for battle—was not so specific as the foregoing—taken from General Mindil’s account— but it was reasonably accurate in all essential particu- lars; including the probable reénforcement of the corps at Seven Pines. Note.—In a work entitled “The Peninsula,” by Gen- eral Alexander S. Webb, it is stated, page 97, that “the consolidated returns of the army (General McClellan’s) show an aggregate of 126,089 officers and men present on May the 31st, with 280 pieces of field artillery.” General Johnston's Plan and Intentions.—At 12.30 A.M, on the 31st, Gen. G. W. Smith, at his headquarters, on the Brook turnpike, about four miles from Richmond, received the following order from Gen. Johnston: “ HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NorTHERN VIRGINIA, ‘May 30, 1852, 9.15 p.m. “ General: “If nothing prevents we will fall upon the enemy in front of Major-General Hill—who occupies the position 162 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, on the Williamsburg road from which your troops moved to the neighborhood of Meadow Bridges early in the morning-—as early as practicable. The Chickahom- iny will be high—and passable only at the bridges—a great advantage to us. Please be ready to move by the Nine Miles road—coming as early as possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off. Should there be cause of haste, General McLaws, on your approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may reénforce General Longstreet. “Most respectfully your obedient servant, “J. E. Jounsron.” “A copy of this has been sent to General Whiting who is directed to act upon this order in your absence, san’ Fig: GS be Before sunrise that morning General Smith reached General Johnston’s headquarters near the Nine Miles road, in the ‘north-east suburb of Richmond. He in- formed General Johnston that the head of the division, under Whiting, had moved before daylight, and would soon arrive at the point where the Nine Miles road leaves the city; and that it would be able to reach the point where the New Bridge road turns off by eight o’clock. He also informed General Johnston that the command of the remainder of the left wing of the army had been temporarily turned over to General A. P. Hill; who was ordered to place his own division nearer to Meadow Bridges—take command of D. R. Jones’s troops and all others in that vicinity—and guard against any move- ment the enemy might make in that direction from the North bank of the Chickahominy. General Smith told General Johnston that he did not propose relieving General Whiting of the command of CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 163 the division; but that he would accompany it to the designated point, and take whatever part circumstances might require of him in the coming contest. General Johnston approved this, and at once explained his in- tentions. He said that Longstreet had been ordered to attack the enemy at Seven Pines, as early as possible that morning, with the whole right wing of the army. Longstreet’s own division moving into action by the Nine Miles road, which it was already on, part of it three or four miles out from Richmond. D. H. Hill’s division to move on the Williamsburg road—and Huger’s on the Charles City road, in position to guard against any movement of the enemy on that side; and by lateral roads, come into action on the left flank of the enemy, in case the attack made by Longstreet’s and Hill’s divi- sions should meet with prolonged resistance. One brigade and two regiments of McLaws’s division were just east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road. Longstreet’s division on the Nine Miles road could easily have reached that point—about one mile and a half from Fair Oaks station—before seven o’clock. D. H. Hill’s division on the Williamsburg road could have moved up to his picket line before that time. General Johnston expected a crushing blow to be struck in the vicinity of Seven Pines by 8 A.a.—and hoped that it would be completely successful before reinforcements of the enemy could reach that point, from the direction of Bottom’s Bridge, or from the North bank of the Chickahominy. But, to provide against contingencies—be ready to meet any reénforcements the enemy might send across the Chickahominy—and be within supporting distance in case Longstreet should need help in his attack—Gen- eral Johnston said he had considered it prudent to order 164 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. the division under Whiting, from the left wing of the army to the right. He was well aware that three of the five corps of General McClellan’s army were on the north bank of the Chickahominy—their right at Me- chanicsville—and that all the crossings of the river had been for several days in the hands of the enemy. And he fully realized that whilst the bulk of the Confederate army was engaged at Seven Pines and beyond, Rich- mond would be in danger of attack coming from the north side of the river. He expressed his determination to take position with the supporting division on the Nine Miles road—leaving to General Longstreet the conduct of the attack on Seven Pines. About 6 a.m. General Whiting, with the head of his column, reached the vicinity of General Johnston’s head- quarters; but was prevented from reaching the Nine Miles road by troops of Longstreet’s division, who were across the line of march of Whiting’s command; and were breaking up their camps, loading baggage wagons, and getting ready for march. In a short time General Whiting became very impatient. General Smith then sent an aide-de-camp to General Longstreet, informing him of the cause of delay, and requesting that it be remedied as soon as possible. This aide, Lieutenant R. F. Beckham, asked General Smith where General Long- street was to be found. General Smith referred him to General Johnston, who was present at the time. The latter said that Longstreet’s division was moving on the Nine Miles road, and that General Longstreet, in all probability, was with it. In about an hour General Smith received a note from his aide stating that the di- vision was not on the Nine Miles road: adding, he would cross the country to the Williamsburg road and try to find General Longstreet. It was now about 9 a.m, and J CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 165 reports were coming in, from our line along the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs, between New Bridge and the Mechanicsville road, indicating some movement of the enemy on the north bank of the river. By this time Longstreet’s troops and baggage trains had ceased cross- ing Whiting’s line of march; but, General Johnston di- rected that Whiting should not move further until it could be determined where Longstreet’s division was. When General Johnston learned that General Smith’s aide reported that Longstreet’s division was not on the Nine Miles road—he sent one of his own aides to Gen- eral Longstreet with instructions to send back at least three brigades to that road, if they had not moved so far as to make the change involve a serious loss of time. General Johnston’s aide went rapidly on the Nine Miles road, in search of General Longstreet, and soon found himself within the enemy’s picket lines—a prisoner. The foregoing statement of General Johnston’s inten- tions is different from that given by many writers. For that reason the following documentary proof is presented here: First. Extracts from a letter addressed to General G. W. Smith, dated February 7, 1863, written by R. F, Beckham, Major of Ordnance, who was a lieutenant and General Smith’s aide at the battle of Seven Pines, He says: “I was directed to carry an order to General Longstreet urging him to push forward with his division so that the road might be cleared to enable your divi- sion to take up the march. . . . I then asked General Johnston if he could give me any idea of General Long- street’s whereabouts. His reply was that he did not know, but that he ought to be on the march on the Nine Miles road. With instructions to find him if possible, I started off, but could learn nothing of him on the route 166 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, indicated by General Johnston. After having gone as far as was necessary to satisfy me that General Long- street’s division was not on the Nine Miles road, I sent, by courier, a note to you stating this fact; and I also remember to have said in it that I would go over to the Williamsburg, or old stage road, and see if General Longstreet could be found there. I found his head- quarters at a house on the side of the road, belonging, I think, to a Mr. Poor, and there delivered to him the order given me. Kemper’s brigade, which formed a part of General Longstreet’s division, was at a halt on the road when I got to General Longstreet’s headquar- ters, and, what surprised me most, was accompanied by wagons loaded with baggage and camp equipage. You ' will remember that I mentioned this thing to you-when I came back to General Johnston’s headquarters. I do not remember at what hour I reached General Long- street. Judging from the time of my joining you at General Johnston’s, and the time which must have elapsed before the order was given me, I would suppose it to have been about ten o’clock when I reached Poor’s house.” ; Second. The following extract is from a letter dated Richmond, June 28th, 1862, written by General J. E. Johnston to General G. W. Smith: “TI enclose here- with the first three sheets of your report, to ask a modification—or omission rather. They contain two subjects which I never intended to make generally known, and which I have mentioned to no one but your- self—and mentioned to you as I have been in the habit of doing everything of interest in the military way. I refer to the mention of the misunderstanding between Longstreet and myself in regard to the direction of his division—and that of his note to me, received about 4 Pe J CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 167 +d sot complaining of my slowness—which note I owed you. As it seems to me that both of these matters concern Longstrret and myself alone, I have no hesitation in asking you to strike them out of sens report —as they inno manner concern your operations, I re- ceived information of Longstreet’s misunderstandin (which may be my fault as I told you at the timay while his troops were moving to the Williamsburg road and sent to Longstreet to send three brigades by the Nine Miles road, if they had not marched so far as to make the change involve a serious loss of time. This, after telling you of the misunderstanding. ae mapeh from General Semmes’s headquarters was not in conse- quence of the letter from Longstreet. Whiting * had os at my request, with your permission, to ascertain nn state of things with Longstreet. Just before 4 o clock we heard musketry for the first time, and Whit ing t was ordered to advance. Just then Major Whit. ing rode up and reported from Longstreet—and ; moment after the note was brought me—which, af ; Oe it, I showed it to you.” day: Pps ird, The following 18 a copy of the three sheets eneral Smith’s report addressed to Major Thom G. Rhett, Adjutant-General, Department of North a Virginia, and returned by General Johnston The portions which were omitted, at the request of Gan: eral Johnst SEE eas ston, are placed in italics and marked by Sh SR APRA AE AS COR EBs URES Malte Lee REO J 5 ate, Ae Major Jasper Whiting, General @. W. Smith’s chief of staff + Brigadier-@ ie division eneral W. H. C. Whiting, commanding Smith’s 168 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. «« RicuMonp, VA., June 28d, 1862. “ Major: « On the 28th of May, by direction of General John- ston, I assumed command of the left wing of the army, and on the same day placed my own division a. rarily under command of the Senior a r W. H. ©. Whiting. At half-past 12 o’clock on Pe morning of the 31st of May, at my headquarters a K @ Brook Turnpike, I received a note from General John- ston directing that my division should take position soon as practicable upon the Nine Miles road, near ee New Bridge fork, ready to support, if necessary, the divisions upon the right in an attack upon the enemy which was to be made early in the morning. I was in- formed that, in case my division did not arrive in prs: a portion of the troops composing the centre would be moved forward, and I was directed, in that event, to me place the troops, thus moved, by my division. [On arriving at the headquarters of General Johnston, about sunrise, I learned from him that his ee was that General Longstreet’s division should move Yy the Nine Miles road—that of General D. H. pet by the Williamsburg stage road—and General Huger’s by the Charles City road. The enemy it was understood had already upon this side of the Chickahominy river a force variously estimated at from twenty to forty thousand men. The recent rains had hemor He creased the difficulty of crossing that stream ; ye notwithstanding the very bad condition of the roads over which we had to pass, and the boggy, swampy con- dition of tne fields and woods through which our hese would have to operate, it was believed that an energetic attack, early in the morning, properly supported and . RENEE ET es i ae eee a . Se atte ie ttl aa OS AT aes ee c not reach General Longstreet. followed up, would result in defeat to that portion of CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 169 the enemy already upon this side, before the other, por- tion of their army could cross the swollen river, either to reinforce their troops, or to attack the city in our rear. About 8 o'clock, I directed Captain Beckham, Aide-de-Camp, to see General Longstreet on the Nine Miles road, and learn from him the state of affairs, and communicate to me all the information he could obtain in regard to the probable movements of the troops under General Longstreet, in order that I might under- standingly give instructions to General Whiting, who had arrived with the head of the division near General Johnston's headquarters—having been for some time waiting for General Longstreet’s troops to pass. In about an hour I learned by note Srom Captain Beck- ham that neither General Longstreet nor any portion of his command were on the Nine Miles road, This note was immediately shown to General Johnston, who despatched his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Washing- ton, to General Longstreet with directions to turn his division into the Nine Miles road, provided it could be done without material loss of time. This message did General Johnston's in- tentions as then explained to me were that whilst Gen- eral D. H. Hill’s division was attacking the enemy’s advanced position on the Williamsburg stage road in Jront, General Huger’s division, from the Charles City road, would attack the left flank, and General Longstreet’s division would engage the enemy on Hill’s left. An hour later Captain Beckham reported that he had found Longstreet’s division on the Williamsburg road, halted, for the purpose of allowing General D. H. Hill's troops to file by; and soon after returned with in- Sormation that General Hill’s troops had passed, and that General Longstreet was making all his dispositions 170 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. to attack the enemy in conjunction with General Fill’s division on the Williamsburg road—his own division being held in reserve on that road.| 1 then directed General Whiting to move three brigades, viz.: his own, Hood’s, and Pettigrew’s, near to the fork of the Nine Milesand New Bridge roads; and placed the other two— Hatton’s and Hampton’s—in reserve near Mrs. Christian’s farm. About one o’clock Irejoined General J ohnston at the head of the three brigades in position upon the Nine Miles road, and found him anxiously awaiting the de- velopment of affairs upon our right. As the day wore on and nothing decisive was heard from General Long- street’s attack, except occasional firing of cannon, and, for some two or three hours, but little musketry, it seemed that no real attack was likely to be made that day, at least. [But between four and five o'clock a note was received from General Longstreet stating that he had attacked and beaten the enemy after several hours, severe fighting; that he had been disappointed in not receiving assistance upon his left; and, although it was now nearly too late, that an attack, by the Nine Mile road, upon the right flank and rear of the enemy would probably yet enable him to drive them into the Chicka- hominy before dark.” The marked portions of the foregoing quotation from General Smith’s report are those indicated in pencil by General Johnston, on the return sheets, with a request that they be omitted. This request was based upon his statement that he did not intend to make generally known either Longstreet’s note or the misunderstanding between Longstreet and himself in regard to the direction in which Longstreet’s division was to move into action; and, upon his opinion that this misunderstanding in no manner concerned the operations of the division, under CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 171 Whiting, which bore General Smith’s name. Although satisfied, at the time, that General Johnston was mis- taken in this opinion, General Smith, whose health was then in a very critical condition, complied with the re- quest of General Johnston, who was lying seriously wounded. J After General Johnston had been informed that Long- street’s division had crossed over to the Williamsburg road, he still had full faith in the ability of the 30,000 men, under Longstreet, to crush the enemy in the vicinity of Seven Pines. In view of this fact, the move- movements of Smith’s division under Whiting, which were directed by General Johnston in person, from soon after sunrise until a little before sunset that day, become easily intelligible. Until it was known that the action had fully commenced on the Williamsburg road General Johnston held the supporting division on the Nine Miles road, just within McLaws’s picket line. To have moved it farther to the front would have brought it immediately in contact with the enemy, and this would have begun the battle by placing first in action the only force available for holding in check reénforcements the enemy might send from the north bank of the river, In short, would have radically changed General Johnston’s plan. When the heavy musketry firing was heard, in the direction of Seven Pines, there was no longer any necessity for holding the supporting division within the Confederate picket line; and, General Johnston would, no doubt, have ordered this division forward, without waiting for Longstreet’s note calling for help. But the hurried advance of this division, into action, directed by General Johnston, in person, would hardly have been so urgently pressed, but for the character of Long- 172 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, street’s note, received at the moment the musketry firing was first heard. This note was taken as sufficient evidence that the time had come when the supporting division was needed, in close action, against the enemy in front of Longstreet. Before giving an account of the operations that fol- lowed on the Nine Miles road, attention is called to the following extracts from a letter written by General C. M. Wilcox, dated March 24th, 1875, addressed to Gen- eral G. W. Smith, giving a description of the movements of three brigades of Longstreet’s division on the 31st of May. He says: “I send you the map of Seven Pines. I cannot, as you requested, mark on the map where my command was on the night of the 30th; but, it was about three and a half miles from Richmond on the road that crossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge. We left camp before sun up, and halted near the forks of the Williamsburg and Charles City roads. Remained at the forks of the road until about 3 p.m., then moved down the Charles City road with my own, Pryor’s and Colston’s brigades of Longstreet’s division, and Armistead’s and Blanchard’s brigades of Huger’s division, We were or- dered to keep abreast of the musketry then raging fiercely on the Williamsburg road, but nearly a mile off apparently, though in reality a great deal farther in front of us. We moved more than a mile down the Charles City road, and were then ordered, by Longstreet, back to the forks of the road and to move down the Williamsburg road. We had nearly reached the forks when ordered back down the Charles City road, guided by a courier—and to cross over to the Williamsburg roail, more than a mile in rear of the fighting, where Long- street was personally. I was ordered forward, with my own brigade and Pryor’s, to report to General D, H, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 1738 Hill. Reachedhim after sunset. One of my regiments, a part of it, engaged, and Colonel Moore, 11th Ala., mortally wounded. At ten o’clock p.m. was ordered by Hill, conducted by one of R. H. Anderson’s staff, to moye to the front and relieve Anderson’s brigade. Found him near two houses, east of Seven Pines—marked on the map by two dots. One regiment, the 19th Miss., farther east, several hundred yards, on picket. Armi- stead, or a part of his brigade, was a little to the left of Pryor.” Had Longstreet’s division, 14,000, moved on the Nine Miles road at daylight—D. H. Hill’s, 11,000 at the same time on the Williamsburg road—and Huger’s 5000, on Hill’s right by the Charles City road—General Johns- ton’s plan would have been carried out; and his expec- tations in regard to the success of the attack, he had ordered to be made by the right wing of his army, would, in all probability, have been realized. But without dwelling longer, at this time, upon what was ins tended by General Johnston—or what might have hap- pened if his intentions had been carried into effect—an account of what occurred near, Fair Oaks, that day, will now be given, CHAPTER IV. Operations on the Nine Miles road—casualties in G. W. Smith’s division, under General Whiting—letter from one of General Whiting’s staff officers—General Smith meets the President and General Lee—the situation after dark. Arter General Johnston received General Longstreet’s note, at four o'clock P.M., it seemed clear that the ene- my in the vicinity of Seven Pines had already been a WD Ge a cA rae a A GNP a a TT cnet Vint lbs me 174 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, largely reénforced, For this reason the division on the Nine Miles road, held in observation until that time, was pushed rapidly in the direction of Seven Pines—to assist Longstreet—without further regard to reénforcements of the enemy from the north bank of the river, The three brigades at hand were moved at once—General Johnston directing the movement in person. General Smith was ordered to have Hampton’s and Hatton’s bri- gades brought up rapidly, from the position in which they had been placed by direction of General Johnston, and follow the other three brigades. In a few minutes, General Smith, having learned that Hampton and Hat- ton were in motion, joined Generals Johnston and Whit- ing in the advance, A little more than half a mile east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road the troops swept over the intrenched picket line, and supports, of the enemy, without a halt; passed through their camps, and the head of the column had about reached the point where the Nine Miles road crosses the Richmond and York River Railroad, at Fair Oaks station, when they were fired upon, from a point five or six hundred yards north of that station, At this time Generals Johnston and Whiting were in the advance. General Smith had halted, about half a mile back, in order to give instructions to General Hampton—the head of whose brigade had just reached the rear of Pettigrew’s. In the mean time General Johnston had ordered Hood’s brigade to bear to the right—and assist Longstreet in the direct attack. When General Hampton came up to the point at which General Smith had halted, the latter directed him to move his brigade by a wood road, lead- ing to the left and front; and, after gaining a little more than a brigade length, resume his line of march parallel CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 175: to the Nine Miles road, which would bring him into line of battle on Pettigrew’s left. Hatton was ordered to. continue his march on the Nine Miles road; this would place his brigade in reserve behind the line formed by Whiting’s, Pettigrew’s, and Hampton’s brigades. Upon reaching the edge of the dense wood, some three: hundred yards from the clump of trees at Fair Oaks sta- tion, General Smith saw the brigades of Whiting and Pettigrew moving into action north of Fair Oaks. For a few minutes it seemed probable that Hampton’s bri- gade in the dense wood—under orders just given by General Smith—would come in collision with the leading: ° brigades, now moving in a direction almost exactly oppo- site to that contemplated at the time the orders were given to Hampton. Information of the movement of the latter was at once communicated to the two leading brigade commanders and to General Whiting. Ina very short time the three brigade commanders understood each other s position: and preparations were made to attack the battery again. This attack was repulsed, and in a few minutes our troops, on the right, came streaming back in the direction of the clump of trees at Fair Oaks—two batteries seemed to open upon us. It was now clear that the movement upon Seven Pines, to assist Longstreet in his attack on that place, must be changed into resisting reénforcements of the enemy that had evidently come from the north bank of the Chickaho- miny. ‘This was the principal, original purpose in order- ing Smith’s division from the left wing of the army. Longstreet, from last accounts, was not more than equal to the task of beating the enemy already in his front. This new movement was against his left flank and rear; and must be stopped before it reached him. When our troops were beaten back, and the two bat- - 176 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. teries opened upon us, General Johnstou was at the grove near Fair Oaks, and General Smith was at the point from which he had first observed the two leading brigades moving into action. It was now near six o’clock P.M. General Johnston sent word to General Smith to. have . all the available troops brought up quickly. Hatton’s brigade had just arrived, and was in the open field north of the Nine Miles road, between the large woods and Fair Oaks. General Smith sent General J ohnston’s order to the nearest of Magruder’s brigade commanders direct. In the mean time.the memevho had been driven back on our right had reformed and were again fighting. The firing was redoubled. On receipt of General Johnston’s order to have the troops brought up, General Smith ordered Hatton’s brigade and Lightfoot’s regiment of Pettigrew’s brigade, which was in reserve in the oat field, to move into the wood north of Fair Oaks—take position in the front line—and drive the enemy back if possible. He went into action with these troops; and had not proceeded far in the wood before he met Gen- eral Hampton. The eneniy’s line of infantry was very close to that of Hampton, whose ranks had been much opened in order to prevent his left flank from being overlapped. Hatton’s brigade and Lightfoot’s regiment formed in the front line with the troops already engaged. General Hatton was killed just as his troops reached the extreme front; about the same time General Pettigrew was wounded (supposed mortally), and was taken pri- soner; and a few minutes later, General Hampton was wounded and disabled. Repeated attempts were made to force the enemy back; but, no perceptible change occurred in their line or ours, on that part of the field, after General Smith reached the extreme front. The conflict was close and reer era re Toe eile CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 177 deadly—a large proportion of field officers were killed or disabled. At dark we had failed to drive the enemy back—but we had stopped their movement upon the left flank and rear of Longstreet’s forces at Seven Pines. _ When it became almost too dark in the wood to dis- tinguish friend from foe—and the firing had virtually ceased—General Smith gave directions to have word passed along the line to fall back slowly and reform in the open field, about one hundred yards to the rear. He then rode back through this field to the Nine Miles road, po 5 two of Magruder’s brigades came up just before ne s ut too late to take any part in the action, Hood’s cane e—which had been sent direct to Longstreet’s dia ance by General Johnston—had been recalled—but P not reach Fair Oaks until the battle was ended, at ark, Stel following official report shows the number of apie wounded, and missing in each brigade of G. W. Bri 7 division, The division was commanded by rigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting. “ - ; Consolidated report of casualties in the lst Di vision, st Corps, May 31, 1862: ta wi Brigades. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. Pe rigade—Hood Perrine ee None 13 None 13 oe ke —Hampton.... ..... 45 984 None 829 4th t —Whi tin Pscppev eee 28 286 42 856 Ran —Pettionraw. <..00..<» 47 240 54 341 —Hatton............ 44 187 18 244 164 1010 109 = 1288 “ Respectfully submitted, ss z “ Joun T. Darsy, Acting Chief Surgeon, 1st Division, 1st Corps.” Hi # i sn At a CAARIIS TPT: lala Hale Ga ald . er eS a ee es pe cI AREA RSIS RE A na so eG NRY Mant. et AAA AY RAIA AE AN BaD AA 2 it inc A a PS iodine te mare “ ~aaaaaraan e.. Res ee eae ‘ = ees $a ‘ ee ° ssi tar Ss : saad —— - saree = * ae " - . 2 a ier] : ‘ 4 . 2 on b 3 7 : ae . be Pl 2 act 178 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. This division was 10,500 strong. The four brigades engaged numbered something over 8000. The Con- federates had no artillery in this action, because of the boggy nature of the ground, and the hurried character of the movement called for by General Longstreet’s note to General Johnston. An officer of General Whiting’s staff describes the movements of this division on the 31st of May.—The following extract is from a letter dated Milledgeville, Ga., February, 1868, addressed to General G. W. Smith by Colonel B. W. Frobel, of the Confederate States Engineers, who was a Major on General Whiting’s staff at the battle of Seven Pines: “ You ask me to give you my recollection of the part taken by your division in the battle of Seven Pines, and I do so with pleasure. On the night of the 30th of May we were encamped at Dill’s farm near the Meadow Bridge road. About mid- night an order was received from General Johnston di- recting us to prepare for action. General W. H. C. Whiting was at that time commanding your division, you bejag jw command of the left wing of the army. ‘About 3.30 a.m. I was sent by General Whiting down the Nine Miles road, to make myself familiar with it, that I might make no mistake in guiding Pettigrew’s brigade down that road to the position assigned them in the coming battle. Pettigrew moved out of camp “about 6 A.M. On reaching the Nine Miles road in the vicinity of General J ohnston’s headquarters, we found other portions of the division halted, as I afterwards learned, to let Longstreet’s troops pass. These troops were moving across the Nine Miles road to the right. So soon as they were out of the way we moved on, as rapidly as the condition of the roads would admit, to a position near the forks of the Nine Miles and New Bridge CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 179 ion. — we halted and formed line of battle, waiting isha ro to advance, which was to be heavy firing Willian 5 from Longstreet’s troops, who were on the are urg road. General J ohnston, as well as your- its ; fe Bei reat, the division, and both of you were “pelpids is time. After waiting several hours, near exis ie, was heard. Orders were at once given wad Beces ich we did, driving the enemy before us, ae ini its i a show of resistance, to the open field ded “wie me house where General Johnston was after- pahtorins ani Hood’s brigade was moving on the tstehe: a ine Miles road, and Whiting’s brigade on his re : and Pettigrew were still farther to Whiting = atton in reserve. Generals Johnston and ec, si ie immediately after Whiting’s alts atic e a hiting s brigade reached the road near iiig areas ip Tossing, I was sent to halt it. On return- = fer Sag ee this, I joined Generals Whiting and ee Waites 0 = riding toward the crossing. Gen- about takin g ee expostulating with General Johnston hilt. ee the division across the railroad—insisting Genicana ft were in force on our left flank and rear. ars son saan we replied, : Oh! General Whiting, you td aces sg At this time we reached the crossing, artillery bg the same ,moment the enemy opened an Whiting Pee the direction pointed out by General while "dh + yr actin hott up the road near the small Chigens Pit : hiting’s brigade was gone—it had been Paes ie ‘ to charge the batteries which were ition _ e brigade was repulsed, and in a few bods ka feed ae back through the little skirt of hen ece tof the Nine Miles road near the crossing. rome Ac y a part of the brigade in this charge. on rallied and re-formed these on the edge of saat 180 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. General Whiting sent an order to him to and if he thought they could Before he could do so some ‘Charge that battery 12: The k, but were repulsed the woods. reconnoitre the batteries, be taken, to try it again. one galloped up, shouting men moved forward ata double-quic as before, and driven back to the woods. In the mean time there. was heavy fighting going on to the left, Hatton’s, Hampton’s and Pettigrew’s brigades having engaged the enemy in that direction. At this moment matters had become so critical on that portion of the field that, although not commanding the division, you had gone to Hampton’s and Hatton’s brigades and taken a personal supervision over their immediate line of battle. Hampton was wounded, Pettigrew wounded and a prisoner, and Hatton killed, and his brigade much demoralized. At this time I was ordered to bring up Hood. I found him to the right of the railroad, a little d and_not a great to the left of the Williamsburg roa way from Seven Pines. By the time he reached the position indicated on the left of the railroad it Was nearly dark. I joined Genera the little oat-field where the battle began, an two hundred yard | Whiting and yourself in d about s from the place where General John- d. Whiting’s brigade still held the wood where they had made their first charge, and so did Hampton’s, Hatton’s, and Pettigrew’s brigades. bout reforming our lines.” You immediately set a General Smith meets the President, and sends for General. Longstreet.—W hen General Smith, at dark, ordered the line to withdraw a short distance and re-form in the open field, he had not heard that General John- ston was wounded, and he knew nothing of what had oc- curred in the right wing of the army later than General Longstreet’s note to General Johnston received at 4 P.M. ston had been wounde re as aaa ee afk aie ae J 5. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 181 Ju : or rN sie ee the wood General Smith was informed ed ves ry Ab igre had been disabled and taken sesion a ; and within three minutes thereafter he secsgeprel Wire in the oat-field near the Nine Miles part sti be ich he first saw the brigades of Whiting deut Si ew hee. into action. He there met Presi- a ot = General Lee. In answer to inquiries aa Ba a pipes General Smith explained fully ated sg 0 General Johnston’s intentions and ex- ke See 9 that morning, as already stated— . ‘en movement of Longstreet’s troops from sta . = road to the Williamsburg road—the nae elays—the note received by General John- m General Longstreet at 4 p.m. asking for help —the hurri ed movement made under General Johnston’s © im i Senden personal direction in aid of Longstreet—the the Gee of the enemy from the north bank of ot Tale Oe —— which resulted in the contest north Sithne “anne a eneral Johnston’s order for all of the Raa = within reach to be brought up rapidly Bier gty he contest that had occurred in the woods, iy tans of our line—and then asked if anything had “ase = the Nine Miles road from the 30,000 men eal haan, . re a the note réceived by Gen- othi Pes pe sabato had been heard, and the President ssidiear thee Pye Smith what were his plans. In standingly = _— told him that he could not under- something ce — what was best to be done until toheaate bay 3 nown of the condition of affairs in the oradin rat ‘ e army—and some data obtained in re- PRs actn ce and strength of the enemy on that tei, be ed it might be found expedient to with- er ground covering Richmond, or it might on 182 not—all depended on what had occurred in the right wing. The President suggested th enemy might withdraw during the night, which would give us the moral effect of a victory. General Smith replied that he would not withdraw without good rea- son—all would depend upon what had occurred on the Williamsburg road—nothing had happened on our side t necessary to retire. Soon after this, the Lee rode away. General Smith nt routes, to communicate with General Longstreet and request him to come ov the Nine Miles road for conference and instructions; and arranged with General Whiting the rectification of his lines upon the field—and the reorganization of the brigades which had lost their commanders and a large portion of field officers. A short time after dark, General J. f. B. Stuart, who had been, during the day, on the extreme right, with a portion of the cavalry, picketing the Charles City road and the White Oak Swamp, reached the field near Fair Oaks, and informed General Smith that the enemy had d, from the posi- not moved south of Williamsburg roa tion they had held at White Oak Bridge—that, our troops had carried the intrenched p Pines some time before sunset, and had moved beyond that point—but he did not know how far. He had several good guides with him, and he offered to go in pers ve him piloted to the headquarters on The gap between Whiting’s right and pelieved to be about a mile. _—When General Smith suc- The situation after dark. d the condition of affairs was not at, if we remained, the to make i President and General sent parties, by differe CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 183 what Gener. tetra. * ohnston had hoped for and expected at egirtee eek rey The sudden and, if posssible, crush- rata = e intended should be delivered early in Sia hore * ad been delayed until the afternoon—time bts os" owed for the enemy to bring up reénforce- ica a Pines from the direction of Bottom’s Clie saeet to bring on to the field, north of Fair enue. sire from the left bank of the Chicka- erar yt sa st the Confederates had succeeded finally Shak ak , a sag at Seven Pines, the contest on Seite: Me i eld only ceased at dark, and was in- Gave. Bake Me Fair Oaks the Confederate troops pteat “es ie ee: y the Nine Miles road to Longstreet’s dekrdls hy daz en Pines, had been interrupted in their Gas ak oo ea reénforcements of the enemy from the $a hoa s he Chickahominy. These reénforcements pen cate forward movement, but the Con- river in gine a . “ : ee back into or across the a f d ocay Gna and General Lee left the field its right de was placed along the Nine Miles road Pet Aston bog of Fair Oaks station; Whiting’s Wweba ée igs eft of Hood’s, extending into the large eb tals cate of the Nine Miles road, and the Geacial aes re within close supporting distance Wise Wiis’ s then returned to the headquarters on the nine o’olock — near the New Bridge fork. About Qeiicsat sad the following was received there from Wow Bridge Br ‘T am at the positian opposite the thanks tie am “i colonel in command informs me that srenlis ths Piva opposite this point, and that this throwing eat c ets reported that the enemy had been tudita-Sncee y objects in the river. As pontoon boat seen there, it is supposed they are making ; 184 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. The force to guard this point is two We have no force to fill up the gap be- regiments of Ker- If this position is as you are pontoon pridge. regiments. . - - tween this and your left except two shaw’s, amd Semmes’s brigade. .. - forced your command will be in great danger, aware.” About the same commanding the left wi time General A. P. Hill, temporarily ng of the army, reported that all had been quiet during the day near Meadow Bridges in front of his division; but the enemy’s batteries in the vicinity of Mechanicsville had been firing heavily with- out inflicting any material damage. About half-past eleven o’clock the following, dated 11 P.M., was received . from General McLaws: “ The positions of the troops are as follows: General Cobb, five regiments, from the Mechanicsville road to General Harvey’s place; General Kershaw from General Harvey’s to Baker's; Generals Griffith and Semmes from General Kershaw’s right to New Bridge, and on the line down New Bridge road and across the country to connect with the railroad. Notice has been received that General Cobb’s brigade is to be relieved from Mechanicsville and sent towards the right—the arrangement of the troops will be rela- tively the same, put more concentrated.” A short time before midnight General Smith received a note from General Stuart stating that, at half-past ten o'clock p.m, he had failed to find General Longstreet. At midnight General Smith had heard nothing from General Longstreet. : General Whiting’s division, in front of the enemy, was supported by a very thin line on the left, and on its right there was a gap—supposed to be about a mile— between Whiting’s troops and the right wing of the army, under Longstreet, east of Seven Pines, At forty CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 185 ™ Rite papa ae General Smith wrote to General ay aad ae position of his command at dark, Eat, paisa men, and requesting Iris views in re- mee I ions to be undertaken in his front that i Raters Ae brig se Smith supposed that all the sata ae right wing of the army bad been closely iy eee . sat early in the afternoon until dark; he dea heck - y reénforcements of the enemy from the he es 0 ore Chickahominy had come over the che ai tage ir afternoon—had no reason to believe patent ee pee become impassable—therefore, Siem ee: a itional reénforcements might arrive g the night, and did not know at what point in our rear the ene . ae enemy might cross the very slightly-guarded CHAPTER V. General Mindiy’ 1 an 3 account of Federal operations on the 31st of May spondence between Generals Johnston and Smith. Grn scanhageaceeae says: * “There were no troops in oilveaiae Wags — s left, and his line on that flank only Hal teaare wo hundred yards beyond the main road. Deetines te Naan but half of his division, moved PS e _ and occupied the ground to Casey’s MES tekizad doe nothing to prevent him—he would wie miter e flank and rear of the Union line, just iar as expected to strike it after a wide de- wait for Huger six hours before commencing #« “Th atten ‘ 1e Battle of Fair Oaks,” by General G. W. Mindil, p. 3. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 186 ithhold two strong divisions the attack, and then to w inly not great generalship. for four hours more, was certa Such a movement by Longstreet as we have just de- scribed would in itself have been decisive. .. . The troops (Casey’s division) were ordered under arms, the artillery was brought i osition, and a line of battle was formed about one third of a mile in front of the in- trenchments. At about half-past one o’clock this line met Hill’s fierce onset, and though resisting gallantly, was soon obliged to retire. .. . At the intrenchments the fighting was heavy and severe, but by dint of i bers in front and in flank (Rain’s brigade having turned the redoubt) Casey was compelled to re- linquish his works. So sudden and unexpected was the flank movement of the Confederates on the left, that the Union troops retired rapidly, and in some confusion. The greater part of Casey’s division did not again be- come engaged, but retired to ‘the third line of defence,’ where they were re-formed and supplied with ammuni- tion. .. - But Keyes did have in position along the sion of General Couch, about Nine Miles road the divi nant of Naglee’s prigade, 7000 strong, the gallant rem: some 1200 more, and four or five batteries of artillery. Against this force, partly protected b line of low rifle-pits, Fiill’s troops, now re reénforced by Longstreet’s brig were directed to advance. .-- Confederates were expose well as to a most destruc ney’s troops, that Heintzelma Berry’s brigade, under the intrepid K a gale through the woods on th the audacious advance soon drove slashing in their front, and occupying y an abattis and a formed and ade, under Anderson, In their advance the d to a galling fire in front, as tive fire in flank, from Kear- n had pushed forward. earney, swept like e left of the road, and in the foe out of the the felled timber CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 187 thems Gao seer commanded with their rifles the left of ace oned camps. In this advanced but well- igh ae minnie Kearney changed his front to the pai Pane ordered a terrible fire of musketry print rr ‘= of the Confederate column pushing a hae ~ Villiamsburg road. Jameson’s. brigade daa e a division now reached the field... One tik anes eintzelman’s (corps) had now been brought fighting — and its determined attack and splendid aa Berssiss oe to renewed efforts the brave but ici ne ed men of Couch’s line. . . . The annoy- Pic pa Bind cers. troops on the Confederate ‘ks soda aused the latter to eross to the north of resting is ns eto add their weight to the already too mn engaged with Couch. ... This over- whelmi es red advance on Couch’s right could not be re- > arapid change of front to the rear on the left battali a eee Dagger a new oblique line of battle, fac- a a , against the advance of the Southern side hee er Couch, a few moments previous to teliees iak ag ra had passed over to the railroad athiall debe a. three of his regiments to reénforce the Seidl soa ste a of Brady’s battery of four guns. hotly ame rst Pennsylvania regiment of infants, EE ae the station with Smith’s okiaieues bed eee PR » by pushing across the Nine Mile voi, lisa ears sans with his battery and four sdeiuida Delowk ‘sad ~ of his division. . . . It was now five seh a ee noeeaend was still holding the advance posi- Ateaiecel ae left, while the brigades of Devens stubbornly nee ; and Naglee, near Seven Pines wii wire irene a every foot of ground. . . Bir- a eae which had halted on the railroad, owin nfortunate conflict in orders for which a 188 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, was not responsible—had not fired a shot—was now again directed to advance, and Birney had hardly passed half a mile to the front when his skirmishers were fired upon from a piece of woods running south from the railroad and skirting the western front of Mrs. E, Allen’s farm. . . . And he was just in time, after a bloody en- counter, to repulse a formidable flank movement then in progress against Keyes’s right. The Confederates, after crossing the Nine Miles road, had advanced “their left column along a farm road running parallel with and about equidistant to the railroad and Williamsburg road, and it was on this small road, near the south-west corner of the Allen field, that Birney struck their head of column and caused them to desist from their efforts in that direction. . . . Darkness was rapidly approaching, and Longstreet and Hill now redoubled their efforts to drive from the shelter of the wood, between the farm road just referred to and the Williamsburg road, and east of the Nine Miles road, the Union troops that had so gallantly disputed its possession. . . . Kearney, with Berry’s brigade, held his position far to the front and on the extreme left, but the Confederate advance be- yond the Seven Pines had cut him off from the rest of his troops. . . . Facing the Thirty-seventh New York regiment to the rear, under cover of their fire, he quickly withdrew his intercepted regiments, passing over awood . road, via Anderson’s Mill, into the White Oak Swamp, and from there, by a short detour, regaining the Williamsburg road. By this bold mancuvre he not only saved his regiments, but reached the intrenched line in time to aid in organizing its defence, and in again pushing forward some of his gallant men to the aid of the main line, still contesting every inch of ground three fourths of a mile in front. The last noo ees nedgene st CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 189 attack of the enemy was made in deep masses just be- fore dark, and met with a complete repulse.” In reference to the movements of General Sumner’s column and that portion of General Couch’s division which was cut off and thrown back north of the rail- road, General Mindil says:*“ About four o’clock in the afternoon of May 31st while Longstyeet and Hill, with their divisions, were still struggling in vain to force the ose in Couch’s front, the Confederate chieftain, ceming it idle to keep General Smith longer out of action for a contingency so remote as the coming of re- €nforcements from the Federal right,’ gave orders for the troops massed on the Nine Mile road to move for- ward into battle. The two advance brigades of Law ees and Pettigrew were gallantly met by the St Sennsylvania regiment and Brady’s battery, after- ward reénforced by three additional regiments under General Couch in person. Johnston, believing that this Small force of Union troops was already attacked by numbers sufficiently strong to insure their defeat, passed to the south of the railroad with Hood’s brigade, and ordered it into line on Longstreet’s left. . . . As early 48 two o’clock p.m. General Heintzelman had sent to ohne McClellan and Sumner for aid. And it was in FM A to his repeated calls that Sumner put his di- arte . a march, arriving with Sedgwick’s near the field nn e at + critical time, when the new flank ee a of mes s column was dangerously threat- Gen uf meron eae sright. The defeated forces under Hotes Couch, heretofore alluded to as being cut off en e eens of his command, after gallantly con- ae Pied t Le Confederates’ overwhelming advance, had W'y retired, in good order, in the direction of the Chick . : Chickahominy bridges, where aid, if any, could be ex- % vs The Battle of Fair Oaks,” by General G@. W. Mindil, p. 8, & & 190 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. pected. To this force were joined the advancing regi- ments under Sedgwick and a new forward movement commenced. The Confederates that had been pushing Couch were now pressed back in turn; and General Johnston, seeing this new reénforcement suddenly ap- pear on the field, ordered Smith to desist from his advance to the south of the railroad, and to change front against the line of blue now rapidly advancing with all the enthusiasm of success. Smith’s five brigades were ordered into action, and the division of General Ma- gruder was brought up to the support.. Charge after charge, with the most reckless daring, was made against the Union line, but each in turn was disastrously re- pulsed. Kirby’s battery of regulars, formerly Ma- gruder’s, succeeded in crossing with the infantry... . . Three separate charges were made on the guns, but Kir- by fired them with a rapidity never surpassed, and the deadly volleys of grape and canister, at short range, poured into the enemy’s ranks, caused him to stagger, reel, then fall back, while the second and third lines of the infantry, firing over the first, cut them down by hundreds. It was Sumner’s turn to charge... . He hurled five regiments with fixed bayonets against the foe. The attack was irresistible; the enemy’s line was broken and forced in disorder from the field to the dark belt of woods beyond. This heroic charge decided the battle on that flank, and darkness being near all firing soon ceased, General Sumner remaining in possession of the field he had so gallantly won. During the progress of the fighting we have just described, General Heint- zelman was by no meansidle. Feeling certain, between six and seven o’clock, that he had checked the enemy in his own front, and no longer fearing for his immediate right, he again ordered Birney forward in the direction CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 191 of the heavy and continuous firing beyond the railroad. Birney met with but slight opposition in his advance, captured some two hundred prisoners, among them Colonel Bratton of the 6th South Carolina, and finally reached the open field (Hycr’s) to Sumner’s left rear; the 7th Massachusetts regiment being sent by Sumner to complete the connection. The battle of the day was Over. . . . But seven pieces of artillery had reached the field (including Brady’s); Richardson’s division and the batteries of the corps not joining Sumner until after the action.” It is thus seen that, a short time before dark, the Confederate right wing, thirty: thousand men, under General Longstreet, had been so thoroughly checked, that General Heintzelman ordered Birney’s brigade to move in the direction of the heavy and continuous firing, north of Fair Oaks station, where Sedgwick’s division and four or five regiments from Couch’s di- Vision, with seven pieces of artillery, well posted, were still being closely pressed by four brigades of the di- Vision under General Whiting—Hood’s brigade of that division having been previously sent, by General John- Ston, direct to Longstreet’s assistance. In other words, the Confederate supporting force, on the Nine Miles Toad, after sending one brigade direct to Longstreet’s assistance, had not only held at bay the Federal reén- forcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy ~ the four (or more) regiments, and a battery cut off es Couch’s division; but pressed them so hard that S Pi bar creases a short time before dark, detached aoe : from the forces that had thoroughly checked ongstreet’s advance and ordered it to move in the dj ; : ‘ ae direction of the heavy and continued firing north of air Oaks station. Te 192 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. Extracts from Correspondence between Generals John- ston and Smith.On the 19th of December, 1867, Gen- eral J. E. Johnston wrote to General G. W. Smith, saying: “The accounts of Federal officers of our opera- tions in 1862 have revived an intention that I formed at the close of the war to make a military report. To assist me in doing so I ask your evidence on two points in which you are no less interested than myself.” The first point referred to by General Johnston was the con- ference held at Richmond, in April. The second was in reference to Seven Pines. In regard to the latter ” General Johnston says: “General Sumner, in his testi- mony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in his narrative, describes the opening of the battle and its continuance for a short time—and then says that five or six regiments which he had on the left of the artillery, charged over a broken fence and routed the rebels—and ended the battle for that day, the 31st. I can’t contradict him with effect without official evi- dence. My recollection is very distinct of the impres- sion that the action was terminated by night, and that you bivouacked on the ground.” On the 23d of the same month General Smith replied, giving in substance what had occurred on the Confed- erate left that afternoon, and added, “There is a good deal yet to be told before the world will understand what occurred at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. Have you ever seen the ‘History of the Army of the Potomac’ (Federal), by Swinton? He attributes to my slowness— or worse—the failure of your plans; and leaves the im- pression that his narrative of events on the Confederate side was obtained from yourself and General Long- street. When you requested me to omit certain facts, stated in my hurried official report to you, because, in 193 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. your opinion, they did not concern me or my command, T acceded to the earnest request of a friend, and direct- ed the paragraphs indicated, in pencil, by you, to be omitted. And ‘History’ now says (see Swinton’s ‘ Army of the Potomac,’ p. 135), ‘ Meantime, though the divisions of Longstreet and Hill had thus for three hours been vigorously pushing forward on the Williamsburg road, the column of G. W. Smith, to which had been intrusted the important flanking operation already indicated in Johnston’s original plan, had not yet moved.’? And a 800d deal more of the same sort of History’ about the battle of Seven Pines. . . . Ihave always regretted that the serious attack of illness which I suffered from on the 2d af June (the day after Lee relieved me—and from which I have never fully recovered) prevented my re- quiring all subordinates to make full reports to me of What transpired during the eighteen hours I commanded On that battle-field. ... I am ‘interested,’ and I want all the facts known.” On the 16th of January, 1868, General Johnston re- plied to the above, saying, “I thank you for your ex- Planation of the incident in the battle of Fair Oaks, which is so magnified by General Sumner and Mr, Swinton, I regard the passage of Mr. Swinton’s book, Which you quote, and the next passage, as representing me (and truly) as fixing the time when your troops were put in motion. I think that examination of the two Passages in connection will bring you to the same con- clusion,” General Smith wrote in reply to this, on the 19th of anuary, 1868, saying, “'The question in reference to Swinton’s account of the battle of Seven Pines, quoted im my letter of the 23d ult., is not as to whether you but my troops in motion at a given time, but in refer- 194 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. ence to the slowness of G. W. Smith in carrying out your ‘ original plan,’ ” General Johnston replied to this on the 21st of Jan- uary, but confined his remarks exclusively to the first of the two points referred to in his letter of the 19th of December. He made no allusion to ‘his original plan ’— Swinton’s history—or the Battle of Seven Pines, Colonel Frobel in his letter addressed to General Smith, already quoted from, says: “ You have called my Sorina to the account given by Mr. Swinton—in his History of the Army of the Potomac’—of this battle. Mr. Swinton is surely greatly mistaken. The division was under the immediate command of General Whiting, and he directly under General J ohnston, who was with the division the whole day until he was wounded late in the afternoon. I am satisfied that no blame can attach to General Whiting for not being on the field sooner. Mr. Swinton must also be mistaken about the slowness of that division frustrating an important flank movement indicated in ‘ Johnston’s original plan.’ I never heard of the movement until I saw it mentioned in Mr. Swin- ton’s book, and certainly no mention was made of it in any battle order sent to our headquarters.” ’ CHAPTER VI. President Davis's description of operations on the 81st of May. Author's comments. Tue official position held at the time by Mr. Davis his early education, service in the regular army of the United States and in the volunteers during the Mexican War, his experience in the civil service of the govern- Kx- + eee Liew pare San ah et a 2 Tia A eS CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 195 ment of the United States, as Secretary of War, and in both houses of Congress—all tend to give weight to his opinions. As President of the Confederate States he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, had access to all official information, and power to compel a complete exhibit of facts. In view of his experience, opportunities, and declared intent- ions, it would seem reasonable to suppose that his state- ments would be strictly correct. The following quotations are from his account of this battle: * “In the forenoon of the 31st of May, riding out on the New Bridge road, I heard firing in the direction of Seven. Pines. As I drew nearer, I saw General Whiting, with part of General Smith’s division, file into the road in front of me; at the same time, I saw General Johnston ride across the field from a house before which General Lee’s horse was standing. I turned down to the house and asked General Lee what the musketry firing meant. He replied by asking whether I had heard it, and was answered in the aftirm-, ative; he said he had been of that impression himself, but General Johnston had assured him it could be nothing more than an artillery duel. It is scarcely necessary to add that neither of us had been advised of a design to attack the enemy that day. We then walked out to the rear of the house to listen, and were Satisfied that an action, or at least a severe skirmish, must be going on. General Johnston states in his re- port that the condition of the air was peculiarly un- favorable to the transmission of sound. . . . General Lee and myself then rode to the field of battle, which * “Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” by Jeffer- 8on Davis, Vol, IL. p, 122, a eR SET ae TOES aS SS UR PER vee | 1} | ee EME ST IEE $$ a A ie a SERIES Seas a ca a A as a 196 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. may be briefly described as follows: the Chickahominy. flowing in front, is a deep, sluggish, and narrow ciate bordered by marshes and covered with tangled woah The line of battle extended along the Nine Mile road; across the York River Railroad and Williamsburg stage road. The enemy had constructed redoubts, with long lines of rifle-pits covered by abattis, from below Bot- tom’s Bridge to within less than two miles of New Bridge, and had constructed bridges to connect his forces on the north and south sides of the Chicka- hominy. The left of his forces on the south side was thrown forward from the river, the right was on its bank, and covered by its slope... . Our main force was on the right flank of our position, extending on both sides of the Williamsburg road, near to its inter- section with the Nine Mile road. This wing consisted of Hill’s, Huger’s, and Longstreet’s divisions, with light batteries, and a small force of cavalry. The division of General G. W. Smith, less Hood’s brigade, ordered to the right, formed the left wing, and its position was on the Nine Mile road, There were small iracts of cleared land, but most of the ground was wooded, and much of it so covered with water as to seriously em- “haar the Movement of the troops. When General m1 and J, riding down the Nine Mile road, reached the eft of our line, we found the troops hotly engaged. Our men had driven the enemy from his advanced ee ets and he had fallen back behind an open eld, to the bank of the river, where, in a dense wood, ‘sis oan an infantry line, with artillery in position. Pie er our arrival, General Johnston, who had gone er to the right, where the conflict was expected, and whither reénforcement from the left was marching, * was brought back severely wounded, and, as soon as an CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 197 ambulance could be obtained, was moved from the field. ‘Our troops on the left made vigorous assaults under most disadvantageous circumstances. They made sev- eral gallant attempts to carry the enemy’s position, but were each time repulsed with heavy loss. After a personal reconnaissance on the left of the open in our front, I sent one, then another, and another courier to General Magruder, directing him to send a force down by the wooded path, just under the bluff, to attack the enemy in flank and reverse. Impatient of delay, I had started to see General Magruder, when I met the third courier, who said he had not found General Magruder, but had delivered the message to Brigadier-General Griffith who was moving by the path designated, to make the attack. On returning to the field, I found that the attack in front had ceased; it was, therefore, too late for a single brigade to effect anything against the large force of the enemy, and messengers were sent through the wood to direct General Griffitn to go back. The heavy rain during the night of the 30th had swollen the Chicka- hominy; it was rising when the battle of Seven Pines was fought, but had not reached such height as to pre- vent the enemy from using his bridges: consequently, General Sumner, during the engagement, brought over his corps asareénforcement. He wason the north side of the river, had built two bridges to connect with the south side, and, though their coverings were loosened by the upward pressure of the rising water, they were not yet quite impassable. With the true instinet of the soldier to march upon fire, when the sound of the battle reached him, he formed his corps and stood under arms wait- ing for an order to advance. He came too soon for us, *and, but for his forethought and promptitude, he would have arrived too late for his friends. It may be granted * at Ih iH : 198 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. that his presence saved the left wing of the Federal Army from defeat. As we had permitted the enemy to , fortify before our attack, it would have been. better to have waited another day, until the bridges should have been rendered impassable by the rise of the river. . Gen- eral Lee, at night-fall, gave instructions to General Smith, the senior officer on that part of the battle-field, and left with me to return to Richmond, Thus far I have only attempted to describe events on the extreme left of the battle-field, being that part of which I had personal observation; but the larger force and conse- quently the more serious conflict were upon the right of the line, To these I will now refer. Our force there consisted of the divisions of Major-Generals D. H. Hill, Huger, and Longstreet, the latter in chief command, In his report first published in the ‘Southern Historical peciety Papers,’ Vol. III, pp. 277, 278, he writes: Agreeably to verbal instructions from the commanding General, the division of Major-General D, H. Hill was, on the morning of the 31st ult., formed at an early hour or the Williamsburg road, as the column of attack upon the enemy’s front on that road. . . . The division of Major-General Huger was intended to make astrong flank movement around the left of the enemy’s position and attack him in rear of that flank. . . . After waiting some six hours for these troops to get into position, I determined to move foraard without regard to them, and gave orders to that effect to Major-General D. H, Hill. The forward movement began about two o’clock, and our skirmishers soon became engaged with those of the enemy. The entire division of General Hill became engaged about three o’clock, and drove the enemy speedily back, gaining possession of his abattis and part of his intrenched camp: General Rodes, by a movement . aes cu renee nic a cA CONFEDERATE WAR .PAPERS. 199 to the right, driving in the enemy’s left. The only: re- énforcements on the field in hand were my own brigades, of ‘which Anderson’s; Wilcox’s, and Kemper’s were put in by the front on the Williamsburg road, and Colston’s and Pryor’s by my right flank. At the same time the decided and gallant attack made by the other brigades gained entire possession of the enemy’s position, with his artillery, camp equipage, etc. Anderson’s brigade, under Colonel Jenkins, pressing forward rapidly, con- tinued to drive the enemy until night-fall. ... The conduct of the attack was left entirely to Major-General Hill. The entire success of the affair is sufficient evi- dence of his ability, courage, and skill.’ This tribute to General Hill was no more than has been awarded to him by others who knew of his services on that day, and was in keeping with the determined courage, vigilance, and daring exhibited by him on other fields.” The Ex-President exonerates General Huger, and proceeds to say:* “From the final report of General Longstreet aiready cited, it appears that he was ordered to attack on the morning of the 31st, and he explains why it was postponed for six hours; then he states that it was commenced by the division of General D. H. Hill, which drove the enemy steadily back, pressing for- ward until night-fall. The movement of Rodes’ brigade on the right flank is credited with having contributed much to the dislodgment of the enemy from their abattis and first intrenchments. As just stated, Gen- eral Longstreet reports a delay of some six hours in making this attack because he was waiting for General Huger, and then made it successfully with Hill’s divi- *« The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II. p. 127 hie aie al ‘. EOI 4 AN A AIP a EE Da Pe be ee ~ 200 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. slon and some brigades of his own. These questions must naturally arise in the mind of the reader: Why did not our troops on the left, during this long delay. 48 well as during the period occupied by Hill’s assanlt, co-operate in the attack? and why, the battle having been preconceived, were they so far removed as not to hear the first guns? The officers of the Federal army when called before a committee of their Congress to ine quire into the conduct of the war, have, by their testi- mony, made it quite plain that the divided condition of their troops and the length of time required for their concentration, after the battle commenced, rendered it practicable for our forces, if united, as taking the initi- re they well might have been, to have crushed or put to flight first Keyes’s and then Heintzelman’s corps be- fore Sumner crossed the Chickahominy, between five and 81x o’clock in the evening.” Comments.—It was after four o’clock in the afternoon and not in the forenoon, when General Johnston wide from the house Mr. Davis refers to. At that time heavy and continuous musketry firing had been distinctly heard, and General Johnston had received General Long- street’s note calling for help. Mr. Davis speaks as if the firing and the movement of the troops under Whiting —the conversation he had with General Lee—and his going to the rear of the house to listen—all occurred in the Jorenoon, This extreme inaccuracy is inexcusable In an account of a battle. But this is of little importance compared with the gross errors contained in his description of the battle- field. The Chickahominy is about two miles from the right of the Federal position; which was on the Rich- mond and York River Railroad, near Fair Oaks, The Chickahominy flowed in rear of their troops on the wee nat mc a la CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 201 Richmond side of the river, and not “in front.” He is equally in error in stating that “the enemy had con- structed redoubts with long lines of rifle-pits covered by abattis, from below Bottom’s Bridge to within less than two miles of New Bridge.” They had constructed a téte-de-pont at White Oak Bridge; another at Bottom’s Bridge; a strong line of works at right angles to the Williamsburg road, about a mile and a half east of Seven Pines; and two lines of rifle-pits with abattis, from the Williamsburg road, in the vicinity of Seven Pines, to the railroad near Fair Oaks station, At a point half a mile west of Seven Pines, just south of the Williamsburg road, there was a small, unfinished, pentangular redoubt; and across the Nine Miles road, about a mile in advance of Fair Oaks station, the Federals had a line of rifle-pits Supporting their pickets. Mr. Davis says: “The division of General G. W. Smith, less Hood’s brigade ordered to the right, formed the left wing of the Confederate forces.” But, he knew, from General Smith, at dark on the 31st, that this divi- sion, under Whiting, had been ordered from the left wing of the army to the point designated on the Nine Miles road, just within the Confederate picket lines, to act as a supporting force; and was not ordered, or ex- pected to attack unless the right wing failed to over- power the Federal corps, isolated at Seven Pines; or, unless the Federals sent reénforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy. Mr. Davis says the enemy on the Nine Miles road “had fallen back behind an open field to the bank of the river,” when he and General Lee reached the left of our line. The position of the enemy north of Fair Oaks was in fact nearly two miles from the river. Before General Johnston was wounded he had sent instructions a EAE GAY AE. a “Sie a ut a AROS Ca pa pl a a a a Ae i CART CN Na aE CaN RN II ) | : 202 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. to General Smith directing that all the available troops should be brought up as rapidly as possible. General Johnston’s order was at once transmitted to the com- manders of the only two brigades within reach that had not already been brought up, and the action north of Fair Oaks continued until dark. It is not considered necessary to comment upon the extraordinary efforts President Davis says he made to achieve victory, with a single brigade, by taking personal command on the field —or to say anything about the reasons he assigns for the failure of his special effort. When the order was given, in the afternoon of the 30th, for the right wing of the Confederate army to at- tack the enemy at Seven Pines, it had not commenced to rain. At that time the cover in front of the lines of the enemy in the vicinity of Seven Pines was unfinished Bieiyeto = 5 $ division was near Bottom’s Bridge—Hook- er’s at White Oak Bridge—and both of these divisions had orders to march, on the morning of the 31st, to sup- port the Fourth Corps at Seven Pines.* “The crossings of the Chickahominy at the Upper Trestle and New Bridges were favorable for artillery, cavalry, and infan- try on the morning of June 1st, and the railroad bridge remained intact during the storm and freshet.” In view of these facts it is not necessary to comment on Mr. Davis’s assertion that, “as we had permitted the enemy to for- tify before our attack, it would have been better to have ' waited another day.” In describing what occurred on the Williamsburg road, Mr. Davis, after quoting General Longstreet’s re- port, showing that the forward movement began about 2 p.m., and the entire division of D. H. Hill became en- * “The Battle of Fair Oaks,” by General G, W, Mindil, PTE We ELS ETN TRE RI Tt ET CONG ET CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 203 gaged about 3 p.m., and drove the enemy steadily back, asks: “Why did not our troops on the left during this long delay, as-well as during the period occupied by Hill’s assault, co-operate in the attack? and why, the battle having been preconceived, were they so far re- moved as not to hear the first guns?” Mr. Davis knew from General Smith, at dark on the 31st, that at sunrise General Johnston had intended, and expected, that Longstreet’s division would be moved promptly into action by the Nine Miles road—D. H. Hill’s by the Wil- liamsburg road, and Huger’s on Hill’s right—as early as possible in the morning. General Johnston believed that the thirty thousand men in the right wing of his army, under Longstreet, would be able to crush the enemy at Seven Pines. But, to guard against contin- gencies, as previously stated, he ordered ten thousand men from the left wing of his army to move to the right, and take position just within the Confederate picket line; and he held them there as a supporting force. To have moved them any farther to the front, before know- ing that the right was in close action and needed help, would have brought the supporting force at once in contact with the enemy, changed Johnston’s plan en- tirely, and would have left no force to oppose reénforce- ments the enemy might send from the north bank of the river. Hill’s division became engaged at 3 p.m.—at 4 p.m. General Johnston received General Longstreet’s note calling urgently for immediate help—the support- ing division was at once moved very hurriedly. forward to Longstreet’s aid. All this Mr. Davis knew; but, he does not ask why Longstreet’s division was transferred from the Nine Miles road to the Williamsburg road, or why the fighting on the latter road was left almost exclusively to Hill’s division. 8 RR NR Moe 904 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. General Johnston did not need the testimony of Fed- eral officers to convince him that the force of the enemy isolated at Seven Pines could be crushed or put to flight early in the morning of the 31st, before it could be re- énforced. He assigned this task to the right wing of his army. If the whole of this wing had been brought into action, as he intended, early in the morning, or even after 3 p.m., when Longstreet’s division had been placed on the Williamsburg road, there would have been no pretext for asking why the supporting force was not moved forward sooner, or why it was not held nearer before the action commenced. In commenting on the ex-President’s account of the battle of the 31st of May it is only necessary to add: he- is entirely in error when he asserts that “General Lee at night-fall gave instructions to General Smith, the senior officer on that part of the field.” General Smith was at that time in command of the army, General Lee gave him no instructions or suggestions. CHAPTER VIL Operations on the 1st of June. General Longstreet directed to renew the fighting—notes calling for help—five thousand men sent to him from the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs— General Lee assigned to the command of the army—position held by Smith’s division under Whiting ten days after the battle. One of the parties sent by General Smith to com- municate with General Longstreet, succeeded in finding him about midnight. Soon after General Smith’s note of 12.40 a.m. was written, General Longstreet, without Re ie em Tigh aan PTA DD eae a Te OY we OE EES suman eno NE A a PC ni. a ca iA a PM Tn NU CA LS SMS AMA Pt tied sbi wens Abe CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 205 having received it, arrived at General Smith’s head- quarters. He reported that only a portion of his own division had been seriously engaged in close action, and that Huger’s division had scarcely been engaged at all; the principal fighting had been done by D. H. Hill’s di- Vision. The enemy’s works at Seven Pines had been car- ried late in the afternoon—their troops had been pressed back about a mile beyond that point—and the fighting had continued until dark. General Smith then directed General Longstreet to Send one brigade of Huger’s division to support the troops on the Nine Miles road—and renew the fighting with the remainder of the right wing as early as possible after daylight—directing his efforts north, instead of any farther east—pivoting this movement on Whiting’s position. General Longstreet was assured that when a determined attack by the right wing was well developed, it should be favored by a strong demonstration—and, if necessary, by a real attack—made. by the division under Whiting and other troops brought up by the Nine Miles road. After General Longstreet left General Smith’s head- quarters to carry out these instructions, the latter wrote to General Lee telling him what had been determined upon, and what orders had been given. The following 1s General Lee’s reply: ‘* RICHMOND, Ist June, 1862. 5 A.M. “* General: “Your letter of this morning just received. Ripley will be ordered and such forces from General Holmes as can be got up will be sent. Your movements are judi- cious and determination to strike the enemy right. Try and ascertain his position and how he can best be hit. ish ane eal ace FA RPT PEON MEE OT 206 “CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. I will send such Engineers as I can raise. But with Stevens, Whiting, Alexander, etc., what can I give you like them. You are right in calling upon me for what you want. I wish I could do more. It will be a glori- ous thing if you can gain a complete victory. Our suc- cess on the whole yesterday was good, but not complete. “Truly, R. E. Lex, General. “Genl. G. W. Smrra, Comdg. Army of N. Va.” Whiting, Magruder, and A., P. Hill were notified of the contemplated movements; and some changes of troops were ordered to be made at once. Magruder was directed to place Cobb’s brigade and Kershaw’s nearer to New Bridge, and hold them in readiness to move at the shortest notice to replace the troops at that point and along that road so the latter could promptly reénforce Whiting. A. P. Hill was directed to hold his division ready to march, leaving a small guard at Mea- dow Bridges. D. R. Jones was directed to look after the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff, from Meadow Bridges to the vicinity of New Bridge, in case the con- templated movement of A. P. Hill’s and Magruder’s troops was carried into effect. Soon after daylight brisk firing commenced some distance to the right and front of Whiting. In a short time it ceased. About six o’clock a.m. Whiting wrote: “ They are advancing a battery of six pieces be- yond the wheat-field of yesterday evening’s fight—in front of where we stood last night. Hood is back in the woods extending to the railroad ina swamp. My brigade partly in those woods and partly in the large woods to the left of the field. . . It is very difficult to make an effective disposition—that is, so the troops can be handled well—and you know that four of my bri- NPE ATPL ES a ass mi a sl SS he a ATA ec i Et A he CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 207 gades are without their commanders.” At half-past six o'clock a.m, Whiting reported: “We will have to at- tack the position we tested last night, and that I own I don’t like. Besides, it. is just what the enemy wants. Heavy firing in advance of us and on the right.” It now seemed that the right wing, under Long- street, was beginning the movement ordered. In reply to General Whiting’s two notes General Smith wrote: “T fully appreciate your want of brigade commanders, and, if your force is increased by fresh troops, will have to send with them an officer of rank who will relieve you of a portion of your onerous duties.” Major-Gen- eral McLaws was the “officer of rank” referred to. General Smith intended, as soon as Longstreet’s attack was fully developed, to place the brigades of Griffith and Semmes in line with Whiting’s and Hood’s at Fair Oaks—put McLaws in command of these four brigades —place Hampton’s, Hatton’s, and Pettigrew’s brigades in second line, take immediate command of them—and control, in person, the movements of both lines until A. P. Hill could reach the field. About this time, Major Jasper Whiting, who was watching the enemy on the north bank of the Chicka- hominy, reported the movement of troops and batteries passing down that bank. Soon after this General Whiting wrote: “Tam going to try a diversion for Longstreet, and have found as reported, a position for artillery. The enemy are in full view and in heavy masses. . . . I have ordered up Lee with four pieces. The muskeiry firing in advance is tremendous.” On the far side of the gap, previously referred to, between Whiting’s right and Longstreet’s left, our troops were falling back. The firing had been, at times, quite heavy; but, there was nothing obseryed, from the Nine Miles road, Sige 208 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. indicating that any large portion of the right wing had begun, in earnest, the movement in which Whiting was ordered to co-operate, The first information from General Longstreet was received about half-past eight a.m; his note was dated eight o’clock. He said: “Major: Yours of six received. I have ordered a brigade of General Huger’s, as agreed upon, to the support of General Whiting. Please send a guide for it.” About nine a.m. General Whiting re- ported: “The enemy are in very heavy force and bring- ing up artillery. If I don’t receive an answer in half an hour I shall commence withdrawing my force. The position is bad—a line extended, and thin, and weak, over a mile or two in length, with no means of inter- communication,” A few minutes later, Whiting wrote: “Some of Griffith’s regiments might be sent down to the railroad in rear of the position oceupied by Hood, which, with a heavy enemy’s battery directly in his rear, has become untenable.” Major Jasper Whiting’s reports continued to indi- cate some movement of the enemy, on the north bank, down the river. On our side they were penetrating the gap between Longstreet and Whiting. The latter was ordered to throw back his right, and take position a little nearer to the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road; and try to establish, and keep up, some sort of communication with Longstreet’s left, At half-past ten A.M. General Smith wrote to General Longstreet: “The enemy are; from all accounts, crossing the river and concentrating below upon this side. I have as yet heard nothing of Ripley’s brigade or of that from Huger’s division, Ask Stuart if he cannot devise means for keeping your left and Whiting’s right in com- munication with each other, I have directed Whiting Pee TPL, EE a ee ee vases cain eisai dum Sl CONFEDERATE WAR PAPHRS. 209 to take closer defensive relations with Magruder’s troops. . . . At any rate, that was absolutely necessary to enable a good defence to be made whiist you are pivoting on Whiting’s position.” : Before this note of 10.30 a.m. was dispatched the following was received from General Longstreet: “The brigade cannot be spared. Every man except a bri- gade is in action. As you are not fighting, I did not Send it, nor can I spare it. If I find myself at any time so that I can spare it, I will send it. But I am not able to do without it.” About the same time the fol- lowing—from General Longstreet addressed to the Adjutant-General—was handed to General Smith: “Major: Yours of to-day received. The entire army Seems to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my favor during these: successive at- tacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition gives out too readily.” At this time, General Smith was about half a mile east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road in consultation with General McLaws, General Whiting, and the Chief Engineer of the Army, Major Stevens. The latter had just returned from a reconnaissance in front of Whiting’s command. He reported that the position held by the enemy north of Fair Oaks, the previous evening, was a good one for defence; that it had been fortified during the night, and was occupied by a strong force of infantry and artillery. During this conference, and but a few minutes after the fore- going notes from General Longstreet were read, the fol- lowing was received from him: NP RE ER TOPE EIS 3 So . 7 - a BA ast cr ae i Ml ia a SRE Ala Re a A A ie RICE al AN sna Mil take Se Sa an IO ll a Pua ERE EIQ. » 3 ¢ : 5 4 4 g an aE ETL TEE EE 8 — poate mio ae lt Ree AE a i as cal A th AY iP A AS lL NA ENE SAREE Be tab aC CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. ** HEADQUARTERS, 10 A.M., June Ist. “ General: “Can you reénforce me? The entire army seems to be opposed to me. We cannot hold out unless we get help. If we can fight together we can finish the work to-day, and Mac’s time will be up. If I can’t get help I fear I must fall back. J. Lon@stReEeEt.” Longstreet’s left, certainly, had already fallen back, and the enemy had got into position on Whiting’s right and rear an hour before.. If Longstreet fell back but a little farther, the right of Whiting’s new line would be turned. In view of the Chief Engineer’s report it was inexpedient for Whiting’s command to attack again the position it had failed to carry the previous afternoon. The rapidly repeated demands made for help, by Long- street, were so urgent, that it seemed the engagement of the right wing with the enemy that morning had been far more serious than was indicated by anything observed from the Nine Miles road. ge General Smith ordered about five thousand men from the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff to move rapidly to Longstreet’s assistance; and Ripley’s brigade, which was expected to arrive by the Nine Miles road, was ordered to move as fast as possible by the Williams- burg road as soon as it reached Richmond. General McLaws was sent to Longstreet to inform him of the reénforcements ordered, assure him that the whole army of the enemy was not in his front, and teli him that he must not fall back any farther—but, drive the enemy and, if possible, regain the ground he had lost. About one o’clock p.m. General Smith received a note from General McLaws stating: “ Longstreet says he can hold his position with five thousand more men. He has nce ise eaeskit acc cae iD PIR enh ” nan tab i ake 7 x ~~ CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. oii now the same ground the enemy held yesterday.” About the same time the following note was received by Gen- eral Smith from General Lee: “ HEADQUARTERS, RicumonD, 1st June, 1862, “General G. W. Samira, “ Commanding Army of Northern Virginia, “ General: “The communication with the right wing of your army, as long as it is in the position in which I left it last even- ing, can be conveniently maintained by means of the York River and Richmond R. R. Cars will be put on the railroad, if you desire it, with orders to go to such point as you may direct. “ Very respectfully, “ Your obedient servant, “R. E. Les.” By the expression “right wing of your army” Gen- eral Lee evidently means the forces engaged the pre- vious day—viz., the right wing and the supporting divi- sion which had been ordered to the right from the left. General Lee assigned to the command of the army. —About 1.30 p.m. President Davis rode up to General Smith’s headquarters, and asked for General Lee. Upon being told that General Lee was not there, he expressed so much surprise, that General Smith asked him if he had any special reason for supposing General Lee would be there at that time. To this he replied, Yes; and added, he had, early that morning, ordered General Lee to take command of the army at once. To this Gen- eral Smith answered: Ah! in that case he will probably soon be here; requested the President to take a seat, and await the appearance of General Lee. The President * - " — — yah eee || i} i | li i : it jomanpete SP a TE TE SO Se AS A OS Nl A a a amt it NERO a naa 212 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. chatted upon a variety of commonplace subjects; but made no allusion to anything pertaining to the state of affairs on the field. General Lee came in, about two o’clock p.m., and Gen- eral Smith at once turned over to him the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, and commenced ex- plaining to him what had occurred during the day. To these explanations Mr. Davis seemed to give some atten- tion: particularly to General Longstreet’s notes asking for help. Whilst General Smith was still speaking, to General Lee, of the state of affairs upon the field of battle, the following communication was received from General Longstreet: * HEADQUARTERS, June ist, 1862. ‘1.30 P.M. “General: “T have just received a note from Major Melton. I will give instructions to General Hill to extend his line of skirmishers to the railroad. The next attack will be from Sumner’s division. I think that if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe from the advance of McClellan’s army. I hope that those who were whipped yesterday will not appear again. The attack this morn- ing was made at an unfortunate time. We had but little ammunition, but we have since replenished our supply, and I sincerely hope that we may succeed against them in their next effort. Oh that I had ten thousand men more! “ Most respectfully, “ J, Lonestreret, Maj.-Gen. Comdg. “ Our line is already connected, General Stuart says, ‘by Cavalry Videttes. J. L.” CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. After reading the above note General Smith handed it to General Lee; and requested him to read, and hand it to the President. General Lee looked very serious whilst reading, and when the President read it he seemed to take a little more interest in what was going on; but said nothing. General Smith, still addressing General Lee, informed him that Longstreet was mistaken in regard to the state of things. That the two corps of the enemy on the north bank of the river, that morning, had not yet crossed to our side; that the force attacked north of Fair Oaks, the previous afternoon, still held that posi- tion; that 5,000 men, ordered from the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs; were already closely approaching Longstreet’s position on the Williamsburg road; that Ripley’s brigade, which was expected, was ordered to move on the same road—that this would still leave Long- street more than 30,000 men, even if his losses had already reached 5000—that the ground he now occupied was favorable to us—and that the danger to Richmond, if any, was not then on the Williamsburg road. About three p.m. the President rode off, leaving Gen- eral Lee and General Smith in conference, alone. (reneral Lee made no adverse comment upon General Smith’s management of the army——gave no orders—and at four p.m. he and General Smith, with a courier as a guide, went over to the Williamsburg road; where they found the President, and several members of his cabinet, talking with General Longstreet. They were at a point about half a mile west of the unfinished pentangular redoubt where our troops first struck the enemy’s main line the previous day. Everything was quiet—the reénforce- ments from the Chickahominy had arrived. In about an hour the President and members of his cabinet started for Richmond. General Lee and Gen- 2S RRR Pees 2 = lr ARIREN SONRN tPO 0 a aac An iN UR Bi 1 ‘ E @ se rit SES SESE nC ee LT LE MT a EN LS LTE ET ARATE) 214 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. eral Smith accompanied them about two miles on the Williamsburg road; and then, leaving the party, crossed over to the Nine Miles road in the direction of General Lee’s headquarters on that road, which were two or three miles nearer Richmond than the headquarters at which the President found General Smith that afternoon. The battle was over. : General Lee gave no orders to General Smith on the 1st of June. Smith’s division, under Whiting, continued to occupy the position it held during the night of the 31st; except the right had been withdrawn slightly, in the morning of the Ist, in order to prevent being turned by the enemy who were following Longstreet’s retiring forces; and this necessitated a new alignment, in better defensive relations with Magruder’s troops, in advance of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road. Gen- eral Smith is not aware that General Lee gave any orders to General Longstreet that afternoon. If he gave authority for the right wing to retire farther toward Richmond, it was not because of any pressure from the enemy, but must have been merely to get the troops out of the swamps and place them upon more, comfortable ground. The following extracts from a letter addressed by General Whiting to the Adjutant-General, of General Smith’s proper command at that time, shows the posi- tion of “Smith’s division,” under Whiting, for some ten days after the battle. ‘HEADQUARTERS, 1st Division, 1st Corps, June 10, 1862. “ Major: “The attention of the General commanding the army should be called, at once, to the condition of this divi- sion, Its effective strength is daily decreasing. Since Pera, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 215 Yorktown, with the exception of some four days during which it was encamped near Richmond, it has been con- stantly in contact with the enemy. It has fought two battles, the last an engagement of great severity, in which it suffered heavy loss, especially in officers; fol- lowed by two days of great hardship and privation. It now occupies an important position, where the service is exceedingly onerous, directly in the face of the enemy, with whom they are constantly engaged. They are in a swamp of an exceedingly unhealthy character, and to properly defend our centre, the labor is exhausting. ... It is absolutely necessary that other troops relieve the Ist division. If no other offers, the 2d division (that of A. P. Hill) might take its place. The Major-General, no doubt, is well aware of the condition of affairs, and although not now on duty, I appeal to his influence if it can be exerted. A copy of this is sent direct to the General commanding the army.” In the letter from Colonel Frobel, to General Smith, previously referred to, it is stated that: “At daylight on Sunday morning, June the Ist, heavy firing began on Hood’s right. Hood occupied the same position he had during the night, while the left of Whiting’s brigade was advanced so as to form with Hood’s line an obtuse angle. The firing on the right was very heavy, both musketry and artillery, and lasted several hours. We remained in the position indicated, but not engaged, until the afternoon, when the brigades were withdrawn a short distance (some three or four hundred yards) to the shelter of heavy woods in our rear. I do not think after this that we changed our position for several days.” General C. M. Wilcox, in a letter to General Smith, already quoted from, says: “ Next morning (June Ist) Le a a ee aA SERIE DELETE EE cee se A A SS er cin 3 a Pt A NAL AD A PNT IN NOAA NSE AT AMA! SES a ak 0. Meg ai RB i Sad Sc Sate 216 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. the first shots heard were north of the two houses, 4 little west. "We soon formed in line parallel with the Williamsburg road, and facing north; Pryor on the left; soon became engaged for twenty minutes or more. Ordered by D. H. Hill to withdraw, did so; and formed on the right of the Williamsburg road at Seven Pines, facing east. Four or five other brigades were there also inline. After dark sll on Williamsburg road withdrew. My brigade slept from two a.m, till daylight near the forks of Charles City and Williamsburg roads; then moved to their previous camp.” ' CHAPTER VIII. General Mindil’s account of Federal operations on the 1st of June, Statement made by Mr. Swinton. a-President Davis's account of operations on the 1st of June—Author’s comments. Greyerat Mryprt says:* “On the extreme right, facing west-northwest, partly in open ground and partly in the woods facing Dr. Courtney’s farm, and near the Adams house, was General Sedgwick’s division of three brigades, the three regiments of Couch, already men- tioned, and five batteries of artillery. While farther to the left, at an angle, and parallel with the railroad, and near Fair Oaks station, the division of General Richard- son, which had arrived about midnight, was formed in three lines of a brigade front each—one battery of artillery on the right of the first line, the remaining three batteries of the division in reserve; then in Hyer’s clearing, behind the railroad and facing south, the 7th a * The Battle of Fair Oaks,” by G. W. Mindil, p. 10. Roane oe i Fi } | ‘ | | 1 ] € = CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 217 Massachusetts and 3d and 4th Maine regiments of Bir- ney’s brigade; the 38th and 40th New York regiments of the same brigade were in position to the south of the railroad, in the edge of the woods directly west of the Allen farm. Farther to the left, but somewhat in rear, covering the large open field between the railroad and Williamsburg road, was Hooker’s division, ready and eager for battle; the line to the south of the Wil- liamsburg road, ‘the third line of defence,’ being held by Kearney’s division and the two divisions of the Fourth Corps. A numerous artillery, over sixty pieces, defending them. . . . Sumner’s line had been reénforced to double its numbers, and every practicable approach to it was commanded by a numerous artillery. The troops were partially protected, a line of rifle-pits having been thrown up during the night. . . . About five o’clock on Sunday morning, in the gray of dawn, the Confederate skirmishers in front of Richardson opened -fire. French’s brigade with a regiment of Howard’s, at once crossed to the south of the railroad, in readiness for the expected attack. Hazard’s battery of the 4th Artillery (6 10-pound Parrot rifle guns) being posted on the right to command the large open field in that direction. Howard’s brigade was in a second line while Meagher’s Irish regiments, with eighteen pieces of artillery, occupied the third, or reserve line. A slight attempt on the part of the Confederates to cross the open field with a heavy skirmish line and some regi- ments of cavalry was checked by Hazard’s guns. , At - half-past six o’clock a determined assault was made against General French’s line, the enemy pushing for- ward, along the two wood roads that crossed the line, heavy columns of attack—supporting them on both flanks by battalions of infantry in deployed line. The firing Bg | wn 218 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, commenced within half-musket-shot, and was maintained at close quarters for nearly an hour and a half before the enemy’s column wavered and broke. French’s men haying exhausted their ammunition—sixty rounds per man—were relieved to enable them to refill their cart- ridge-boxes, Howard’s five regiments taking their places. Hardly had this been done, when the enemy’s column, strongly reénforced, gave a general yell, and again dashed forward to the attack. This renewed fight was of the most desperate and sanguinary character, lasting more than an hour, when the enemy were again driven back, without gaining a single point of the Union Line— their retreat being more precipitate than before, a rapid artillery fire accelerating their flight. So fierce was the fighting in Richardson’s front, that he sustained a loss of nearly 800 men, ina division much smaller in numbers than Sedgwick’s. . . . This desperate encounter was but a part of Sunday’s battle, for when the firing first became heavy on the right, General Heintzelman sprang to Sumner’s aid. ‘ At half-past seven on Sunday morning, when the firing became heavy on the right,’ says General Heintzelman, ‘I sent forward one brigade and two regi- ments under General Hooker, and on the right General Birney’s brigade, under the command of Colonel Ward. The 5th and 6th New Jersey regiments under General Hooker, moving through the woods towards Allen’s farm and the railroad, soon joined the left of Ward’s command, when, with the “38th and 40th New York regiments, the move was continued through the timber, the enemy falling back before this determined advance. * As Hooket neared the clearing on Hyer’s farm, he ordered his four regiments to charge; this cleared the woods, and the enemy were entirely broken, when they were met in the open ground by the destructive flank ones in a sin A 219 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. fire of three regiments posted behind ‘the ~——- Hooker was now on the right flank and rear o forces engaged with Richardson, and he was not a nt to improve his opportunity. While this was — — along the railroad, General Sickles with the : nea brigade of five regiments, moved out the wil — Rite road about a mile, and when nearly opposite t a . houses in front of which Colonel Poe fought 80 we — preceding evening, he changed the head of his co re to the left, and brought it on the right by file into . As soon as line was formed, his troops opened fire e advanced. In the woods the battle raged quite heavi 3 for a few minutes, but Sickles gradually gained — to the front. He certainly advanced to fight, and t “ his brigade was not more seriously engaged, or e troops farther to the right, was no fault of M6 t z en - yielding after slight resistance the ees a — se Williamsburg road. Sickles soon joined Hooker, . in union with Richardson a general advance er ma : No serious opposition was encountered, and — . camp was reoccupied before two 0 clock P.M. he ground being covered with the rebel dead and pe as well as our own.’... From the files of the War Department we gather the following statement of = on Sunday, June Ist. In Richardson's division, pei brigades, 765; in Birney’s, four regiments, 196; 1m te eral Hooker’s, seven regiments engaged, 313; a eee 1276. The enemy’s loss must have been nearly _ @, and for the reason that he assaulted Richardson’s com- mand, no less than three times with heavy masses; and in front of Hooker’s, his loss was at least equal.” That there was some very heavy firing between a por- tion of Longstreet’s command and the Federal forces, for several hours, there can be no doubt, but the con- aint wae £2 ne ET EES = os 220 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. test made by the right wing of the Confederate army on the Ist of June was not of the character contem- plated in General Smith’s order. General Longstreet says the ammunition gave out too rapidly. The right wing withdrew from the position it occupied during the night of the 31st, instead of pushing its success of the previous day—making a real combined attack—fighting north—pivoting the movement on the position of Gen- eral Whiting. Mr. Swinton, in his “ History of the Army of the Potomac,” after stating the number of killed and wounded, in the two days’ fighting, says: “A severer toss befell the Confederates than is expressed even in this heavy aggregate; for the able chief of the Army of Northern Virginia was struck down with a severe hurt. The command, for the time being, devolved upon Gen- eral G. W. Smith, but the failure to make good the pur- pose of the attack, the heavy loss already suffered, and the disabling of General Johnston, determined General Smith to retire his forces. Preparations for withdrawal were actively pushed forward during the night; but through some accidental circumstances, a portion of Sum- ner’s line having become engaged on the morning of the ist of June, there ensued a recontre of some severity, which lasted for two or three hours. It ended, how- ever, after some brisk sallies, in the withdrawal of the entire Confederate force to the lines around Richmond. . . » General Johnston has frequently expressed to the writer his amazement at the swelling bulk assumed by the ‘skirmish’ of the Ist. Though not present, having been removed to Richmond after his hurt, General John- ston yet knew by constant reports from the field, what was going on, and asserts that nothing more severe than an affair of the rear-guard took place. In his official a © CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. report General Johnston simply says: ‘ Major-General Smith was prevented from resuming his attack on the enemy’s position next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not seen on the previous evening. On the morning of June Ist the enemy attacked the brigade of General Pickett, which was supported by that of General Pryor. The attack was vigorously re- pelled by these two brigades, the brunt of the fight fall- ing on General Pickett. This was the last demonstra- tion made by the enemy. In the evening our troops quietly returned to their own camps.’ ” ae In view of established facts, already related, it is not worth while to make any comment upon these extracts from Mr. Swinton’s History. Ex-President Davis's Account of Operations on the lst of June.—* When riding from the field of battle with General Robert E. Lee, on the previous evening, I informed him that he would be assigned to the com- mand of the army, vice General Johnston, wounded, and that he could make his preparations as sogn as he reached his quarters, as I should send the order to him as soon as I arrived at mine.”* “On the morning of June the 1st I rode out toward the position where Gen- eral Smith had been left on the previous night, and where I learned from General Lee that he would re- main. After turning into the Nine Mile road, and be- fore reaching that position, I was hailed by General Whiting, who saw me at a distance and ran towards the road to stop me. He told me I was riding into the position of the enemy, who had advanced on the with- drawal of our troops, and there, pointing, he said, ‘is a battery which I am surprised, has not fired upon you.’ * Rise and Fall, Vol. IL. p. 180, italiani a PT SETTLE —— a ' ei a wes “aa ae nmr aN A i a DSP SY ONCE NBC RC ARNE AEN AE IE ca 222 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. J asked where our troops were. He said his was the advance, and the others behind him. He also told me that General Smith was at the house which had been his (Whiting’s) headquarters, and I rode there to see him. To relieve both him and General Lee from any embar- rassment, I preferred to make the announcement of General Lee’s assignment to command previous to his arrival. After General Lee arrived I took leave, and, being subsequently joined by him, we rode together to the Williamsburg road, where we found General Long- street, his command being in front, and then engaged with the enemy on the field of the previous day’s com- bat.”* “General Longstreet states that a serious attack was made on our position, and that it was re- pulsed. This refers to the works which Hill’s division had captured the day before, and which the enemy en- deavored to retake.”+ “The operations of that day were neither extensive nor important, save in the col- lection of the arms acquired in the previous day’s battle.” { ‘During the night our forces on the left had fallen back from their position at the close of the previous day’s battle, but those on the right remained in the one they had gained, and some combats occurred there between the opposing forces.”§ “There have been various attempts made to point out the advantage which might have been obtained if General Lee, in suc- ceeding to the command, had renewed on the Ist of June the unfinished battle of the 31st of May.” || Comments.—Mr. Davis says he rode out in the morn- ing. He reached General Smith’s headquarters in the afternoon, having the previous evening ordered General ne * Rise and Fall, Vol. IL. p. 128. + p. 127. } p. 129. § p. 180. | p. 155. al CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 223 Lee to-take command ofthe army. The headquarters at which the President—after his, graphically described, perilous ride to the front—found General Smith, were two or three miles in advance of the place already selected by General Lee as his headquarters in the field, teneral Smith had never informed General Lee, or any one else, that he would remain in person at the point where he was when the President and General Lee left him the previous night. Mr. Davis knew that General Smith ordered General Longstreet to renew the attack early in the morning of that day; he saw the notes from General Longstreet written to General Smith during the morning, and that dated 1.30 P.M. ending with the exclamation, “Oh that I had ten thousand men more!” he knew that the division under Whiting biv- ouacked on the field of battle; and that late in the fore- noon the right of this division had to be slightly thrown ‘back, and the line otherwise adjusted, because the enemy in following Longstreet’s withdrawing Sep aes a threatening the right flank and rear of Whiting’s line; and he knew that on the Ist of June our troops on the right lost the ground they had gained on the 31st of May. In asserting that, on the 1st of June, General Lee ‘accompanied him to the Williamsburg road, where they found General Longstreet, Mr. Davis makes another mistake. In stating that, in the evening of the 31st, he ordered General Lee to take command of the army—then inti- mating that General Lee took command in the morning— and referring to “the advantage which might have been obtained if General Lee, in succeeding to the command, had renewed on the Ist of June the unfinished battle of the 31st of May’—Mr. Davis practically ignores the fact, well known to him, that General Lee did not take 224 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, the command until about two o’clock in the afternoon. It is not deemed necessary to say here anything more about the ex-President’s professed attempt to elucidate obscurity and correct error in regard to the operations on the Ist of June. CHAPTER IX. General J. E. Johnston’s account of the battle of Seven Pines— Author's comments, Arter stating that a reconnaissance made on the _ Williamsburg road on the morning of the 30th * under the direction of General I). H. Hill, encountered Federal outposts more than two miles west of Seven Pines, in such strength as indicated the presence of a corps at least, General Johnston proceeds to say: “This fact was reported to me by General Hill soon after noon. He was informed in reply that he would lead an attack upon this enemy next morning. An hour or two later, orders were given for the concentration of twenty-three of our twenty-seven brigades against McClellan’s left wing. . . . Longstreet and Huger were directed to conduct their divisions to D. H. Hill’s position as early as they could next morning; and Smith to march with his to the point of meeting of the New Bridge and Nine Miles road, near which Magruder had five brigades—Long- street, as ranking officer of the three divisions to be united near Hill’s camp, was instructed verbally to form his own and Hill’s division in two lines crossing the * Johnston’s Narrative, p. 132. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. Williamsburg road at right angles, and brings _ the attack in that order; while Huger’s division shou march along the Charles City road-by the right flank, - fall upon the enemy’s left flank as soon as = pe became engaged with those in front. masentle was to engage any troops that might cece the i a hominy to assist Heintzelman’s and Keyes S ngs : . none came, he was to fall — the oa sas of tho ith General Longstreet. bee sien sh the time General Johnston says = gave orders for concentrating more than five sixths 0 his army in the vicinity of Seven Pines, It had not com- menced to rain. The crossings of the Chickahominy, ‘by the fords and bridges, as far up as Meadow Wi pee were all in the hands of the enemy. The right of the Federal forces was at Mechanicsville, and three of $e: five corps of ‘their army were known to be on a ai bank of the river. The first duty of the reset erate army was to protect the city of Richmond, anc - hardly credible that General Johnston, early in % afternoon of the 30th, deliberately gave orders loo ing to the engagement of such a large proportion “i bes army against the comparatively small force 0 : enemy at Seven Pines, thus leaving the city open to at- tack by the mass of the Federal army crossing the = in his rear, anywhere betweey New Bridge and Mea en Bridges. Certainly, if such a movement against : enemy at Seven Pines was contemplated, the _— celerity in its execution was imperatively demande : , The records show that this extreme concentration 0 Confederates, in the vicinity of Seven Pines, bee" _ ordered at all, much less, early in the afternoon 2 : e 30th, before it commenced to rain. General Jo 8 on entrusted the attack upon the Federal corps at Seven EASE WIEEA ES & + ne CES 7 near A ae ‘ Seaver eU TESTES one te a ta RL ES lt athe LN i A ATT ORET ee ~~ 226 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, Pines to the right wing of hisarmy. The only concen. tration of other troops was that directed by him at 9.15 p.M. on the 30th. In his written order, which has already been given in full, he says, in reference to G. W. Smith’s division under Whiting: “Please be ready to move by the Nine Miles road—coming as early as possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off, Should there be cause of haste, General McLaws, on your approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may reénforce General Longstreet.” McLaws’s division was guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy from the Mechanicsville road to New Bridge, with one brigade and two regiments along the New Bridge road. The division under Whiting was on time, and McLaws’s troops were not moved. General Johnston believed—with good reason—that the 30,000 men in the right wing of his army, under General Long- street, were sufficient to crush the comparatively small portion of General McClellan’s army in the vicin ity of Seven Pines; and his main purpose in ordering the division under Whiting to move from the left wing of the army to the right, was to guard against reénforce- ments of the enemy from the north bank of the Chicka- hominy. At 11 A.M. on the 31st, whilst McLaws’s division was guarding the Chickahominy as already stated, and D. R. Jones’s division was guarding the crossings at the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges roads; with A. P. Hill’s division in supporting distance of Jones— General Johnston directed General G. W. Smith to take ‘two brigades of the division, under Whiting, to the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff between the Mechanicsville road and New Bridge, examine into the state of affairs, and, if necessary, remain there and take proceed Py t 227 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. command of all the Confederate forces — ae crossings of the river. These facts esate: a4 enough, that General Johnston did not so i = = . the safety of Richmond, an hour or two a. 7 cual the 30th, as to order “the concentration me bhi three of our twenty-seven brigades against Mc left wing.” : ; Geena Johnston’s letter, es ent — seo @ h, 1862; General Smi : pr Haw ey as June 23d, 1862; and eps ter of Major Beckham, to General Smith, date os ruary 7th, 1863, all of which have in ap: — quoted from, show that, about sunrise on the bes Sr of the 31st of May, General Johnston intende pre expected, that Longstreet’s divisron ergy egies action early that morning, by the Nine . * a Until he saw General Johnston’s published Na ‘ i. General Smith never heard of the verbal instruc nage General Johnston says he gave General oo. 3 conduct his own division from the Nine Miles sey a the Williamsburg road, and, “form his own so i division in two lines crossing the o> egareniotag mi at right angles, and to advance to the attack in ” ae is nothing in General J ohnston’s order, of 9.15 P.M. on the 30th, indicating that, in any ere the division, under Whiting, was to make any — ; ant flanking operation.” If General J ohnson ~ od plated such a movement by this division, the act he was with it in person, and directed all pdr. from about sunrise until he was wounded just be ee sunset that day, must exonerate its commana, ao Whiting, from all censure for not attacking eas ght flanks of those troops engaged with Longstreet. pa bn a aE SR oes Soe ee ee — . ; 5 ‘ 228 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, In continuing his Narrative, General Johnston says: * “ Being confident that Longstreet and Hill, with their forces united, would be successful in the earlier part of the action, . . . I left the immediate. control on the Williamsburg road to them, under general instructions, and placed myself on the left, where I could soonest learn the approach of Federal reénforcements from be- yond the Chickahominy. . . . An unexpected delay in the forward movement on the right disappointed me greatly, and led to interchanges of messages between Longstreet and myself for several hours. At three o’clock the Federal advance troops were encountered. They were a long line of skirmishers supported by five or six regiments of infantry covered by abattis. . . . The resolution of Garland’s and George B. Anderson’s brigades, that pressed forward ‘on the left through an open field, under a destructive fire; the admirable ser- vice of Carter’s and Bondurant’s batteries, and a skil- fully combined attack upon the Federal left, under General Hill’s direction, by Rodes’s brigade in front aud that of Rains in flank, were finally successful, and the enemy abandoned their intrenchments. Just then reénforcements were received from their second line, and they turned to recover their lost position. But to no purpose—they were driven back, fighting, upon their second line—Couch’s division at Seven Pines, R.. H Anderson’s brigade, transferred by Longstreet to the first line, after the capture of ~Casey’s position, bore a prominent part in the last contest. Keyes’s Corps, united in this second position, was assailed with such spirit by the Confederate troops’ that, although re- énforced by Kearney’s division of Heintzelman’s corps, * Johnston’s Narrative, p. 134, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 929 it was broken, divided, and driven from its ground, - greater part along the Williamsburg road, to -shogpee Heintzelman’s intrenched line, two miles from Bottom 8 Bridge, and two brigades to the southeast into White Oak Swamp. General Hill pursued the enemy toward Bottom’s Bridge, more than a mile; then, night borty near, he gathered his troops and re-formed them, —_ to the east, as they had been fighting. The line thus formed crossed the Williamsburg road at right angie. The left, however, was thrown back to face sscorgeeh corps at Fair Oaks. In an hour or two Longstreet’s and Huger’s divisions, whom it had not been we cso | to bring into action, came into this line under Genera Longstreet’s orders.” Comments.—The first delay occurred, near General Johnston’s headquarters in the suburbs of Richmond, id little after sunrise, caused by troops of Longstreet’s division breaking up their camps and moving hing pan baggage trains across Whiting’s line of march; thus preventing the head of his column from getting on to the Nine Miles road. About nine o’clock A.M. General Johnston first learned that Longstreet’s division had been moved from the Nine Miles road—this information came from General Smith’s Aide. General Johnston then sent his own Aide to General Longstreet directing that three brigades be sent back to the Nine Miles road if they had not gone so far that sending them beck would cause a serious loss of time. General Johnston’s Aide was captured and the message to General Long- Street was not delivered. At 11 a.m. General Johnston learned, through General Smith’s Aide, that Long- Street’s division, with its baggage train, was on the Williamsburg road, halted—waiting for D. H. Hill’s division, which had just passed—and preparations were slink Th Ge ae aa SB ADA Hi PTOI a te Mah oS Lowen omen an i ML i i IS cud RM AE cna a Nt ita tcte ak ean Laan - - ———— Dis - ( " ne Ba ae ‘ 230 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, being made on the Williamsburg road to move forward to the attack. At 4 p.m. General Johnston learned through General Smith’s Chief of Staff, that the troops on the Williamsburg road had been engaged for an hour or more and that General. Longstreet was greatly disappointed because the troops on the Nine Miles road were not fighting—a few moments later, General John- ston received a note from General Longstreet urgently asking for immediate help; and about the same time heavy musketry firing, in the direction of Seven Pines, was first heard on the Nine Miles road. Previous to the receipt of the note just referred to, General Johnston—although evidently much annoyed: by the delay on the Williamsburg road, and apprehensive that time had been allowed for reénforcements from the direction of Bottom’s Bridge to reach the enemy at Seven Pinés—was still confident that the 30,000 men under Longstreet* “would be successful.” But when General Johnston put the division, under Whiting, in motion he had reason to believe that Longstreet’s whole forces were hardly equal to the task assigned them. In speaking of the successes of Hill’s division aided by . R. H. Anderson’s brigade of Longstreet’s division, and the position they occupied at dark, about a mile east of Seven Pines, General Johnston says: “In an hour or two Longstreet’s and Huger’s divisions, whom it had not been necessary to bring into action, came into the line under General Longstreet’s orders.” He makes no mention of the note he received from Longstreet, at 4 p.M., asking for help: and no adverse comment on Longstreet’s failure to put more than five of his thirteen brigades into the fight. = Continuing his narrative in reference to the opera- tions of Smith’s division, under Whiting, General John- race ai Le acai Sl a ee eee eae on ee ; 4 Meo NL i CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 231 ston says: * “ When the action began on the right, the musketry was not heard at my position on the Nine Miles road, from the unfavorable condition of the air to sound. I supposed, therefore, that the fight had not begun and that we were having an artillery duel. How- ever, a staff officer was sent to ascertain the fact. He returned at four o’clock with intelligence that our in- fantry as well as artillery had been engaged for an hour, and that our troops were pressing forward with vigor. As no approach of Federal troops from the other side of the Chickahominy had been discovered or was sus- pected, I hoped strongly that the bridges were impas- sable. It seemed to me idle, therefore, to keep General Smith longer out of action, for a contingency so remote as the coming of reénforcements from the Federal right. He was desired, therefore, to direct his division against the right flank of Longstreet’s adversaries. £ thought it prudent, however, to have Magruder’s division in reserve. It was under arms near. General Smith moved promptly along the Nine Miles road. His leading regi- ment, the Sixth North Carolina, soon became engaged with the Federal skirmishers and their reserves, and in a few minutes drove them off entirely. On my way to Longstreet’s left, to combine the action of the two bodies of Confederate troops, I passed the head of General Smith’s column near Fair Oaks, and saw the camp of a body of infantry of the strength of three or four regiments, apparently, in the northern angle be- tween the York River Railroad and the Nine Miles road, and the rear of a body of infantry moving in quick time from that point toward the Chickahominy by the road to the Grapevine Ford. A few minutes after this a Poeeeeee snes Sane Nee eee ee eee me, * Johnson’s Narrative, p. 136. rer aera eRe bea 232 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. battery, at the point where this infantry had disap- _ peared, opened its fire upon the head of the Confed- erate column. A regiment sent against it was received with a volley of musketry, as well as canister, and re- coiled. The leading brigade, commanded by Colonel Law, then advanced, and so much strength was devel- oped by the enemy that General Smith formed his other brigades and brought them into battle on the left of Law’s. An obstinate contest began, and was maintained on equal terms, although the Confederates engaged superior numbers in a position of their own choosing. I had passed the railroad some little distance with Hood’s brigade when the action commenced, and stopped to see its termination. But, being confident that the Federal troops opposing ours were those whose camps I had just seen, and therefore not more than a brigade, I did not doubt that General Smith was quite strong enough to cope with them. General Hood was de- sired to go forward, therefore, and, connecting his right with Longstreet’s left, to fall upon the right flank of his enemy. ‘The direction of the firing was then (near five o’clock) decidedly to the right of Seven Pines. It was probably at Casey’s intrenched position. The firing at Fair Oaks soon increased and I rode back to that field— still unconvinced, however, that General Smith was fight- ing more than a brigade, and thinking it injudicious to engage Magruder’s division yet, as it was the only re- serve. While waiting the conclusion of this struggle, my intercourse with Longstreet was maintained through staff officers. The most favorable accounts of his prog- ress were from time to time received from them. The contest on the left was maintained with equal determina- tion by the two parties, each holding the ground on which it had begun to fight. This condition of affairs CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 233 existed on the left at half-past six o’clock, and the firing on the right seemed then to be about Seven Pines. It was evident, therefore, that the battle would not be ter- minated that day. So I announced to my staff officers that each regiment must sleep where it might be stand- ing when the contest ceased for the night, to be reney to renew it at dawn next morning. About seven o’clock I received a slight wound in the shoulder from a musket - shot, and, a few moments after, was unhorged by a heavy fragment of shell which struck my breast. Those around had me borne from the field. . . . The firing ceased, terminated by darkness only, before T had been carried a mile from the field. As next in rank, Major-General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command of the army. His division remained in the immediate presence of the enemy during the night, its right resting on the ad road, where it joined Longstreet’s left. Magruder’s division was within supporting distance.” Comments.—Magruder’s division, referred to by Gen- eral Johnston, was McLaws’s division—a part of the centre of the army commanded by General Magrader. D. R. Jones’s division was also a part of Magruder’s regular command—but, several days before the battle of Seven Pines, when an attack upon the enemy north of the Chickahominy, in the direction of Mechanicsville, had been contemplated by General Johnston, he had placed D. R. Jones’s division temporarily in the left wing, under the command of General G. W. Smith. The position oceupied by McLaws’s division has already been stated. It will be remembered that the left of this division was on the Mechanicsville road, nearly six miles, in an airline, from Fair Oaks station. Just before Gen- eral Johnston was wounded, he sent a message to Gen- eral Smith directing that-all the available troops be i & ; ‘ ; 5 234 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, brought up as soon as possible. General Smith sent this order direct to the only two brigades of Magruder’s troops that were within reach. These brigades were in McLaws’s division—they reached the field just before dark, too late to take any part in the action. After dark they were sent back; because, at the end of the action north of Fair Oaks the enemy were threatening our left flank on the immediate field, and the bringing up of Magruder’s (McLaws’s) two brigades had left a gap in our line from Fair Oaks to New Bridge. General Johnston and General Whiting directed the movements against the enemy north of Fair Oaks until General Johnston was wounded. General Smith had no specific command on the field. At the time General Johnston sent instructions to have all the available troops brought up, the right of Whiting’s line had been driven very hurriedly back toward the clump of trees at Fair Oaks where General Johnston then was. General Smith at once rode to the front where our left was closely engaged in the wood several hundred yards north of the Nine Miles road—and upon learning that the enemy were being rapidly reénforced on that part of the field, and that our troops had already suffered severely and were in danger of being crushed or routed—he ordered Hatton’s brigade and Lightfoot’s regiment of Petti- grew’s brigade into close action—went with them to the extreme front, and remained there until the firing ceased at dark. , When General Smith went into the front line it was clear that the enemy had sent strong reénforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy—how many had arrived, or how many more might be coming, was not known—but there were already enough engaged to make it very doubtful whether the four Confederate CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 235 brigades on that part of the field could hold them back, and prevent them from reaching the left flank and rear of the troops in the Confederate right wing—which, judging from the character of Longstreet’ note, re- ceived by General Johnston at 4 P.M., had, in their front, all they could successfully contend with, Before reading General Johnston’s Narrative General Smith never heard that during the engagement north of Fair Oaks General Johnston received most favorable accounts of General Longstreet’s progress: nor that Gen- eral Johnston, before he was wounded, had announced to his “ staff officers that each regiment must sleep where it might be standing, when the contest ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at dawn next morning. At dark on the 31st there was a considerable gap—be- lieved to be about a mile—between Longstreet’s left and Whiting’s right. It has already been stated that the left of what General Johnston calls “ Magruder’s divi- sion” was on the Mechanicsville road, about six miles from Fair Oaks, and the remainder of this division was guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy from that point to the New Bridge; with one brigade and two regiments on the line between the latter point and Whiting’s left. At the time General Johnston announced to his “ staff officers that each regimént must sleep where it might be standing when the contest ceased for the night,” there was nothing in the situation decidedly favorable to the Confederate arms, On the morning of the 31st of May the Federals had, on the Richmond side of the Chicka- ; hominy, one corps at and near Seven Pines and another at Bottom’s and White Oak Bridges. On the morning of the Ist of June they had three corps on the field of battle in the vicinity of Seven Pines, General Johnston +S GRIER: FCAT pete pags ———e ot A a a i ct as en ns ee 236 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, had the initiative on the morning of the 31st, and the enemy did not expect to be attacked at that particular time. There was every reason for the belief that the Confederates would derive great advantage from an un- expected, sudden, and determined attack, in full force, upon a single Federal Corps, early in the morning of the 31st of May. But on the morning of the 1st of June, the three Federal Corps on the battle-field, fully aware of the immediate presence of the Confederates, were prepared for the attack. General Johnston’s account of what occurred on the 1st of June.—Continuing his narrative he says:* “Next morning, Brigadier-General Pickett, whose brigade was near the left of Longstreet’s and Hill’s line, learned that a strong body of Federal troops was before him and near. He moved forward and attacked it, driving it from that.ground. Very soon, being reénforced appar- ently, the Federals (several brigades) assumed the offen- sive, and attacked him. In the mean time General Hill had sent two regiments of Colston’s brigade to him. Although largely outnumbered, Pickett met this attack with great resolution, and after a brisk but short action repulsed the enemy, who disappeared, to molest him no more. I have seen no Confederate officer who was con- scious of any other serious fighting, by the troops of those armies, on Sunday. .. . The loss in Longstreet’s and Hill’s divisions (in the two days) was about three thousand. . . . About five-sixths of the loss was in the latter division, upon which the weight of the fighting on the right fell.” Comments.—In regard to what General Johnston’ says of the fighting that occurred on the Ist of June, * Johnston’s Narrative, p. 189, a. the reader is referred to Gener saat at ae ea ea ee AS he 237 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. al Longstreet’s battle- field notes addressed to General Smith, and to — Mindil’s account of the operations on that day. : is believed that there was a ~ pa a oe Ps ing done on the Ist of June sete Narrative, and not so much as might be in- Longstreet’s notes. é : priesarecbe dwelling upon this point, renew Ne now be called to what General J ohnston more , “ = timates ought to have been accomplished by the Co federates on the Ist of June. He says: The wack in position to renew the battle on Sunday cee at rs Oaks, on the Federal side, two divisions and a See . . . On the Confederate side, ten brigades in Smit ; and Magruder’s divisions, six of which were pera ea having fired a shot. On the Williamsburg ea a Federal divisions, three of which had fought an : - thoroughly beaten—one, Casey’s, almost ey aye j : the Confederate side, thirteen brigades, but five o which had been engaged on Saturday—when they de- feated the three Federal divisions that were brought against them successively. After nightfall, Saturday, the two bodies of Federal troops were completely sepa- rated from the two corps of their right, beyond the Chickahominy, by the swollen stream, which had — away their bridges; and Sumner’s corps at sire aks was six miles from those,of Heintzelman and Keyes, idge; derate - which were near Bottom’s Bridge; but the Confede forces were united on the front and left flank of Sum- + ner’s corps. Such advantage of position and pray of numbers would have enabled them to defeat = corps had the engagement been renewed on Sunday AGT iho ee rane * Johnston’s Narrative, p. 141. Se ONES REO aly éCebggnast: 5 wf ME a a a a A 238 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, morning, before any aid could have come from Heintzel- man, after which his troops, in the condition to which the action of the day before had reduced them, could not have made effectual resistance. I was eager to fight on the 31st, from the belief that the flood in the Chicka- hominy would be at its height that day, and the two parts of the Federal Army completely separated by it; it was too soon, however. We should have gained the advantage fully by aday’s delay. This would also have given us an accession of about eight thousand men that arrived from the south next morning, under Major-Gen- eral Holmes and Brigadier-General Ripley. No action of the war has been so little understood as that of Seven Pines; the Southern people have felt no interest in it because, being unfinished in consequence of the dis- abling of the commander, they saw no advantage de- rived from it.” Comments.—-Before proceeding ta show how greatly mistaken General Johnston is, in his statement of the positions occupied by the contending ‘forces on the morning of the Ist of June, it is well to look at the evidence showing what did occur on that day. In Gen- eral G. W. Smith’s report, to General Johnston, dated June 23d, 1862, it is stated that, “General Longstreet was directed to push his successes of the previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement upon the position of General Whiting on his left. The latter was directed to make a diversion in favor of General Long- street’s real attack.” The engagement was renewed on Sunday morning. On the Confederate side the battle-field notes of Gen- eral Longstreet, already given, show that before 10 a.m. he wrote to General Smith: ‘The brigade cannot be spared, Every man except a brigade is in action.” TR ADS RN er ae Ge ee CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 239 About the same time he wrote to the Adjutant-General: “The entire army seems to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my favor during these successive attacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition gives out too readily.” At 10 a.m. he wrote to General Smith: “Can you reénforce me? The entire army seems to be opposed to me. We ae hold out unless we get help.” And at 1.30 P. M.: The next attack will be from Sumner’s division. I think that if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe from the advance of McClellan’s army.” On the Federal side, General Mindil, as already stated, Says: “In the gray of dawn the Confederate skirmishers in front of Richardson opened fire. . - . At half-past six o’clock a determined assault was made against Gen- eral French’s line. . . . The firing commenced within half-musket shot, and was maintained at close quarters for nearly an hour and a half before the enemy’s column wavered and broke. . reénforced, gave a general yell and again dashed for- ward to the attack. This renewed fight was of the most desperate and sanguinary character, lasting more than an hour. . . . So fierce was the fighting in Richard- son’s front, that he sustained a loss of nearly 800 men. . . . This desperate encounter was but @ part of Sun- day’s battle.” At the time in question the centre of the Confederate army, under General Magruder, and the left, under - General A. P. Hill, were substantially in the positions occupied before the order to attack was issued on the 30th of May. The connection between the division under Whiting near Fair Oaks and Magruder’s right was very weak; and the enemy north of Fair Oaks had been specially pressing in that direction at dark on the . . The enemy’s column, strongly a SS ~ PE Ee waa § my AAT I th oot es ee en aye eres i Joke aside 240 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 31st. Between Whiting’s right, which was on the rail- road a little west of Fair Oaks station, and Longstreet’s left—which it now appears was near the two wood roads leading to the railroad about a half mile east of that station, there was a gap of about three quarters of a mile. Longstreet’s right was across the Williamsburg road a little east of the two houses marked on the map by two dots. General Mindil says: Keyes’s corps was in the “third line of defence,” about one mile and a half east of Seven Pines, the interval between Keyes’s corps and Sumner’s was held by the brigade of Birney, Hooker’s division, and part of Kearney’s; the troops were parti- ally protected—a line of rifle-pits having been thrown up during the night, the pickets of the three corps thus disposed were in‘communication throughout. And he adds: “The crossings at the Upper Trestle and New Bridges were favorable for artillery, cavalry, and in- fantry, on the morning of June the Ist.” It is not considered necessary to comment upon Gen- eral Johnston’s statement that he “was eager to fight on the 31st from the belief that the flood in the Chicka- hominy would be at its height that day;” or, say any- thing further in regard to his assertion that, “ we should have gained the advantage fully by a day’s delay.” CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, CHAPTER X. General Taylor’s statement. General Webb’s account of the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines—Author’s comments. ‘Letter from Major 8, B. French. General remarks. Generar Ricuarp Taytor,* in speaking of the battle of Seven Pines, says: “General Johnston’s ‘ offensive’ must be limited to Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. Here his plan was Well considered and singularly favored of for- tune. Some two corps of McClellan’s army were posted on the southwest or Richmond side of the Chicka- hominy, and a sudden rise of that stream swept away the bridges and overflowed the adjacent low lands, eut- ting off these corps from their supports. They ought to have been crushed, but Johnston fell severely wound- ed, upon which confusion ensued, and no results of im- portance were attained.” This was written by General Taylor several years after General Johnston’s Narrative was published. It is quoted here to show the effect of General Johnston’s claim that the battle was “unfinished in consequence of the disabling ‘of the commander.” General Webb's account of the Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks.—In the beginning of the preface to his work, entitled “The Peninsula,” General Webb says that, “To be of any practical use, all history, and par- ticularly military history, must be gradually sifted and reduced to small compass.” He then proceeds to say that to his “task has been added the special work re- quired in comparing and collating for careful investi- ESE ARS st Banc Sen ee ed OS stain * «Destruction and Reconstruction,” by Richard Taylor. «Rai at aad at i ik Pl th at ie a a A A EE PRED DN : | | | - jie ek kn ah a AS PR By 242 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. gation the new material gathered by the War Depart- ment, and now for the first time made the basis of a history of that period.” He says that he has “been forced to choose between repeating the well-known ac- counts of various battles and giving from new data the proof.” And adds that he has “chosen the latter course.” In concluding his preface he says he is “ under special obligations to Secretary of War Lincoln, to Secretary of the Navy Hunt, to Colonel Robert N. Scott, of the Bureau of Archives in the War Depart- ment, to Generals Wright, Meigs, Barnes, Humphreys, Keyes, and others for their kindness in furnishing maps and documents.” That he was “An actor himself in everything here treated of ”—and on the title-page we find this work is “By Alexander 8. Webb, LL.D., President of the College of the City of New York; As- sistant Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac; In- spector-General, Fifth Army Corps; General command- ing second division Second Corps; Major-General as- signed, and Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.” He devotes a special chapter to, what he styles, “ The first bloody and important contest of the campaign, known as the Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines.” Amongst other things he says that early-in the after- noon of the 30th, orders were promptly given by Gen- eral Johnston,* “to concentrate twenty-three out of twenty-seven brigades of the Rebel army against the two Union corps, about two fifths of McClellan’s army. .. . Longstreet and Huger were directed to move to D. H. Hill’s position as early as possible next morning, and Smith to march, with his brigade, to the point of meeting of the New Bridge and Nine Miles roads, near —_——_ ® “Battle of Fair Oaks,” by Alexander S. Webb, p. 99. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 243 which Magruder had five brigades. . . . General Smith was to engage reénforcements should any be sent across the Chickahominy; and in case he should encounter none, to attack on the left of the troops already en- gaged. Although the second in command, General Smith was not transferred to the point of first attack, lest the delay in moving his troops from the left, where they lay, should take up valuable time.” “But he went to that point and remained there.” “Their order of. battle, it will be remembered, put G. W. Smith on the left, Johnston being with him, Longstreet and D. H. Hill in the centre, and Huger on the right, with orders to move on the left flank and rear of the Federals. Some recrimination was indulged in by the commanding officers on account of the delay on Longstreet’s part in making the attack, and the alleged total failure of Huger to co-operate at all.”* “Huger seems to have defended himself successfully. As to Smith, on the other hand, a cause for the delay in his attack is found in a peculiar condition of the elements. . . . The wind proved an unreliable courier; it took up the sound of the cannon and carried that only to Johnston and Smith. It was not until Hill’s movement resulted in a heavy engagement which had lasted for some hours that, about three o’clock p.m., Smith was informed of the state of affairs and pushed in on Couch’s right, cutting the latter off from the remainder of his division. These mistakes on the part of the enemy saved us from a more Serious disaster than we suffered.”+ ‘The troops to shape mer: line (Sedgwick’s division and five regiments : Couch’s) was opposed during the latter part of the ay were Hood’s brigade, Whiting’s, Pettigrew’s, Hamp- * «* Battle of Fair Oaks,” by A. S. Webb, p. 108. + p. 110. 244 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. ton’s, and Hatton’s.*. . . General Hampton reports that after driving the enemy a short distance through the woods, he found that they were being rapidly reén- forced and held a strong position either fortified or af- fording natural shelter, and were fast extending beyond his (Hampton’s) left... . General Smith expresses the rather sanguine opinion that if he could have had an hour more of daylight, with the assistance of Hood’s brigade of Texans on the right, supported by Griffith’s, - of Mississippi, on the left, as well as by the brigade of General Semmes, all fresh troops, the enemy would have been driven into the swamps of the Chickahominy. . . . Three times, in his report of this day’s action, General Smith speaks of the enemy’s (Federal) strong position, as ‘either fortified or affording natural shelter;’ again, the ‘strong position of the enemy is better understood;’ again, ‘reconnoissance made during the morning de- veloped the fact that the enemy (Federal) was strongly fortified in the position attacked by my division on the previous evening.’ There was no fortification, or the semblance of one, on any part of the line held by the fragment of Couch’s division under General Aber- crombie and the troops of Sumner’s corps as they ar- rived on the field in the afternoon. . . . The imaginary fortified position which Smith encountered was, in fact, the living wall of brave men who withstood his advance and compelled him finally to retreat... . The Second Mississippi, upon whom General Smith relied to take the enemy’s (Federal) fortifications the next morning, were. withdrawn before daylight.” “The attempt of the Rebels to drive the left wing into the Chickahominy, and cut McClellan’s line of supply from White House, * «Battle of Fair Oaks,” by Alexander 8, Webb, p. 112, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 245 which opened with every prospect of success, was turned first into failure and then into disaster, which sent them back to Richmond in a panic on the night of June Ist. General Johnston, who refers in his report to the in- trenchments which prevented General G. W. Smith from attacking the right of Sumner’s line on June 1st, claims a victory on that day, when he was not on the field. . . . D. H. Hill, who led the advance on Casey’s camp, claims to have driven the Union troops first a mile and a half, and subsequently a mile farther, meeting with a con- stant series of successes on May 31st and June the Ist until by reason of the ‘ Yankees’ occupying ground i his rear on the Nine Miles road (a strange place for a beaten army to be in) it was deemed best to withdraw to Richmond.” * General G. W. Smith “ directed opera- tions until June 2d, when General R. E. Lee was placed in command of the army of Northern Virginia.” + On page 105 Gen. Webb says: “Sergeant Porter, left guide of the One Hundred and Fourth, was struck over the neck with a musket. . . . It was necessary to leave the guns, most of the horses having been killed, with the exception of a part of Regan’s battery which was brought off, the men supporting the wounded horses to keep them from falling in the traces.” On page 102: “It is not often that within the stern brevity required by a military report, any allusion is made such as the fury of the storm drew from General Keyes, who in speaking of It says: ‘ From their beds of mud and the pelting of this storm the Fourth Corps rose to fight the battle of the 31st of May.’” He adds: “Longstreet’s division was called right wing at Seven Pines ;” ¢ informs his readers * “Battle of Fair Oaks,’’ by Alexander 8. Webb, p. 116, 7 pride, + The Peninsula, p. 203. ane = SRR RE aaa see eRe te Se RL lel ie Mn As Nl i ae i he a a i lt a i ae A 246 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. that the story of this battle “is well known to all;”* and asserts that it has been discovered since the war the Federal army “ could have gone to Richmond.” + Comments.—The foregoing quotations, from General Webb’s description of the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines fairly illustrate the result of his labors in sifting new. material and reducing the data to small compass. It is not proposed to follow him closely, upon the ele- vated plane which he professes to have occupied, whilst executing his assigned task of recording condensed truth in regard to the “first bloody and important con- test” of the Peninsula campaign against Richmond. In view of facts already stated no comment is needed here in reference to his assertion that Smith was ordered to march his brigade to the point of meeting and attack in case Federal reénforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy were not encountered—that Smith relied upon the Second Mississippi regiment to take the Federal fortifications next morning—or his various other gross errors in regard to the part taken by General Smith in this action. But, it may well be said, General Webb’s conclusion that disaster to the Confederates sent them back to Richmond in a panic on the night of the 1st of June is just as unfounded as his gratuitous postponement, to the 2d of June, of General Lee’s as- signment to the command of the army of Northern Vir- ginia. In his description of this battle General Webb appears to have blindly adopted many of the errors, in regard to Confederate movements, contained in the narratives which preceded his own, and to have introduced some new ones. On the other hand it must be conceded that, * The Peninsula, p. 186. t p. 186. Stn te ne se CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 247 in sifting new material, he reduces military history to small compass, for “practical use,” by saying: “Ser- geant Porter (Federal), left guide of the One Hundred and Fourth, was struck over the neck with a musket.” Without further reference to General Webb’s account of this battle, attention is called to the following letter from Major Seth B. French, which was written to Gen- eral Smith soon after the publication of Mr. Swinton’s account of General Johnston’s original plan of the bat- tle of Seven Pines. “CHATTANOOGA, TENN., July 8, 1867. “ My Dear General: “Tn compliance with your request I have the pleasure of furnishing you, to the best of my recollection, with incidents and facts associated with movements made on the 31st of May, 1862—the battle of Seven Pines. On the morning of that day, under your orders, I, with other members of your staff, followed you to the head- quarters of General Johnston, known as the Stubbs House, and there learned, as an officer of your staff, particulars of movements preparatory to an attack upon the enemy’s forces on the south side of the Chickahominy. General Longstreet had been ordered to move his own division on the Nine Miles road; General D. H. Hill on the Williamsburg, and General Huger on the Charles City, three divisions, forming the right wing of the army, under the command of General Longstreet. General Whiting commanding your own proper division, had been ordered by General Johnston to move at an early hour to the Nine Miles road and act as a support to General Longstreet, who had been directed to engage the enemy. General Whiting with his command, with- in a short distance of General Johnston’s headquarters, ea A le lk Fc oP Ali I ii a Na le a il I, Ra tate oa 248 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 249 reported that his march was impeded by the movement wished the troops were back in their camps. Subse- of General Longstreet’s troops across his line of march, and in the direction of the Williamsburg road. With this information, you ordered Colonel Beckham, then Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp, to go to General Long- street and find out his exact position, and report to him the delay—in the movement of Whiting’s command— caused by Longstreet’s division crossing Whiting’s line of march—and have it remedied. In about an hour after that a courier arrived from Lieutenant Beckham, stating that he could not find General Longstreet or his command, and was fully satisfied that neither he nor his division was on the Nine Miles road. General John- ston on receipt of this information—and being satisfied that Beckham must be mistaken—despatched his Aide- de-Camp, Lieutenant Washington, in search of General Longstreet on the Nine Miles road, which resulted in the capture of Washington. Colonel Beckham, on his return to headquarters, reported that General Longstreet was on the Williamsburg road, and the troops he saw had halted, having with them their baggage wagons, etc. Some time after Beckham returned, you, with a selection of officers of your staff, moved under orders from General Johnston, to a point, and with an object, not known to me; leaving myself and a number of your officers to accompany General Johnston on the Nine Miles road. Which we did, and remained with him until you rejoined us about half a mile this side of the junction of the New Bridge and Nine Miles roads. At the house selected for headquarters much anxiety was manifested because of the unaccountable delay of Gen- eral Longstreet in striking the enemy. General John- ston requested me to listen for musketry, and when I reported that I could not hear any, he said that he a BE ea Ba! CaaS SST quently information was received at headquarters that Longstreet had engaged the enemy. I cannot remem- ber the hour when this information arrived, but am in- clined to think it was after four o’clock in the afternoon when General Johnston left his headquarters and gal- loped down the Nine Miles road to the point where General Whiting was in command of your division, You followed soon after General Johnston. When I arrived on the field General Johnston was, in person, giving orders for the movement of the troops under General Whiting, and called upon different members of your staff to assist him, which they cheerfully did. I understood at the time of the fight, in fact prior to leav- ing General Johnston’s headquarters (in the suburbs of Richmond), that you were on the field without an im- mediate command—though a portion of your troops under General Whiting were engaged—for the purpose of rendering any assistance occasion might demand, and watching the movements of the enemy. I do not remember now of your taking any active part in the affair until it was reported that General Hampton’s command was in much peril, and unless assistance whs rendered it would possibly be crushed. This aid you promptly rendered, so far as it was in your power, and In person went immediately to the scene of action. I Saw very little of you after that during the engagement; but, was quite near General Johnston when he was wounded. Captain Fauntleroy, of General Johnston’s staff, started off to inform you of the Commanding-Gen- eral’s wound, though I do not think he‘ found you, When you returned to the Nine Miles road the firing had ceased, it was quite dark and rainy, and I am under the impression it was there that you first heard of the 250 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, injury sustained by the General Commanding, who had. retired from the field. I regret I cannot go more into detail. “ Most truly your friend, “SS. B. FREncH.” General Johnston’s letter to General Smith, dated the 28th of June, 1862, shows clearly that he intended Long- street’s division, or at least a large portion of it, should move into action by the Nine Miles road. It is quite certain that previous to the receipt of General Long- street’s note, at 4 p.m. on the 31st, General Johnston believed—and with good reason—that the thirty thou- sand men in the right wing of his army would be able to defeat the enemy in the vicinity of Seven Pines. He did not direct the division under Whiting to move from the left wing of the army to the right in order to attack the right flank of the enemy at Seven Pines in case it did not encounter Federal reénforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy. In other words, no important flanking operation was entrusted to this divi- sion in General Johnston’s original plan. But, when Gtneral Longstreet—within less than an hour after only one of the three divisions under his command was fully engaged—called upon General Johnston for immediate help, the latter moved the supporting division under Whiting, rapidly to Longstreet’s assistance. Four bri- gades of that division encountered, and held at bay, Federal reénforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy, whilst the other brigade was sent by General Johnston direct to Longstreet. It is believed that General Johnston is correct in saying that only five of the thirteen brigades under Longstreet were brought into action on the 31st, and that five sixths of the loss CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 251 sustained by the right wing, in the two days’ fighting, was suffered by D. H. Hill’s division. All that is said and intimated by General Johnston, Mr. Davis and others, in reference to the advantage that might have been gained by the Confederates, if the unfinished battle of the 31st of May: had been re- newed early on the morning of the 1st of June, is suffi- ciently answered by the fact that the Federals had three corps on the battle-field on the Ist whilst they had only one on the morning of the 31st—and the Confederate force on that field on the first of June was the same as that ordered by General Johnston on the 30th of May. But, apart from this, General G. W. Smith, who as- sumed command at dark on the 31st, ordered the Con- federate attack to be renewed as soon after daylight as practicable next morning. The result is indicated in General Longstreet’s battle-field notes, ending with that of 1.30 p.m., in which he exclaims, “ Oh that I had ten thousand men more !” PART Iv. DEFENCES OF RICHMOND AND NORTH CAROLINA IN THE LATTER PART OF 1862—AND HARLY MONTHS OF 1863. CHAPTER I. Richmond in September, 1862—protection of General Lee’s line of communication—forces in and near Richmond—negroes drafted to work on fortifications—General Smith asks why six of his juniors had been promoted over him—written reply to reasons assigned for the wholesale overslaughing to which he had been subjected. Wuen General Lee’s army left the vicinity of Rich- mond, in the latter part of August, 1862, and moved North against the Federal forces under General Pope, General G. W. Smith, the second officer in rank in Lee’s army, was assigned to command in North Carolina and that part of Virginia south of the immediate theatre of Lee’s active operations, with headquarters in Richmond, The Commanders of the Military Departments of North Carolina and of Henrico—the latter embracing the city of Richmond, were directed by the Secretary of War to report to General Smith and obey, his orders. On the “19th of September General Smith wrote to General Lee: “Captain H. H. Walker, C. 8. regular army, has been appointed Colonel in the Provisional army, and ordered by me to report to General Winder, who has been di- cae CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 258 rected to assign Colonel Walker to command all the guards in the city. I have managed to gather force enough, I think, to enable them to systematize and con- trol things here. . . . The Secretary of War has ap- pointed Dr. E. S. Gaillard, Medical Director of my com- mand, and has placed the general hospitals (in Virginia and North Carolina) under my control. The authority heretofore exercised by General Winder and a Medical Board in regard to discharges and furloughs is with- drawn from them and conferred upon me and the medical officers under me. . . . I have not overlooked your suggestion in regard to expelling the enemy from our borders and securing a point lower down the James River. . . . General French is moving on Suffolk, and General Wise is moving on Williamsburg. . . . I shall never cease to regret that I could not be with you; but you may rest assured that I will, on that account, abate no effort to perform as well as I can the part assigned me by the Government.” On the 26th of September General Smith wrote to General Lee: “The expedition against Suffolk and that against Williamsburg, had to be relinquished—the enemy having been reénforced at both places, making their numbers in each case largely superior to ours. . . . Our picket lines are extended farther than formerly and the enemy kept within narrower limits than heretofore. » +. . The expeditions recently undertaken have de- layed the work upon the defences. Negroes are diffi- cult to procure. ... Iam endeavoring to introduce order and system into the city and press forward mili- tary preparations of every kind. I sometimes feel that the task is hopeless; but will continue to try to improve and perfect instead of allowing things to remain as they are.” 254 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. On the 28th of September: “One of my best. staff officers, Major Beckham, ordnance officer of my com- mand, has been sent to Gordonsville, Culpepper, War- renton, and Winchester, with special instructions and authority as Acting Inspector-General to regulate all - Matters in that section of my command... . Officers here who are acting under the immediate orders of Heads of Departments of the General Government claim to be, and are in fact, under authority higher than mine. (They trace right back to the President.) But so far we have managed, by extra trouble anda good deal of worry, to procure in time nearly all that is necessary. . »+ General French reports the force of. the enemy at Suffolk increasing. . .. The enemy are still reported near Bristoe Station. . . . There are no means here, or on the road, sufficient to prevent the advance of a column from Washington, or that direction, against the flank of your line of communications.” ~ On the 2d of October: “Colonel Chambliss, Colonel Niemeyer, and the Second North Carolina, when it gets up, will continue to give their attention to pressing the stragglers forward to your army as well as to watching - and holding the enemy in check. I enclose with this copies of letters just received from General French and my reply. These will give you an idea of our condition at Petersburg and in North Carolina—and my inten- tions. . . . We have had such poor success in procuring negroes for work upon the fortifications that the Secre. _ tary of War has applied to the Legislature to pass an act drafting negroes into the service for this Work. 5.4% At the risk of being considered intrusive I will say, in closing this letter, if you cannot strike a decisive blow in a short time from your present position, I think you ought to be nearer Richmond.” ‘ my juniors, have been recently promoted to rank me in ae eee cee CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 255 On the 6th of October: “ Wise (Chapin’s Bluff), 1755 effectives; Daniels (Drewry’s Bluff), 3044; artillery, heavy and light, 1825; City Guard, under Colonel H. H. Walker, 838; four regiments, not brigaded, 2091. Total effectives in and near Richmond, 9553. This does not include the cavalry picketing from the J ames River to the upper Rappahannock, nor the 61st Virginia In- fantry in advance of Culpepper Court House. . : General French has been directed to place troops in position to defend Weldon from attack coming from Suffolk. The yellow-fever at Wilmington will prevent the enemy from attempting anything in that quarter for j some time to come. During the epidemic the troops will be removed except from the fortifications.” =e On the 15th of October, General G. W. Smith ad- dressed a note to the Secretary of War, as follows: “Having been informed to-day that six Major-Generals, Pere are eee the army, I respectfully ask the reasons therefor.” On the 16th General Smith wrote General Lee: “There is enough confusion and disorder here at the best, but it is vastly increased by (unassigned) con- . . scripts held back from the front—paroled prisoners—and sick and stragglers from your army... . By last ad- vices from General French the force of the enemy at j 4 Suffolle is still increasing. . . They are also said to be reénforcing at Newbern. The recent arrivals are sup- posed to be new levies. . . . The signs indicate that they contemplate operations south of the James River, but I think they are not yet ready to take the field, . . » Lam sorry to say that in the execution of the most difficult, complicated, and important work with which I have ever been charged, I feel that the Government has not helped me—or the cause—by placing six Major- Met ae a RIMS eT PL See 256 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. Generals—who were recently my juniors—over me in the army.” ‘* HEADQUARTERS, RicuMonp, Oct. 21st, 1862, “General Guo. W. Ranpopn, : Secretary of War. “General: “On the 15th inst. I had the honor to address youa letter stating that I had been that day informed that six Major-Generals, my juniors, had been recently pro- moted to rank me in the army, and respectfully asking the reasons therefor. “To this letter I have received no written reply, but have been informed by you that the President, in ex- planation, states that Senator Wigfall did not consider that my present command came within the intention of the law authorizing the appointment of Lieutenant- Generals. “On the 19th of September, 1861, I was appointed Major-General, and was at once assigned to command the 2d Corps of the Army of the Potomac. From the time General Beauregard left that army in January last, until the 31st of May, I was the second officer in rank in the field this side of the Alleghany Mountains, and com- manded during most of that time one, or the other, wing of the army. When General J. E. Johnston was wounded at the battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, the command of the army devolved upon me, I was, how- ever, superseded during the battle by General R. E. Lee, by order of the President, on the 1st of June. On the 2d of June I retired from the field on account of ill-health and was unable to return until about the 10th of August. “On reporting to General Lee for duty, I asked to bo er ae TES ee CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 257 assigned to my own division. This wasrefused. I was assigned to another division, and in a few days was placed in command of the right wing of General Lee’s army. About the time of the commencement of Gen- eral Lee’s operations on the Rappahannock, I was ordered to remain in Richmond, and, without being for- mally separated from Lee’s army, was instructed to com- municate direct with the War Department and to com- mand in place of General Lee from the mouth of the Cape Fear River north to the line of Lee’s active opera- tions. “T objected to remaining here and claimed to be allowed to go with the division to which I had been recently assigned. I was overruled in this matter and given to understand that the Government considered my Services more necessary in my present position. It is not for me to say how the duty imposed upon me has been performed. I will say, however, that I have found it to be a position of vital importance, vast in extent, complicated and annoying. The difficulties and respon- sibilities have been great, the enemy threatening—col- lisions taking place along the line from the upper Rap- pahannock to Wilmington. My command of troops in the field, operating against the enemy, being made all the more difficult by the vexatious interferences and details connected with command in this city. I may have made mistakes, but if General Lee, to whom I re- port all matters of interest by letter, yourself or the President are not satisfied with what I have done, I am not aware of that fact. “T am not acting under a General, but have absolutely relieved General Lee of a large portion of his command, and am in direct communication with the Government; and, if numbers are to be taken into consideration as an oi a —— _ 258 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. * element in estimating the importance of a command, I venture the opinion that not one of the six Major-Gen- erals promoted to rank me have as many enlisted men under them as are within the limits of my command and under my orders. My position and duties here are more assimilated to those properly pertaining to the rank of ‘General than to that of Lieutenant-General. “In addition to the above statement in regard to the nature of my present command, and of that previously exercised by me, I beg leave to refer to the subject of the command proper of a Major-General, which, in an army organized like ours, is a division. When the two corps of which the Army of the Potomac was composed were broken up, I most willingly accepted the command - of a division instead of a corps. It was the proper com- mand for my rank. And I would most gladly have re- tained the command of the old 1st Division of the Army of the Potomac to the end of the war—shared its fate— and united my destiny with that of the gallant officers and men who composed it. But the division was broken up, and I was ordered to another command, without my consent, against my wishes, and without being con- sulted. I submitted without complaint. Had we been engaged in any other than a war for existence I would have resigned rather than be thus separated from my division. But the command to which I was assigned contained two brigades which had formerly belonged to the 2d Corps: that of Whiting and that of Hood, This division was also broken up and distributed amongst my juniors. I objected to this, but to no purpose. I was then assigned to another division which was ordered off, and I ordered to remain here. “TI have heretofore made no complaint—I make none now. IJ have applied for nothing—and apply CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 259 for nothing now. I have not been consulted by the Government in regard to the duties and _ positions assigned me since receiving a commission—unless this may be called an exception—viz.: The President in- formed me that he had told a distinguished gentleman from South Carolina that he would order me to Charles- ton to command the Department of South Carolina and Georgia in July last if my health would permit. I was consulted on the state of my health alone. That subject was referred to the Medical Director of my command. He decided that the state of my health would not justify my attempting to take that command at that time. Or this, viz.: “ When most of the troops of my command were ordered forward to the Rapidan, the Secretary of War told me that it was desirable for me to remain here. I expressed an unqualified preference to go with my troops. But told him that, if, in his judgment, it was to the interest of the service and the cause for me to remain, I would obey his order to do so, in a willing spirit, and be none ‘the less useful here because of my decided and clearly expressed desire to go with my troops. The Secretary then gave the order forme to remain. But I had reason to believe afterwards that the President had previously determined to keep me here. “ My sole desire is to aid in resisting Northern despot- ism—to drive back the invaders, and establish our inde- pendence, But the recent action of the Government, in putting over me six of my juniors, diminishes my useful- ness in the position I now occupy to an extent which makes it incumbent upon me to give place to some one who is not laboring under the great disadvantage of con- demnation in advance, “I know that the President has the right to select gen- _—m Se rere ¥ 260 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, eral officers, and I would under other circumstances say nothing. But I maintain that J was selected to perform duties clearly pertaining to the rank of Lieutenant-Gen- eral, that I commanded a corps when most if not all of those who have been promoted over me were command- ing brigades, that I have had a Lieutenant-General’s com- mand nearly all the time I have been in service, that I commanded the right wing of General Lee’s army, and was by him ordered to the front with my command, and was selected and ordered by the Secretary’ of War. to remain here in a position in which he considered that I could render more important services to the country than by going to General Lee’s army with the three divisions then under my command—a position in which I am com- manding more troops than are in the three divisions that went on without me. “The responsibilities and difficulties connected with my present duties are well known to the Government. Ihave * been selected to perform these duties, and when a law is passed, authorizing the appointment of Lieutenant-Gen- erals—a rank corresponding to the position I have so long occupied, and hold now—I am selected to be over- slaughed. “'The morale in war is an essential element of success and cannot with safety be ignored. Had I been allowed to command my own division I would have been not only satisfied to command it, and 7 alone, to the end of the war, but would have been proud and glad to remain with it, and share its fate—and the Government as far as con- cerned me, might have selected six hundred instead of six of my juniors and made them Lieutenant-Generals— It wouid have been no affair of mine, “But the old 1st Division was broken up and taken from me—the division to which I was next assigned was broken CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 261 up and distributed amongst my juniors—the division to which I was afterwards assigned was ordered off and I ordered to remain here. I have no division now, and, if one should be given me, I have no reason to believe that I would be allowed to remain with it long enough to be- come its real commander. “T have the honor, sir, to tender my resignation as Major-General ‘of the Provisional army of the Confed- erate States, and request its immediate acceptance, “Very respectfully, your obedient servant, “Gusravus W. Smiru, Major-General.” “ Mem. October 21st, 1862.—The above letter was not delivered to the Secretary of War for reasons stated in & memorandum appended to the letter after our inter- view of this morning. Instead of the letter as above recorded, a copy of it, excepting the last paragraph, was sent informally to the Secretary of War for file in his office, G. W. S.” “HEADQUARTERS, RIcHMOND, October 21st, 1862. “ Mem. to be appended to copy of letter of this date to be filed with Secretary of War. “On Saturday last I had an interview with the Secre- tary of War, and in that interview gave him to under- stand that I was not satisfied with what he then told me of the reasons for not appointing me Lieutenant-General. He requested me to delay action in the matter until he could have another interview with the President on the subject. Believing that no satisfactory answer would be given—on the next day—I prepared a letter to him on the subject, and called on him this morning with the in- tention of delivering that letter, a éopy of which is on -record, The letter was not delivered, but the substance 262 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, of it was talked over, and I stated freely, without reserve, all that I felt. I did not tell the Secretary that I had the letter, because of his remarks, when I told him that I in- tended to resign; which were to the effect that my place could not now be filled. That my resignation at this time would embarrass the business of his office fearfully, and would certainly be a great injury to the Confederate cause. He said that there was no want of confidence in me on the part of the Government, that the fact of my being passed over was accidental or incidental, that the nominations were very hurriedly made, that the subject had not been finally disposed of—that time and a revision of work that had been too much hurried would set all things right. That my services here as an administra- tive officer, in addition to commanding troops in the field, had been of the greatest benefit to the President, to himself and the whole War Department. That if I left now, the confusion and disorder would be worse than ever—and he urged me to defer action until some one who now ranked me came to take command, or until the whole matter was satisfactorily arranged. At least wait until Richmond was in less danger than it is now and has been during the time I have been in command, I told him that I would rather have been shot dead than to have had my usefulness in so important a command impaired, if not destroyed, by the recent: wholesale over- slaughing to which I had been subjected. And told him it had unfitted me for the command; and that I would not for any consideration on earth retain rank at the hazard and risk of the vital interests of the country. He said that I ought to allow the government to judge of my fitness for the position, and again urged and advised me to wait for a time. “TI told him at the end of an hour’s conversation that CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 263 IT would stand by him in defence of the city and see him through it. With the understanding between us that if one of my former juniors, now promoted over me, came here to relieve me, or if after a reasonable time the whole matter was not satisfactorily settled, that I would be entirely free to take the course I proposed. “G, W. Smiru, Major-General.” ‘CHAPTER IL. Brigade from General Lee’s army ordered to North Carolina by Secretary of War—forces under General Smith’s orders check movements of the enemy against General Lee’s rear—General Smith appointed Secretary of War ad interim—Enemy at Fredericksburg and on the Black Water—number and posi- tion of troops—reference to future operations. On the 30th of October, General Smith wrote to Gen- eral Lee: “The negroes under the draft seem to be almost as slow coming in as they were under the old arrangement, but we are still expecting them. .. ; General French is satisfied that his information is cor- rect in regard to the force of the enemy at Suffolk. . . . The railroad from Wilmington to Petersburg is very accessible to them. . . . I have not yet succeeded in getting a Brigadier-General to command the four un- attached regiments here.” On the 5th of November, General Smith telegraphed to General Lee, at Culpepper Court-house: “General French urgently asks that a brigade be sent to him at once. Can you send it immediately? It is needed.” And, later, on the same day: “The Secretary of War Says send a brigade through to Weldon as soon as it can Aa Ua a a ener ee oe eT yee ee ae EN SMES oF MEE a eT 264 CONFEDERATE WaAR PAPERS. possibly be done.” General Smith wrote to General Lee, same date: “Daniel’s brigade cannot be sent away from Drewry’s Bluff. Wise’s brigade is very small and not sufficient to guard the batteries at Chapin’s Bluff, The only available force with which to reénforce either of these points or the heavy batteries around Richmond, is the brigade of General Jo. Davis, composed of the four unattached regiments previously referred to. So far from having any troops to send to General French, I require, here, for the defence of this city, against sud- den attack by way of James River, at least a division in addition to the force we now have.” On the 9th of Novembér: “General French estimates the enemy at four to one against him, and considers his force unequal to the task of holding the rich seaboard counties with a view to procuring from them the large supplies of provisions and forage they contain (which are so essential to your army). His instructions are to protect Weldon, Petersburg, and the railroad, I think he can do this with the force he now has: but, a portion of this force must be returned to Wilmington in a few days; the yellow fever having abated, and these troops being the regular garrison at Wilmington. . + » The enemy’s .cavalry dashed into Fredericksburg to-day, but were driven across the river again and chased several miles.” On the 10th of November, Telegram to General Lee, at Culpepper Court House: “Colonel Ball’s regiment, 15th Va. Cavalry—is at Fredericksburg. He and Colonel Chambliss have instructions to keep in com- munication with each other. Colonel Ball has been in- structed to communicate with you direct. General French telegraphs that the enemy have fallen back to Plymouth.” CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, ~ 265 On the 11th, Telegram to General French: The Secretary of War directs that you send es to the vicinity of Wilmington immediately.” On t e same day, telegram to General Lee: “ The following telegram is just received from Colonel Davidson, com- manding at Staunton: ‘The enemy are within thirty- five miles of this place. One column at McDowell and one at Raleigh Springs. Amounting to five or six - thousand. Can you send me more troops ?’” On the 16th, telegram to General Lee: “Colonel Ball, at Fredericksburg, applies for more force. I ee already sent more than can well be spared from here. The same day telegram to General Lee: ‘Colonel Ball thinks an immediate advance on Fredericksburg cer- tain.” , ““RicHMoND, VA., November 17th, 1862. “ Major-General G. W. Smith is hereby appointed Secretary of War ad interim. “ Jerrerson Davis.” On the 18th, telegram to Colonel Ball: “It is im- portant to delay the enemy’s crossing. The question of risk of battery and other points is left to your dis- cretion. You will undoubtedly be justified in shooting down any man who deserts his guns.” On the same day telegram to General Lee: “ General French says, ‘The enemy are reported to be in full force on the Blackwater. Prisoners report it a real advance.’ Later same day, ‘Colonel Ball reports no further ad- vance on the town. Prisoners taken say it is Sumner’s corps opposite Fredericksburg. Lieutenant Reese, 13th Va. Cavalry, on picket at Ellis’s Ford, reported a large force advancing on Fredericksburg rapidly.” On the 26th, General Smith wrote to General Lee: sar —— bas “as soon as it is safe, time, have not been able t On the 29th, General Smith present. . . . I have directed Evans to support you in case do all in my power to put you General R. E. Lee ne HEapQuarters, Arm “Major-General G. W. § “ General: -.. Upon with General Early, Major- oo rales eo to have been assigned fences of this city, was to the command of the local de- 0 do so.” iimington, “TI am Satisfied ora gun from General Lee at General French to order of emergency, and I will In condition,” to General G. W. Smith, y N. Va., 6th Dec., 1869, MitH, Comdg., etc., Richmond, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 267 River. They, like others transmitted to me, knowing none of the circumstances connected with them, present no definite idea of operations which may be in progress or contemplation, I presume you know what weight to give them, and should like always to have your opinion, . .. The reports that I have received from other sources do not make the force at Suffolk so large as is represented by the informants of General French, and the Northern papers seem rather to indicate an appre- hension of an attack by you, which I have considered was the cause of the reénforcements being sent under General Corcoran and others. General Burnside’s army, I am inclined to believe, is encamped between the Rap- pahannock and Potomac—nor can I learn of any prepara- tions to transfer it elsewhere. . . . The withdrawal of this army from the front of General Burnside, or even a portion of it, would, I think, cause his advance to Rich- mond, and cut us off from the supplies we are drawing from the valley of the Rappahannock. I think it im- portant to keep him ata distance as long as possible. If you can, with the forces in the vicinity of Richmond, retard, if not successfully oppose, the advance of the enemy south of James River, the army could arrive _ there in time to give battle. I hope your strength is sufficient for this purpose, and I should be glad to know the number of troops you would be able to concentrate when occasion requires it. “Tam, very respectfully, your obedient servant, “R. I. Len, General.” “‘RicumonpD, Dec. 10th, 1862. “General R. E. Lex, Comdg. Army N. Va. “ General: “Your letter of the 6th inst, is received. To answer your inquiry as to the number of troops in this com- EE er ata ne ak ta li ll See arenes emma armmal - 268 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. mand that could be concentrated should occasion re- quire, it ,will be necessary first to state in general terms the number and position of the troops and the nature of the points they are guarding. “Ist. Richmond.—At Chapin’s Bluff we have Wise’s brigade, about 1700. effectives; At Drewry’s Bluff Daniel’s brigade, about 3000 effectives. Neither of these brigades ought to be removed from this vicinity. In case of attack by troops landed just below either of the Bluffs they would have to be promptly reénforced or we would lose the gate through which gunboats could pass to our wharves. There is one brigade, Davis’s, here in reserve numbering 2318 effective men Besides these three brigades, we have artillery, heavy and light, numbering 1497; and the guard of the city numbering about 1000 men, My conviction is that no portion of this force should be removed from Richmond 8o long as the James River is open to the enemy to Chapin’s Bluff. “2d. At Wilmington—the other end of the line—we have, besides artillerists in the forts and batteries form- ing the water defences, four regiments of infantry (say about 2000). Making total force at Wilmington about 4000. I do not think that it would-be safe to remove any of this small infantry force from Wilming- ton because the enemy can bring troops by water and disembark within a very short distance without going. near the defences at the mouth of the river, “Tt is not necessary for me to enlarge upon the im- portance of holding Richmond and Wilmington and preparing to resist any force that might be landed with- in a few miles of either; at least, until reénforcements could be brought to their assistance. Neither of the two places have anything like adequate garrisons. But - CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 269 Richmond is now within supporting distance of your army. I feel great anxiety for Wilmington, as you 0 already aware, and fear its isolation by the breaking (a) the railroad communication between that point and Richmond. “3d. Petersburg.—General French commands here and to the Cape Fear District. By his last report he had about 11,000 men, Two regiments have since that time gone to Wilmington and form a part of the force at Wilmington as given above. Deduct these from the number stated in General French’s last return, and his present force is about 10,000, viz.: Pettigrew’s brigade, at Petersburg and on the Blackwater, 3465. Pryor’s, on the Blackwater, 2151. Robertson, near Weldon, 1322, (Cavalry under instruction.) And Evans at Kin- ston, about 2000. These with detachments and small guards make the command of General French, as already stated, about 10,000. ; “ Petersburg is too accessible from City Point—to say nothing about Suffolk—to leave without a garrison, and the force cannot with any safety be reduced to less than it is now, viz.: about 2000. “4th. Kinston.—Evans’s small force at this point, in front of Newbern, and covering Goldsboro, cannot well be withdrawn. Besides, this is the only means we have for reénforcing Wilmington without taking the troops from the Blackwater for that purpose, which would un- cover Weldon and allow the enemy from Suffolk to break our connection with North Carolina without a blow being struck to prevent it. : : “In short, the force in my command is entirely in- adequate to the work to be done, and I know of no good reason why, within the last two months, the enemy have not broken the line of railroad at one or more points t ‘ { t a F \ i - ee, ee 270 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, between Richmond and Wilmington, at any time they chose to make the effort. _ “Tf they attack this place I can, with aid from the Blackwater, hold them in check until a portion of your army can come to our relief, If they attack Peters- burg, our forces being in their present positions when they attempt it, we could hold Petersburg until assist- ance could arrive from your army. If by demonstra- tions in North Carolina they draw our forces in that - direction from the Blackwater and Petersburg a fatal blow might be struck at Petersburg before you could prevent it. If they send an expedition against Wil- mington, I have no adequate reénforcements for that place without exposing Richmond, Petersburg, and Weldon. Even if disposed to do this, which is very far from my intention, I am by no means satisfied that troops could reach Wilmington from here, in time to save that place if they were not siarted until a landing had been commenced by the enemy against it... . Major-General Elzey has reported to me for duty. As soon as he can get his staff, I shall assign him to com- mand here and go in person to North Carolina—see the condition of affairs—and endeavor to put everything in the best condition to meet whatever may come. Rest assured that I shall do the best I can. I would be pleased to have your views. Will keep you promptly informed of all movements of importance even at the risk of occasionally sending crude and imperfect infor- mation, “Very respectfully, your obedient servant, “G, W, Surrn, Major-General.” ee QOONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. CHAPTER II. General Beauregard sends troops from Charleston to Wilmington —Evans fighting in front of Kinston, N. C.—General French ordered to reénforce Evans—driven back, burns the bridge at Kinston—fight at Whitehall Bridge—enemy driven back with severe loss—troops from Richmond had not arrived—enemy burns one of the two bridges—General Smith’s report to the Secretary of War—General Clingman’s report—position of forces in North Carolina—political feeling in that State— another invasion anticipated. Telegram, December 13th, 1862, to Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting, Wilmington: “The Secretary of War has directed General Bearregard to send to you all the force he can spare, without too much risk at Charleston, in case the troops from Banks’s fleet are landed at a point threatening Wilmington. General Beauregard has been requested, in case communica- tions are cut off between this place and Wilmington, to give special attention, and such aid to your command as may be in his power. In this contingency you will of course obey the orders of General Beauregard.” Telegram, December 13th, 1862, to General R. E. Lee: “Evans is fighting near Kinston. I have directed General Whiting to give all the aid he can to prevent the railroad communications from being cut. The enemy were driven back completely on the Blackwater yester- day. General French has been directed to send all the force he can spare to Evans. I have ordered Davis’s brigade south of the James River, and will move it to Petersburg if required.” On the 15th General Smith—from Weldon, N. C.—. —————— Seance a TOO iE TOURS CRT: wre — OARS TT TL 272 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. ordered by telegram, that Daniel’s and Davis’s brigades be sent at once to Goldsboro. Evans had retired across the river at Kinston about dark on the 14th and burned the bridge. General Beauregard telegraphed that he would send five thousand infantry and their batteries from Charleston to Wilmington. General Smith arrived at Goldsboro about 3 p.m, and telegraphed the Secretary of War: “The telegraph with Evans is cut. By latest information he is at Falling Creek, six miles this side of Kinston.” On the 16th, General Smith, from Goldsboro, to the Secretary of War: “At midnight it was reported that the enemy were passing up the river on the south side of b) } towards Dudley Station or this place. General Evans 7 vor Wilegraph: 1.086 permanente se ehentas appealed strongly for cavalry—reporting that he had but : i Pe 8 apt “ ne pe as the telegraph poles and one company. I had no troops of any Kind. With the HE the bhitvoad track, to what extent is not known. assistance of Governor Vance, who is here, I improvised ed 8 sent out this morning report the enemy three the best means I could for obtaining information from miles this side of White Hall. A large force of cav- the south side of the river. There were no troops of ours alry advancing towards Dudley or Goldsboro had not there whatever—the battalion picketing on that side reached the forks of the road. . .. We must concen- below Kinston having been enveloped by the enemy, trate in this direction and cross over and whip them if General French arrived about seven o’clock this morn- they attempt the railroad bridge.” ' : ing with one regiment from P etersburg—he has gone Telegram, December 16th, 1862, to Secretary of War. : down .to Bear Creek, about twelve miles, to join Gen- “The enemy made this morning a serious attack at i eral Evans. During the night, not knowing when the 7 White Hall bridge, on the right and rear of our position ; troops from Petersburg might be expected, I ordered this side of Kinston. . . . Later.—The enemy has been Evans to send one regiment to a bridge six miles below % here, and one to this place to guard the railroad bridge and the common road bridge near it. We can get noth- ing through the telegraph from Wilmington. Heavy firing is now heard distinctly upon the river below— supposed to be at White Hall bridge fifteen miles below or perhaps near the Six Miles Bridge. There is, as usual, great delay and difficulty in the railroad transpor- oe EA SH CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 2738 tation. I hope soon to obtain information of the move- ments of the enemy, and, on the arrival of the troops from’ Richmond, will endeavor .to strike an effective blow. Banks’s fleet is reported to General Whiting as certainly at Beaufort—but it is not known whether the troops have landed. They are within ten or twelve hours’ sail of Whiting. . .. We have no cavalry, no transportation, and are laboring under _ other diffi- culties. My staff officers are not yet here. December 16th, 1862, to Major-General 8. G. French: “Tsend you a despatch which the operator attempted to transmit to you some three or four hourssince. You will see by memoranda on it that we can’t depend upon driven back from White Hall bridge—his loss severe— ours not so. None of the troops from Richmond have arrived.” ; December 16th, 1862, to Major-General 8, G. French: “J willsend down five empty trains to-night. It. will be well to have the men sleep on board. In case the enemy move upon the railroad and the County bridges, Sh rte oc ke NN i ah naa Ss a SS st or . 274 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, General Clingman should be reénforced at once or we lose all chance of taking the offensive when the troops arrive: from Richmond. . . , The two thirty-pounders reached here to-day, but without horses they are almost useless, if not in the way... . One regiment, the 52d N. C., has just arrived—it will be sent over the river, If it is practicable, General Pettigrew had better come up in the first train with Burgwyn’s regiment and Petti- grew’s own troops immediately after. Let General Robertson hold position at Spring Bank bridge with two regiments and two pieces, and let General Evans with his brigade take position to cover the town—sup- port Robertson if it should be necessary—and be in place to support, in time, the troops beyond the bridge here if required. There are five field-pieces now be- yond the bridge with Colonel Pool’s battalion of artil- lery and Clingman’s two regiments of infantry. . . . If Pettigrew’s brigade crosses over I desire that you take ‘command of the force on that side—that is, of Cling- man’s and Pettigrew’s brigades. When the six regi- ments from Richmond get here we will, I hope, be strong enough to protect this place (its depots and sup- plies) from any movement they may make against it from below by means of their pontoon bridges—and at the same time be strong enough on the other side to beat them in any attempt they may make to burn therailroad bridge and county bridge.” Telegram, December 17, 1862, to Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting, Wilmington: “TI have no cavalry, and learn but little of the movements of the enemy. Troops from Richmond expected here to-night. Move your force up the railroad to a point this side of Mag- nolia; reconnoitre and use your own judgment. I will endeavor to keep you informed of my movements,” 8 ae NE A AR AS AE OS A RAN aN TIN CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 275 Telegram, December 18, 1862, to Secretary of ae “Yesterday afternoon the enemy made a sudden = e ment in large force upon the two bridges near this place—drove back our pickets and succeeded in Sten the railroad bridge. Several brigades were rset passed over the County bridge; attacked and drove the enemy back and saved the County bridge. The enemy were in large numbers, their second position was a strong one, night was at hand, only a portion of the ee from Richmond had arrived, none of the artillery, an no cavalry from either Richmond or Petersburg. I did not consider it advisable to attack again at dark. The enemy retired during the night. The few mounted men we now haye, about sixty, have been sent to ascertain their position and probable intentions. It was supposed that the whole force of the enemy was present. With- out cavalry it has been almost impossible to obtain ac- curate or prompt information in regard to their move- ments or numbers. They are burning mills and houses and devastating the country. We have not transporta- tion sufficient even for ammunition. I shall move as soon as possible.” Telegram, December 18, 1862, to Secretary of War. “One of my best officers returned at 2 p.m, having fol- lowed the enemy thirteen miles on the road to New- bern, He is satisfied they are rapidly moving to that place.” Geyerat T. L. Cirxeman in an official report, dated December 21, 1862, says: “Colonel Marshall with the Fifty-second N. C. regiment (of Pettigrew’s brigade) was stationed in front of the railroad bridge; and Colo- nel Shaw with the Eighth N. C., supported by a section of Starr’s battery, placed in the field in front of the County bridge; while Colonel Allen with the Fifty- sate ace et tb te a ei An i ES ata! ws wa . ar gn a Dea hg eT OPT a ae TRIE: LAI oT py. oo es A NOE EEO AO ARTE ACT i a ee ae _ 276 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. first N. C. was between the two to support either in case of need, The enemy soon opened heavily both with cannon and musketry against Colonel Marshall, evidently with a view of reaching the railroad bridge. I carried, therefore, the Fifty-first regiment to his sup- port, and placed it on his left flank. So heavy, however, was the fire from the large force of the enemy that these regiments were broken and fell back. They were soon rallied and taken back to their position. The increasing volleys of musketry and the rapid falling of shells from the numerous batteries of the enemy, in spite of all my efforts to keep them longer in position, caused them to - give way a second time. It being obvious that so small a force could not long maintain a contest against such heavy odds, they were formed in the rear, and carried back in good order to the County bridge, and with’ the force stationed there recrossed the river. To defend the bridge; the two guns of Starr’s battery, under com- mand of Lieutenant Fuller, were placed near it, and Colonel Marshall’s regiment lined the river bank below, and Colonel Allen occupied it above, while Colonel Shaw’s was placed as a reserve in the rear. For the defence of the railroad bridge there was in position on the north side of the river Colonel Pool’s battalion with ' several pieces of artillery.” After stating that the railroad bridge was burned General Clingman says: “General Evans ordered me to advance across the County bridge with my command and attack the enemy and feel his strength. The Sixty- first N. C. regiment of my brigade, in charge of Lieu- tenant-Colonel Devane, having by this time arrived, it, with the three already under my command, and the two field-pieces above mentioned, were moved across the river. Skirmishers were thrown forward and the enemy 277 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. were found to be posted from the river for a mile and . half, along the railroad in line of battle, well pen by the high embankment of the road in front of t ah General Clingman describes his ‘preparations for se tacking both flanks of the enemy’s line, with his force 0 two thousand infantry and two piecesof artillery, states what occurred, and says: “Evans’s brigade soon filled up the centre. After retreating from this sree (along the railroad) the enemy occupied a high field in our front with a large number of cannon, and heavy bodies of infantry drawn up in two lines with an interval of one or two hundred yards between them. . . . During the evening the regiments of Colonels Marshall ce _Allen, by General Evans’s order, as I have since Pepe made a charge against the enemy’s positicn on the ns They advanced most courageously, but were 2 se by heavy showers of grape and musketry. ‘ ~ : nares diately after dark, the enemy retreated with his i " army. ... Having been threatened with attack a ot wings at the same moment, while the swamp in his ve prevented his attacking and dividing our centre, he seems to have been terrified and induced to abandon as strong a position as the art of the engineer could Ras made, and fled with his large army toward the coast. Letter from General G. W. Smith to the ont of War, dated Goldsboro, Dee. 28th, 1862.— On my return from Wilmington last night, I received your letter of the 23d inst. and sent you a telegram saying that Clingman’s brigade had been ordered to Wilming- ton, General Beauregard having recalled his troops — that point: Before leaving for Wilmington, z priighics you that Pettigrew’s brigade and Leaventhorpe’s — ment had been sent back to Petersburg, Weldon, fe the Blackwater. General French returned with these ‘ 278 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS a troops. There are now here only three regiments. of Daniel’s brigade and three Mississippi regiments of Davis’s brigade.- Evans’s brigade, numbering about 1200, is at Kinston. If Beauregard’s troops could have been left at Wilmington, I would have felt secure at that point, and would-even have counted upon co-operation from there in case of another foray in force—but ‘as things stand now we are nowhere strong enough to resist successfully a real determined attack. I do not wish to be importunate or troublesome, but it is neces- sary to say again that the forces from Richmond to Wilmington, inclusive, are inadequate for the protection of the important points upon that line. The state of feeling in North Carolina is such that reverses will do. oi preg sates St pe iia aed us immense injury politically; and the military conse- 4 quences of disaster here would be felt with great effect 3 by the army in Virginia. Has not the time arrived when a portion of General Lee’s forces can be returned z to this section of the country? He has two regiments, oi of cavalry—the 13th Vag,Colonel Chambliss, and the ee i 15th Va., Colonel Ball—and the 61st Va. Infantry, and two batteries of artillery, all of which pnoperly belong aes to my command. These troops were sent up, by me, to a protect General Lee’s line of communication whilst he a was at Winchester and beyond the Potomac. Nothing a ‘ short of their absolute necessity to the. success of his a army will justify his keeping them any longer. But’ ¢ my intention is not so much to call your attention, at this time, to these minor details as to urge upon you to consider now the question of preparing at once to resist the invasion and occupation of North Carolina by the enemy. We have no reason to éxpect much further as- sistance from this State for a month or two, and I fear not much then. Conscripts come in very very slowly, PETA RENDER EMP T Dee OTe ee Pa a ee es are CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 279 and are worth but little when they do come. I beg you to think over the question of the defence of this State, and, if possible, furnish in time something like an ade- quate force for that purpose. If nothing occurs to prevent my leaving here, I expect to return to Rich- mond in a few days, and will then bring to your notice, | not only the matters referred to in this letter, but the question of organization in this command—which is now more geographical than military, and requires revising to adapt it to practical war purposes.” CHAPTER IV. The state of affairs in North Carolina—Ransom’s division (two small brigades) detached from General Lee’s army—contflict of opinion in regard to the movements of Ransom’s division— letter from General Smith to Secretary of War. «‘Ricumonp, VA., Jan. Ist, 18638. “General R. E. Ler, “ Commanding Army N. Va., “ Fredericksburg, Va. “ General: “TJ returned from North Carolina ‘on the night of the 30th ult. At the time I left Goldsboro all seemed to be quiet, and I returned for the purpose of communi- cating to the War Department, and to yourself, my views and conclusions in regard to the existing condi- tion of affairs in North Carolina. “You are aware that, by orders from the War Depart- nrent, my headquarters are in Richmond. Until Sat- urday, the 13th of December last, besides the general command over all that part of your Department not m- fa le oh i eal ci aE Ae MTU SS LP I a en & ET Mo SE BIC, 280 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. cluding the immediate theatre of operations of your army in the field, I was the local commander in Rich- mond. The day that General Elzey assumed the local command in this city, I started to North Carolina for the purpose of visiting and inspecting Wilmington and other points. At Petersburg I heard of the advance of the enemy upon Kinston, and immediately proceeded to Goldsboro, ordering forward such troops as could be spared from Richmond, Petersburg, and Wilmington, and directed my staff officers to join me at once. The railroad officers showed perfect willingness to do every- thing in their power, but we were twenty-four hours late in effecting the concentration of troops. General Beauregard reénforced Wilmington, and my opinion is that, if the enemy had remained forty-eight hours longer _ in the interior, we would have been able, in spite of their great superiority of force, to have beaten them. “General Beauregard’s troops have been withdrawn, the forces from Petersburg, Weldon, and the Black- water had to be returned. The brigade from Wilming- ton was sent back there when General Beauregard’s troops were withdrawn, and we are pretty much~-as before. But the enemy are constantly reénforcing Suf- folk and passing troops from Suffolk to Newbern. - I am satisfied that they ought to, and will, make a serious attempt in large force against points in North Carolina. Wilmington is of vast importance; Goldsboro and Weldon are important points; Petersburg is directly connected with the defences of this city on the south side; from Richmond to Wilmington inclusive there are not troops enough to enable us, if they were all con- centrated on one point, to meet the enemy in equal force. But Richmond, Petersburg, Wilmington, etc., cannot be entirely stripped of troops, I have no con- cl il) tO tl Wahi RAMANA a Nee! CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 281 fidence in the ability of our railroads to transport troops with promptness and regularity, and have no reason to believe that they will ever do better than they did on the recent trial. “The state of affairs in North Carolina is such that reverses will do us immense injury politically—and the military consequences of disaster there would be felt with great effect in Virginia. I do not consider it ne- cessary to dwell upon the peculiar geographical features giving advantages to the enemy—thus increasing largely the difficulties in defending such a line—but. it is my duty to inform you fully of my opinion in regard to this portion of your command. I do not hesitate to say that the forces are inadequate on every point, and I respect- fully urge upon you again the question of reénforcing this portion of your command by detachments from Fredericksburg. I am satisfied that the enemy are pre- pared to make a struggle for ascendency in North Caro- lina, and that to meet it successfully detachments will have to be made from the main army under your own immediate command. There are no other means that I know of, and to be effective your action in this matter should be immediate. Perhaps the time has already passed when this could have been done to the best ad- vantage. These are my views, but you have informa- tion of what is in your front and will decide what can be done. I may be mistaken as to the intentions of the enemy, but there is no mistake in regard to the vast in- terests at stake and the injurious political as well as military consequences that will result from disaster to us in North Carolina at this time. “Jan. 2.. Since writing the above I have received a telegram from Goldsboro—copy of which is herewith enclosed. I consider the information reliable in the i % iF RAN Pee eg ee ee (Sans nce 282 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, main. And have no doubt they are rapidly preparing another expedition to move from Newbern either against Goldsboro or Wilmington—more likely the latter. The Secretary of War has requested General Beauregard to render all the aid he can. Cavalry is very much needed in North Carolina, and I would like, at any rate, to have Colonel Chambliss and Colonel Ball’s regiments and the two batteries that were sent from here with those regi- ments. “ Appearances certainly strongly indicate that whilst your army is at Fredericksburg the enemy will strike in force at Wilmington. I think that at least twenty thousand men, thoroughly organized and effective should be sent at once to North Carolina. If there is ‘ possibility of your being able to send the whole or any considerable proportion of this amount I would be glad to confer with you in regard to it. Please answer as soon as practicable and oblige. “Very respectfully and truly yours,. “G. W. Suiru, Major-General.” Letter from General R. E. Lee to General G. W. Smith, “ TEADQUARTERS ARMy OF N. Va., ‘*CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, Jan. 4, 1868. “ Major-General G. W. Surru, Commanding, etc., Richmond. “ General: “Your letter of the 1st inst. has been received. As you seem to be certain the enemy are reénforcing Suf- folk and passing troops from that point to Newbern, I would recommend that you collect a force at Goldsboro and within supporting distance of it, adequate to oppose them. I do not think that the enemy can bring into the ee gs: : sesh a ee * ras ® bar aia ore ete 2 aaa CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 283 field, in that region, at present, a large or stable force. Their troops must be new and not very reliable, nor have they an officer there, that I am aware of, in whom much confidence is reposed by his Government. It is as impossible for him to have a large Operating army at every assailable point in our territory as it is for us to keep one to defend it. We must move our troops from point to point as required, and by close observation and accurate information the true point of attack can gen- erally be ascertained. I may be mistaken, but I have thought that the troops at your disposal would be suffi- cient to drive back the threatened incursions of the enemy south of James River, until he is reénforced from some of his armies now in the field. General Burnside has all of his army between Fredericksburg and Acquia Creek, with the addition of Siegel’s corps. His own headquarters are near Burke’s station, nor is there.any indication of an embarkation, or retrograde movement, or going into winter quarters. I think it dangerous to diminish this army until something can be ascertained of the intention of that opposed to it; and I hope you will be able, by judicious arrangements and concentra- tion of the troops under your command, to protect the frontier line of North Carolina, Partial encroachments of the enemy we must expect, but they can always be recovered, and any defeat of their large army will re- instate everything. From information received from the Secretary I yesterday put Ransom’s division in motion to Hanover Junction, and will continue him to Richmond unless I receive other information. You will find it necessary in North Carolina to dispose your troops so that they can march to the points required in- stead of trusting to the railroad, otherwise it will be im- possible to collect your troops as rapidly as necessary. : ax SAT aS ey OA TE Pe AC era 284 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. The railroads must be reserved for transporting muni- tions of war. I would recommend that you take the field in person and endeavor to get out troops from the State of North Carolina for her defence. Wilmington should be defended at all hazards. “JT have the honor to be, with great respect, “Your obedient servant, “R. E. Ler, General.” January 7th, 1863. General Smith, from Goldsboro, to Brigadier- General W. H. C. Whiting, Wilmington. —“T returned from Richmond last night. General Lee advises that we draw troops from the State of North Carolina for her defence, and adds that Wilmington must be defended at all hazards. I have just inquired of you, by telegraph, asking what number of Beauregard’s troops you now have, and in what contingency you will have to give them up. I have here Daniel’s and Davis's brigades; Pettigrew is at Rocky Mount; French, with a brigade, is at Weldon; Pryor has four regiments on the Blackwater and Ransom’s division—only two small brigades—arrived at Richmond last night. The enemy are concentrating at Newbern and have a force in Gates County threatening Weldon, but ready to be transported by water to Newbern or other points. I still hope we will receive additional forces from General Lee’s army, but if they are not faster they will be too late. Jf Beauregard can furnish you with troops to hold the enemy in check long enough for me to bring forces to your relief all will be well. If he cannot, I will, if pos- sible, send enough to enable you to hold on until more troops can be brought from above.” Telegram, January 7th, 1863. To Secretary of War: “There is no change since the information sent you by Thee ers 4 + 4 285 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, General French from Weldon yesterday. > et to i i to-morrow. go to Raleigh to-night and return : Telegram, January 8th, 1863, from General Smith at Raleigh, to Secretary of War: “ It will do no good to call out the militia at this time. I propose to order Ransom’s division to North Carolina, I return to Golds- boro in the morning.” « Gotpsporo, N. C., January 9, 1863. “ Hon. James A. SEDDEN, “ Secretary of War, Richmond, Va. Sir: «“] returned this evening from Raleigh, which place i visited at the solicitation of Governor Vance. Isent you a telegram from there last night, saying that it is not ad- visable to call out the militia at this time. I will add that I do not think it ever will be advisable to do so. I telegraphed at the same time that I proposed ordering Ransom’s division into North Carolina. I would have done this whilst at Richmond, had I felt at liberty to act in the case upon my own judgment—will do it from here at once as soon as a movement of the enemy in force is known. But, as my general views have been laid be- fore the War Department, and General Lee: and the latter only detached Ransom’s division for the protection of Richmond and Petersburg; I refrain from ordering it farther, on mere anticipated action of the enemy— but, it is needed here, and many more troops will be re- quired to put us on anything like equality of numbers with the enemy. General Beauregard, has left two regi- ments and a battery at Wilmington. This, in addition to Clingman’s brigade, which is about 2000 effectives, leaves General Whiting’s force too small for manwuvres far from his interior line of intrenchments, and materi- Ct A ss 286 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. ally lessens the chances of his being effectively aided by a force from here. General Beauregard evidently con- siders it hazardous to place any large number of his troops in Wilmington when there is a prospect that the enemy’s iron-clads may take possession of the Cape Fear river. There is much reason in this view of the case. “ Upon information received from Beaufort and New- bern it is certain that the enemy are concentrating rapid- ly at Newbern through the sound; and by sea through Beaufort harbor. Had not their principal iron-clad ves- sel been lost, and others injured, they would, in all prob- ability, ere this have made a combined attack by land and sea upon “Wilmington. I have no confidence that either Fort Caswell or Fort Fisher can prevent the passage of heavy iron-clad steamers into the river, If either of these forts are passed, by such vessels, both forts will fall. Astormat seahas deferred the time of attack. T hope we have still time enough to get ready for them, “General Lee’s letter to me, wiiich I showed you the night before I left Richmond, almost deters me from re- ferring any further to the subject of reénforcements from that end of the line—but I beg that you will bear in mind that it is far more easy to hold Wilmington than to re- take it. The same is true of other points in this State and true of the State itself. I send with this copies of communications just received from General Beauregard and from General Whiting. I may have to reénforce Wilmington from here. I have orte brigade at Kinston . (Evans’s) about 1200—two here, one of 1300—the other about 3000. Ransom’s two brigades should have been sent on at once and others should now be rapidly follow- ing. Please let me know, as soon as possible, whether General Lee can look after Richmond and Petersburg if Ransom’s troops are ordered here ; and decide what ad- m - ieee. hae a ain a i i i CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 287 ditional forces, if any, are to be sent. It is very ee ant that I should know what force I am to have—an that I have it in hand as soon as possible. “ Yours respectfully, : : “GW. Smrru, Waj.- Gen. Telegram, January 10th, 1863, to Secretary of War: “Tn addition to information sent you by letter last night, General Whiting telegraphs to-day that there are twenty- one gunboats at Beaufort, and that a very large force is concentrated at Morehead City. Where is Lieutenant- General E. K. Smith? Telegrams are being received here for him.” r Telegram, January 10th, 1863, to Secretary War: “I cannot encourage calling out the North oe lina militia, for the reason that it will do no good. cannot consent to Ransom’s troops returning to Drewry’s Bluff unless that point is attacked. I must have means in hand here. There is but one source from which they drawn—we are losing time.” cae ner January 10th, 1863, to Brigadier-General Robert Ransom: “TI have, as yet, no further instructions for you than those contained in my letter to you from Richmond. Your position for the present is Peters- burg. Keep your command in readiness to move at otice.” “tina 11th, 1863, to Major-General 8. G. ee Weldon, N. C.: “Yours of the 9th inst. is received, ‘ regard. to Ransom’s division there is some conflict o opinion. General Lee ordered it to Richmond. I or- dered it to be moved to Petersburg without stopping in Richmond to take position in that immediate vicinity— to be held constantly in readiness to move in any og tion on the shortest notice. General Lee objects to its oe . ane abinadatiebaic bite. APPENDIX B. EXTRACTS FROM A SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF GENERAL G. W. SMITH, PUB- LISHED IN THE “ENCYCLOPADIA OF CONTEMPORARY BIOGRAPHY OF NEW YORK” (Vol, IL., 1882). “Smirn, GENERAL Gustavus Woopson, late a Major- General in the Confederates States army, was born in Scott County, Kentucky, January 1, 1822, and is now a resident of New York City. . . . He entered the United States Military Academy as a cadet in 1838, was gradu- ated in 1842, was then appointed Lieutenant in the United States Corps of Engineers, and ordered to New London, Connecticut, as assistant engineer in the con- struction of the fortifications of that harbor. He re- mained on this duty two years, and was ordered to West Point, in 1844, as junior Assistant Professor of Civil and Military Engineering and the Art of War in the U.S. Military Academy. After serving two years in this capacity he was ordered to join the army of Gen- eral Zachary Taylor, in Mexico. Soon after the declara- tion of war between the United States and Mexico, in 1846, Congress passed an act authorizing the raising of a company of sappers and miners, or engineer soldiers, as part of the regular army of the United States. Cap- tain Alexander J. Swift, of the Corps of Engineers, wag 844 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, e command of the company; Gustavus We and George B. McClellan the assigned to th Smith was the senior, junior Lieutenant. Captain Swift, one of the most prominent officers of that grade in the corps to which he belonged, had served two years in the school for engineer officers at Metz, France, and Lieutenant Me- Clellan was graduated at West Point in 1846. Soon after the company arrived in Mexico, Captain Swift was ‘taken ill at Matamoras, on the Rio Grande, and the command of the engineer company devolved upon Lieutenant G. W. Smith. Lieutenant John G. Foster, U. §. Engineer Corps, joined the company at Vera Cruz. In the campaign from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico, inclusive, the engineer company made a proud and worthy name in the annals of American history. lected from an official ab- Tbe following extracts are se stract of the records of the War Department in Wash- General Totten, Chief Engineer, in his annual report, 1848, in giving a summary of the services of engineer officers in Mexico, says: ‘ Lieutenant G. We Smith was in command of the engineer company in the march from Matamoras to Tampico, and in the siege of Vera Cruz, and in all the battles in General Scott’s march to the city of Mexico.’ In his official report to General Scott, dated Camp Washington, before Vera Cruz, March 28th, 1847, he speaks in terms of highest praise of the officers and men of the engineer company. Battle of Cerro Gordo, April 18th, 1847.—Colonel W. S. Harney, command report, dated Jalapa, Mexico, April 21, 1847: ‘ Lieu- tenant G, W. Smith, of the engineers, with his company, rendered very efficient service in his own department, as well as in the storming of the fort.’ In reference to the same battle, General D. E. Twiggs, commanding ington. ing-Ist Brigade, says in his official . CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 345 2d Division, says in his official report, d April 24th, 1847: ‘Lieutenant G, i ae engineers, with his company of sappers and miners joined Colonel Harney’s command in the assault on the enemy’s main work, and killed two men with his own hand.’ Battles of Contreras and Churubusco, 19th and 20th of August, 1847.—General Persifer F Smith commanding 1st brigade, 2d division, says in his offici l report, dated August 28th, 1847: ‘Lieutenant G W — “f ee of the engineer company, and Lien- enan . B, McClellan, his sub f isti ished themselves throughout .the whole ge: see cae Nothing seemed to them too bold to be undestal oe too difficult to be executed; and their services as pork neers were as valuable as those they rendered in Pa “i = head of their gallant men.’ Referring to eas aa paanay D. E. Twiggs says in his official report gust 23, 1847: ‘To Captain R. E. Lee, of the tae I have again the pleasure of tendering oe _ seek _ exceedingly valuable services iy Be ating ss : whole of these operations; and to Lieu- = a mith of the engineers, who commanded e sappers and miners, I am under many obligations for his servi on thi rvices on this and on other occasions. Whenever his legitimate duties with the pi pick and spad Saba always solicited permission heaps in the ad- position 0 or axe _ Bind ae ; at of his officers an pes! Seas me displayed at Contreras as vara = ets Pie of Mexico, 13th and 14th of Sep- a. é 2 Ps eneral W. J. Worth, commanding 1st phe ye ys in his official report, dated September 16th ; = lieutenants I. I. Stevens, G. W. Smith, and G. » McClellan, engineers, displayed the gallantry, skill, ? a es = ae Se eee eee ea ae es ee ARR: 846 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. and conduct which. so eminently distinguished their corps.’ In reference to these operations General Scott, in his official report, dated National Palace of Mexico, September 18th, 1847, says: ‘ Lieutenants Beauregard, Stevens, and Tower, all wounded, were employed with the divisions; and Lieutenants G. W. Smith and G. B. McClellan with the company of sappers and miners. These five Lieutenants of engineers, like their Captain (R. E. Lee), won the admiration of all about them.’ In an official letter dated January 27th, 1854, General Scott says: ‘I have never known a very young officer so fre- quently and so highly distinguished as Captain G. Wis Smith was in the campaign of Mexico.’ He was recom- mended by General Scott for a third brevet, that of Major, and General Scott adds: ‘I was afterwards sur- prised to learn that Smith’s name had been stricken off by the Secretary of War and President, on the ground that no Second Lieutenant could be allowed to hold three brevets at once, no matter what his merits or ser- vices.’ Upon the return of the army to the United States, at the end of the war in 1848, Captain Smith was, at his own request, relieved from duty with the engineer company. In 1849 he was appointed principal Assistant Professor of Engineering and the Art of War in the Military Academy, and ordered to West Point. He remained in this position until he resigned his com- mission in the United States army in 1854. The follow- iny extract is from a letter written by General Totten, Chief Engineer, U. 8. Army, dated December 26th, 1854, and addressed to Captain Smith on the subject of his resignation: ‘I am parting in the present case with an officer whose services in the field have, by their marked gallantry and high professional character, added to the reputation of the corps and the army. These considera- a na anit we Mi Nd a . a areca a cain aR UR By CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 847 tions strengthen my regret at the loss we are now sus- taining.’ After resigning his commission in the army. Captain Smith selected New Orleans as his future hahion, In 1855 the Secretary of the United States Treasury. J ames B. Guthrie, appointed him Superintendent of the repairs of the Branch Mint, and of the construction of the New Marine Hospital at New Orleans. In 1856 he re- signed this position, and came to the city of New York for the purpose of accepting, in the house of Messrs Cooper & Hewitt, the position of Chief Engineer of the Trenton Iron Company. In 1858 the Mayor of New York, Daniel F. Tiemann, on the recommendation of Messrs. Cooper & Hewitt, and of Mr. Peter Cooper nominated Captain G. W. Smith, to be Street Corniaatas sioner of New York City, and he was unanimously con- firmed by the Board of Aldermen. He retained this position to the end of the term for which he was ap- pointed, and continued in office for nearly a year lon ba awaiting the appointment of his successor. He finall resigned in September, 1861; turning the control of res Straet Department over to his deputy, Mr. Edward Ewing, who continued to manage the business for sev- eral months, until a new Commissioner was appointed to fill the vacancy. It was generally conceded in New York that the Street Department business had been abl and honestly conducted by Captain Smith. In fact the Sagh oe the people were unanimous ‘in this opinion: a ti oe extract from one of the leading journals hoes y, published October 5, 1861, illustrates the ing In reference to his resignation: ‘It is stat d th aig W. Smith, late Street Cotaaiaaiaee a6 ork City, and Chairman i cratic Committee of the City and See prersory has been appointed a Major-General in the rebel babs cast Sean SEES a OP! ei A MAIER Ac Mion a a aed 848 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. ... As Street Commissioner of this city, he showed himself as competent to discharge the duties of a civil, executive, and administrative office as he had previously done as a soldier and engineer. . . . It is asad reflection that he has turned a traitor to his country, and, as a Major-General in the rebel army, is using his unques- tionable talents to assist in the attempted overthrow of this Government, and in the dishonor of the flag under whose graceful folds he won such distinguished fame.’ It is hardly necessary to say that Captain Smith, in leav- ing New York and returning to his own people, did not consider that he was a traitor to his country, attempting to overthrow this Government, and to bring dishonor on its flag. He had taken an earnest and very active part in the Presidential election in 1860, because he was con- vinced that the election of Mr. Lincoln, on the platform of principles adopted by the party of which he was the candidate, would lead to the secession of, at least, some Southern States; that this meant war, which must result either in disunion or union enforced at the point of the - bayonet. . . . From the time Mr. Lincoln was elected, Captain Smith took no part in the politics of the coun- try, but gave his time and attention exclusively to the public business of the city entrusted to his control, and waited, rather anxiously, for the appointment of his suc- cessor in the Street Department. About two weeks be- fore the difficulties between the two sections of the country culminated in actual hostilities—at Fort Sum- ter, in Charleston harbor—Captain Smith was suddenly stricken down with a terrible disease, brought on by overwork in his department. He was confined to his room on a bed of sickness, and for several months was cut off from all intercourse except with his physicians, nurses, and immediate family. When sufficiently re- CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. sician—in the latter part of July—to go to his frjends in Kentucky, remain there until cold weather, and then proceed to Hot Springs, Arkansas. Soon after his ar- rival in Kentucky, he learned that the authorities in Washington intended to arrest and imprison him. He then resigned his position as Street Commissioner of New York City, left Kentucky, went to Richmond early in September, and at once offered his services to the Con- federate Government.” That portion of this sketch which refers to the period between General Smith’s appointment as Major-General in the Confederate States Army and the acceptance of his resignation is omitted. : “The day that General Smith tendered his resigna- tion as Major-General in the Confederate States Army, he offered his services to General Beauregard, as a vole unteer in the defence of Charleston, and they were ac- cepted. He was with General Beauregard when the fleet of iron-clads attacked Fort Sumter. After the Keokuk was sunk and the whole fleet had been re- pulsed, he proceeded to Georgia, and in a short time thereafter was offered, and finally accepted, the Presi- dency of the Etowah Manufacturing and idining Com: pany at Etowah, in that State. He was soon afterward appointed Aide-de-Camp to the Governor of Georgia. grey that capacity directed the construction of stich “ - eaeots as were made by the State for the defence is see points, which could not well be attended ahead the Confederate army, then in Tennessee and North Georgia. In May, 1864, the Conf having crossed th icc encanta e Etowah River, the works at that place had to be abandoned, and they were burned b the Federal army. About this time the Governor of 849 covered to be able to travel, he was advised by his phy- a NN Ma NI ae ae AIBN 8 ae 6 ERAN Ae This tablet pa: ar mee Ce 850 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. Georgia ordered the civil and military officers of the State, who were exempt from Confederate conscription, to assemble at Atlanta. They were organized into companies and regiments, and formed into three bri- gades. This body of militia, about three thousand in number, elected General Smith their commander. The Governor placed this force at the disposal and under the control of the commander of the Confederate army, then operating in that State. The militia of Georgia afterwards increased by calling out the men of the State up to fifty-five years of age, performed well all the duties of regular soldiers. . . . When the Confederate army marched into Alabama and Tennessee, the militia held in check the large Federal garrison of Atlanta. When General Sherman started on his march to the sea, the militia confronted him in the works at Griffin, He went around without touching that place. When his troops ap- peared before Forsyth it was occupied by the militia, and the Federals made no serious attempt against it. When the Confederate cavalry were jammed back to the river at East Macon, the attacking party recoiled from the forti- fications of that place, held by the militia. A day or two later General Hardee, at the suggestion of the President, ordered the militia to Augusta. A large por- tion of them, in the absence of General Smith, became involved with a force of the Federals, intrenched in strong position, and, ill advisedly, against orders, made a determined attack and. persisted in it for several hours, finally retiring, under instructions, without being pur- sued. The command was withdrawn to Macon, and by authority of General Richard Taylor, in the absence of General Hardee, was taken by rail to Savannah. When the ieading trains, containing about one thousand men, arrived in Savannah, they passed into South Carolina, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 851 and with two hundred Confederate troops, which were all that could be brought there in time, defeated a large force of Federals, which was moving to cut off railroad communication between Charleston and Savannah, and meet Sherman’s army on the Savannah River, thus open- ing to him easy communication with Port Royal on the South Carolina coast. After a fight lasting five or six hours, the Federal force retired precipitately, leaving more than two hundred dead upon the field. The num- ber of their killed and wounded in this action, at Honey Hill, near Grahamville Station, on the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, was believed to be nearly equal to the whole force of Georgia militia engaged there. General Smith was the only Confederate General officer present. That night, after the Federals had retired to their gunboats, several thousand Confederate troops ar- rived, including three or four Brigadier-Generals, and after breakfast the next morning Licutenst-Ganeral Hardee came over by rail from Savannah. There being no further occasion for the Georgia militia to remain in South Carolina, General Smith took them back to Savan- nah, where he found the remainder of his command except one brigade, ordered by General Hardee He guard a bridge, some distance west of Savannah which brigade was soon cut off by the Federals gettin between them and the city. There were no troops at = near Savannah when the militia arrived there, except a age eears and the heavy artillery in the forts below. ough air of the Georgia militia at Honey Hill saved ; ommunications with Savanah, enabled the Con- ederate Government to send about 15,000 i supplies and ammunition i : rapt ee - munition into the place, and compelled erman to besiege it, instead of passin i agtagtgdl g quietly and q Y to the coast at Port Royal. In the lines around Aras aaa tatiana eal st: 352 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. Savannah, the militia, about 2500 strong, were on a front of two miles and a half, with two corps of General Sherman’s army close against them. When General Smith learned from General Hardee that it was not in- tended to’hold Savannah to the last extremity, but only to delay the Federals as long as possible and then with- draw, he advised Hardee that it would be necessary to construct a bridge over which his army could pass the Savannah River. General Hardee thought the army could be taken over to the South Carolina shore in the steamboats then lying at the wharves, and that a bridge, even if one were needed, could not be constructed in time. General Smith persisted, and General Hardee reluctantly consented to let him try it, and gave the order without which the material proposed to be used, being private property, could not be seized. The bridge was constructed; the command, including artillery and baggage wagons, passed over it, the militia being the rear-guard. General Hardee afterwards stated that if he had continued to rely upon the steamboats his army would have been captured. After getting out of Savan- nah, the Georgia militia were engaged in protecting Augusta. They were afterwards transferred to Macon, where General Smith, with a portion of his troops under General Cobb, surrendered at the end of the war, April, 1865. In 1866, General Smith accepted the position of General Manager of the business of. the South-Western Iron Company, at Chattanooga, Tennessee. In 1870, he was appointed Insurance Commissioner of the State of Kentucky. The First National Convention of the Insur- ance Commissioners of the different States was held in New York Cityin 1871. Twenty-eight States were repre- sented, and it is safe to say that no one in that body of State officers exercised greater influence than Gustavus CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 353 W. Smith. This influence continued unabated in the annual sessions for the five years during which he held the office of Insurance Commissioner of the State of Kentucky. Although not a professional actuary, he understood the simple principles upon which net money values in life-insurance are computed, when based upon data designated by law as the State standard of safety for these companies. This special knowledge—pos- sessed at that time by a very limited number of persons in the United States—together with his regard for jus- tice and right, as between the insurer and insured, com- bined to give him the great influence which he wielded. His works on the subject of Life Insurance and his pub- lished official reports made to the several annual Insur- ance Conventions, have done much toward enlightening - the public in regard to the elementary principles upon which calculations of legal net values in life-insurance are founded. In 1876, General Smith returned to New York City, where he has since resided.” SOON IE BL EE I tC ARE Rhy Dis MT . "4 porn: id a tl laa ncaa — iiiaimmaamaaiamaaaaii ala ; Hekepan Raia a as sci tia, — ll i i os a) ys a | APPENDIX C. SEVERE ACCUSATIONS—REFUTED BY PLAIN FACTS. In illustration of the nature of the accusations widely circulated by* the Press against Gustavus W. Smith, soon after he joined the Confederate States Army, attention is called to the following editorial article published in the New York Herald, October 11th, 1861, “SECRET REVOLUTIONARY CONSPIRACY IN NEW YORK. “The late Street Commissioner of the City of New York is now Major-General Smith of the Army of the Confederate States. Mr. Mansfield Lovell, who occu- pied, until within a week or two, the position of Deputy Street Commissioner, is said to have been also promoted to a high rank in the rebel army. These gentlemen have monopolized a large share of the patronage of this metropolis, up to a very recent period. Their influence has been next to unbounded, for over three years, and, although they have neither of them dabbled with the petty concerns of municipal plunder, and Pewter Mug intrigue, they have been known to be men of large capacity and truly statesmanlike talent. Incapable of identifying themselves with the venal and corrupt cliques by which the city is governed, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Lovell have, nevertheless, steadily labored to accomplish GL LAN FT CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 355 the object for which they remained here, of fostering sympathy with rebellion. Educated at West Point, and graduates of the highest distinction from the na- tional Military Academy, they deservedly rank among the’ ablest officers in the country, and little surprise has been elicited by the intelligence that both Beaure- gard and Johnston have been thrown into the shade by their superior reputation. General Smith announced his intention, long since, of joining the insurrectionary army, in case Kentucky should secede. Meanwhile, preparatory for that event, he labored assiduously to create a disunion party in this city and State: nor did he leave here until his plans were fully matured. The instruments with which he intended to act were known by him thoroughly, and he was able to lay his hand on every one of those who would aid in getting up a sud- den revolution, in favor of the South, whenever the rebel troops should have passed the Potomac and occupied Maryland and Pennsylvania. No scheme could have been laid more carefully than that which Mr. Smith concocted to effect his purpose, and, through the patronage which he so extensively controlled, it was easy for him so to identify himself with party organi- zations, here and in the interior, that it is not improb- able candidates for office have been selected with a sole view to their treasonable proclivities. The general plan of the conspirators who are laboring to overthrow the nationality of the North American republic, and dissever the union between the States, is well known. As long ago as last November, the columns of the Herald contained an elaborate expoaie tion of the details of the plot which had been entered into by Jefferson Davis and his associates, Their idea was to reconstruct the nation upon a slavery basis, and, ETS Oy, 356 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. after having seized upon Washington, to dictate such terms to New York,. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and the Northwest, as should compel submission to the programme laid down at the Montgomery Congress, ~ and a revolution in favor of the cherished institution of the seceding States. In order to accomplish this ob- ject the co-operation of the Democratic party at the North was, for a while, implicitly relied on, and after the patriotic outburst of feeling, on the part of leading individuals of the conservative portion of the com- munity, had dispelled this delusion, a hope still -re- - mained that enough disaffection might be found to dis- tract the councils of the administration, and thwart the measures that had been taken to crush out treason. Street Commissioner Smith, and his Deputy, Mr. Lovell, made it their principal occupation to foster disloyalty, and it has become transparent now that their efforts were not unattended with success. Neither of them belonged to the class of mean, plundering, pettifogging politicians. On the contrary, they contemplated with disgust the corruption of metropolitan demagogues, and refused to sanction their intrigues to empty the pockets of our tax-payers. Their labors were deeper, and of far more extensive signification, than any that the petty cliques of New York could point out. Through the Regency at Albany, and affiliated seditious elements in this city, they aimed a death-blow, which it was in- tended should strike at the very heart of our institu- tions, and, so soon as the ends of the rebel army on the Potomac should have been obtained, cause a general uprising in the Central States, in favor of a permanent alliance with the South, against the constitution be- _queathed to us by Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. Jefferson Davis and his allies entertained no doubt, a CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 357 a few months since, the hope that, ere this, the national capital, Baltimore, and even Philadelphia, would have passed under their control. With true Southern arro- gance, they contemplated the future of a confederation which would be subject to the military dictation of a nigger-driving oligarchy, and include Northern wealth together with Southern products. In this fond dream they have been disappointed. But, up to the very latest period, the expectation has remained that a party. nominally enlisted under the banners of peace, although really pledged to secession, would rise up to espouse their cause. Messrs. Smith and Lovell continued to re- side in New York, wielding the patronage of one of the most lucrative offices in the gift of the city, whose ramifications extend even throughout the State up to the moment that their presence was more syeied else- where than here, and until they had paved the way fora outbreak, whenever such a movement might be acs prudent and expedient. Their efforts have hth un flagging in behalf of the South, and no reasonable i dividual can doubt for an instant that, but for the prompt and efficient steps taken by the administrati : formidable factitious opposition might have rai a ite head, in the Northern States, against the cours a i statesmanlike President in crushing out saballiiea The aod can gee be presented, that, from chs feel ommissioner’s ce as a centre, rebellion d direction of Messrs. Smith and Lovell ‘atid 2 sey zy iene rents this city, and permeated the Soa They did not oe reds or. dep Geaangi South, until they had theron hi oo nek thee ee and left behind them Selene ent ninasared a f Ives who would seize upon the first opportunity to subyert the existing order + cena atind energie pails. te = 358 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. of things, and proclaim adhesion to the Montgomery Government, so soon as a fitting occasion should offer. These representatives are to be found among the parties which lay claim to title to public confidence at the ap- proaching elections, and it is the duty of loyal citizens to sift them out and to refuse to give to any of their candidates their suffrages.” Passing to a period nearly ten years later, attention is called to the following extracts from the Congres- sional Globe—Part VI., Proceedings of the Senate— July 8th, 1870: “Mr, Cameron. I am very anxious to gratify the Senator from Kentucky; there is hardly anything in reason that I would not do to gratify him, but I never will vote to take the disabilities off such a man as Gus- tavus W. Smith. I remember the impression his leay- ing New York made upon the patriots of the country at the time. It was done with a flourish of trumpets. It was said that here was a man holding one of the most lucrative offices in this country, who gave it up to go to the South and fight in the cause of his countrymen against ours. He is a man who had received his educa- tion from the Government, the very education which gave him the office at New York, and the one which gave him all the distinction he had in his life; and he was not content with throwing that up and going quietly to his countrymen down there, but he made a flourish of it, and boasted himself that he gave up this office yielding him, as I was told, forty or fifty thousand dollars a year, to sustain that cause which he called a holy one. How ~ can gentlemen here vote to take the disabilities off such a man as he?” “Mr. Howarp. There is the name of Mr. Smith. According to my recollection his case was a most wanton CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 859 one. He was educated at the Military Academy of the United States, and raised in the free State of New York; he had received employment in the City of New Yak: and went off to the rebellion and joined the Southern insurgents without any excuse or apology at all, not even the apology of residence in the insurgent States I hope that name will be stricken out; for if there is anything in the world, in my judgment, that shows a bad character, it is the act of a military officer who has taken the formal oath to be true to the flag and then goes off wantonly, without excuse deserts his flag, and joins the enemies of his country. Why, sir, that will ihe Maa - yet Soest to strike out the name of “Mr. Conxune. As I contributed the fact that Gus- tavus W. Smith was Street Commissioner of the City of New York, I will say that I did not. mean to contribute it in the direction in which the Senator from Kentuck employs it. I did not know that Gustavus W. Smith was paralyzed. If I believed as much as those of greater faith. do in the general harmony of things, I should not wonder that he is paralyzed. When hice began he held in the City of New York a lucrative and honorable place; and it is true, therefore that without the extenuation arising from the force of example, of locality, and of surrounding, this man, who had. been Say ononly treated with kindness in a free State, oie sn opportunities which he enjoyed to go ig on . te I confess T am surprised to see his Stat mi coe : ee has overtaken him, I do opte of greater faith than I might suppose that even that is something mor th accident of things. When the wae ok “s ee aaa or three men who belonged to the same sot ra , ? & PT EE SE I ae ————=—=_== ae 360 ; CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. and who like him had been conspicuously treated with generosity and kindness in the community which he deserted, he turned against it and went into the re- bellion. Iam sorry for him if he is paralyzed. I am sorry for him as a man; Lam sorry for him as a Senator; but I confess I listen with some surprise to the sugges- tion that Gustavus W. Smith, who was educated and nurtured at the public cost, and who afterward drew against the country the sword the country gave him and taught him how to wield, comes here so hastily after the blood has dried which he helped to spill and seeks con- donation for his offences.” It is believed that a plain statement of facts will be sufficient answer to the foregoing accusations. On entering the Military Academy at West Point Gustavus W. Smith obligated himself to serve in the United States Army for five years unless sooner dis- charged. He served more than sixteen years. His resignation as an officer of that army was accepted in December, 1854. The official records of the War Office show the character of his services; and it may be safely stated that, after the acceptance of his resignation, the general Government had no special legal claim upon him for further military service because of the fact that he had graduated at the West Point Academy. For the four years next after his resignation from the army he was engaged in civil pursuits. During a large portion of that time circumstances brought him very closely under the observation of Messrs. Edward Cooper and Abram 8. Hewitt and of Mr. Peter Cooper. In their opinion he had shown himself capable of perform- ing well the important duties of Street Commissioner of the City of New York. When the nomination to that office was tendered him, on their recommendation, in a ee cae ea aa al Sen ae re : mrss? SAE Oa Pe eae eee CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 361 ~ ane ne of the year 1858, he declined it. In er of that year, however, he acce V ted th i- el and ps unanimously poihaasad “ws the Boul al ermen. ‘The salary of the Street C issi om: five thousand dollars a year—no per aiden 30° ie A q es of any In taking control of the Str moted Mansfield Lovell to ihe chien there oa missioner, and appointed Mr. Edward Ewin Kw office of Superintendent of Street laeecrelaa foe vacant by Lovell’s promotion. © It was conceded ye _opeenige ie affairs in this city, that eckal an that of Edward Ewi been made for the important tec ae e coer changes of officers in the Street Department were e at that time by the new Commissioner; and very few occurred until 1860, when Mr. Fernando Wood be spe eee of the city. In the contest in the Board ° ermen which soon after took place betw regular Democratic and the Republican Ald hg = side against Fernando Wood and the Mosart Hall ig on the other, the Street Commissioner a wo a se Si and used what is called the sis ment in upholding the r ond we the Republican Waster: ae pee ad Pe using to allow about fifty of the more import- 3 uty Aaa the Department to be interfered with oo ommissioner allowed the Aldermen, whom Be: ays Si to nominate persons to fill nearl “pat ne ordinate places, requiring only that in .* ey Piri nominated should be of good ao ong ully competent to perform well the =e € positions to which they were appointed is resulted in a decided improvement in ee fitnens ER NEE: See ame 362 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. of the subordinate officers of the Department. Very few changes were made from that time until a new Street Commissioner was appointed in December, 1861. In the summer of 1860, after the Presidential candi- dates were nominated, Gustavus W. Smith took an active part in national politics. He consented, at the earnest solicitation of James T. Brady and other lead- ing Democrats, to accept the position of Chairman of the National Democratic Committee of the City and County of New York. In this capacity he favored combined action on the part of all those who were op- posed to the election of Mr. Lincoln. This proposition, made in July, was not then acceptable to the Douglas Democrats or to the Bell and Everett party. But, in October of that year a “fusion” ticket, in the State of New York, was proposed against Mr. Lincoln, At the request of those who initiated this “fusion” movement, the Democratic Committee of which Gustavus W. Smith was Chairman, cordially united with them in this —too long delayed—effort to unite the opponents of the Republican party. Mr. Lincoln was elected. During that canvass no attempt was made by the Street Com- missioner to use the patronage of that Department with a view to affecting the Presidential election in any man- ner whatever. The term for which Gustavus W. Smith was ap- pointed Street Commissioner expired just after the Presidential election in 1860. From that time he held the office, only awaiting the appointment of his suc- cessor. In the latter part of 1860 the Governor of Kentucky tendered him position with a view to his ultimately taking command of the organized military forces of that State. The offer was declined. But, in refusing the position tendered him, he said that, in case CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 363 of war between the two sections of the country, he ° would return to his native home and take whatever place might be assigned him in the defence of that State. In the early part of the year 1861, he took part in the famous “Pine Street Meeting,” of citizens of New York, for the purpose of helping to devise meas- ures to avert the impending war. He favored the “Crittenden Compromise,” and all other measures which had for their object a settlement of the differ- ences between the two sections of the country without a resort to arms. Early in April, 1861, He was stricken with paralysis brought on by overwork; as Street Commissioner, in be- half of the interests of the people of the city of New York. For nearly three months he was confined to his home in this city. When sufficiently recovered to per- mit of his removal he was taken to Sharon Springs, New York. During his long illness the duties of Street Commissioner were performed by the Deputy; but no changes were made in the organization, or business methods, of the Department. In the latter part of July his physician, in New York, advised him that a visit to the Hot Springs of Arkansas offered the best, if not the only, chance for his complete . recovery. In the mean time his physician suggested that he should go to his friends in Kentucky, and await there until October or November before proceeding on his journey to the Hot Springs. Having determined to act on this advice, he returned to the city of New York and appointed Edward Ewing Deputy Street Commis- sioner. The appointment to take effect as soon as the then Deputy was ready to turn over to him the control of the Department. No better selection could have been made in the interests of the people of the city of PS Se see 864 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, - New York than that of Mr. Edward Ewing. He con- trolled the Street Department until the new Commis- sioner was appointed in December of that year. When Gustavus W. Smith, on his way to his friends in Kentucky, reached the city of Cincinnati he was too much fatigued to proceed farther without rest. Long after the war he was credibly informed his presence at a hotel in that place was promptly telegraphed to the Government at Washington, and orders were immedi- ately issued for his arrest and detention until further instructions were received. But, entirely unconscious of this action on the part of the United States Govern- ment, he had proceeded on his way early the next morning and arrived at Lexington, Kentucky, that day. Within a few weeks he received information that the Government at Washington intended to arrest and im- prison him. He then determined to resign the position of Street Commissioner of the City of New York and pass at once into the Confederate States. He had held that office nearly a year beyond the expiration of the term for which he was appointed; and after his resigna- tion the city of New York had no claim upon him based upon services already rendered. Having been constrained to leave Kentucky before the time when it would be prudent for him to attempt the journey to the Hot Springs, he proceeded to Rich- mond and tendered his services to the Confederate States Government. Until he was within the lines of the Confederate States he had committed no act incon- sistent with the duties of a citizen of New York and of the United States. In 1870 an over-zealous, indiscreet friend, without authority, made an application to Congress, petitioning for the remoyal of the political disabilities of Gustavus ” CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS, 865 W. Smith. The latter never heard of the petition until he saw the published proceedings of the Senate, as re- ported in the Congressional Globe, In view of the facts here stated, and others contained in the sketch of the life of Gustavus W. Smith previously given, it is not deemed necessary to make further allu- sion, in this paper, to the alleged “ Secret Revolutionary Conspiracy in New York,” or to the above-quoted speeches made by Messrs. Cameron, Howard, and Conk- ling in the Senate of the United States. The following extracts are from Collins’s History of Kentucky. They are given as an illustration of feeling, opinion, and action in that State during the winter and spring of 1861, Asa preliminary, it is desired to call attention to the fact that, until the winter of 1870-71, Gustavus W. Smith had never heard that his name had been even mentioned as one of a board of five persons to whom it was proposed to entrust the raising, arming, organizing and equipping the military forces of Ken- tucky. “ January 21st, 1861.—The following resolutions, by George W. Ewing, of Logan County, adopted in the House; the first unanimously, the second by 87 to 6: “ Resolved, That this general assembly has heard with profound regret of the resolutions recently adopted by the States of New York, Ohio, Maine, and Massachu- setts, tendering men and money to the President of the United States, to be used in coercing sovereign States of the South into obedience to the Federal Government. “ Resolved, That this general assembly receives the action of the Legislatures of New York, Ohio, Maine, and Massachusetts, as the indication of a purpose upon the part of the people of those States to further compli- cate existing difficulties, by forcing the people of the RENEE re mm AT OE 366 CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. South to the extremity of submission or resistance. And so regarding it, the Governor of the State of Kentucky is hereby requested to inform the Executives of each of said States that it is the opinion of this general assembly, that whenever the authorities of these States shall send armed forces to the South for the purpose indicated in said resolutions, the people of Kentucky, uniting with their brethren of the South, will as one mar resist such invasion of the soil of the South at all hazards and to the Jast extremity. .... “ May 10th, 1861.—At an informal conference of lead- ing men of both the Bell and Douglas parties, John J. Crittenden, Archibald Dixon, and Samuel S. Nicholas were selected as representatives of those parties, to ne- gotiate with three representative men of the Breckin- ridge party whom they selected and proposed—Governor Beriah Magoffin, John C. Breckinridge, and Richard Hawes—and who should first be recognized by that party. It was believed that those six persons would be authorized—by the respective members of those parties in the Legislature, then in session—to devise an adjust- ment that all would combine to make the united action of the State, in the then alarming condition of the coun- _try. ‘Those men promptly and cheerfully left their homes and repaired to Frankfort, anxious, if possible, to avert the threatened civil war and preserve the peace of the State, if not of the country. In the evening of the day they arrived, a caucus of the Breckenridge members of the Legislature was held in the representative hall, and a similar one of the united Bell and Douglas (who called themselves the ‘ Union’) parties in the Senate Chamber —each eagerly consenting to the mode of arbitrament proposed and agreeing (the former, at least, wnanimous- ly) to abide by, and carry out by legislative action, CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 367 whatever the six ‘arbitrators’ should agree in recom- mending.” * The six arbitrators agreed in recommending “ that the State of Kentucky should not take part either with the Federal Government or with the seceded States, in the conflict then impending; but should occupy a soutien of armed neutrality, forbidding and resisting the entrance of either upon her territory.” It was further agreed to entrust the raising, arming organizing, and equipping the military forces of the State to a board of five persons to be established by act of the Legislature. Finally the following persons were named to constitute this board, viz.: “ General 8. B. Buckner, Gustavus W. Smith, George W. Johnson, Archibald Dixon, and Samuel Gill.” Mr. Hawes was delegated to communicate the conclu- sions of the arbitrators to the Breckinridge party, and Mr. Nicholas to the Bell and Douglas parties in the Le- gislature. “The caucus of the legislative Breckinridge party agreed unanimously to the report of Mr. Hawes and pledged themselves to carry it out.” “Judge Ni. ‘ cholas, at an early hour next morning, called upon the Breckinridge arbitrators, expressed himself as deeply mortified that the caucus of his party could not agree to carry out the award—adding with much chagrin, that he would wash his hands of the whole bosleeia: and leave on the morning train for his home in Louisville which he did.” * Collins's History of Kentucky, 1870, Vol. I. p. 86. —— a “2 pment tet es — INDEX, Accusations, against Gustavus W. Smith, 354-360; refuted by plain facts, 360-365. s Advantage of action and evil of inactivity, Confederate, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 28, 31, 39. Alleged proposal to depose President Davis, 327. Arms, Confederate, want of, 18, 20, 23, 27, 38. Army of the Potomac, Confederate, near Fairfax Court-house, effective strength, 29; reénforcement of ‘‘ seasoned soldiers,” 17, 21, 23, 29, 30, 36. Army of the Potomac, Federal, in front of Fairfax Court-house, 16, 19, 32; Confederate Generals disappointed that it did not advance, 40; transferred to the Peninsula, 50; in front of Richmond, 159. Army of Northern Virginia—second name of the Confederate “ Army of the Potomac”’—conference at Richmond, 40; battle of Seven Pines, 159; re- enforcements previous to the Seven Days’ Battles, 57. Ball, Colonel, commanding regiment and battery at Fredericksburg, protect- ing General Lee’s communications, 264, 265, 278, 282. Banks, General; his “ movement may be a ruse,” 26; position on upper Potomac, 28; fleet at Beaufort, N. C., 273. Beauregard, General G. T., commanding First Corps, Confederate Army of the Potomac, 14; proceedings of conference at Fairfax Court-house, 13-20; transferred to General A. 8. Johnston’s Army in the West, 40; opinion and advice in regard to Mississippi river at Forts Jackson and St. Philip, 60; sends troops from Charleston to aid in the defence of Wilmington,.N. C., 271; troops recalled to Charleston, 277, 280, 286. Beaverdam Creek, natural strength of position described by Mr. Davis, 155; ground examined and reported upon by the Chief Engineer of the army and by General Smith’s chief of staff, 148; attack advised by General G. W. Smith, 148; advice modified when it was understood that McDowell's forces were no longer approaching Richmond, 149; Mr. Davis’s statement of what General Smith said about attacking, 155; comments on that state- ment, 155. Beckham, Lieutenant R. F., aide to General Smith at battle of Seven Pines, letter from, in reference to the movements of Longstreet’s division, 165; letter from, in reference to General G. W. Smith’s resignation, 340. Benjamin, Judah P., Secretary of War; letter to the Governor of Louisiana in reference to the defences of New Orleans, 63; by direction of President Davis orders General Lovell to seize, arm, and equip for war purposes fourteen named river steamers, 70,75; by direction of President Davis EA AE TET 370 INDEX. orders General Lovell to send 5000 men from New Orleans to Columbus, Ky., 71; explains the President’s reasons for certain orders in reference to the defence of the Mississippi coast, 72; highly commends General Lovell, 76; informs General Smith that Mr. Horace Randall cannot be the recipi- ent of an executive appointment, 318. f Brigades, reorganization of, in General J. E. Johnston's army, suggested by President Davis in the conference at Fairfax Court-house, 324; corre- spondence between the President and General Smith on this subject, 324-6; letter from General Whiting, 326; the President continues to urge the mat- ter, but does not give a positive order, 327; constant source of dissatisfac- tion until General Lee was assigned to command the Army of Northern Virginia, 327. Cameron, Senator, speech in U. S. Senate, 858; refuted by facts, 360. Campaign of invasion advocated, in the Conference at Fairfax Court-house, 15; in conference at Richmond, 42. Camp Moore, seventy-eight miles north of New Orleans, on the Jackson Railroad, 66; point to which the Confederate forces retired after the evac- uation of New Orleans, 82-90. Casey, General Silas, commanded advanced division of Keyes’s corps at the battle of Seven Pines, 160; retired to “ third line of defence,”’ 186. Chickahominy River, said by Mr. Davis to be flowing in front of the field of battle at Seven Pines, 196; its real position in relation to that battle-field, 200. Chambliss, Colonel, protecting General Lee's communications, 254, 278. Clingman, General Thomas L., official report of the operations of his com- mand in the action near Goldsboro, N. C., 275. Cobb, General Howell, commanded a brigade of McLaws’s division on the Bluffs of the Chickahominy river near the Mechanicsville road, 146, 155, 184. Conference at Fairfax Court-house, 13-40. Conference at Richmond, and operations that followed, 41-58. Conkling, Senator, speech in U. S. Senate, 359; refuted by facts, 360. Conrad, Hon. Charles M., testimony, 60, 131. Couch, General Darius N., commanded division of Keyes’s corps, in second line, at battle of Seven Pines, 160. Court of Inquiry, in regard to the evacuation of New Orleans, applied for by General Lovell, 91; President Davis delayed action, 96, 98, 99; court finally ordered to convene, 99; instructions to the court, 100; instructions changed, 101; letter from Secretary of the Navy to President Davis on which the change of instructions was based, 102; facts found by the court, 103; opinion of the court, 105; comments on that opinion, 108; promulga- tion of opinion delayed, 114; proceedings of the court called for by Con- gress, 187; delay of President Davis in transmitting the proceedings, 137; Mr. Davis finds it difficult, in reviewing the matter, to reach a satisfactory conclusion, 126. Daniel, General Junius, commanded brigade at Drewry’s Bluff, 268; at Golds boro, 284; letter in reference to General G. W. Smith’s resignation, 336. Darby, Dr. John T., report of casualties in the 1st Division, 1st Corps, at the battle of Seven Pines, 177. Davidson, Colonel, guarding General Lee’s communications, 265. —— i INDEX. 871 Davis, Jefferson, surprised and disappointed at his election to the Presidency, 13; thought himself better adapted to command in the field, 14; writes of military events in order to elucidate obscurity and correct error, 21; grati- fying to him “only to notice for praise each and all who wore the gray,” 21; notices the allegation that he was responsible for the inactivity of the army in the autumn of 1861, 22; account of the conference at Fairfax Court-house, 22; criticises the written statement made by the three senior generals, 23; account .of conference at Richmond and subsequent opera- tions, 50; formally warned of ‘‘ the danger which at last proved fatal” to New Orleans, 60; could not bring himself to believe that the apprehensions of the Governor of Lovisiana would be realized, 62; assigns General Lovell to command the military department of Louisiana, 63; refuses to authorize him to control the naval defences, 63; directs that General Lovell seize, arm, and equip, for war purposes, fourteen named river steamboats, 70, 75; these vessels ‘in no event to be put under control of officers of the navy,” 76; directs that five thousand men be sent from New Orleans to Columbus, Ky.; ‘‘New Orleans is to be defended from above,” 71; men, arms, and munitions sent away until New Orleans was about defenceless, 72; tele- graphs to the Governor of Louisiana, “The wooden vessels are below, the iron’gunboats are above. The forts should destroy the former if they attempt to ascend,” 81; enlarges the powers of the “ military men” after the fight at the forts had commenced, 82; fails to perceive the application of General Lovell’s remark about ‘‘the error of dispersion,” 96; delays action on General Lovell’s application for a Court of Inquiry, 96; said Gen- eral Lovell had not kept the Government informed of the condition of the defences of New Orleans, 96; orders General Van Dorn to supersede Gen- eral Lovell, 97; does not see why Lovell could not serve under Van Dorn, 97; Court of Inquiry ordered, but indefinitely postponed, 113; General Lovell relieved from duty in the field, 97, 98, 114; official correspondence between the Government and General Lovell in regard to the defences and the fall of New Orleans called for by Congress, 99; Court of Inquiry again ordered, 99; instructions to the court, 100; instructions changed, 101; delay in promulgating the opinion of the court, 114; proceedings of the court called for by Congress, 115; delay in transmitting, the proceed- ings, 115; refuses to grant General Lovell’s request to be assigned to duty, 114; reviews the circumstances connected with the fall of New Orleans, 116; account of his ride on the Meadow Bridge road ‘‘ to see the action commence,” 154; account of operations, battle of Seven Pines, May 31st 194; June 1st, 221; General G. W. Smith ordered from Goldsboro to Rich- mond, 295; interview with that officer, 296; directs the Secretary of War to order changes in the command, without consulting or informing the commander of the troops, 298, 299, 301-303, 315; endorsements on General G. W. Smith's letters of resignation, 305; orders General Van Dorn to Gen- eral J. E. Johnston’s army, 316; letters to General G. W. Smith in refer- ence to the appointment of an aide, 320, 322; letter to General G. W. Smith in reference to the reorganization of brigades, 324; inquiries about alleged proposal to depose the Confederate Government, 328; his mind ** poisoned,” 829, 332. Davis, General Joseph R., assigned to command of a brigade in Richmond 264; at Goldsboro, N. C., 284; letter to General G."W. Smith, in reply, to anaes ua a ee ap * aad ieee 872 INDEX. memoranda of the latter, 293; letter in reference to General G. W. Smith’s resignation, 336, Duncan, General J. K., commander of the sea-coast defences of the Military Department of Louisiana, 63; protests against sending the iron-clad Louisi- ana up the river, 81; official report of the action at the forts, 85. Eltham Landing, near West Point, at the head of York river, action be- tween Confederate and Federal forces, 47, 54. Elzey, General Arnold E.; assigned to local command of the city of Rich- mond, 270. Evans, General N. G., detached from General Lee’s army in compliance with order of Secretary of War, 263; fighting near Kinston, 271; retires and burns the bridge, 272; falls back toward Goldsboro, 272; ordered to cover that place and protect the two bridges, 274; orders a charge which was repulsed, 277; reoccupies Kinston, 294; ordered to Wilmington, 298. Fairfax Court-house Conference, statement of the three senior generals, 14; Mr. Davis's statement, 21; comments on Mr. Davis's statement, 29, Fair Oaks; see Seven Pines. Fredericksburg, held by Colonel Ball, defending General Lee’s line of com- munication, 264-5. French, Colonel 8. Bassett, Aide-de-Camp to the Governor of Virginia; let- ter in reference to General G. W. Smith’s resignation, 334, French, Major Seth Barton, Chief Commissary of General G. W. Smith’s command; opinion that President Davis’s mind had been “ poisoned,” 829; letter in regard to operations of G. W. Smith’s: division, under Gen- eral Whiting, at Seven Pines, 247. French, General 8. G., in command of the Department of North Carolina, including Drewry’s Bluff, 302; moves on Suffolk, 253; number and posi- tion of his troops, 269; at Goldsboro, 272; operations in that vicinity, 272- 275; returns to Weldon, 284; again ordered to Goldsboro, 288; sent with three brigades to Kenansville, 291; placed in command of troops operat- ing in North Carolina during General G, W. Smith’s absence, 295. Frobel, Colonel B. F., letter in reference to the operations of G. W. Smith’s division, under Whiting, at the battle of Seven Pines, 178, 194, 215. Goldsboro, N. C., operations in that vicinity December, 1862, 272; General Smith’s report to Secretary of War, 275; General Clingman’s report, 275; operations in that vicinity January, 1863, 284-295. . Hampton, General Wade, commanding brigade in the action near Fair Oaks Station, battle of Seven Pines, 174, 175, 176; losses in action, 177; state- ment from his official report, 244; wounded and disabled, 176. Hatton, General Robert, reports enemy in his immediate front at Seven Pines on the 24th of May, 146; killed in action, 176; losses in his brigade, 177. Hawes, Richard, Provisional Governor of Kentucky, letter in reference to General G. W. Smith’s resignation, 341. Heintzelman, General S. P., in command of his own corps, and that of Gen- eral Keyes at the battle of Seven Pines, 161. Riggins, Colonel, formerly a Lieutenant in the U. 8. Navy, ordered to en- deavor to repair the raft at the forts below New Orleans, 74; made a new obstruction by using parts of the old raft and additional schooners and chains, 74; assigned to command both forts, Jackson and Saint Philip, | \ 5 | ! INDEX. 373 82; advised that the iron-clad Louisiana should take position below the spol A. P., ordered to take the works at Mechanicsville by assault at daylight on the 29th of May, and move on at once against the enemy “ main line at Beaver Dam Creek, 148; band ns cya: by direction 0: n the night of the 28th, 149. san taawat >. fe, pathos 4 division in the right wing, under General Longstreet, at the battle of Seven Pines, 159; fully engaged the enemy s first line at 3 p.m., and carried it after some hours of hard fighting, 198; assisted by Anderson’s brigade of Longstreet’s division carried the second line and pressed the enemy pack until nightfall, 199; on the Ist of J une the Confederate right wing under Longstreet yielded the ground Seen the previous day by Hill’s division and Anderson s brigade, 223; five sixths of the loss in Longstreet’s command, thirteen brigades, fell upon the four brigades of D. H. Hill’s division, 286; his conduct highly praised by General Longstreet and by Mr. Davis, 199; assigned to command the Confederate forces in North Carolina, 302; letter in reference to General . W. Smith's resignation, 338. : eo tabe Captain Gres N., Confederate States Navy; testimony before rt of Inquiry, 129. ry fhanseal J Sos B., commanded brigade of Texans in the affair Bl Eltham Landing, at the head of York river, 54; at the battle of tog was ordered by General Johnston to bear to the right, and be s I —— street, 174; recalled before reaching Longstreet’s position, an Sia. u ve too late to take any part in the action, 177, 180; position of Hood’s brigade on the morning of June 1st, 215; withdrawn slightly during the forenoon, Pa Joseph, commanded division in Heintzelman’s corps, battle of Seven Pines, 160; engaged on the 1st of June, 218. Howard, Senator, speech in U. S. Senate, 358; refuted by facts, 360. ug Huger, General B. F., in command of Confederate forces at Norfolk, ; his division had not arrived in Richmond at 6.30 a.m., May 29th, 151; formed a part of the right wing of the army under General pong ae 159; ordered by General Johnston to move into action at Seven Pines y the Charles City road, 163; charged with being late in getting into posi- tion, 198; defended himself successfully, 243. Inaction of the Army of the Potomac in the autumn of 1861; see Conference at Fairfax Court-house, 14; Mr. Davis’s reply to alleged attacks made by his “ assailants,”’ 22; comments on his reply, 29. rative incidents, 316-382. Saeko n, General T. J. (Stonewall), commanded a brigade in vested se = Smith’s corps, 30; decision of President Davis, in the Fairfax Cow Aa — E Conference, a severe blow to Jackson’s hopes, 315 ordered with his rigs : to the Valley of Virginia, 31; tenders his resignation, 31; his example imitation, 306. pacane. thats Albert Sydney, commander of the Confederate forces in Kentucky and Tennessee, arrived in Richmond in September, 1861, 312; urges President Davis to appoint Gustavus W. Smith to high military rank and send him to the Western army, as second to him, if possible, 312. Johnston, General Joseph E., commander of the Confederate Army of the 874 INDEX Pot s * . . 3 ais oh yed President Davis to visit the headquarters at Fairf: a eats os Prat proceedings of conference, 14; opinions cegledietia a a eines ichmond, 42; ordered by President Davis to take aed nba iar ae Yorktown, 44, 52; withdraws from eheoee lines. all heehee ve the Chickahominy river, 48; reasons for crossing t < sudiak Wee side of that stream, 49; Mr. Davis’s statement of ‘a 3 sh andar Ri contemplated attack on the Federal right pris : “8 zie ar hoe the direction of Mechanicsville, at daylight on the ee ans eee re ae for that attack countermanded, on the 28th, when it cust fe pibawn ; pret aha s forces had returned to Fredericksbur 100: me spec hahss ¥ , hiting, dated May 29th, in reference to Ais a “ne vl heeds tapi order, on the 30th, directing Smith’s prs es ¢ ting, o move toward Seven Pine si i : ae -” sunrise on the 31st of May, 163; pects : rye ” pram hi a ge ar Smith’s division, under Whiting pap rier eee ea tog about sunrise until he was wounded a little befor: Brrayyi cant an ail pion 3 oops crm with General Smith in reas ; exti 2 bet ad of that battle, avd pePratere yaoi ne RE ener ky annul mes, General D. R., transferred to G , ; : “s eneral G. W. Smith’ i vor i d placed in command, 310; attached to the pacer pee ins ~ - er General Magruder, 147; temporarily transferred to the lef "oie of ‘ e army under General G. W. Smith, 147. iit earney, General Phil., commanded " divisi a a i i vine siharaeteicr thiea tax the division in Heintzelman’s corps at ennon, Captain Beverly, enone a J er of the San vessel; testimony before court of hae Rather stra, 28 Saas ei ape 1861, 365; refusal of the Douglas party and th cana ee a the decision of arbitrators chosen by Shiicasinas ge S, rasmus, in “s page , in command of a Federal corps at’ Seven Pines, Lee, i eos E., stationed in Richmond in general charge of Con- Araby oom emacs yrtnyer 50; opinions an advice given in the sath pa and neers . a 57; conversation with President Davis in regard iat Grewia Pata . ee ees, 158; rides with President Davis to the battle- as odaizad (oa ia te about dark on the 31st, that he would q ° e army as soon as pri cont a ag approves General Smith’s determination ami vemedianng ho oriet A e ae 205; relieves General Smith of the command of the pt ; ern Virginia, 212; rides with General Smith 4 ; ; to the Willi ae be they find the President with General Longstreet. Ape sen pe Hag age that might have been obtained ‘if General Lee. in suce ~ are my peg ag on the 1st of June the ratininind peers 4 “ i ; letter to General G. W i y ar. ee letter to General G. W. Smith, January 4. legge ee ~~ weer James, in conference at Richmond agrees artiall oe ae J. "y Johnston, 51; division engaged at vk eta ais rity aoe oy corps in the withdrawal from the Peninsula, 46. ‘45; poise eg nrihgy e 28th of May advised that an attack be rhinthe ‘next Dp e right of the enemy’s line on the north side of the 875 an attack upon the left of the enemy A near Seven Pines, 149; in command of the right wing, consisting of D. Hi. Hill’s division, Huger’s and his own, at the battle of Seven Pines, 159; calls upon General Johnston for help about 4 P.M. on the 31st of May, 166, 170; ordered by General G. W. Smith to renew the attack as early as prac- 205; notes addressed to General 3 , ed by Mr. Davis, ig \ ticable on the morning of the ist of June, d by President Davis to General G. W. FS Chickahominy, 149; later, advised Smith during that day, 208-212; official report as quot 198, 222; his example commende Smith for imitation, 306. Louisiana, Military Department No. 1; boundaries of, 64. Louisiana, iron clad, ordered up the river, 795 General Lovell protests, 79; Governor Moore protests, 81; President reluctantly enlarges the discre- tionary power of the ‘“‘ military men,’ 82; arrival of the Louisiana at the forts, 86; unfit for service, 87, 105. Lovell, General Mansfield, assumed comman' Louisiana, Oct. 18th, 1861; letter of that authority for him to control the naval Davis, 63; state of military defences when tary preparations rapidly pressed forwar' petent officers, 67, 69, 72, 78, 80; supplied the navy with guns, powder, men to serve their guns, 68; reported New Orleans safe from land attack, 69; deprived of all available troops by direction of president Davis, 71; every naval vessel ordered up the river, 129; ordered, by direction of the Presi- dent, to seize, arm, and equip, for war purposes, fourteen, named, river steamboats, 70, 71, 75, 765 ordered “in no event” to put these vessels un- der control of officers of the navy, 76; filled requisitions ‘* until New Orleansis about defenceless,” 723 ‘“ persons are foufhd-here who assert that he city may fall an easy prey to the Lam sending away all troops so that t enemy,” 75; reports to the War Department that the raft had given way 75; reasons for not mentioning all deficiencies to the War Department, 109; applies for and gets one hundred thousand dollars from.the city of, New Orleans to. repair the raft, 74; new obstruction made, 74, 106, 109, 110; from that place after Pensacola was abandoned, urged that heavy guns be sent to Forts Jac 9, 139; war steamers kson and St. Philip, 77, 78, “ only await the arrival of the mortar fleet to attempt to come up the river to New Orleans,” 77; not probable that the enemy’s gunboats would come down the river muc h in advance of their army, 80; might bring down the Confederate fleet, “clear thi e mouth of the river, and then send the whole fleet above and drive them back to Cairo,”’ 80, 130; the enemy will shell the forts, ‘‘and then try to dash by with their steamers,”’ 81; no con- fidence in the river-defence fleet, 81; protests against sending the iron-clad Louisiana up the river, 79; important letter, April 12th, to Secretary of War, 79; report on the evacuation of New Orleans, 82; application for Court of Inquiry, 91; conduct approved by Generals R. E. Lee, J. E. John- ston and Beauregard, 92; report on the evacuation of a two- gun battery, 94; outcry against him, 91; makes preparati ion for the defence of Vicks- burg, 92; President Davis asserts that the disaster at New Orleans would he commanding gene have been averted if t ral had informed the Govern- 96; superseded by G ment of its condition, eneral Van Dorn, 97; serves with distinction in Van Dorn’s campaign against Corinth, 93; relieved d of the Military Department of date to Secretary of War, 64; defences refused by President Lovell took command, 64; mili- d, 66; delayed by want of com- and 376 INDEX. from duty in the field, 97 3 renews his application for a Court of Inquiry, 98; official correspondence called for by Congress, 99; Court of Inquiry ordered to convene, 99; no charges against General Lovell, 100; instrue- tions to the court, 100; instructions changed on application of the Secretary of the Navy, 101; General Lovell placed on trial by the new instructions, 103; vindication by the court, facts, 103; opinion of the court, 105; delay in promulgating the opinion of the court, 114; the order failed to state that the investigation was applied for by General Lovell, 137; refusal to assign him to duty, 137; appeal to the Secretary of War, May 5th, 1864- 112; not permitted to exercise any command after he was relieved from duty in 1862, 143. . Magruder, General John B., in command of the defensive line on the Peninsula, 50; “ successfully checked every attempt to break it,’ 52; it was believed that the forces already there, under Magruder, could sue- cessfully resist open assault, 42; these lines could not resist regular siege approaches, and could be easily turned, 43; mistake in regard to the junc- tion of the roads near Williamsburg, 45; placed under command of Gen- eral G. W. Smith, 144; relieved and ordered to report direct to General Johnston, 147. Mallory, S. R., Secretary of the Navy; Captain Kennon’s testimony, 127; Captain Hollins’s testimony, 129; testimony of Hon. C. M. Conrad, 131; let- ter to President Davis in regard to testimony, 102; zeal and capacity of, at- tested by Mr. Davis, 126. McClellan, General George B., commander of the Federal Army of the Poto- mac, disappointed the Confederate generals by not making a determined forward movement in the autumn of 1861, 40; moved his army to the Pen- insula, 50; constructéd siege approaches against the Confederate lines near Yorktown, 44; attacked the fortifications at Williamsburg, 47; followed slowly after the retiring Confederate army, 47; moved two corps to the Richmond side of the Chickahominy river, leaving three corps on the north bank of that stream, 160; during the battle of the 31st of May, moved another corps to the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, 189, be McDowell, General Irving, in command of Federal forces at Fredericksburg, advanced a short distance toward Richmond, 147; returned to Fredericks- burg and moved north, 149. McLaws, General Lafayette B., commanded division that repelled the Feder- alsin the first day’s action atWilliamsburg, 45; ordered to leave his ground on the 31st of May, in order to reénforce General Longstreet, should there be cause. of haste, 162; letter indicating danger in the direction of New Bridge, 183; letter stating position of each brigade of his division, at 11 P.M. on the 31st, 184; in consultation withs General Smith at 10.30 a.m. on the 1st of June, 209; carries message from General Smith to General Longstreet, 210; ‘‘ Longstreet says he can hold his position with five thou- sand more men,” 210. : Militia, of North Carolina, 285, 291, 294. Mindil, General George W., aide-de-camp to General Phil. Kearney, author of pamphlet entitled the “ Battle of Fair Oaks;” statement of number and position of Federal forces on the south side of the Chickahominy, May 30th, 160; account of operations on the. Williamsburg road on the 3ist, 185; INDEX. 877 orth of Fair Oaks same day, 189; position and strength of Federal forces si Hy » OF at daylight June ist, 216; operations that day, 217. ississippi Coast, defence of, 72. ; ; : eae th, ite J. K., in command of everything afloat in the fight at ma ae paws New Orleans, refused to allow the iron-clad Louisiana to be aaa t below the raft at the Forts, 87; sustained by all the naval officers P present, 87; aind by Court of Inquiry, 105. i 19 25, 36, 37. “ Modesty and experience,”’ 25, 36, fat : : : aarocey Captain of Mississippi river steamboat, assigned, in connee Ys ¥) iver-defence fleet, 70, 76; want : i in Townsend, to command river a Seine vad efficiency, 81; Confederate States Government hopeful + : fai eR 46 g Qn of this experiment, 71; its failure, 84-86, 126, 129, 135, 189. eee s, Governor, of the State of Louisiana, asks that the de ences ea be no longer neglected, 62; protests against sending the phen eT. rie wch up the river, 81; complains of the evacuation of a two-gun bat- s ) - ; tery on the Grand Caillou, 93. ; s abe drafted to work on fortifications of Richmond, 254, — Frye New Orleans, description of locality, 59; President Leib bse Birk, - i imself to belief that the apprehen: anger, 60; he could not bring himse ‘ rai omit bes would be realized, 62; drained of men, arms, and —— f war, 72; to be defended from above, 71; every gun sho ba ~~ : “4 i nived 129; the raft gives way, 73; efforts to he eiera gas gi acct ears Hapeined: 74; Federal war steamers pass a ig ig x er i ity, 88; city evacuated, 84; water batteries below the city, 83; v ; mates it fficial report, 85; General M. cial report, 82; General Duncan’s 0 2 Be 4 ues eanik's citclal report, 89; report of facts by Court of Inquiry, “ er of court, 105; comments on opinion, 108; Mr. Davis's account, di aot mony of naval officers, 127; testimony of C. M. Conrad, 131; summary a ght i r snip: i Ty, * sagerect Herald, editorial, ‘“‘secret revolutionary conspiracy in New i cts, 360. York,”’ 354; refuted by facts, 3 . Bie i Niemeyer, Colonel, guarding General Lee’s eg er n pee Nas ; j i ‘ a . ris! i anded brigade in G, W. Smith's ‘ Pettigrew, General J. J., comm ve Ss Se ore Vhiti i Seven Pines, 175; losses in r General Whiting, in the battle o' : 5 ; arial 177; severely wounded and taken prisoner, 176; commanded ’ , oF. brigade in the operations near Goldsboro, N. C., 274; letter in reference to i esignation General G. W. Smith’s resigna i bs mare : Political effect likely to be produced by military reverses in North Carolina, ie: D. D., U. 8. Navy, in command of on ay in the ; as ‘ 3 er to, 89. forts below New Orleans, 88; forts surrenc ; ‘ be Pecgaa ernest by General Beauregard, 60; funds for its constr uction furnished by the city authorities of New Orleans, 74; raft gives way, Bs city of New Orleans furnished one hundred thousand dollars for repairs, f 74; another obstruction constructed, 74; injured by the enemy one by Confederate fire-boats, 86; the second obstruction gives way, 86, 108; Mr. i 20: « S 39. Davis’s account of, 120; comments, 13! ne : 2 é Randal, General Ri arade resigns his commission as Lieutenant in the Yon federate States regular army, 319; ineligible to appointment by. the Chief Executive, until he recalls his resignation, 318; President Davis refused to Tae en aR : ae 378 INDEX. INDEX, 379 tter from General G. W. Smith, 329; President French, 247; remarks, 250; le’ Davis's mind “ poisoned,” 829, 332. deicol a : é agmatine arc in the Provisional Army, 320; President cha salags se eeaamerte Prethahanens 322; Randal resigned. nate iteers or the war, was elected iene J gona tap of a brigade—killed in battle 323, 324. Coe Aarne 1 , é . = wee: ae W., Secretary of War, favored sending the arm, theives — ens. 42; testimony before Committee of Confed- ss, 52; oral answer to General G. W. Smith i . motions to the grade of Li Pasi ietacee er ieiesick aan eutenant-General, 256; urges General Smith not Ranso) Penwcmeatin, 5 : pee he by General Lee to Hanover Junction with » 283; ssion 5 oneal er ticlchve ee n reference to movements of, 285, 287, 290; _ Richardson, General, comm ivi d anded divisi i ‘ see in battle of flavin Pines, 216. srrrialbescirembsieesastice ss 5 ic i f enygrqeal Se of the Confederate States, Conference at, in April 7» 415 ral G. W. Smith in command of, 252; number oe oven tie its defence, 255; General El i acaeneeine ra izey appointed to the local command under River-defence fleet, Mississi ; 7 ppi steamboats. See Mon we a, party ee H., commanded two taste of cavalry on, al eldon, N. C. ; i F forces at White Hall Bridge, 273. Se ee oe acne soldiers,’’ 17, 21, 23, 29, 30, 36. dgwick, General John, comm: ded divi and i i bene hemo i ed division of Sumner’s corps in battle of Sedd awe hi notin A. myer 4 of War, directs General Beauregard to send all - aa ~— : poset spinberr oie 271; orders General G. W. Smith D : ud, 295; invites im to call on the Presid jem ened with the President’s action, 298; by Sais ar cao hee ome : wyotin G. W. Smith to change the position of nearly portent Peas sp demas nae sends to General Smith the wuandeaeaaa sab and himself on that officer's let i he oa endorseaent on General Smith’s second letter pt agit os is! na as to tacts, 315. ae ven Pines: first skirmish in that vicini : vicinity, 146; d ipti ran GH and strength of Confederate poeeni ee hee be we : eneral Johnston’s plan, intentions, and expectations, ane ae - n ere, 161-171; operations on the Nine Miles ro Nes aver ae vee he General Mindil’s account, 185; correspondence between Ghose a ee ween Smith, 192; President Davis’s account of seule gied yi fear cheaper 200; operations on the 1st of June, 204; Gin eneral Longstreet to renew the fighti } : ‘ ‘ ht cosmid te 205; General Lee approves. om Gensekiind we “a ee uring the forenoon, 209, 210; and at 1.30 oa 212; General amen ent 2P.M., 212; General Mindil's account of nani sone e, 216; Mr. Swinton’s remarks, 220; Mr. Davis’s account of Sete ise aN = 221; Comments, 222; General Johnston’s account am ee ee 224-240; General Richard Taylor's statement, 241; { ount, 241; comments, 24°; letter from Major Ss B. re lated he should relieve General G. W. Smith, General E. K. ; it was contemp) Smith in command of the defences of Richmond and of North Carolina, tention not carried into effect, 300. 296; for some reason this in Smith, General G. W., assigne' J. E. Johnston’s army, 14; account of procee plication to have Mr. Horace Randal appointed on fax Court-house, 14; ap d to command the Second Corps of General dings in conference at Fair- 316; General Smith his staff, 318; General Van Dorn ordered to that army, continues to comman d the Second Corps, 817; opposed to sending the 41; commanded the re- under General Johuston, to the Peninsula, army, serve near Yorktown, 328; and all the forces on the road leading through awal from the Peninsula, 46; ordered New Kent Court-house, in the withdr ieved of the duty of commanding to the left wing of the army, and rel General Magruder, 147; proposed attack on the right of the Federal main line at Beaver-Dam Creek, 148; advised that this movement be relinquished when it was learned that McDowell's forees had returned to Fredericks- General Whiting, ordered to move from the burg, 149; his division, under left wing, in order to check any ank of the Chickahominy, der Longstreet, if require north of Fair Oaks Ss kk, on the 31st of May, 180; ight next morn sent from the north b port the right wing un the front line in the action mand of the army at dar street to renew the fighting at dayl Federal reénforcements that might be and be in position to sup- d, 161; takes commana of tation, 176; assumes com- orders General Long- ing, 205; relieved by 212; stricken with severe illness General Lee, at 2 P.M., on the 1st of June, August, 256; in command of the on the 2d, 256; reported again for duty in right wing of General Lee’s army, Richmond, and of North Carolina, 257; day to rank him in the army—asks rites letter of resi t that time, 262; ope: eral Lee, 263-270; takes command in the fie 272-279; visits Richmon' with the answer, W of War not toresign tions around Goldsboro, Department and back to Richmon letter of resignation, his letters of resignation, ignation, 333; sketch of life of, 3435 by plain facts, 360; named as one ofa arming, organizing, and equipping th Smith, General M. L., chief Louisiana, 66; appointed General Lee, 279; returns to d, 295; President Davis inter’ 299; endorsements by the tary of War, 305-307; resignation accepted, 307; 307; letters f engineer, an brigadier-gener 257; in command 0 the reasons f ignation, 256; severe accusations f the defences of six of his juniors promoted in one ‘or this, 255; not satisfied induced by the Secretary rations described in letters to Gen- id in North Carolina, 272; opera- d to confer with the War North Carolina, 284; ordered feres with the command, 303; President and the Secre- reply to endorsements on rom friends in reference to his res- against, 354; refuted poard to be entrusted with raising, e military forces of Kentucky, 367. d chief of ordnance department of al, and placed in command of the interior line of defence aroun with Federal fleet at water batteries, 89. Stevens, General Walter H., port of reconnaissance, Beaver-Dam Creek, 148; d on the south side of James river,” 48, Stuart, General J. E. B., commander d New Orleans, 111; official report of action chief engineer, Army of Northern Virginia, re- anger to Richmond “is of the cavalry; succeeded in bringing in his command at Williamsburg, 46; reported to and received orders from ashes kis ey “880 INDEX. General G. W. Smith during the withdrawal of the army from the Penin- sula, 48; on the 24th of May reported to General Smith that the Meadow Bridges and New Bridge were in the hands of the enemy, 146; in confer- ence with General Smith and General A. P. Hill on the 29th of May, 150; reported to.General Smith, same day, that before he could get to Ashland, the enemy had returned to that place, 151; 1300 cavalry under his com- mand, May 30th, 159; picketing the Charles City road and White Oak swamp with a portion of his troops, 182; informs General Smith that the enemy from the White Oak bridge had not moved forward south of the Williamsburg road, 182; offered to go in person to General Longstreet and have him piloted to the headquarters of the army, 182; failed to find Gen- eral Longstreet, 184. Sumner, General E. V., commanded the Second Corps of the Federal Army at Seven Pines, 189. Swinton’s History of the Army of the Potomac, extracts from, 192-4, 220. Taylor, General Richard, says: The two corps of the Federal Army on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy ‘‘ ought to have been crushed, but Johnston fell severely wounded; upon whith confusion ensued, and no results of importance were obtained,” 241. Tift, Messrs., agents to build the iron-clad steamer Mississippi, 117. Twiggs, General D. E.; in command of the Department of Louisiana, re- lieved by General Lovell, in October, 1861, 64; could get nothing done, 65; feeble state of health, 65. Vance, Z. B., Governor of North Carolina, orders the militia to be reorgan- ized, and offers to cal] them out whenever desired by General Smith, 291; requested to order them out as soon as possible, 291; ‘In the new shape they will probably be of some service, but there is no law for the reorgan- ization,” 294; shows the utmost willingness to co-operate in all matters affecting transportation, supplies, recruiting, and general efficiency of the Confederate forces in North Carolina, 294; letter in reference to General G. W. Smith’s resignation, 333. Van Dorn, General Earl, appointed Major-General, and ordered to report to General J. E. Johnston for duty soon after the conference at Fairfax Court-house, 316; it was supposed this would deprive General Smith of the command of the corps to which he had been recently assigned, 316; Van Dorn assigned to Beauregard’s corps, 316; dissatisfied, he protests; see letter to General G. W. Smith, 317; applies to be relieved from duty with General J. E. Johnston’s army, 317; ordered by President Davis to supersede General Lovell, 97; letter expressing regret that Lovell was re- lieved fromi duty in the field after the Corinth campaign, 98. War Policy of the Confederate Administration; defensive, in 1861, 31, 39. Walker, Colonel H. H., commanding local guards of the city of Richmond, 252. Warwick River Lines, strong against attack in front, 42; General Magruder’s forces in that line believed to be sufficient to repel open assault, 42; the position could be readily turned, 42; considered indefensible for any length of time, 56; impure water, wet, muddy, and unhealthy trenches, 44; the President orders General Johnston’s army to that position, 44; the lines easily held until General McClellan had constructed regular siege ap- proaches, 44; the position indefensible against such an attack, 43; General ———— INDEX, 381 Johnston withdrew when General McClellan was ready to open fire with his siege guns, 44. Webb, General Alexander S., account of the battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, 241; comments thereon, 246. White Hall Bridge, action at, 273. Whitford, Mr., Acting Confederate States Agent for Railroad Transporta- tion in North Carolina, 295; notified by Quarter-Master General that his services were no longer required, 295. * Whiting, General W. H. C., letter in reference to reorganizing brigades, 326; letter from General Johnston in regard to the movement of Whiting’s troops, 151; in command of G. W. Smith’s division, 147; ordered by Gen eral Johnston to move the division by the Nine Miles road to the point where the road to New Bridge turns off, 162; impatient at the delay caused by troops of Longstreet’s division crossing his line of march, 164; the division under Whiting accompanied by General Johnston, 194; difference of opinion between Generals Johnston and Whiting in regard to the Federal force north of Fair Oaks station, 179; operations of this division near Fair Oaks on the 31st of May, 173; on the ist of June, 204; letter in reference to the position and condition of this division for ten days after the battle of Seven Pines, 214; in command of Wilmington and the Mili- tary District of Cape Fear, 327; his promotion strongly urged upon Presi- dent Davis, 328; President’s inquiry about alleged proposition to subvert the Confederate Government, 328; letter in reference to General G. W. Smith’s resignation, 335; second letter on same subject, 339. Whiting, Major Jasper, A. A. G., Chief of Staff of General G. W Smith's command; report of reconnaissance, Beaver Dam Creek, 148; communi- cates with General Longstreet for General Johnston on the 3ist of May. 167; observations of Federal movements, June 1st, 207. ; Whittle, Captain W. C., Confederate States Navy, testimony, 180. Wilcox, General Cadmus M., commanded a brigade in Longstreet’s division at the battle of Seven Pines; describes the movements of his brigade and others previous to, during, and after that battle, 172-215, 2 neg imme ey Pn number of garrison, 268. , Gener enry A., commanded a bri yi : moves on Williamsburg, 253. ee eee Yorktown; fortified left flank of the Confederate li i 3 ines al river on the Peninsula, 42. ee Zeal and capacity of the Secretary of the Navy attested by Mr. Davis, 116-126; disputed by testimony of Hon. Charles M. Conrad, 131; Captain George N. Hollins, 129; and Captain Beverly Kennon, 127. —— eerie Te 24 *F A eats | i ue) ? | é\ | a | 2 i Pond Posrtiom of Forces on Richmond side of ae. re, \) Zi Si H the Chickshominy River at dark on ee J YY ¥ _—~ fhe 30% of May 1861. ccm OMe ndow Bridge \ ( ‘\ CONFEDERATE FEDERAL x \ K MecHANIG ite ae 1.1. LONGSTREET'S DIVISION 8. CASEY’S DIVISION een ae 5 Ge ie 2.D.H.HILLS » 9. COUCH’S ” TRS chanicey. 9 3.HUGER’S " 10.KEARNY’S ” Se. y heh, MELAWS? ” UW HOOKER’S =? 5.5,D.R.JONES’ ry 6.G.W.SMITHS >”? T.A.P.HILUS al Guu FAIR OAKS STA. 9 YORK SAYAGE STA. BS QL __staa, Lo S > z Qa 26,9 © pz 2k 2 a ee i" oe, 3 ju Se in oe Se ¢ Mi5= PS0/S 2/0 5 Ded Peg a 2G oozio 2 Bop «| (Oy 24 «ine eelo5 4a $s x <) 23/3 > QSESFES . -_— | oO a ‘iS °; seats oa Dp il! je i 4 as eee z ere é| Gey of oi 25)6° eee) | @ ul w hot HM oe} or Soe bE] yu Spee a 4 [id 5 Ficzelm= S29 «2 x 2| 3 arom rege) - a é Miles. Scale of =: "=~ a © Ono 78 40 os / : totus’ fret ie” Ja | aie os", 4% “fe} a en 2 o\3 +449 69 a Oy oes eo aeaiase 741 e wave ‘ 7 v. eta e Ze > iB od - on 2 o=|Sloi¢)_-o a", +4 °C, 40 | @ >} 4) =| wiz > wid g's." is] 409 =O} Fle vic 5 ays(: Tete 8% S236! ti > wOl-ls red > Seu = & a] 2 s(lz|2\5|20 Zoe ites - = ] > va wi Oo ws Oo) > uw WE @ sa Ay 34, O} 2 Bz) lyse ® Ci Ove wl x a2 om el |> 2 z a ot 6 +4 co} <| z| a « thy "oh eit © | a. ay CONFEDERATE. Lonestreet’s , D-H. HILL’s, tAND Hucer’s Divisions. -.W.SmituH's Division. 2.6 ly ze LEED ortho Seale of Miles.